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What Happened to Goldman Sachs: An Insider’s Story of Organizational Drift and its 
Unintended Consequences 
Steven G. Mandis 
 
This is the story of the slow evolution of Goldman Sachs – addressing why and how the 
firm changed from an ethical standard to a legal one as it grew to be a leading global corporation. 
In What Happened to Goldman Sachs, Steven G. Mandis uncovers the forces behind what he 
calls Goldman’s “organizational drift.” Drawing from his firsthand experience; sociological 
research; analysis of SEC, congressional, and other filings; and a wide array of interviews with 
former clients, detractors, and current and former partners, Mandis uncovers the pressures that 
forced Goldman to slowly drift away form the very principles on which its reputation was built. 
Mandis evaluates what made Goldman Sachs so successful in the first place, how it responded to 
pressures to grow, why it moved away from the values and partnership culture that sustained it 
for so many years, what forces accelerated this drift, and why insiders can’t – or won’t – 
recognize this crucial change. 
Combining insightful analysis with engaging storytelling, Mandis has written an insider’s  
history that offers invaluable perspectives to business leaders interested in understanding and 




Table of Contents 
 
Prologue: A Funeral                                                                                                           1 
   




How Goldman Succeeded 
 
 2. Shared Principles and Values                                                                                       46 
 






 4. Under Pressure, Goldman Grows Quickly and Goes Public                                        96 
 




Acceleration of Drift 
 
 6. The Consequences of Going Public                                                                            159 
 






 8. Nagging Questions: Leadership, Crisis, and Clients                                                   205 
 
 9. Why Doesn’t Goldman See the Change?                                                                    240 
 
Conclusion: Lessons                                                                                                         250 
 
Methodology                261 
 
References                283  
 
Appendix A: Goldman and Organizational Drift                                  285 
 
i	  
Appendix B: Analytical Framework Applied to Goldman                 297 
 
Appendix C: Selected Goldman Employees and Lobbyists with 
 
Government Positions (Before or After Goldman)             302 
  
Appendix D: Value of Partners’ Shares at IPO                                  313 
 
Appendix E: Goldman’s History of Commitment to Public Service           323 
 
Appendix F: Key Goldman People                                          325 
 
Appendix G: Goldman Timeline of Selected Events                             335 
 
Appendix H: Goldman’s Culture and Governance Structure                  360 
 
Notes                                                                              361
	   	   ii	  
Acknowledgments 
 
I would like to thank the faculty, graduate students, and administrators at the Department 
of Sociology at Columbia University, and in particular Professor David Stark, my thesis adviser 
and mentor, and Professor Josh Whitford, the director of graduate studies, for their training, 
support, and advice. In addition, I would like to thank the faculty and administrators, as well as 
my MBA and Executive MBA students, at Columbia Business School for their encouragement. 
I want to thank my agent, Susan Rabiner, who, together with my editor at Harvard 
Business Review Press, Tim Sullivan, saw my PhD dissertation for what it was—a book not just 
about Goldman Sachs, but a book that brings business and finance together with sociology to 
improve the study of management, sociology, and public policy. They understood my vision and 
helped make it a reality. 
Thank you to those I interviewed. I would love to recognize your contributions, patience, 
and time on an individual basis, but I want to respect your privacy. 
Many professionals, professors, students, classmates, research assistants, and friends 
helped with my training and/or the book. Many thanks to Gary Ashwill, Red Ayme, Peter 
Bearman, Erin Brown, Soman Chainani, Manu Chander, Sidney Dekker, Helena Ding, Yige 
Ding, Erin Dolias, Nate Emge, Gil Eyal, Michelle Fan, Stephani Finks, Joe Gannon, Jie Gao, 
Kyle Gazis, Katrin Giziotis, Angel Gonzalez, Angelito Gonzalez, Simon Gonzalez, Ryan Hagen, 
Kathryn Harrigan, Charles Harrison, Simon Head, Jon Hill, Gailen Hite, Karen Ho, Paul Ingram, 
Jane Jacobi, Sam Johnson, El Kamada, Ko Kuwabara, Nan Liu, Emily Loose, Yao Lu, 
Evangelos Lyras, Donald MacKenzie, Jeff Madrick, Kinga Makovi, Yarden Mariuma, Joanne 
Martin, Charles Masson, Debra Minkoff, Carlos Morei, Joy Nee, Olivia Nicol, James O’Shea, 
Neni Panourgia, Christina Perez, Allison Peter, Damon Phillips, Katherine Phillips, Joyce Plaza, 
	   	   iii	  
Paula Reid, Ernesto Reuben, Tim Rich, Nan Rothschild, Jonathan Salky, Krista Schult, Hersche 
Shintre, Hana Sromova, Richard Swedberg, Noriyuki Takahashi, Matthias Thiemann, Mathijs de 
Vaan, Diane Vaughan, Oliver Wai, Karl Weber, Joanne Willard, Sang Won, Stacy Xing, and Xu 
Zang. 
I would like to thank those who have researched and written about Goldman Sachs over 
the years, because without their diligent work it would have been impossible to write my PhD 
dissertation. Many are cited in my work and some are not, but I want to specifically acknowledge 
a few: Justin Baer, William Cohan, Susanne Craig, Charles Ellis, Lisa Endlich, David Faber, 
Richard Freedman, Boris Groysberg, Jonathan Knee, Susan McGee, Bethany McLean (who was 
in my Goldman 1992 M&A analyst class), Gretchen Morgenson, Andrew Serwer, Scott Snook, 
David Ross Sorkin, Louise Story, Matt Taibbi, Gillian Tett, Jill Vohr, the US Senate 
Subcommittee on Investigations, and the US Securities and Exchange Commission. 
I would like to thank some people who manage to be pragmatic and entertaining at the 
same time: Stephen Colbert, Jim Collins, Malcolm Gladwell, Vijay Govindarajan, Tony 
Kornheiser, Michael Lewis, Bill Maher, Roger Martin, Robert K. Merton, Bill Simmons, Jon 
Stewart, Jack (and Suzy) Welch, and Michael Wilbon. I am sure they never dreamed that they 
would be acknowledged in a book related to Goldman Sachs, but their work stimulates my 
thinking. 
Last, this book is a result of the love and support of my family and close friends. I didn’t 




This book is dedicated to my devoted wife, Alexandra, and my two loving 
daughters, Tatiana and Isabella. They were my cheerleaders through many 
long days and nights of working, studying, and writing. 
I would also like to thank my parents, George and Theoni, who immigrated 
to America from Greece with very little money and no knowledge of English. 
They quietly sacrificed so that my brother Dean, my sister Vivian, and I 
could have a better life. They taught us the meaning of values and hard work 
as well as the power of the combination of these two qualities. They asked 
for only one thing in return—for us to strive to give our children more opportunities 
than they had been able to give us.








On September 25, 2006, I filed into the memorial service for John L. Weinberg, senior 
partner of Goldman Sachs from 1976 to 1990. More than a thousand people filled Gotham Hall 
in New York to pay their respects. John L. (as he was often referred to within Goldman, to 
distinguish him from other Johns at the firm) was the product of Princeton and Harvard Business 
School and the son of one of the most powerful Wall Street bankers, Sidney Weinberg, who had 
literally worked his way up from janitor to senior partner of Goldman and who had served as a 
confidant to presidents. 
The program listed a Goldman honor roll of those who would speak, including Lloyd 
Blankfein, the firm’s current chairman and CEO; John Whitehead, who had run the firm with 
John L.—the two of them were known as “the Johns”—and who had left Goldman in 1985 to 
serve as deputy secretary of state; Robert Rubin, who had gone from co-senior partner in the 
early 1990s to secretary of the Treasury; Hank Paulson, who had run Goldman when it went 
public on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in 1999 and had just become secretary of the 
Treasury; John S. Weinberg, John L.’s son and current vice chairman of Goldman; and Jack 
Welch, former chairman and CEO of General Electric and a long-standing client of John L.’s. 
Welch’s eulogy stood out. His voice cracking, holding back tears, he said, “I love you, 
John. Thanks for being my friend.” Imagine a CEO today saying that about his investment 
banker and almost breaking down at the banker’s memorial service. 
John S. tried to lighten the mood with a funny line: “My father’s favorite thing in life was 
talking to his dogs, because they didn’t talk back.” But he caught the essence of John L. when he 
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said, “He saw right and wrong clearly, with no shades of gray.” John L. was a veteran, having 
served in the US Marine Corps in both World War II and Korea, and the recessional was the 
“Marine Hymn.” The lyrics “keep our honor clean” and “proud to serve” seemed to provide a 
perfect end to the service. 
From 1976, when the two Johns became cochairmen, until John L.’s death in 2006, 
Goldman grew from a modest, privately owned investment banking firm focused on the United 
States—with fewer than a thousand employees, and less than $100 million in pretax profits—to 
the most prestigious publicly traded investment bank in the world. The firm boasted offices all 
over the globe, more than twenty-five thousand employees, almost $10 billion in pretax profits, a 
stock price of almost $200 per share, and an equity market valuation of close to $100 billion. 
I had left Goldman in 2004 after a twelve-year career, a few months after my Goldman 
IPO stock grant had passed the five-year required vesting period. I had moved on to become a 
trading and investment banking client of Goldman’s. I went to John L.’s memorial service out of 
respect for a man I had known and admired—a Wall Street legend, although one would never 
have guessed that from his demeanor. I also wanted to support John S., whom I considered (and 
still consider) a mentor and a friend. (See appendix F for an annotated list of key Goldman 
partners over the years.) 
I first met John L. in 1992, when I was a Goldman financial analyst six months out of 
college. The legend of Sidney and John L. Weinberg was one of the things that had attracted me 
to Goldman, and I was excited at the prospect of meeting him. I identified with John L. because 
we were both sons of parents who came from humble beginnings. I figured if John L.’s father 
could start by emptying spittoons and end up running Goldman, then anything was possible for 
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me, the son of Greek immigrants. My father had started as a busboy at the Drake Hotel in 
Chicago, and my mother worked at a Zenith TV assembly factory. 
I met John L. early in my time at Goldman, as a financial analyst in the M&A 
department, when I interviewed him as part of a work assignment. I was asked to make a video 
on the history of the M&A department to be shown at an off-site department outing. Goldman 
was enthusiastic about documenting and respecting its history and holding off-site outings to 
promote bonding among the employees.  
In the interview John L. could not have been more jovial and humble. At the time, Goldman had 
less than $1.5 billion in pretax profits, and fewer than three thousand employees. Steve Friedman 
and Bob  
Rubin, co-senior partners, had embarked on an aggressive growth plan—growing proprietary 
trading and principal investing, expanding internationally, and spreading into new businesses. 
John L. told me that his father had once fired him in the 1950s for what seemed a minor 
offense—without the proper approvals, he had committed a small amount of the firm’s capital to 
help get a deal done for a client—and how, lesson learned, he had groveled to get his job back. 
He told me about sharing a squash court as an office with John Whitehead—the second of the 
two Johns—because there was no other space for them. He talked about integrity and business 
principles and explained how his military experiences had helped him at Goldman and in life. He 
told me how proud he was  
of his family, including his young grandchildren. He took a strong interest in my own family, 
and I was struck by his asking me to share my father’s stories about his Greek military 
experiences. John L. asked why I volunteered for Guardian Angels safety patrols and also 
wanted to know how I had managed to play two varsity sports at the University of Chicago while 
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simultaneously performing community service. He revealed that his two children also played 
college tennis. Sharing that he liked Chicago, where I was born, he advised me to work with the 
head of the Chicago office, Hank Paulson, because I would learn a lot from him and it would 
allow me to fly from New York to see more of my family, something he emphasized was 
important. 
I didn’t see John L. again until 1994, after Goldman had lost hundreds of millions of 
dollars betting the wrong way on interest rates as the Fed unexpectedly raised them. There were 
rumors that partners’ capital accounts in the firm, representing their decades of hard work, were 
down over 50 percent in a matter of months. And to make matters worse, because Goldman was 
structured as a partnership, the partners’ liability was not limited to their capital in the firm; their 
entire net worth was on the line. With the firm reeling from the losses, Steve Friedman, now sole 
senior partner because Rubin had left to serve in the Clinton administration, abruptly resigned. 
Friedman cited serious heart palpitations as the reason for his unexpected retirement. John L. 
viewed Friedman as a “yellowbellied coward” and his departure as tantamount to “abandoning 
his post and troops in combat,” regardless of Friedman’s stated reason for leaving.1 
Despite John L.’s best efforts to persuade them to stay, almost one-third of the partners 
retired within months. Their retirements would give their capital in the firm preferential 
treatment over that of the general partners who stayed—and would allow the retirees to begin 
withdrawing their capital. Many loyal employees were being laid off to cut expenses. 
When John L. walked onto the M&A department’s twenty-third floor at 85 Broad Street 
that day in 1994 to calm the troops, the atmosphere was tense. The firm seemed in jeopardy. 
Before he spoke,  
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I genuinely was worried that Goldman might fold. Drexel Burnham Lambert had filed for 
bankruptcy a few years earlier—why not Goldman? John L.’s encouraging words meant a great 
deal to my colleagues and me, as did the fact that he delivered them in person. The amazing 
thing is that he remembered me from my video project and, in a grandfatherly way, patted me on 
the shoulder as he said hello. 
Later, I spent time with John L. socially. We belonged to the same club in the Bahamas, 
and I often saw him there. Although many of the members own large, impressive vacation 
homes, John L. did not. He rented a cottage. He told me once how many cots he had managed to 
fit into a bedroom when his kids were younger—proud of how much money he saved by not 
having to rent larger quarters. He read voraciously, and I always remembered how much he 
loved to eat coleslaw with his lunch. We exchanged books, and once he even wrote a letter of 
recommendation for me. 
One night when he was in his seventies, I had the pleasure of having dinner with him, his 
wife, John S., and a few others at La Grenouille, one of New York’s best restaurants. John L. 
was in failing health, so he didn’t go out often. The place was filled with prominent CEOs and 
other VIPs, and, as they were leaving, each stopped at our table to say hello to John L., although 
many had not seen him in years. He greeted each of them by name and asked about their 
families, deflecting any praise about himself or Goldman. 
In 2004, after twelve years, I left Goldman to help start an asset management firm. But 
when I saw John S. after the funeral service, he offered to help me in any way he could, just as 
his father had done, and showed an interest in how my family was doing, even at a difficult time 
for him and his own family. 
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Yet something struck me at the service. It caused me to stop and reflect on the cultural 
and organizational changes I’d witnessed, first as an employee and later as a client. The service 
brought them into sharp focus. 
It felt strange, almost surreal, to be reflecting on change. In that fall of 2006, Goldman 
was near the height of its earning power and prestige. But I felt that, in some weird way, I was 
mourning not only the loss of the man who had embodied Goldman’s values and business 
principles, but also the change of the firm’s culture, which had been built on those values.2 
 





"Goldman is going strong” declared the title of a Fortune article in February 2007. “On 
Wall Street, there’s good and then there’s Goodman,” wrote author Yuval Rosenberg, “Widely 
considered the best of the bulge-bracket investment firms, Goldman Sachs was the sole member 
of the securities industry to make [Fortune’s] 2006 list of America’s Most Admired Companies 
(it placed 18th).” 1 Rosenberg argued that what distinguished the firm was the quality of its 
people and the incentives it offered. “The bank has long had a reputation for attracting the best 
and the brightest,” he wrote, “and no wonder: Goldman made headlines in December for doling 
out an extraordinary $16.5 billion in compensation last year. That works out to an average of 
nearly $622,000 for each employee.” And as if that weren’t enough, “[i]n the months since our 
list came out, Goldman’s glittering reputation has only gotten brighter.” 
 But only two years later, Goldman was being widely excoriated in the press, the subject 
of accusations, investigations, congressional hearings, and litigation (not to mention late-night 
jokes) alleging insensitive, unethical, immoral, and even criminal behavior. Matt Taibbi of 
Rolling Stone famously wrote, “The world’s most powerful investment bank is a great vampire 
squid wrapped around the face of humanity, relentlessly jamming its blood funnel into anything 
that smells like money.”2 Understandably it seemed that angry villagers carrying torches and 
pitchforks were massing just around the corner. (In 2011, the Occupy Wall Street protest 
movement would begin.) The public and politicians grew particularly upset at Goldman as 
allegations surfaced that the company had anticipated the impending crisis and had shorted the 
market to make money from it. (Goldman denies this.) In addition, there were allegations that the 
firm had prioritized selling its clients securities in deals that it knew were, as one deal was 
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described by an executive in an e-mail, “shitty”—raising the question of whether Goldman had 
acted unethically, immorally, or illegally.3 
Particularly agonizing for some employees were accusations that Goldman no longer 
adhered to its revered first business principle: “Our clients’ interests always come first.” That 
principle had been seen at the firm as a significant part of the foundation of what made 
Goldman’s culture unique. And the firm had held up its culture of the highest standards of duty 
and service to clients as key to its success.  
A partner made this point as part of a 2006 Harvard Business School case, saying “Our bankers 
travel on the same planes as our competitors. We stay in the same hotels. In a lot of cases, we 
have the same clients as our competition. So when it comes down to it, it is a combination of 
execution and culture that makes the difference between us and other firms . . . That’s why our 
culture is necessary—it’s the glue that binds us together.”4 
Some critics asserted that Goldman’s actions in the lead up to the crisis, and in dealing 
with it, were evidence that the firm’s vaunted culture had changed. Others argued that nothing 
was really new, that Goldman had always been hungry for money and power and had simply 
been skillful in hiding it behind folktales about always serving clients, and by doing conspicuous 
public service.5 
Meanwhile, many current and former employees at Goldman vehemently assert that there 
has been no cultural shift, and argue that the firm still adheres as strictly as ever to its principles, 
including always putting clients’ interests first. They cite the evidence of the firm’s leading 
market share with clients and most-sought-after status for those seeking jobs in investment 
banking. How, they ask, could something be wrong, when we’re doing so well? In fact, while in 
Fortune’s 2006 list of America’s Most Admired Companies, Goldman placed eighteenth, in 
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2010, after the crisis, it placed eighth,6 and in 2012, Goldman ranked seventh in a survey of 
MBA students of firms where they most wanted to work (and first among financial firms).7 And 
even with all of the negative publicity, Goldman has maintained its leading market share with 
clients in many valued services. For example, in 2012 and 2011, Goldman ranked as the number 
one global M&A adviser.8 
So has the culture at Goldman changed or not? And if so, why and how? It strains 
credulity to think that the firm’s culture could have changed so dramatically between 2006, when 
the firm was so generally admired, and 2009, when it became so widely vilified. Once I decided 
that these questions were worth investigating—whether Goldman’s culture had changed and, if 
so, how and why—I chose to start from 1979, when John Whitehead, cochairman and senior 
partner, codified Goldman’s values in its famous “Business Principles.” As many at Goldman 
will point out, those written principles are almost exactly the same today as they were in 1979. 
However, that doesn’t necessarily mean adherence to them or that the interpretation of them 
hasn’t changed. What I’ve discovered is that while Goldman’s culture has indeed changed from 
1979 to today, it didn’t happen for a single, simple reason and it didn’t happen overnight. Nor 
was the change an inexorable slide from “good” to “evil,” as some would have it. 
There are two easy and popular explanations about what happened to the Goldman 
culture. When I was there, some people believed the culture was changing or had changed 
because of the shifts in organizational structure brought on by the transformation from private 
partnership to publicly traded company. Goldman had held its initial public offering (IPO) on the 
NYSE in 1999, the last of the major investment banks to do so. In fact, this was my initial 
hypothesis when I began my research. The second easy explanation is that, whatever the 
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changes, they happened since Lloyd Blankfein took over as CEO and were the responsibility of 
the CEO and the trading-oriented culture some believe he represents. 
I found that although both impacted the firm, neither is the one single or primary cause. 
In many ways, they are the results of the various pressures and changes. The story of what 
happened at Goldman after 1979 is messy and complex. Many seemingly unrelated pressures, 
events, and decisions over time, as well as their interdependent, unintended, and compounding 
consequences, slowly changed the firm’s culture. Different elements of its culture and values 
changed at different times, at different speeds, and at different levels of significance in response 
to organizational, regulatory, technological, and competitive pressures. 
But overall, what’s apparent is that Goldman’s response to these pressures to achieve its 
organizational goal of being the world’s best and dominant investment bank (its IPO prospectus 
states, “Our goal is to be the advisor of choice for our clients and a leading participant in global 
financial markets.” Its number three business principle is “Our goal is to provide superior returns 
to our shareholders.”) was to grow—and grow fast.9 Seemingly unrelated or insignificant events, 
decisions, or actions that were rationalized to support growth then combined to cause unintended 
cultural transformations. 
Those changes were incremental and accepted as the norm, causing many people within 
the firm not to recognize them. In addition, the firm’s apparent adherence to its principles and a 
strong commitment to public and community service gave Goldman employees a sense of higher 
purpose than just making money. That helped unite them and drive them to higher performance 
by giving their work more meaning. At the same time, however, it was used to rationalize 
incremental changes in behavior that were inconsistent with the original meaning of its 
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principles. If we’re principled and serve a sense of higher purpose, the reasoning went, then what 
we’re doing must be OK. 
Since 1979, Goldman’s commitment to public service has ballooned in both dollar 
amounts and time, something that should be commended. But this exceptional track record 
prevents employees from fully understanding the business purpose of this service, which is 
expanding and deepening the power of the Goldman network, including its government ties (the 
firm is pilloried by some as “Government Sachs”). Some at Goldman have even claimed that 
having many alumni in important positions has “disadvantaged” the firm.10 
For example, a Goldman spokesman was quoted in a 2009 Huffington Post article as 
saying, “What benefit do we get from all these supposed connections? I would say we were 
disadvantaged from having so many alumni in important positions. Not only are we criticized—
sticks and stones may break my bones but words do hurt, they really do—but we also didn’t get a 
look-in when Bear Stearns was being sold and with Washington Mutual. We were runner-ups in 
the auction for IndyMac, in the losing group for BankUnited. If all these connections are 
supposed to swing things our way, there’s just one bit missing in the equation.” The spokesman 
added that government agencies have bent over backward to avoid any perception of 
impropriety, explaining that when the firm’s executives would meet with then-Treasury 
Secretary Paulson, “it was impossible to have a conversation with him without it being 
chaperoned by the general counsel of Treasury.”11 
The vast majority of the employees, who joined Goldman decades after the original 
principles were written, do not really know the original meaning of the principles. Always 
putting clients’ interests first, for instance, originally implied the need to assume a higher-than-
required legal responsibility (a high moral or ethical duty) to clients. At the time, the firm was 
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smaller and could be more selective as it grew. However, over time, the meaning slowly shifted 
(generally unnoticed) to implying the need to assume only the legally required responsibility to 
clients. As the firm grew, the law of large numbers made it harder for Goldman to be as 
selective. A legal standard allowed Goldman to increase the available opportunities for growth. 
In accommodating this shift, those within Goldman, including senior leaders, 
increasingly relied on the rationalization that its clients were “big boys,” a phrase implying that 
clients were sophisticated enough to recognize and understand potential risks and conflicts in 
dealing with Goldman, and therefore could look out for themselves. And in cases when the firm 
was concerned about potential legal liability, it even had clients sign a “big boy letter,” a legal 
recognition of potential conflicts and Goldman’s various roles and risks by the client in dealing 
with Goldman. This is in keeping with Goldman’s general explanation of its role in the credit 
crisis: it did nothing legally wrong, but was simply acting as a “market maker” (simply matching 
buyers and sellers of securities), and it responsibly fulfilled all its legal obligations in this role. 
This argument is also reflective of a shift in the firm’s business balance to the dominance of 
trading, as generally the interpretations of the responsibilities to a client are more often legal in 
nature, with required legal disclosures and standards of duty in dealing in an environment in 
which there is a tension in a buying and selling relationship of securities in trading, versus a 
more often advisory relationship in banking. 
It’s important to note in examining the change at Goldman that, as we’ll explore, certain 
elements of the firm’s organizational culture from 1979, like strong teamwork, remain intact 
enough that the firm is still highly valued by clients and potential employees and was able to 
maneuver through the financial crisis more successfully than its competitors. The slower and less 
intense change in certain elements is a factor in why many at Goldman seem to either miss or 
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willfully ignore the changes in business practices and policies. Also complicating the recognition 
of the changes is that some of them have helped the firm reach many of its organizational goals. 
While many clients may be disappointed and frustrated with the firm, and many question 
both its protection of confidential client information and its rationalizations for its various roles 
in transactions, at the same time they feel that Goldman has the unique ability to use its powerful 
network and gather and share information throughout the firm, thereby providing excellent 
execution relative to its competitors. As for ethics, many clients reject Goldman’s general belief 
that it is ethically superior to the rest of Wall Street; nonetheless, many clients consider ethics 
only one factor in their selection of a firm, albeit one that may make them more wary in dealing 
with Goldman than in the past. 
The frustration with the kind of analysis I’ve undertaken is that it’s tempting to ask who 
or what event or decision is responsible. We want to identify a single source—something or 
someone—to blame for the change in culture. The desire is for a clear cause-and-effect 
relationship, and often for a villain. The story of Goldman is too messy for that kind of 
explanation. Instead, we need to ask what is responsible—what set of conditions, constraints, 
pressures, and expectations changed Goldman’s culture. 
One thing I learned in studying sociology is that the organization and its external 
environment matter. The nature of an organization and its connection to the external environment 
shape an organization’s culture and can be reflected through changes in structure, practices, 
values, norms, and actions. If you get rid of the few people supposedly responsible for violations 
of cultural or legal standards, when new ones take over the behavior continues. We need to look 
beyond individuals, striving to understand the larger organizational and social context at play. 
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I don’t intend my analysis as a value judgment on Goldman’s cultural change. I 
purposely set aside the question of whether the change was overall for the better or worse. My 
primary intent is to illuminate a process whereby a firm that had largely upheld a higher ethical 
standard shifted to a more legal standard, and how companies more generally are vulnerable to 
such “organizational drift.” 
This is the story of an organization whose culture has slowly drifted, and my story 
demonstrates why and how. The concept of drift is established, but still developing, in the 
academic research literature on organizational behavior (what I refer to as organizational drift is 
sometimes described as practical drift or cultural drift).12 Organizational drift is a process 
whereby an organization’s culture, including its business practices, continuously and slowly 
moves, carried along by pressures, departing from an intended course in a way that is so 
incremental and gradual that it is not noticed. One reason for this is that the pursuit of 
organizational goals in a dynamic, complex environment with limited resources and multiple, 
conflicting organizational goals, often produces a succession of small, everyday decisions that 
add up to unforeseen change.13 
Although my study focuses on the Goldman case, this story has much broader 
implications. The phenomenon of organizational drift is bigger than just Goldman. The drift 
Goldman has experienced—is experiencing, really—can affect any organization, regardless of its 
success. As Jack and Suzy Welch wrote in Fortune, “‘Values drift’ is pervasive in companies of 
every ilk, from sea to shining sea. Employees either don’t know their organization’s values, or 
they know that practicing them is optional. Either way the result is vulnerability to attack from 
inside and out, and rightly so.”14 And leaders of the organization may not be able to see that it is 
happening until there is a public blow up/failure or an insider who calls it out. The signs may 
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indicate that the culture is not changing—based on leading market share, returns to shareholders, 
brand, and attractiveness as an employer—but slowly the organization loses touch with its 
original principles and values. 
Figuring out what happened at Goldman is a fascinating puzzle that takes us into the 
heart of a dynamic complex organization in a dynamic complex environment. It is a story of 
intrigue involving an institution that garners highly emotional responses. But it is more than that. 
It raises questions that are fundamental to organizations themselves. Why and how do 
organizations drift from the spirit and meaning of the principles and values that made them 
successful in reaching many of its organizational goals? And what should leaders and managers 
do about it? It also raises serious questions about future risks to our financial system. 
The impressive statistics of Goldman’s many continuing successes, and of clients’ 
willingness to condone possible conflicts because of its quality of execution, doesn’t mean that 
the change in the firm’s culture doesn’t pose dangers both for Goldman and for the public in the 
future. For one thing, if Goldman’s behavior moves continually closer to the legal line of what is 
right and wrong—a line that is dangerously ambiguous—it is increasingly likely to cross that 
line, potentially doing damage not only to clients but to the firm, and perhaps to the financial 
system (some argue the firm has already crossed it). We have seen several financial institutions 
severely weakened and even destroyed in recent memory due to a drift into unethical, or even 
illegal, behavior, even though this is often blamed on one or a few rogue individuals rather than 
on organizational culture. Obviously this would be a terrible outcome for the many stakeholders 
of Goldman. However, Goldman is hardly an inconsequential or isolated organization in the 
economy; it is one of the most important and powerful financial institutions in the world. Its fate 
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has serious potential consequences for the whole financial system. This doesn’t go for just 
Goldman, but for all of the systemically important financial institutions. 
I am not arguing or predicting that Goldman’s drift will inevitably lead to organizational 
failure, or an ensuing disaster for the public (although there are those who believe that this has 
already happened), I am saying that the organizational drift is increasing that possibility. This is 
why it’s important to illuminate why and how the organizational drift has come about. 
A Little History 
 
In considering how and why Goldman’s interpretation of its business principles has 
changed, it’s important to consider some key aspects of the firm’s history, and why the principles 
were written. 
According to my interviews with former Goldman co-senior partner  
John Whitehead, who drafted the principles, there was something special about the Goldman 
culture in 1979, one that brought it success and kept it on track even in tough times. He thought 
codifying those values, in terms of behaviors, would help transmit the Goldman culture to future 
generations of employees. The business principles were intended to keep everyone focused on a 
proven formula for success while staying grounded in the clear understanding that clients were 
the reason for Goldman’s very existence and the source of the firm’s revenues. 
Whitehead emphasized the fact that he did not invent them; they already existed within 
the culture, and he simply committed them to paper. He did so because the firm was expanding 
faster than new people could be assimilated in 1979, and he thought it was important to provide 
new employees a means to acquire the Goldman ethic from earlier generations of partners who 
had learned by osmosis. Though by no means the force in the market the firm is today, Goldman 
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had grown and changed a great deal from its early days and its size, complexity, and growth 
were accelerating. 
Goldman Sachs was founded in 1869 in New York. Having made a name for itself by 
pioneering the use of commercial paper for entrepreneurs, the company was invited to join the 
NYSE in 1896. (For a summary timeline of selected events in Goldman’s history, see appendix 
G.) 
In the early twentieth century, Goldman was a player in establishing the initial public 
offering market. In 1906, it managed one of the largest IPOs of that time—that of Sears, 
Roebuck. However, in 1928 it diversified into asset management of closed end trusts for 
individuals who utilized significant leverage. The trusts failed as a result of the stock market 
crash in 1929, almost causing Goldman to close down and severely hurting the firm’s reputation 
for many years afterward. After that, the new senior partner, Sydney Weinberg, focused the firm 
on providing top quality service to clients. In 1956, Goldman was the lead adviser on the Ford 
Motors IPO, which at the time was a major coup on Wall Street. To put Goldman’s position on 
Wall Street in context at the time, in 1948 the US Department of Justice filed an antitrust suit 
(U.S. v. Morgan [Stanley] et al.,) against Morgan Stanley and eighteen investment banking 
firms. Goldman had only 1.4 percent of the underwriting market and was last on the list of 
defendants. The firm was not even included in a 1950 list of the top seventeen underwriters. 
However, slowly the firm continued to grow in prestige, power, and market share. 
The philosophy behind the firm’s rise was best expressed by Gus Levy, a senior partner 
(with a trading background) at Goldman from 1969 until his death in 1976, who is attributed 
with a maxim that expressed Goldman’s approach: “greedy, but long-term greedy.”15  
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The emphasis was on sound decision-making for long-term success, and this commitment to the 
future was evidenced by the partners’ reinvestment in the firm of nearly 100 percent of the 
earnings.16  
Perhaps surprisingly, although it’s had many triumphs, over its history  
Goldman has had a mixed track record.17 It has been involved in several controversies and has 
come close to bankruptcy once or twice. 
Another common misperception among the public is that today Goldman primarily 
provides investment banking services for large corporations because the firm works on many 
high-profile M&A deals and IPOs; however, investment banking now typically represents only 
about 10 to 15 percent of revenue, substantially lower than the figure during the 1980s, when it 
accounted for half of the revenue. Today, the majority of the revenues comes from trading and 
investing its own capital. The profits from trading and principal investing are often 
disproportionately higher than the revenue because the businesses are much more scalable than 
investment banking. 
Even though the firm was growing when Whitehead wrote the principles, its growth in 
more recent years has been even more accelerated, particularly overseas. In the early 1980s the 
firm had a few thousand employees, with around fifty to sixty partners (all US citizens), and less 
than 5 to 10 percent of its revenue came from outside the United States. In 2012, Goldman had 
around 450 partners (around 43 percent are partners with non-US citizenship) and 32,600 
employees.18 Today about 40 percent of Goldman’s revenue comes from outside the United 
States and it has offices in all major financial centers around the world, with 50 percent of its 
employees based overseas. 
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Once regulations were changed in 1970 to allow investment banks to go public on the 
NYSE, Goldman’s partners debated changing from a private partnership to a public corporation. 
The decision to go public in an IPO was fraught with contention, in part because the partners 
were concerned about how the firm’s culture would change. They were concerned that the firm 
would change to being more “short-term greedy” to meet outside stock market investors’ 
demands versus being “long-term greedy,” which had generally served the firm so well. The 
partners had voted to stay a privately held partnership several times in its past, but finally the 
partners voted to go public, which it did in 1999. Goldman was the last of the major investment 
banking firms to go public, with the other major holdout, its main competitor Morgan Stanley, 
having done so in 1986. In their first letter addressing public shareholders in the 1999 annual 
report, the firm’s top executives wrote, “As we begin the new century, we know that our success 
will depend on how well we change and manage the firm’s rapid growth. That requires a 
willingness to abandon old practices and discover new and innovative ways of conducting 
business. Everything is subject to change—everything but the values we live by and stand for: 
teamwork, putting clients’ interests first, integrity, entrepreneurship, and excellence.”19 They 
specifically stated they did not want to adjust the firm’s core values, and they included putting 
clients’ interests first and integrity, but they knew upholding the original meaning of the 
principles would be a challenge and certain things had to change. 
Although the principles have generally remained the same as in 1979, there was one 
important addition to them around the time of the IPO—“our goal is to provide superior returns 
to our shareholders”—which introduced an intrinsic potential conflict or ambiguity between 
putting the interests of clients first (which was a Goldman self-imposed ethical obligation) and 
those of outside shareholders (which is a legally defined duty), as well as the potential conflict of 
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doing what was best for the long term versus catering to the generally short-term perspective 
from outside, public market investors. There’s always a natural tension between business owners 
who want to make the highest profits possible and clients who want to buy goods and services 
for as low as possible, to make their profits the highest possible. Being a small private 
partnership allowed Goldman the flexibility to make its own decisions about what was best in its 
own interpretation of long term in order to help address this tension. Having various outside 
shareholders all with their own time horizons and objectives, combined with Goldman’s legal 
duty to put outside shareholders’ (not clients’) priorities first, makes the interpretation and 
execution of long term much more complicated and difficult. 
When questioned about the potential for conflict, Goldman leaders have asserted that the 
firm has been able to ethically serve both the interests of clients and those of shareholders, and 
for many years, that assertion for the most part was not loudly challenged. That was largely due 
to Goldman’s many successes, including leading market position and strong returns to 
shareholders, and rationalized by the many good works of the firm and its alumni, which served 
to address concerns about conflicts, even most of the way through the 2008 crisis. 
At the beginning of the crisis, Goldman was mostly praised for its risk management. 
During the credit crisis, Goldman outperformed most of its competitors. Bear Stearns was bought 
by J.P. Morgan with government assistance. Lehman Brothers famously went bankrupt, and 
Merrill Lynch was acquired by Bank of America. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co. sold a 
stake to Mitsubishi UFJ. But the overall economic situation deteriorated very quickly, and 
Goldman, as well as other banks, accepted government assistance and became a bank holding 
company. The company got a vote of confidence with a multi-billion-dollar investment from 
Berkshire Hathaway, led by legendary investor Warren Buffett. But soon after, things changed, 
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and Goldman, along with the other investment banks, was held responsible for the financial 
crisis. The fact that so many former Goldman executives held positions in the White House, 
Treasury, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and the Troubled Asset Relief Program in 
charge of the bailouts (including Hank Paulson, the former CEO of Goldman and then secretary 
of the Treasury) even as the bank took government funds and benefited from government 
actions, raised concerns about potential conflicts of interest and excessive influence.  
People started to question if Goldman was really better and smarter, or wasn’t just more 
connected, or engaged in unethical or illegal practices in order to gain an advantage. 
In April 2010, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) charged Goldman with 
defrauding investors in the sale of a complex mortgage investment. Less than a month later, 
Blankfein and other Goldman executives attempted to answer scorching questions from Senator 
Carl Levin (D-Mich.), chair of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, and other 
senators about the firm’s role in the financial crisis. The executives were grilled for hours in a 
publicly broadcasted hearing. The senators pulled no punches, calling the firm’s practices 
unethical, if not illegal. Later, after a Senate panel investigation, Levin called Goldman “a 
financial snake pit rife with greed, conflicts of interest, and wrongdoing.”20 But lawmakers at 
the hearings made little headway in getting Goldman to concede much, if anything specific, that 
the company did wrong.21 
In answering questions about whether Goldman made billions of dollars of profits by 
“betting” on the collapse in subprime mortgage bonds while still marketing subprime mortgage 
deals to clients, the firm denied the allegations; Goldman argued it was simply acting as a market 
maker, partnering buyers and sellers of securities. Certain Goldman executives at the time 
showed little regret for whatever role the firm had played in the crisis or for the way it treated its 
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clients. One Goldman executive said, “Regret to me is something you feel like you did wrong. I 
don’t have that.”22 
There does seem to have been some internal acknowledgment that the culture had 
changed or at least should change. Shortly after the hearing, in response to public criticism, 
Goldman established the business standards committee, cochaired by Mike Evans (vice chairman 
of Goldman) and Gerald Corrigan (chairman of Goldman’s GS Bank USA, and former president 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York), to investigate its internal business practices. 
Blankfein acknowledged that there were inconsistencies between how Goldman employees 
viewed the firm and how the broader public perceived its activities. In 2011, the committee 
released a sixty-three page report, which detailed thirty-nine ways the firm planned to improve 
its business practices. They ranged from changing the bank’s financial reporting structure to 
forming new oversight committees to adjusting its methods of training and professional 
development. But it is unclear in the report whether Goldman specifically acknowledged a need 
to more ethically adhere to the first principle. The report states, “We believe the 
recommendations of the Committee will strengthen the firm’s culture in an increasingly complex 
environment. We must renew our commitment to our Business Principles—and above all, to 
client service and a constant focus on the reputational consequences of every action we take.”23 
The use of the word “strengthen” suggests that the culture had been weakened, but the report is 
vague on this. According to the Financial Times, investors, clients, and regulators remained 
underwhelmed in the wake of the report by Goldman’s efforts to change.24 
A Goldman internal training manual sheds some more light on whether the firm 
acknowledged its adherence to its first business principle has changed. The New York Times 
submitted a list of questions in May 2010 to Goldman for responses that included “Goldman’s  
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Mortgage Compliance Training Manual from 2007 notes that putting clients first is ‘not always 
straightforward.’”25 
The point that putting clients first is not always straightforward is telling. It indicates a 
clear change in the meaning of the original first principle. 
The notion that Goldman’s culture has changed was given a very public hearing when, on 
March 14, 2012, former Goldman employee Greg Smith published his resignation letter on the 
op-ed page of the New York Times. In the widely distributed and read piece, Smith criticized the 
current culture at Goldman, characterizing it as “toxic,” and specifically blamed Blankfein and 
Goldman president Gary Cohn for losing “hold of the firm’s culture on their watch.”26 
Years ago, an academic astutely predicted and described this type of “whistle blowing” as 
being a result of cultural change and frustration. Edgar Schein, a now-retired professor at the 
MIT Sloan School of Management, wrote “. . . it is usually discovered that the assumptions by 
which the organization was operating had drifted toward what was practical to get the job done, 
and those practices came to be in varying degrees different from what the official ideology 
claimed . . . Often there have been employee complaints identifying such practices because they 
are out of line with what the organization wants to believe about itself, they are ignored or 
denied, sometimes leading to the punishment of the employees who brought up the information. 
When an employee feels strongly enough to blow the whistle, a scandal may result, and practices 
then may finally be reexamined. Whistle blowing may be to go to the newspapers to expose a 
practice that is labeled as scandalous or the scandal may result from a tragic event.”27 The 
publishing of Smith’s letter certainly resulted in a scandal and an examination.28 
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Goldman and Me 
The question of what happened to Goldman has special resonance for me. I have spent 
eighteen years involved with the firm in one way or another: twelve years working for Goldman 
in a variety of capacities, and another six either using its services as a client or working for one 
of its competitors. I still have many friends and acquaintances who work there. 
In 2010, I was about to start teaching at Columbia University’s Graduate School of 
Business and shortly would be accepted to the PhD program in sociology at Columbia. The 
sociology program in particular—which required that I find a research question for my PhD 
dissertation—provided me with many of the tools I needed to start to answer my question. I 
decided to pursue a career as a trained academic instead of relying solely on my practical 
experiences. The combination of the two, I thought, would be more rewarding and powerful for 
both my students and myself. When I began the study that would become this book, my 
hypothesis was that the change in Goldman’s culture was rooted in the IPO. I conjectured that 
what fundamentally changed the culture was the transformation—from a private partnership to a 
public company. As I learned more, I realized that the truth was more complicated. 
My analysis of the process by which the drift happened is deeply informed by my own 
experiences. Though some may think this has made me a biased observer, I believe that my 
inside knowledge and experience in various areas of the firm—from being based in the United 
States to working outside the United States, from working in investment banking to proprietary 
trading, from being present pre- and post-IPO—combined with my academic training gives me a 
unique ability to gather and analyze data about the changes at Goldman. My close involvement 
with Goldman deeply informs my analysis, so it’s worth reviewing the relationship. A brief 
overview of my career also reveals how Goldman’s businesses work. 
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In 1992, fresh from undergraduate studies at the University of  Chicago, I arrived at 
Goldman to work in the M&A department in the investment banking division. M&A bankers 
advise the management and boards of companies on the strategy, financing, valuation, and 
negotiations of buying, selling, and combining various companies or subsidiaries. For the next 
dozen years, I held a variety of positions of increasing responsibility. My work exposed me to 
various areas, put me in collaborative situations with Goldman partners and key personnel, and 
allowed me to observe or take part in events as they unfolded. 
I rotated through several strategically important areas. First I worked in M&A in New 
York and then M&A in Hong Kong, where I witnessed the explosive international growth 
firsthand with the opening of the Beijing office. Next, I returned to New York to assist Hank 
Paulson on special projects; Paulson was then co-head of investment banking, on the 
management committee, and head of the Chicago office. Also, I worked with the principal 
investment area (PIA makes investments in or buys control of companies with money 
collectively from clients, Goldman, and employees). Then I returned to M&A, rising to the head 
of the hostile raid defense business (defending a company from unsolicited take-overs—one of 
the cornerstones of Goldman’s M&A brand and reputation) and becoming business unit manager 
of the M&A department. Finally, I ended up as a proprietary trader and ultimately portfolio 
manager in the fixed income, commodities, and currencies division (FICC)—similar to an 
internal hedge fund—managing Goldman’s own money. My rotations to a different geographic 
region and through different divisions were typical at the time for a certain percentage of 
selected employees in order to train people and unite the firm. 
Throughout my career at Goldman, I served on firm-wide and divisional committees, 
dealing with important strategic and business process issues. I also acted as special assistant to 
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several senior Goldman executives and board members, including Hank Paulson, on select 
projects and initiatives such as improving business processes and cross-department 
communication protocols. Goldman was constantly trying to improve and setting up committees 
with people from various geographic regions and departments to create initiatives. I was never a 
partner at Goldman. I participated in many meetings where I was the only nonpartner in 
attendance and prepared analysis or presentations for partner meetings, or in response to partner 
meetings, but I did not participate in “partner-only” meetings. 
As a member of the M&A department, I worked on a team to advise board members and 
CEOs of leading multinational companies on large, technically complex transactions. For 
example, I worked on a team that advised AT&T on combining its broadband business with 
Comcast in a transaction that valued AT&T broadband at $72 billion. I also helped sell a private 
company to Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway. As the head of Goldman’s unsolicited take-
over and hostile raid defense practice, I worked on a team advising a client involved in a proxy 
fight with activist investor Carl Icahn. 
When I joined Goldman, partnership election at the firm was considered one of the most 
prestigious achievements on Wall Street, in part because the process was highly selective and a 
Goldman partnership was among the most lucrative. The M&A department had a remarkably 
good track record of its bankers being elected—probably one of the highest percentages of 
success in the firm at the time. The department was key to the firm’s brand, because representing 
prestigious blue chip clients is important to Goldman’s public perception of access and influence 
that makes important decision makers want to speak to Goldman. M&A deals were high profile, 
especially hostile raid defenses. M&A was also highly profitable and did not require much 
capital. For all these reasons, a job in the department was highly prized, and the competition was 
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fierce. When the New York M&A department hired me, it was making about a dozen offers per 
year to US college graduates to work in New York, out of what I was told were hundreds of 
applicants. 
While in the department, I was asked to be the business unit manager (informally referred 
to as the “BUM”). I addressed issues of strategy, business processes, organizational policy, 
business selection, and conflict clearance. For example, I was involved in discussions in deciding 
whether and how Goldman should participate in hostile raids, and in discussing client conflicts 
and ways to address them. The job was extremely demanding. After a relatively successful stint,  
I felt I had built enough goodwill to move internally and do what I was more interested in: being 
an investor. I hoped to ultimately move into proprietary trading or back to Principal Investment 
Area (PIA), Goldman’s private equity group. 
Many banking partners tried to dissuade me from moving out of  
M&A. However, I wanted to become an investor, and a few partners who were close friends and 
mentors helped me delicately maneuver into proprietary investing. I was warned, “If you lose 
money, you will most likely get fired, and do not count on coming back to banking at Goldman. 
But if you make money for the firm, then you will get more money to manage, which will allow 
you to make more money for the firm and yourself.” 
Today people ask me whether I saw the writing on the wall—that the shift to proprietary 
trading was well under way and would continue at Goldman—and whether that’s why I moved. 
To be honest, I didn’t give it as much thought as I should have. My work in helping manage the 
M&A department and assisting senior executives on various projects exposed me to other areas 
of the firm and the firm’s strategy and priorities. When you’re in M&A, you work around the 
clock. You don’t have time for much reflection or career planning. (This may be, upon 
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reflection, part of the business model and be a contributor to the process of organizational drift.) 
You’re working so intensely on high-profile deals—those that end up on page 1 of the Wall 
Street Journal—that you’re swept up in the importance of the firm’s and your work. Your bosses 
tell you how important you are and how important the M&A department is to the firm. They 
remind you that the real purpose of your job is to make capital markets more efficient and 
ultimately provide corporations with more efficient ways to finance. So you rationalize that 
there’s a noble and ethical reason for what you and the firm are doing. In general, I greatly 
respected most of the investment banking partners that I knew. And I certainly didn’t have the 
academic training, distance, or perspective to analyze the various pressures and small changes 
going on at the firm and their consequences. I do remember simply feeling like I should be able 
to do what I wanted and what I was interested in at Goldman—an entitlement that I certainly did 
not feel earlier in my career, and maybe one I picked up from observations or the competitive 
environment for Goldman-trained talent. 
Paulson, a banker, was running the firm, and several others from banking whom I 
considered mentors held important positions. So even though it was no secret that revenues from 
investment banking had declined as a percentage of the total, I didn’t think very much about that, 
nor did I consider its consequences. One longtime colleague and investment banking partner 
pulled me aside to tell me that moving into proprietary trading was the smartest thing I could do 
and that he wished he could take my place. When I asked why, he said, “More money than 
investment banking partners, faster advancement, shorter hours, better lifestyle, you learn how to 
manage your own money, and, one day, you can leave and start your own hedge fund and make 
even more money—and Goldman will support you.” I assured him I was only trying to do what 
interested me, but I agreed it would be nice to travel less, work only twelve-hour days, and spend 
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more time with my wife and our newborn daughter. When I asked why he didn’t tell me this 
before, he said, “Then we would have had to find and train someone else.” 
I became a proprietary trader and then a portfolio manager in Goldman’s FICC Special 
Situations Investing Group (SSG). We built it into one of the largest, most successful dedicated 
proprietary trading areas at Goldman and on Wall Street. Created during the late 1990s, SSG 
initially primarily invested Goldman’s money in the debt and equity of financially stressed 
companies and made loans to high-risk borrowers (although we expanded the mandate over 
time). SSG was separated from the rest of the firm, meaning we sat on a floor separate from the 
trading desks that dealt with clients. We were called on as a client by salespeople at Goldman 
and the rest of Wall Street as if we were a distinct hedge fund. We did not deal with clients. 
Even separated as we were, we had the potential for at least the perception of conflicts of 
interest with clients. For example, we could own the stock or debt of a company when, unknown 
to us, the company would hire Goldman’s M&A department to review strategic alternatives or 
execute a capital market transaction such as an equity or debt offering. In that case we could be 
“frozen,” meaning we were restricted from buying any more related securities or selling the 
position, something that would place us at a potential disadvantage because we could not react to 
new information. If we wanted to buy the securities of a company, and unbeknownst to us 
Goldman’s bankers were advising the company on a transaction, we could be blocked from the 
purchase. 
The biggest advantage I believed we had over our competitors—primarily hedge funds—
was that we had a great recruiting and training machine in Goldman; we could pick the very best 
people in the company. Most had heard that we were extremely entrepreneurial, that we gave our 
people a lot of responsibility and ability to make a larger impact, that we were extremely 
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profitable, and that we paid very well. Those from SSG also had an excellent track record of 
eventually leaving to set up or join existing hedge funds. We also had infrastructure—
technology, risk management systems, and processes—that was unmatched by Wall Street 
banks, because Goldman invested heavily in it, recognizing the strategic importance of the 
competitive advantage it gave us. 
We were trained to run investing businesses (for example, evaluating and managing 
people and risk or setting goals and measureable metrics). We had access to almost any corporate 
management team or government official through the cachet of the Goldman name and its 
powerful network. We also had a low cost of capital, because Goldman borrowed money at very 
low rates from debt investors, money that we then invested and generated a return a good deal 
higher than the cost of borrowing. We had one client—Goldman—and this was good, because it 
meant we did not have to approach lots of clients to raise funds. However, it was also a bad 
thing, because all the capital came from one investor. If Goldman (or the regulators, as later 
happened with the Volcker Rule) decided it should no longer be in the business, you were out of 
a job, although it was likely many others would want to hire you. 
When I started in proprietary trading in FICC, I immediately noticed one big difference 
from the banking side. Although my new bosses were smart, sophisticated, and supportive, and 
as demanding as my investment banking bosses, there was an intense focus on measuring 
relatively short-term results because they were measurable. Our performance as investors was 
marked to market every day, meaning that the value of the trades we made was calculated every 
day, so there was total transparency about how much money we’d made or lost for the firm each 
and every day. This isn’t done in investment banking, although each year new performance 
metrics were being added by the time I left for FICC. Typically in banking, relationships take a 
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long time to develop and pay off. A bad day in banking may mean that, after years of meetings 
and presentations performed for free, a client didn’t select you to execute a transaction. You 
could offer excuses: “The other bank offered to loan them money,” “They were willing to do it 
much cheaper,” and so on. It was never that you got outhustled or that the other firm had better 
people, ideas, coordination, relationships, or expertise, something that would negatively reflect 
on you or the firm (or both). In proprietary trading, there were no excuses for bad days of losses. 
We were expected to make money whether the markets went up or down. There was another 
thing I learned quickly. One could be right as a trader, but have the timing wrong in the short 
term and be fired with losses that then quickly turned around into the projected profits. In 
addition, relative to banking, in judging performance the emphasis seemed to tilt toward how 
much money one made the firm versus more subjective and less immediately profitable 
contributions. The fear of this transparency and the potential for failure kept many bankers from 
moving to trading. 
I later discovered that Goldman’s proprietary trading areas actually maintained a longer-
term perspective than did most trading desks and hedge funds, where a daily, weekly, or (at 
most) monthly focus was generally the norm. Our bosses reviewed information about our 
investments daily, but they tended to have a bias toward evaluating performance on a quarterly 
and even yearly basis (but much shorter than evaluating a client relationship in banking, which 
could take years). We were held accountable and were compared on risk-based performance 
against hedge fund peers, as well as other Goldman desks. If we found good opportunities, we 
got access to capital and invested it. Theoretically, when we didn’t see attractive opportunities, 
we were to sell our positions and return the money to Goldman, with the understanding that we 
had access to it when we felt there were attractive opportunities. 
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However, I learned there was a perverse incentive to keep as much money as possible and 
invest it to make the firm as much money as possible—and yourself as much money as 
possible—even if the risk and reward might not be as favorable as other groups’ opportunities.  
There was a feeling that we were “paid to take risks,” and the larger the risks you took, or were 
able to take, the more important you were to the organization. We did have a critical advantage 
over most banks—we knew that many of our bosses and those at the very top of the firm 
understood, and were not afraid of, risk. Many had managed risk and knew how to evaluate it. 
They also would sometimes leave us voicemails or discuss in meetings their feelings or 
perspectives on the current environment and risks. 
In my conversations with former competitors, I later learned that Goldman’s approach to 
managing proprietary traders was substantially different from theirs. For example, if we lost a 
meaningful amount of money in an investment while I was at SSG, we would sit down with our 
bosses (and sometimes other traders not in our area) to rationally discuss and debate alternatives, 
such as exiting all or some of the position, buying more (“doubling down”), hedging the 
downside, or reversing our position and making an opposite bet. I learned that traders from other 
firms generally did not sit down with others to discuss alternatives. Rather, most often they were 
simply told to sell and realize the loss of money-losing investments (“cut your losses”), because 
their bosses or their bosses’ bosses didn’t understand the risks. Competitors’ traders told me they 
couldn’t comprehend the idea of our getting together with someone as senior as the president of 
the firm, and especially traders outside our area, to discuss and debate the attractiveness of an 
investment. For this reason, traders at other firms did not get as many great learning 
opportunities or would make poor decisions. 
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When I left in 2004, the firm was very successful in reaching certain organizational goals. 
It had the best shareholder returns and continued to recruit the best and brightest people in the 
industry. It had access to almost any important decision maker in the world. The culture and 
working environment were such that a motivated, creative person felt as if he or she could 
accomplish just about anything; all one had to do was convince people of the merits of the idea. 
But the firm felt different: it was much larger, it was more global, and it was involved in many 
more businesses. One could certainly start to feel the greater emphasis on trading and principal 
investing. The bureaucracy had grown, and as SSG grew and diversified we were increasingly 
encountering turf wars with other areas. I knew fewer people, especially senior partners, many of 
whom had retired by 2004, so I also felt a weaker social tie to the firm. 
At the same time, there was great demand from outside investors (including Goldman 
Sachs Asset Management) to give money to Goldman proprietary traders to start their own firms 
and invest. Also the firm’s prime brokerage business and alumni network had a great track 
record for helping former proprietary traders start their own firms. I felt I had a good track record 
and reputation, and enough support from Goldman and many of its employees and alums who 
were friends, to start my own investment business. 
With my savings from bonuses, and with my 1999 IPO stock grant and other shares fully 
vested on the fifth anniversary of the IPO, I left Goldman in 2004 to cofound a global alternative 
asset management company with an existing hedge fund that already had approximately twenty 
people and $2 billion in assets under management. Shortly after, several Goldman investment 
professionals joined me. Less than four years later, I had helped expand the firm to 120 people 
and $12 billion in assets under management.28 I was the chief investment officer and helped 
manage and oversee over $5 billion, about half of the firm’s assets, through multiple vehicles 
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focused on the United States and Europe. Also, I helped start several other funds while also 
serving on all of the firm’s major investment committees. In my position, I saw firsthand the 
competitive, organizational, technological, and regulatory pressures facing an organization (also 
a private partnership) as well as the organizational challenges of growth. I maintained a close 
relationship with Goldman, becoming a trading and prime brokerage client and coinvested with 
Goldman. My partners and I also hired Goldman to represent us in selling our asset management 
firm. In early 2008, we announced a transaction valuing the firm at $974 million.29 So I also 
experienced what it meant to be a trading and banking client of Goldman’s and am able to 
compare the experience versus other firms. 
I have also worked for one of Goldman’s competitors at a very senior level, as an 
executive at Citigroup from 2010 to 2012 in various roles, including chief of staff to the 
president and COO, vice chairman and chief of staff to the CEO of the institutional clients group  
(ICG), and member of the executive, management, and risk management committees of that 
group.30 When I joined Citi, it was under political and public scrutiny for taking government 
funds, and the government still owned Citi shares. It was a complex business with many 
organizational challenges; it was an intense experience, with me starting work at 5:30 a.m. 
almost every day to be prepared to meet with my boss at 6 a.m. My experience at Citigroup was 
critical in my development of a new perspective on Goldman and the industry. Citigroup has 
approximately 265,000 people in more than 100 countries. In addition to being much larger (in 
total assets and number of employees) than Goldman, Citigroup is much more complex, because 
it participates in many more businesses (such as consumer and retail banking and treasury 
services) and locally in many more countries. In addition, unlike Goldman, Citigroup was 
created through a series of mergers and acquisitions. At Citi, I had the chance to compare the 
	   	   	   35	  
practices and approaches of a Goldman competitor that had a big balance sheet (supported by 
customer deposits to lend money to clients) and that had grown quickly through acquisitions—
two things Goldman did not really do. 
Before working at Citigroup and during the financial crisis, I advised McKinsey & 
Company on strategic, business process, risk, and organizational issues facing financial 
institutions and related regulatory authorities worldwide. McKinsey is one of the most 
prestigious and trusted management-consulting firms in the world, with some fifteen thousand 
people globally. There are many differences between the firms, but as with Goldman (before 
Goldman became a public corporation), McKinsey is a private partnership that has a revered 
partnership election process. Goldman and McKinsey compete for the best and brightest 
graduates every year, and there are elements of the McKinsey culture that are similar in many 
ways to Goldman’s, especially to the Goldman I knew when I started. When attending McKinsey 
training programs, I could have closed my eyes and replaced the word McKinsey with Goldman, 
and it would have been like my 1992 Goldman training program all over again. McKinsey has an 
intense focus on recruiting, training, socialization of new members, and teamwork. It also has 
long-standing, revered, written business principles. Lastly, it has an incredible global network. 
The people at McKinsey are incredibly thoughtful and hard working and have very high 
standards of integrity, and I learned a great deal about how they built and grew the business 
globally and added new practices while trying to preserve a distinct culture.  
McKinsey provided me the context of a large, global, growing advisory firm. McKinsey 
emphasized “client impact” over “commercial effectiveness” in evaluating its partners. With 
McKinsey, I also gained exposure to many other financial institutions, along with their senior 
management teams, their processes, and their cultures, and this exposure also helped put my 
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experiences at Goldman—and the reaction of its management teams to various pressures—into 
context. Lastly, I had hired and worked with McKinsey as a client, and am able to compare that 
experience as a client versus being a client of other firms, including Goldman. 
Subtle Changes Made Obvious 
To give you a better sense of the shift I noticed and the organizational drift I’m talking 
about, I want to offer a set of comparative stories—“before” and “after” snapshots—to illuminate 
the differences. They illustrate the shift in the client-adviser relationship as well as in Goldman’s 
practice of putting the clients’ interests first. 
This post-1979 historic commitment to always putting clients’ interests first and 
signifying more then a legal standard is demonstrated by a 1987 event. Goldman stood to lose 
$100 million, a meaningful hit to the partners’ personal equity at the time, on the underwriting of 
the sale of 32 percent of British Petroleum, owned by the British government. The global stock 
market crash in October had left other investment banks that had committed to the deal trying to 
analyze their legal liability and their legal rights to nullify their commitment, but Goldman stood 
firm in honoring its commitment despite the cost and despite Goldman’s legal claims. Senior 
partner John L. Weinberg explained to the syndicate, “Gentlemen, Goldman Sachs is going to do 
it. Because if we don’t do it, those of you who decide not to do it, I just want to tell you, you 
won’t be underwriting a goat house. Not even an outhouse.”30 
The decision was not a simple matter of altruism. The principle of standing by its 
commitment had long-term economic benefits for Goldman. Weinberg was able to see beyond a 
short-term loss, even a large one, and to consider Goldman’s longer-term ambition to increase its 
share of the privatization business in Europe. That could be achieved only by living up to its 
commitments to clients, even beyond the legal commitment. His decision was consistent with the 
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standard of the original meaning of the first principle: “Our clients’ interests always come first.” 
In addition, it illustrates the nuance between “long-term greedy” and “short-term greedy.” 
More than twenty years later, this standard of commitment to clients beyond legal 
responsibility has largely been lost. Goldman policy adviser and former SEC chairman Arthur 
Levitt has challenged the “clients first” principle because “it doesn’t recognize the reality of the 
trading business.”31 He points out that Goldman’s sales and trading revenues outstrip those of 
the advisory businesses, financing, and money management, and there are no clients in sales and 
trading—only buyers and sellers. There should be transparency, Levitt suggests, but no 
expectation of a “fellowship of buyers and sellers that will march into the sunset” together. 
Goldman should stop using “clients first” in promoting itself, Levitt argues, because of the 
conflicts inherent in trading—the natural and ever-present tension between buyers and sellers. 
This argument hit home for me when I compared one of my first experiences as an 
analyst at Goldman with my later experience as a Goldman client. When I was a first-year 
financial analyst in 1992, I was assigned to work with Paulson and a team of investment bankers 
to advise the Chicago-based consumer goods company Sara Lee Corporation. The project was to 
review Sara Lee’s financial and strategic alternatives related to a particular management 
decision. Paulson was demanding, and he instructed us to leave no stone unturned. 
We worked 100-hour weeks, fueled by Froot Loops and Coca-Cola for breakfast and 
McDonald’s hamburgers and fries for lunch and dinner. We performed all sorts of financial 
analysis, trying to make sure we thought of every possible alternative and issue. We also 
collected ideas from all the experts Goldman had. In the end, we had a presentation book 50 to 
70 pages long for the client, plus another 100-page backup book. We made sure that every I was 
dotted and it was crossed, every number corresponded to another number, every financial 
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calculation was accurate, and every number that needed a footnote had one. Perfection and 
excellence were expected - not only by Paulson but also by everyone else at the firm - no matter 
the personal sacrifice. 
At Sara Lee’s offices, all five of us from Goldman, including Paulson, waited anxiously 
to go into the meeting. When we were ushered into the boardroom, we took seats across the table 
from Sara Lee’s CEO, John H. Bryan, who would one day join the board of Goldman. After 
saying our hellos, we started putting our material out on the table. However, Paulson sat down 
next to Bryan, across the table from the rest of the Goldman team. After Paulson made some 
introductory remarks, speaking to Bryan as if no one else was in the room, we started presenting 
our analysis, the pros and cons of the alternatives, and our recommendations. (I had no speaking 
role; I was at the meeting in case someone asked any questions about the numbers. This was 
customary at Goldman—to watch and learn.) 
Throughout the meeting, Paulson asked questions that he felt should be on Bryan’s mind, 
challenging us—grilling us, really—and posing follow-up questions to Bryan’s own. I wondered, 
Which one is the client—Bryan or Paulson? That’s when I learned an important lesson: they 
were one and the same. To Paulson, and therefore to Goldman, Bryan was not a client; rather, he 
was a friend. This was Goldman’s first business principle in action. In that meeting, Paulson 
embodied the spirit of that principle and of Goldman at its best. He didn’t just walk a mile in the 
client’s shoes; he ran a marathon. This rigor of service, along with his Midwestern work ethic 
and values, led not only to his own many professional successes but also to the many successes 
for his clients and for the firm he would one day lead. 
Flash-forward to 2008. After I left Goldman and my partners and I decided to review 
strategic alternatives for our firm, I moved to the other side of the table as a Goldman banking 
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client. After interviewing several investment banks, I voted to hire Goldman because it had the 
best overall team, knowledge about the markets, understanding of how to present our firm, and 
access to the key decision makers at potential buying firms. However, I noticed a contrast with 
my early years at Goldman. I certainly did not feel as though anyone from Goldman was looking 
at things from my perspective in the same way Paulson had at Sara Lee. No Goldman banker sat 
on my side of the table and raised the questions I should have been considering. In fact, I was 
concerned that Goldman cared more about its larger and more important clients that might 
consider buying our firm (and would remain Goldman clients) than about us. I had the same 
sense with most of the other banks that pitched for the assignment. Maybe I held Goldman to a 
higher standard. When we hired Goldman, I requested that John S. Weinberg—the grandson and 
son of former Goldman senior partners, and someone I had worked for at Goldman—help 
oversee the project. I felt he embodied the spirit and standards that had been in effect when I had 
joined the firm. Goldman was highly professional and extremely capable, but for some reason 
the shift was enough for me to want John S. Weinberg involved. (For more information about the 
Weinberg family and other key Goldman partners, see appendix F.) 
The Study 
While my experiences at Citigroup and McKinsey, as well as in helping build a firm, 
combined with distance, time, and maturity, helped put my experiences at Goldman into 
perspective, my insider experience also made me aware of how difficult it can be to perceive this 
kind of change from within, even though examples such as these may seem to suggest that the 
change should be obvious. Also, recognizing that change had occurred and understanding why 
and how that’s the case are very different propositions. This is why the perspective from 
sociological theory is so helpful. Personal perspective isn’t enough.  
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The analysis of Goldman that I offer here is based on established sociological approaches 
to studying organizational change, behavior, and innovation, an approach I’ve learned at both the 
sociology department and the business school at Columbia University. It doesn’t come naturally 
to me. Having been a banker, consultant, and investor, typically I try to understand problems 
quantitatively. Those in the financial industry seem to share this trait, because they have a certain 
comfort with quantifying things and using numbers and metrics to hold people accountable. This 
approach is also followed by many regulators, policy makers, and economics and finance 
professionals. They focus on quantitative measures—such as imposing regulatory  
capital requirements or limiting activities to certain percentages—as the best way to prevent 
other crises. 
The quantitative approach is reasonable, but it is not complete. Those trying to regulate 
Goldman and similar financial institutions have focused relatively little on the social activity, 
structures, and functions of their organizational culture—the hallmarks of the sociological 
approach—and I believe this focus will help get us closer to the root of the issues. 
This book is based on my doctoral dissertation in sociology at Columbia, work that I 
started in 2011. It is the result of more than 100 hours of semistructured interviews with over 
fifty of Goldman’s partners, clients, competitors, equity research analysts, investors, regulators, 
and legal experts.32 I also researched business school case studies, news reports, and books about 
Goldman; quotations from those sources are peppered throughout the book. In addition, I 
analyzed publicly available documents filed by Goldman with the SEC (including financial 
data), congressional testimony, and legal documents filed in lawsuits against Goldman. 
The purpose of going beyond interviews was to challenge, support, and illuminate the 
interviewees’ and my own conclusions. I suspect that many of the people to whom I spoke are 
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bound by nondisclosure agreements, but I never asked. I did agree that I would keep their 
participation confidential and not quote them. I did not take notes during the interviews, nor did I 
use a recording device. The only interviewee whose name I disclose, with his permission, is John 
Whitehead. He worked at Goldman from 1947 to 1984. Since he wrote the original business 
principles, he was able to clearly describe what he meant when he wrote them and what the 
culture was like at the time.33 
It is not my intent to glorify or vilify any individual, group, or era in Goldman’s history, 
although I suspect parts will be used to do so. I’ve tried not to be influenced by nostalgia for the 
Goldman that once was, and I’ve tried to recognize that the people I interviewed were looking 
back in hindsight and may have had agendas or other issues, something I tried to overcome by 
speaking to many different people and by balancing the interview data with other information 
and analysis. I’ve tried not to be affected by many people’s contempt for the firm or by the 
recent economic recovery. I have relied on publicly available data to confirm and disprove 
various claims and theories advanced by those I interviewed.34 
I do not wish to assert that the change in culture at Goldman I’ve analyzed is necessarily 
change for the worse, or that the changes will lead to an organizational failure or a disaster 
(though some would argue that it does). The concept of drift, loosely defined, has often been 
used to study how a series of small, seemingly inconsequential changes can lead to disaster, such 
as the explosion of the space shuttle Challenger or the accidental shooting of two Black Hawk 
helicopters over Iraq in 1994 by US F-15 fighter jets. Though the change at Goldman is different 
in a number of regards from both of those examples, they do nonetheless offer important insights 
into why and how Goldman’s culture has drifted. In both cases—analyzed by Columbia  
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University sociologist Diane Vaughan and Harvard Business School professor Scott Snook, 
respectively—pressures to meet organizational goals generally caused an unintended and 
unnoticed slow process of change in practices and the implementation of them, which in those 
cases led to major failures.35 Each tiny shift made perfect sense in the local context, but together 
they created a recipe for disaster. 
My analysis also draws on the sociological literature about the normalization of deviant 
behavior, which illuminates processes by which a deviance away from original values and 
culture can become socially normalized and accepted within an organization. Another factor that 
clearly comes through is that Goldman’s business has become more complex, and that there is 
less cross-department and other communication, which contributed to what Diane Vaughan calls 
structural secrecy—the ways in which organizational structure, the flow of information, and 
business processes tend to undermine the understanding of change that may be taking place.35 
(For more on these concepts and an academic study of organizational cultural drift, see appendix 
A.) 
My argument, in essence, is that Goldman came under numerous types of pressure—
organizational, competitive, regulatory, technological—to achieve growth, and that pressure, 
from both inside and outside of Goldman, resulted in many incremental changes. Those included 
changes in the structure of the firm, from a partnership to a public company, which in turn 
accelerated many changes already occurring at the firm. The change in structure also limited 
executives’ personal exposure to risk, as well as ushering in changes in compensation policies, 
which led to different incentives. The pressure for growth resulted in the mix of business also 
shifting over time, with trading becoming more dominant, which carried its own impetus for 
change. The growing complexity of the company’s business also led both to more structural 
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secrecy and to more potential for conflicts of interest. At the same time the external environment 
was also rapidly changing and impacting the firm. 
These and many other changes, added up over time, caused Goldman to drift from the 
original interpretation of the firm’s principles, most notably from the first principle of always 
putting clients’ interests first. As the firm got larger and growth became more challenging 
because of the law of large numbers, there was even more pressure to change the standards to 
allow the maximum opportunities. Those within Goldman were unable to appreciate the degree 
of change at the time, and are unable to now, due in part to a process of normalization of the 
deviance from the firm’s principles that occurred as those changes unfolded. That blindness (or 
willful blindness) to the degree of change was enabled in part by rationalization and also by the 
sense that the firm serves a higher purpose because of the good works of the firm and its alumni, 
which mitigated against recognition from within that the firm was engaging in conflicts. 
Whether or not this process of drift is a harbinger of potential failure at the firm is an 
open question. Certainly there is reason to worry that the many interdependent and compounding 
pressures that led Goldman to slowly change and adopt its new standard of ethics from one that 
was a higher than legal requirement to meeting only the legal requirements will combine with its 
increasing size, more complexity, and greater interrelatedness, and the consequences will be an 
increasing risk of conflicts and organizational failure. 
Since Goldman plays such a prominent role in the economy, as do other investment 
banks, this is an urgent issue for further exploration. Maybe even more so because I believe that 
Goldman is becoming even more important and powerful in our economic system. Goldman 
almost went bankrupt in the late 1920s, was struggling in 1994, and took government money 
directly and indirectly in order to hold off possible collapse in 2009 (Goldman denies this), even 
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despite the profits or protection (depending on one’s view) from the infamous “hedging” bets 
taken against toxic mortgage assets. Many other financial firms disappeared, of course; the 
economy was near collapse, and taxpayers were left with an enormous bill. I hope the analysis in 
this book can demonstrate that sociology can contribute to the public understanding and debate 
about risks in the system. 
I also hope the book will help leaders and managers consider the dangers that can 
accompany the responses to organizational, competitive, technological, and regulatory pressures 
in striving to meet organizational goals. 
Finally, I hope the book is an interesting journey inside Goldman, with which I’ll also 
seek to answer a handful of questions that continue to nag other observers: why Goldman 
performed so well (relatively speaking) during the financial crisis, what role Lloyd Blankfein and 
the trading culture he is associated with played in the change, and why clients continue to flock 
to Goldman. 
This book isn’t intended as a history of Goldman—there are several authors who have 
admirably tackled that job (and without which this study would not be possible)—but I have also 
included a Goldman timeline and short biographies on selected Goldman executives  
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Chapter 2 
Shared Principles and Values 
In 1979, Goldman Co-Senior Partner John Whitehead wrote down the firm’s principles 
“one Sunday afternoon.” Whitehead explained, “In the first draft, there were ten principles, and 
somebody told me that it looked too much like the Ten Commandments, so I made it into twelve. 
I believe it’s up to fourteen now, because the lawyers got hold of it and they’ve changed a few 
words and added to it a little bit.”1 Although he helped bring in deal after deal and helped make 
strategic decisions for Goldman, Whitehead said that committing the firm’s values to words on 
paper was his greatest contribution.2 More than anything else, it was a statement about the 
perceived power of the codified values to nourish and support the partnership culture. 3 
 From my interview with those who were partners in the 1980s, it is apparent that all of 
them thought the principles reflected that culture and agreed with and relied upon them, which 
they believed allowed the firm to be less hierarchical than its peers.4 Although many firms now 
have codified principles of ethical behavior (some more revered than others), Whitehead’s 
commandments were revolutionary for the Wall Street at the time.5 The principles promoted 
cohesiveness in a firm with decentralized management, among Goldman partners who were 
owners and managers of businesses. 
The list of twelve principles was approved by the management committee—which is 
responsible for policy, strategy, and management of the business and is chaired by the head of 
the firm—and was then distributed to every Goldman employee. A copy was sent to each 
employee’s home as well to help family members understand and cope with the long hours and 
extensive travel demanded of their loved ones.6 Whitehead’s hope was that family members 
would be proud of their association with an ethical firm that espoused high standards, and that 
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employees—especially new partners with heavy travel schedules—would feel less guilty about 
spending so much time away from home.7 Goldman managers were expected to hold quarterly 
group meetings for the sole purpose of discussing the firm’s values and principles as they applied 
to the group’s own business.8 When I started at Goldman in 1992, it was typical, when 
introducing ourselves and the firm in initial meetings with clients, to include the “Firm 
Principles” on the first page of the presentation (essentially a sales pitch), letting the clients know 
what differentiated Goldman from its competitors.9 
By the time of the tech boom in the late 1990s, the practice of managers holding regular 
meetings to specifically discuss the principles seems to have been discontinued, although they 
were certainly discussed in general meetings and in training sessions. One current  
Goldman partner told me that the principles are still talked about and discussed.10 They have not 
been abandoned, but he believes they are not as revered as they once were. He told me he could 
not recall seeing the principles hanging on the walls like they used to, although they can be found 
in annual reports and on Goldman’s website. However, the partner explained that with the recent 
regulatory and legal scrutiny, along with media attention, there is a renewed focus and more 
training sessions on the business principles. 
Goldman’s principles were modified slightly over the years when, as Whitehead put it, 
the lawyers got hold of them. I also remember when a fellow analyst wrote a memo in 1992 
pointing out grammar and punctuation errors in the principles and sent it to a member of the 
management committee. I believe a few of his recommended changes were made. As mentioned 
earlier, the most significant modification to the list of principles, made just before Goldman went 
public, was the addition of the principle related to returns to shareholders, which was given 
prominence by being listed third. 
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Here are the principles (as updated, now including fourteen): 
1. Our clients’ interests always come first. Our experience shows that if we serve our clients 
well, our own success will follow. 
2. Our assets are our people, capital and reputation. If any of these is ever diminished, the last is 
the most difficult to restore. We are dedicated to complying fully with the letter and spirit of the 
laws, rules and ethical principles that govern us. Our continued success depends upon 
unswerving adherence to this standard. 
3. Our goal is to provide superior returns to our shareholders. Profitability is critical to 
achieving superior returns, building our capital, and attracting and keeping our best people. 
Significant employee stock ownership aligns the interests of our employees and our 
shareholders. 
4. We take great pride in the professional quality of our work. We have an uncompromising 
determination to achieve excellence in everything we undertake. Though we may be involved in 
a wide variety and heavy volume of activity, we would, if it came to a choice, rather be best than 
biggest. 
5. We stress creativity and imagination in everything we do. While recognizing that the old way 
may still be the best way, we constantly strive to find a better solution to a client’s problems.  
We pride ourselves on having pioneered many of the practices and techniques that have become 
standard in the industry. 
6. We make an unusual effort to identify and recruit the very best person for every job. Although 
our activities are measured in billions of dollars, we select our people one by one. In a service 
business, we know that without the best people, we cannot be the best firm. 
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7. We offer our people the opportunity to move ahead more rapidly than is possible at most other 
places. Advancement depends on merit and we have yet to find the limits to the responsibility 
our best people are able to assume. For us to be successful, our men and women must reflect the 
diversity of the communities and cultures in which we operate. That means we must attract, 
retain and motivate people from many backgrounds and perspectives. Being diverse is not 
optional; it is what we must be. 
8. We stress teamwork in everything we do. While individual creativity is always encouraged, we 
have found that team effort often produces the best results. We have no room for those who put 
their personal interests ahead of the interests of the firm and its clients. 
9. The dedication of our people to the firm and the intense effort they give their jobs are greater 
than one finds in most other organizations. We think that this is an important part of our success. 
10. We consider our size as an asset that we try hard to preserve. We want to be big enough to 
undertake the largest project that any of our clients could contemplate, yet small enough to 
maintain the loyalty, the intimacy and the esprit de corps that we all treasure and that contribute 
greatly to our success. 
11. We constantly strive to anticipate the rapidly changing needs of our clients and to develop 
new services to meet those needs. We know that the world of finance will not stand still and that 
complacency can lead to extinction. 
12. We regularly receive confidential information as part of our normal client relationships. To 
breach a confidence or to use confidential information improperly or carelessly would be 
unthinkable. 
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13. Our business is highly competitive, and we aggressively seek to expand our client 
relationships. However, we must always be fair competitors and must never denigrate other 
firms. 
14. Integrity and honesty are at the heart of our business. We expect our people to maintain high 
ethical standards in everything they do, both in their work for the firm and in their personal lives. 
The emphasis on the principles helped distinguish the firm, and over the years, most 
successful interview candidates were very familiar with them. The principles guided thousands 
of interactions each day—interactions that put the firm’s reputation and partners’ capital at risk.11 
One senior partner said, “As a small firm, we passed on our shared ideals and culture in an 
avuncular style. Everyone sat next to someone who was very experienced and had been there a 
long time. We were very small, concentrated in a few offices around the United States, so it was 
easy to do . . . Every boss I ever had worked harder than I did . . . This is a really good business 
and it’s also a pleasant place to work, if you select the right people on the way in.”12 Goldman’s 
principles also provided a way to substantiate the firm’s trustworthiness in the eyes of clients and 
potential candidates. 
The principles, combined with actual strategic business practice and policy decisions 
(such as not representing hostile raiders, as I discuss later), created for Goldman a powerful 
“good guy” image—both internally and externally. In 1984, a Morgan Stanley banker even 
publicly conceded that the principles and resulting practices made clients perceive Goldman as 
“less mercenary and more trustworthy than Morgan Stanley.”13 
The ultimate fate of the Water Street Corporate Recovery Fund provides a good example 
of Goldman’s sensitivity to the potential impact of its strategic business decisions on the firm’s 
reputation after the principles were written. In 1989, two Goldman partners convinced the 
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management committee to commit as much as $100 million of the firm’s money toward starting 
Water Street, a fund that bought controlling blocks of distressed high-yield junk bonds. The fund 
began soliciting outside investors in April 1990, with the goal of raising $400 million. Within a 
few months, Goldman had raised almost $700 million and stopped accepting investments. The 
partners were willing to give Water Street four years to see whether it could produce an annual 
return of 25 percent to 35 percent.14 However, several corporate executives and large money-
management firms complained to Goldman that the fund was a “vulture” investing business, 
claiming it was in direct conflict with the firm’s reputation for acting at all times in the best 
interests of clients. The executives were particularly concerned that the fund was also being run 
by someone who was actively involved in Goldman’s corporate finance advisory business. The 
dual roles would potentially allow the Water Street Fund to access confidential information from 
investment banking clients that it could use to benefit its investing. Nine of the twenty-one Water 
Street investments were in current or former clients. Even though the fund was making a lot of 
money for Goldman, the management committee, advised by John L. Weinberg, shut it down. At 
the time, investing clients who bought stocks and bonds also were threatening to boycott 
Goldman’s trading desks because of their concern about potential conflicts (although many 
discounted that would actually happen). John L. was concerned that clients thought the fund 
violated Goldman’s number one principle. According to partners I interviewed, the firm’s 
decision to shut the fund down sent a powerful message, internally, especially considering how 
profitable the fund was. Many clients at the time also felt it sent a powerful message 
differentiating the firm from the principles of its competitors.  
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Best and Brightest 
Goldman’s corporate ethos, its common value system, John L. called “the glue that holds 
the firm together.”15 Goldman executives were conscious of sustaining this culture when 
recruiting and tried to hire the best of the best, but not just for their intelligence, drive, or 
experience. The partners looked for people who fit a certain profile: people who had all the 
requisite skills and knowledge, were hardworking and driven, and also espoused a value system 
consistent with Goldman’s.16 New hires were immersed in the Goldman culture and encouraged  
to apply their preexisting values and principles in a business context. 
Goldman was not known as the highest payer on Wall Street for entry-level positions, 
and yet talented people often prioritized working for Goldman. Interviews revealed that they 
were attracted by the allure of partnership and the feeling that the firm’s culture of putting 
clients’ interests first and being long-term greedy was different from the other firms on Wall 
Street. They pointed to the principles and the firm’s actions and policies, along with stories and 
lore that reinforced this differentiation. 
Although many firms had high hiring standards, they did not as regularly send senior 
executives to college campuses to interview potential recruits. In the 1980s and 1990s, this was a 
critical part of a Goldman executive’s job, an outward expression of the company’s passion and 
culture. It was one of the roles of a culture carrier—someone who always put the firm and clients 
first, had the right priorities, cared about the firm’s reputation, and put the firm’s principles and 
long-term goals before short-term profits.17 
Whitehead described Jimmy Weinberg, brother of John L.  
Weinberg, as “one of the most important culture carriers . . . He was an advocate of team play, 
no internal ugly competition, service to customers, putting the customers’ interests before the 
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firm’s interests and all of those good things that make a partnership.”18 In a speech to the 
partnership, a partner stated, “Hiring the right people is the most important contribution you can 
make. Hire people better than yourself.”19 
Partners wanted people smarter even than they were, but they also wanted recruits who 
shared their values. The relatively low wages paid during employees’ early years, partners 
thought, fostered an appropriately long-term perspective.20 To this end, sometimes twenty or 
more employees, including several partners, often interviewed successful candidates. Whitehead 
told me that during his time, a potential candidate also had to be interviewed and approved by at 
least one secretarial assistant, because how one treated assistants was considered important. It 
showed one’s values. Sometimes the interview process itself weeded out candidates better suited 
to a firm where “individual performance was applauded and assimilation was less important.”21 
Author Charles Ellis notes that “extensive interviewing was becoming a firm tradition . . . It gave 
the firm multiple opportunities to assess a recruit’s capabilities, interests, and personal fit with 
the firm . . . ‘You could say that our commitment to interviewing was carried through to a 
fault.’”22 
Whitehead was clear that, as a service business, Goldman needed to select the best people 
if it was to be the best firm: “Recruiting is the most important thing we can ever do. And if we 
ever stop recruiting very well, within just five years, we will be on that slippery down slope, 
doomed to mediocrity.”23 Active participation by the most senior partners underscored 
Goldman’s emphasis on hiring the best people.24 
Goldman also made sure that the future leaders devoted a “material” amount of time to 
recruiting. Rob Kaplan—who joined Goldman in 1983, went on to run investment banking, and 
retired as a vice chairman—credits Goldman’s recruiting process with helping build a 
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“powerhouse operation.” He describes his impressions of the process: “I grew up [at Goldman]. 
We identified attracting, retaining, and developing superb talent as a critical priority. As a junior 
person, I was enormously impressed that the very senior leaders of the firm were willing to 
interview candidates and attend recruiting events on a regular basis. I learned from their example 
that there wasn’t anything more important than recruiting and developing talent.”25 
As evidence of his commitment to recruiting, Whitehead personally conducted on-
campus interviews. The qualities he looked for in potential recruits were “brains, leadership 
potential, and ambition in roughly equal parts.”26 
During a meeting I challenged him, saying that every firm claims to look for these 
qualities. “What about values?” I said. 
Whitehead told me that he had overlooked the word values because it should have been 
obvious that Goldman would hire only people who exhibited values like the firm’s. To him, it 
was the first prerequisite for employment—and the firm dedicated senior people to the task. 
Most importantly, he wanted people who shared the Goldman values and were willing to act in 
concert with its ethical principles both within the firm and in interactions with clients. For 
example, the boasting and displays of ego common on Wall Street were not welcome at 
Goldman; offenders were quickly reminded that their accomplishments were possible only 
because of everyone’s hard work and contributions. Whitehead once admonished an associate for 
saying “I” rather than “we.”27 When I interviewed him, Whitehead himself used “we” instead of 
“I.” To this day, my wife and non-Goldman friends tease me for the same subconscious 
substitution—it is that ingrained. 
Goldman’s practice was to hire directly from top business schools rather than from other 
firms because recent MBAs were more malleable; the “plasticity” of a young MBA’s character 
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made it easier to inculcate the Goldman ethos.28 The firm’s recruiting focused on merit rather 
than pedigree.29 A privileged background was often a strike against a candidate: it was thought 
that perhaps he or she might not work as hard or be as careful with money as someone who had 
not come from wealth. 
My own experience in interviewing for my job at Goldman in 1992 told me, in no 
uncertain terms, exactly what Goldman valued in an employee. A partner who interviewed me 
explained that I would regularly have to work one hundred hours a week—until two or three 
o’clock in the morning, Saturdays and Sundays included, and most holidays.30 I was then asked 
what I had done that demonstrated my ability to maintain that pace and still excel, so I explained 
that I had done well academically while playing two sports in college and performing community 
service. 
Playing team sports in college, serving in the military, performing public service, or 
being involved with the Boy Scouts or Girl Scouts were seen as big advantages at Goldman, 
because they demonstrated teamwork, discipline, and a sense of community and obligation to 
society. Teamwork is codified in Goldman’s principle 8 (“We stress teamwork in everything we 
do”), and discipline is implicit in principle 9 (regarding the “dedication of our people to the firm 
and the intense effort they give their jobs”). Interestingly, a sense of community and obligation 
to society is not written as a business principle, but it is so ingrained that almost every internal 
and external communication about the firm prominently describes and displays its “citizenship.” 
(For examples, see appendix E.) 
At the close of the interview, the partner asked me whether I had any questions as he 
filled out a form for human resources. “If I work until two or three o’clock in the morning, how 
will I get home?” I asked. “Are the subways open at that hour?” 
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He chuckled. “There are always Lincoln Town Cars lined up outside  
the building. You can take one of them home.” 
Coming from a middle-class Midwestern background, I had never heard of such a thing (I 
couldn’t contemplate someone else driving a car with me in the backseat), so I asked what I 
thought was a practical question: “So do I drive the car back when I come back in the morning?” 
He burst out laughing. While having trouble to stop laughing, he then explained that I 
would be “chauffeured” and dropped off at home. There he sat, with his sleeves rolled up on his 
white shirt, top button undone and back of his shirt slightly untucked, Brooks Brothers striped  
tie loosened a little. It was the standard look in M&A. You looked as if you were working hard. 
He leaned over and said, “Let me read what I wrote on your review form: ‘Lunch pail kind of 
guy—knows nothing but will kill himself for us—and smart enough so we can teach him.’” That 
was me in a nutshell—and just the kind of person Goldman wanted. 
I was surprised that other candidates and I were interviewed by the people they would 
work with, not human resources people. After completing ten or fifteen interviews, I got an offer 
the next day.Soon after I was hired, I was asked to review résumés from Midwestern schools for 
candidates to interview. When I was given hundreds of them bound in three-ring folders, I asked 
the vice president who had given me the assignment, “How should I go about choosing?” 
He shrugged and told me to take anyone who didn’t have a certain grade point average 
and SAT score and throw them out, and then get back to him.I did that, but I was still left with 
what still seemed like hundreds of résumés. So I asked, “Now what do I do?” 
“Take out anyone who doesn’t play a varsity sport or do something really exceptional or 
substantive in public service,” he told me, waving me out of his office.Once again I culled the 
folders, but still I had too many. So I went back again. 
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“Now throw out any that don’t have both sports and public service,  
and raise your grade and SAT requirements.”After this round, I came up with the thirty people 
we would interview to select the one or two who would get an offer. 
It seemed to me that a large percentage of people hired by Goldman in the United States 
had roots in the Midwest or in Judaism, and when I discussed this with Whitehead and others, 
they said that there was no conscious effort to hire to a certain ethnic or regional profile; it was 
most likely only that people are attracted to people who have similar values and backgrounds. 
The similarities in backgrounds can be seen in this list of the past five CEOs or senior partners: 
• Lloyd Blankfein: Jewish; raised in New York public housing in the Bronx 
• Hank Paulson: Christian Scientist; raised in Barrington Hills, Illinois, on a farm; played 
football in college; Eagle Scout; worked in the government before joining Goldman 
• Jon Corzine: Church of Christ; raised on a farm in Central Illinois; football quarterback and 
basketball captain in high school 
• Stephen Friedman: Jewish; on his college wrestling team 
• Robert Rubin: Jewish; Eagle Scout 
Partners modeled and reinforced the desired behaviors and delivered “sermonettes of 
perceived wisdom” as deemed appropriate.31 French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu argued that in 
analyzing any society, as well as a firm’s culture, what matters “is not merely what is publicly 
discussed, but what is not mentioned in public . . . Areas of social silence, in other words, are 
crucial to supporting a story that a society is telling itself.”32 The written principles were 
important, but it is how they were interpreted and put into action—brought alive each day—that 
really mattered. The Goldman partners reinforced the importance of the values by their actions; 
they didn’t need to be specifically mentioned because they were understood by watching. The 
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way these CEOs and partners acted, dressed, and behaved reinforced unwritten norms or 
uncodified principles. The men at the top wore Timex watches and not Rolexes (and this is 
before Ironman watches were fashionable). Partners did not wear expensive suits or drive fancy 
cars (most drove Fords because it was such a good client and many partners got a special 
discount). They lived relatively modestly, considering their wealth. It was simply not in the ethos 
to be flashy but rather to be understated, with Midwestern restraint. 
The archetype for proper behavior was John L. Weinberg: “Revered by his partners and 
trusted by the firm’s blue-chip corporate clients, he was entirely without pretension, he spoke 
blunt common sense, [and] wore off-the-peg suits.”33 
The unwritten commandment to keep a low profile was not, until rather recently, violated 
casually. In the early 1990s, an analyst was riding in a taxi past the famous and pricey Le Cirque 
restaurant in New York when he spotted a low-key Goldman vice president standing outside. To 
tease the VP in a funny, friendly way, the analyst rolled down the cab window and yelled out 
several times, “VP at Goldman Sachs!” Clearly, the subtext was, “VP at Goldman Sachs dining 
extravagantly at an elite restaurant!” The VP took it so seriously that the next morning he called 
the analyst into his office, along with a few of the analyst’s friends (including me), who, he 
correctly assumed, had already heard the funny story. The VP explained that he had been invited 
to Le Cirque by his girlfriend’s parents and that he would never have gone there on his own. 
Then he asked us to please not tell anyone or discuss (or joke about) the matter further. 
The low-key imperative extended even to the modest Goldman offices. Goldman did not 
want clients to view an ostentatious display of corporate wealth, fearing it would be seen as an 
indication that the fees for the firm’s services were too high or that the firm had the wrong 
priorities.34 
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When I started at the firm, there was no sign bearing the name Goldman Sachs when one 
entered 85 Broad Street; behind the reception desk there just was a list of the partners’ names 
and floor numbers. There was even a floor for retired partners, but their names were not listed 
individually, the label for that floor just said, “Limited Partners” and a floor number. Even the 
twenty-second-floor offices of the senior partners were relatively modest, with the elevator doors 
opening to a gallery of senior partners’ portraits. It all served to reinforce the message: keep a 
low profile, respect the history, and remember whose money is at risk here. Such organizational 
humility, combined with the business principles and a drive for excellence, helped Goldman 
develop strong client relationships and allowed the firm’s culture to hold materialism at bay for a 
long time. 
There was also an ethic that talking about compensation was taboo, although no one ever 
actually said so. Almost all of us had our sights set on partnership, and we were certainly curious 
about how our compensation stacked up against that of others, but no one ever directly asked. 
One class of vice presidents had an interesting approach. Each year, all the members of 
that class got together and anonymously wrote their compensation figures on a slip of paper and 
dropped the paper into a bowl. The slips were then extracted randomly and read aloud to the 
group. In that way, no one knew exactly how much each person was making, but they knew the 
range and could figure out where they fell within it. I learned the range was less than 5 percent to 
10 percent from the highest to the lowest (a remarkably narrow range by today’s standards), and 
this represented that the firm equally valued each person’s contribution and the equally high 
level of talent and hard work. I remember thinking the firm’s policy on compensation range was 
almost “socialist.” 
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Family Values 
The firm also instilled a feeling of “family.” Goldman inculcated its values in other ways 
as well. When I started, I was assigned a “big buddy” who had graduated from business school 
and worked at Goldman for a few years to work with me on my first few projects. Big buddy 
relationships could be traced like a family tree: my big buddy had a big buddy, and so on. He 
also had little buddies like me. We were “related,” and one could essentially trace his 
“ancestors.” It was an informal network, and people had a sense of pride in their lineage of 
buddies. 
Fortunately, my big buddy was great (as were my several little buddies). He had been an 
athlete at a small college, worked as an accountant, and pushed his way through to an Ivy League 
business school and into Goldman. Someone told me that when my big buddy had been a 
summer associate, he essentially slept under the desk in his cubicle because he wanted to make 
sure he would get a full-time offer. When I sheepishly asked another associate whether the story 
was true, he scoffed and said, “Of course not.” 
I was relieved. Then he walked me to the other side of the floor, to the office of  
Peter Sachs (a descendent of the original Sachs). He pointed, smiling, to a worn leather couch 
and advised me to take short naps there when pulling all-nighters, adding, “It’s a lot more 
comfortable than a cubicle.” 
In addition to teaching me financial analysis, my big buddy gave me hints about what to 
wear and how to act. His general advice was don’t do or wear anything to draw attention to 
myself. 
I also was assigned a mentor—a vice president—who was supposed to speak to me about 
my career and give me a senior connection to the firm. If my big buddy was like an older brother 
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figure, my mentor was like a father figure. He took me to lunch or dinner periodically and told 
me which projects I should work on and with whom. He also spoke to other senior people to get 
me assignments that would help me improve. In addition, I sat in a cubicle right outside a 
partner’s office, and we shared the same assistant. 
My mentor told me that everyone was expected to accept any social invitation from 
another Goldman employee (not to mention attending every department or firm meeting or 
function). He told me there was no excuse for missing a wedding, funeral, bar or bat mitzvah, or 
christening. My London wedding in 1998, when I was an associate, was attended by the head of 
my department, one of the co-heads of banking, and a member of the management committee. 
After seeing how my mentor and the partners worked, I certainly didn’t need codified 
business principles to understand the ethic. One partner literally had holes in the soles of his 
shoes. My mentor had holes in the elbows of his shirt. Both worked twelve- to fourteen- 
hour days and on the weekends. I once had to call a partner at his home on Christmas Day to ask 
him a question and got no complaints.  
My mentor had an L.L.Bean canvas briefcase, and one of the partners carried his things 
and paperwork in a large brown paper bag. I was afraid to carry the new leather briefcase my 
parents had given me for college graduation. And I made sure I was in the office before my  
mentor and the partners, and I left after they did. 
When I started at Goldman, I was handed a two-hundred-page, green-covered directory 
with every employee’s and partner’s home address and work and home phone numbers (cell 
phones were not widespread, and e-mail was years away from being used at Goldman) as well as 
summer or weekend contact information. Obviously, having readily available contact 
information increased efficiency, but the other message was that you were expected to be 
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reachable at all times—no matter who you were. The directory seemed like a club book, and it 
reinforced the feeling of being in a family, adding to the flatness of the organization. 
One implication of the value of keeping a low profile was that there were to be no 
superstars.35 The implicit proscription of displays of ego extended beyond office walls. Unlike 
other investment banks, which allowed their bankers to be quoted by the media, Goldman 
preferred its M&A bankers to be “anonymous executers of transactions.” The unspoken message 
was clear to all: “No one is more important than the firm.”36 
Goldman also invested serious time and effort in training. Most analysts and associates 
joining Goldman from school are trained over weeks to learn the firm’s history, expectations, 
processes and procedures, and organizational structure. The primary intent is the socialization of 
new members. During my training, various Goldman executives came and spoke about the 
Goldman history and their departments. Junior people gave talks about their jobs and explained 
how to be successful at Goldman. There were group dinners and cocktail parties. We learned 
specifics that would help us in our day-to-day jobs, such as Excel spreadsheet-modeling skills, 
but it was also a way for new people to gain exposure to various people and departments that 
would help trainees think about problems or provide information to help clients. The people we 
were in training with were our “class,” and we developed a strong identity as members of our 
class. You would also be evaluated by comparison to those in your class. Even with the implicit 
competition, we felt a great camaraderie. My twenty-year class reunion party in 2012, sponsored 
by Goldman, drew people from all over the world. Retired senior partners also attended. 
After the initial sessions, Goldman provided constant formal training: tools to do the job 
better, updates on product innovations or trends, information about how to be a better interviewer 
or mentor, training on how to better provide clients with full solutions and not only a product 
	   	   	   63	  
solution, and updates on compliance and legal issues as well as best practices. Not a month went 
by without some sort of formal training. We also had outside guest speakers to talk about 
specific topics. As we progressed in our careers, we received specialized training for any 
promotions—usually followed by a cocktail party in which partners congratulated us, perhaps 
followed by handwritten notes of congratulations from various partners. In addition to training, 
we attended many department functions, including holiday parties, strategy sessions, outdoor 
bonding exercises, and picnics—even group trips to the beach or skiing (often, spouses were 
invited). 
Goldman also strongly encouraged participation in community and public service. Most 
people looked up to and admired Goldman employees who went on to public service, and those 
who were hired from government. You were expected to participate in Goldman’s  
Community Teamworks program, an initiative that allows employees to take a day out of the 
office and spend it volunteering with local nonprofit organizations. The firm also matched the 
charitable contributions of employees, and partners generously gave to their alma maters and 
other nonprofit organizations. In some interviews, partners explained that citizenship had 
multiple purposes: to do good, to make people feel good about where they worked, and, 
admittedly, to extend Goldman’s network. 
Long-Term Greed 
Goldman’s foremost principle—of “clients’ interests first”—entails doing what is best for the 
client, regardless of the size of the fee (whether it will be received now or later) and never 
suggesting deals to clients specifically to generate fees. Putting clients first requires a 
commitment to the honesty and diplomatic candor that enable clients to trust Goldman to honor 
confidentiality of information, provide reliable advice, and not pull any punches. This honesty 
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was a hallmark of Goldman’s earlier days, and the firm’s reputation for ethical behavior 
distinguished it among Wall Street firms.37 
When I was a financial analyst, we were asked to review the strategic alternatives for a 
division of an industrial company. Internally, we informally gathered about a dozen M&A 
bankers and debated the best courses of action for the client. During the discussion, a young 
associate revealed something the CFO had said: that the client CEO thought the division in 
question should be sold, and pointed to the data and analysis that would substantiate this point of 
view. Goldman would collect a fee if the division sold. 
The vice president who was assigned to advise the company patiently listened and then 
snapped, “The CEO hired us for our unbiased advice, and not to justify what he thinks.” 
We incorporated the group’s suggestions and then spent days going from one partner’s 
office to another, discussing the merits of various courses of action. I was impressed that all 
these partners would take the time to listen to discussions about a situation in which they were 
not involved—to help us get to the best advice and teach us how to think about the issues. 
In the meeting with the client CEO, the Goldman vice president presented the various 
alternatives. He concluded by recommending that the CEO not sell the division at that time, 
because there was a good probability it would be worth more in the future. Then there was an 
awkward silence. The client CEO complimented the team for the quality of its work and then 
said Goldman was the only bank that did not recommend a sale. Unexpectedly, he called a few 
days later. He decided to wait and continue executing the business plan. 
A few years later, that same division had doubled its profits, and Goldman was hired to 
sell the entire company. 
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The Goldman approach in this case was consistent with Steve Friedman’s description of 
Jimmy Weinberg: “He just had a great demeanor, and people would develop confidence in him 
because he wasn’t pandering to them, he would tell them what he thought.”38 I interviewed 
several Goldman clients from the 1980s, and there was a general consensus that typically 
Goldman did emphasize unbiased advice. 
Devotion to Client Service 
The values of integrity and honesty are codified in the last of Goldman’s business principles as 
being “at the heart” of the business. In the eyes of the partners during the Weinberg and 
Whitehead days, the firm’s reputation for ethical behavior was a competitive asset and crucial to 
the firm’s success. It was the right thing to do, and it made good long-term business sense. They 
recognized the value of their reputational capital.39 
Integrity was the favorite word of longtime Goldman head Sidney  
Weinberg, and he defined it as a combination of being honest and putting the interests of clients 
first. As one partner observed, “Mistakes were quite forgivable, but dishonesty was 
unpardonable.”40 John Whitehead explains: “Our industry is one in which the services of the 
leading investment bankers are all pretty much the same. So, I’ve always believed that one’s 
reputation is extremely important and that decisions are often made according to the general 
reputation a firm has, not so much by the fact that they will perform a service a little cheaper and 
a little faster. Reputation is what matters.”41 
When describing Jimmy Weinberg, Tom Murphy, former chairman and CEO of Capital 
Cities/ABC, said, “His clients were his friends . . . His whole reputation in the business world 
was as a person of honesty and integrity.”42 
	   	   	   66	  
Whitehead expressed the strategy behind the philosophy this way: “We thought that if 
our clients did well, we would do well.”43 Together with the emphasis on maintaining a 
“steadfast” focus on the long term, this almost religious devotion to clients’ interests and service 
was largely responsible for Goldman’s success. 
Gus Levy, a senior partner at Goldman from 1969 until his death in 1976, originated the 
maxim, mentioned earlier, that expressed the proper attitude for Goldman partners: “greedy, but 
long-term greedy.”44 These words helped remind partners to focus on the future, as evidenced by 
the nearly 100 percent reinvestment of partners’ earnings. One author interprets Goldman’s long-
term greedy mantra to mean that “while the firm worked in its own interest, it did so in a manner 
consistent with the long-term health of its industry, business, and clients.”45 This was not purely 
a matter of altruism. Goldman existed to make money for its partners, not only at the moment but 
also for years to come. Goldman cultivated an image of responsibility, trust, and restraint by 
intimating that the firm held itself to a higher standard than other firms.46 
The emphasis on long-term greedy also explains in part why employees were willing to 
work grueling hours for relatively modest wages. In the long term, if they made partner they 
would more than make up for the sacrifice. Lower wages in one’s early years with the firm were 
part of Goldman’s strategy for success—part of the business model—because the less that was 
paid to nonpartners, the more the partners got paid.47 Goldman got its employees to buy into 
long-term greedy for themselves, and the Goldman culture was distinctive enough that people 
wanted to work there even if they worked harder and for less money than did competitors. 
Many of the partners I interviewed cautioned me that Goldman was not always all about 
teamwork, collaboration, and shared values. Hiring mistakes were made. Indiscretions were dealt 
with. Politics did enter into the picture the further one moved up, and there were sharp elbows. 
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But in the end, the principles generally won out. People came and went, but generally the culture 
and principles remained. Just as the policy of not advising hostile raiders (see chapter 5) and 
keeping the client first were good business decisions, so was getting people to buy into a culture 
and a purpose—it made the partners (who were certainly greedy) more money over time and 
helped sustain the money machine for the next generation. 
Very few people left Goldman voluntarily. When I was an analyst, in the early 1990s, a 
respected associate decided to leave and join his father’s business, and we had a department 
meeting to discuss this shocking event. The purpose of the session was to make us feel that in 
this one instance, it was acceptable; he was going to work with his family, and that was just 
barely excusable. I would have thought that many people would leave because of the lower pay 
than peers and the slim chances of becoming a partner. But voluntary turnover was less than 5 
percent, I was told—significantly below the industry average in the 20 percent range. 
Generally, Goldman bankers obsessed more about making partner and their relative 
compensation than they did about their absolute compensation. Their social identity was so 
bound up, through their socialization at the firm, with what Goldman valued, that bankers 
routinely turned down multiyear guaranteed contracts for significantly more money at other 
firms, even when the possibility that they would make partner at Goldman was, according to my 
interviews, less than 5 percent to 10 percent.48 After their socialization into Goldman, working 
at any other firm, regardless of the title or compensation, would seem to them a step down, 
according to many of the people I interviewed.49 
Goldman bankers were also generally convinced that they were the best—that they 
worked at the best firm, with the best people, and with the best brand. At the same time, they 
were convinced that teamwork and a team relationship with clients were so important that their 
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own value as bankers outside Goldman would be diminished. The socialization process made 
well-educated, thoughtful, talented people believe that Goldman made them better bankers than 
they could be elsewhere. Blankfein summarized the culture as “an interesting blend of 
confidence and commitment to excellence, and an inbred insecurity that drives people to keep 
working.”50 Although it seems he was talking about an insecurity that motivated people to keep 
working harder and longer, this inbred insecurity is a paradox. 
Nostalgia 
I do not want to wax nostalgically about the good old days. I did on occasion observe 
vice presidents and partners acting in a way that might not be considered in the best interests of 
clients, though those were exceptions to the rule. For example, I remember working with an 
associate on a project advising a company that was buying a small subsidiary of another 
company. The partner was extremely busy and traveling, and although we sent him our analysis 
and kept scheduling calls to speak to him, he always canceled our discussions. He showed up 
less than a few hours before our client meeting, and, based on his questions, it appeared as if he 
had not read anything we sent him and was not prepared. This surprised me, because usually 
partners were highly detail oriented and well prepared. 
He asked us for our valuation analysis, the value of the synergies, and the price the seller 
wanted. The asking price was higher than our valuation analysis (a breakdown that is more art 
than science). Moreover, our estimates of the potential synergies (the cost savings and revenue 
enhancement resulting from the deal), which meaningfully impacted the value, were highly 
subjective. When we met with the client CEO, the Goldman partner claimed that he had “been 
poring over the numbers all day and night” and he thought that if the company could buy the 
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business at X price (coincidentally, the asking price we’d told the partner), then it was a good 
deal for strategic reasons. 
When he said this, the associate and I looked at each other and then looked down. I 
reasoned that he might have been poring over the numbers without my knowledge, or maybe he 
meant “the team” had been. The deal ultimately got done; Goldman was paid a fee; and the 
partner was right—it was a strategic success, and the synergies justified the price. But it was one 
of the few times when I was junior that I privately questioned the approach. As for the other 
junior associate, we never really discussed what the partner had said.51 
A few times I questioned coworkers directly when I felt it was appropriate. For example, 
I was tangentially helping a team led by a vice president in selling a company, and when the final 
bids and contracts were due from all the potential buyers at the same time in a sort of sealed 
auction process, only one buyer submitted a bid, and the bid price was less than the amount our 
client was willing to sell for. It seemed to be a delicate situation, because we had little 
negotiating leverage to persuade the only potential buyer to pay more. Also, the bidder was a 
good client of Goldman’s. However, the vice president called the sole bidder and said, “We had 
a number of bids” and told the bidder that to win the auction, he would have to raise his bid. 
I questioned him, and based on his facial expression and the tone of his response, I don’t 
think he appreciated my inquisitiveness. He pointed out to me that he had said “a number of 
bids,” and “in this instance, the number is one.” 
Ultimately, the bidder raised his price and ended up buying the company. When the vice 
president told the client exactly what he had done and said, the client chuckled approvingly.52 
Then there are things I was uncomfortable with that I never raised through the proper 
channels—by speaking with vice presidents, partners, my big buddy, or my mentor, or by writing 
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about the issues in “confidential and anonymous” reviews and surveys. Maybe it was because I 
didn’t trust the system or didn’t know how people would react. Maybe I was worried about 
developing a reputation as a tattletale or, worse, losing my job—something I couldn’t afford. 
Stories were quietly discussed and passed down—stories of people having challenged behavior 
or things said in confidence that got back to the wrong people, and then slowly and subtly those 
people would be “transitioned out.” Ironically, sometimes the guilty parties were characterized as 
not being team players or not embodying the culture when he or she left or was demoted. I was 
trying to figure out what was right and what was wrong—what was acceptable and what 
wasn’t—which, it seemed, wasn’t always black and white. In the story just related, the client 
seemed happy and the vice president didn’t “technically lie.” Technically, one could rationalize, 
we did put our client’s interests first. 
But, as said, these examples were exceptions. The vast majority of the time that I worked 
in banking, the people with whom I worked did not rely on technicalities to determine what was 
right or wrong. I once joked to a friend that if someone found a nickel on the floor of the 
Goldman M&A department in 1992, he or she would go so far above and beyond what was 
required as to put up a “found” poster with a nickel taped to it, something that seems crazy 
anywhere, let alone on Wall Street. But in retrospect, “a number of bids” should have alerted me 
to the fact that there were multiple moralities or interpretations and that sometimes people might 
be obeying the letter of the law while violating its spirit, and rationalizing their behavior.53 
Old School 
At its best, Goldman enjoyed a reputation for honesty, integrity, and unquestioned 
commitment to serving the best interests of its clients, and at the same time enjoyed superior 
financial results. Critical to the firm’s success were the principles and values, both codified and 
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uncodified, intended to guide behavior, communicate the essence of the firm, and aid in the 
socialization of new employees, and a partnership culture that emphasized social cohesion and 
teamwork. Recruitment sought to bring in people perceived to share the values, and the meaning 
of “long-term greedy” was taught and practiced. Sharing information and getting input from 
others were important, as was the socialization that the firm was a part of you and your success. 
In chapter 3, I discuss the importance of the partnership structure and explain how it 
supported financial interdependence and provided opportunities for productive debate and 
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Chapter 3 
 
The Structure of the Partnership 
 
When I was a Goldman associate in the late 1990s, I was asked to prepare materials for 
and attend a meeting with a senior partner and an unhappy client. It was unclear whether the 
client was not happy with the firm or with the junior partner in charge of the relationship, so the 
junior partner was asked not to attend. 
During the meeting, the client, a CEO, said he thought very highly of Goldman but that 
he felt the junior partner in charge had acted inappropriately by speaking to one of his board 
members about something that the client felt should have been directed to him first. And when 
the board member called the CEO, the client was caught off guard. The client told us that if that 
junior partner continued to work on his Goldman banking team, Goldman would get no more 
business from him. At this point the senior partner, to appease the client, could easily have 
thrown the junior partner in charge under the bus and agreed to remove him from the team. 
Instead, his actions defined for me what partnership meant. 
The senior partner told the client that he had known and worked with the junior partner in 
question for more than fifteen years and that he had the highest respect of his clients and the 
other partners. There must have been, he asserted, some sort of misunderstanding.  
He would be willing to consider replacing the partner only if the client would agree to have a cup 
of coffee with the junior partner in question to discuss in person what happened. And if the client 
would not agree to this, he said, then there was no reason for Goldman to have a relationship 
with him. 
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The client had paid the firm millions of dollars over the years, and now the senior partner 
was willing to walk away from the relationship and sacrifice future fees because his partner’s 
integrity was being questioned. That was what partnership meant at Goldman. 
Today, Goldman, a public company for more than a dozen years, states on a document on 
its website, “Our culture is rooted in our history as a partnership when business decisions were 
conducted by consensus.” In a diagram on a page titled “The History of Our Culture: Our  
Governance Foundation,” the partnership culture is shown at the center of Goldman’s structure, 
guiding behavior through formally stated business principles and corporate governance 
practices.1 Surrounding this are four quarter-circles—labeled “Values,” “Ownership,”  
“Teamwork,” and “Public Service”—connected, respectively, with arrows suggesting their 
relationships. Clearly, Goldman’s leaders recognize how important the partnership legacy is to 
the firm’s success. (See appendix H.) 
The elements of its value system were embodied in the firm’s organizational structure of 
ownership and culture. Because the two things went hand-in-hand, both were inextricably bound 
with the concept and practice of partnership. Values, public service, teamwork, and ownership 
were interconnected. 
Goldman’s partnership structure helped create and sustain its culture in several ways, 
including: 
• A formal process through which people became partners (or left the partnership) 
• A social network based on mutual trust and financial interdependence2 
• Opportunities for disagreement and discussion that informed decision making (“dissonance”) 
• Ownership of the firm by its partners 
• Having personal capital at risk 
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Although each of these structural characteristics is discussed sequentially here, they are 
interrelated. 
The Goldman Career Path 
When I started in investment banking in 1992, Goldman typically hired new college 
graduates as financial analysts. Financial analysts, who made a two-year commitment to the firm, 
did very junior work, usually supporting more-senior people. In their third year, excellent 
performers were sometimes offered an opportunity to stay for a year, and top performers might 
be invited to work in another group or geographic region of interest. However, to become an 
associate, the next step on the typical career path at Goldman, one had to leave, attend business 
school or law school, and then apply to return as an associate. Occasionally, financial analysts 
were directly promoted to associate, meaning that no graduate school or reapplication was 
necessary (that’s the path I was invited to take). 
Associates were typically hired right out of top business schools or law schools, and most 
of them spent their summer vacations working at Goldman, thereby allowing the firm to make 
sure there was a cultural as well as a performance fit. Associates did financial analysis but also 
spent time with clients and thinking more broadly about what was required for the client. After 
four years (if they hadn’t been transitioned out of the firm or to another group), most associates 
were automatically promoted to the title of vice president (“executive director” outside the 
United States). Vice presidents spent most of their time with clients and reviewed work done by 
analysts and associates. Typically, VPs worked with partners on larger deals or with larger 
clients. One way Goldman maintained its culture was through an elaborate employee review 
process begun in the early 1990s.3 The anonymous 360-degree reviews were so extensive, even 
for analysts completing their first year, that they sometimes filled a binder the size of a phone 
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book. As many as twenty people (managers and peers) contributed to the meticulous preparation, 
which included quantitative rankings, areas for comments, and also a self-review and statement 
of goals. The review meeting, conducted annually, was scheduled far enough in advance of 
decisions about compensation that it was not a discussion about compensation, but rather about 
performance and improvement. 
When I gave reviews as a business unit manager, people typically asked where they 
ranked in their class. By sitting in on reviews and in training sessions about giving reviews, I had 
learned to maneuver the discussion to methods for improvement and not relative class rankings 
or compensation. My understanding was that employees were supposed to leave the review 
feeling positive but, at the same time, with some degree of insecurity, knowing that they had 
things to work on, though no one ever formally discussed with me the rationale for (and the 
consequences of ) delivering this mix of positive and negative messages. In my experience, most 
people heard only the negative message, thus socializing the idea that they needed the firm  
more than the firm needed them. We also had less-formal six-month reviews, especially with 
more junior employees, to give timely feedback for improvement. 
Reviews became more sophisticated, quantitative, and professionalized during my years 
at Goldman. When I started in 1992, I never heard of a policy or ritual to cull the bottom 5 to 10 
percent of a class. The classes were very small, and there seemed to be little differentiation 
among the members. However, as classes became larger and some people were viewed as 
stronger than others, Goldman seemed to informally adopt the 5 to 10 percent policy (a policy 
often credited to Jack Welch, then CEO of General Electric). People who did not perform well 
enough were told in the annual review that they were in “the bottom quartile,” which at Goldman 
was interpreted as a professional way of saying one should start looking for a job elsewhere.  
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At the time, Goldman tried not to fire people outright but instead to give messages tactfully 
through reviews and compensation so that people could find another job. The trick in many ways 
was to convince the people not in the bottom quartile, but in the middle of their class, that they 
were on track for partner so that they were motivated, stayed focused, and did not leave. Though 
nearly all professionals at Goldman thought they were on the partnership track, in the back of 
their minds, typically they knew the chances were slim. Nonetheless they stayed.4 
Typically, it took four to six years as a vice president in investment banking to be 
considered seriously for partnership election. The election process served as a sort of “up or out” 
mechanism, because being up for partnership a few times and not making it was essentially a 
public message about one’s future with the firm. Being denied partnership too many times could 
damage one’s external market value, so getting turned down for partnership the first time 
presented a difficult decision. One rejection could be rationalized, but failure to make partner 
two or three times was far more difficult to explain away to a potential employer, and by then 
one’s compensation and responsibilities probably reflected diminished prospects at Goldman. 
After 1986, when Goldman’s primary competitor, Morgan Stanley, went public, 
Goldman was the only comparable firm that was a partnership and still used the title “partner.” 
Partnership election happened every two years. Until 1996, when the firm changed to a limited 
liability corporation (LLC) and adopted the title managing director, the progression was from 
analyst to associate to vice president to partner. Unlike now—when titles have proliferated at 
Goldman and on the rest of Wall Street—the head of a department or specialty area in the early 
1990s typically was a partner. That was it—only four titles (analyst, associate, vice president, 
and partner)—making Goldman a very flat organization.5 The cubicles where analysts and 
associates sat were right next to the partners’ offices, and they worked directly with the partners 
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and shared assistants. In fact, some partners tried to sit in cubicles to make themselves more 
accessible and approachable. They abandoned this approach because the partners had so many 
meetings with so many people it distracted the junior people around them. Also, the junior 
people who sat next to the partners felt their personal lives and comings and goings were 
becoming too transparent. One banking partner instituted trading desks instead of cubicles in his 
department to facilitate communication. This approach didn’t work, either, for much the same 
reasons. 
Being a partner at Goldman was one of the most sought-after positions on Wall Street in 
part because of partners’ prestige and because Goldman partners generally were the highest-paid 
people on Wall Street. A Goldman partnership was “about as close to a sure thing as there is 
anywhere in the business world—a ticket to wealth and prestige.”6 Partners tended to manage 
departments or work with the most important clients and had responsibilities other than working 
on deals. For example, in the M&A department several partners would have to agree to sign 
something called a fairness opinion, a document issued by Goldman to a public company’s board 
of directors stating that the M&A transaction in question was “fair from a financial point of 
view” to shareholders. This “opinion” gave the board members confidence in the deal and was 
thought to protect them if they were to be sued or their judgment was questioned by 
shareholders. 
Issuing an opinion was risky, because it could be challenged in court and Goldman could 
be subjected to legal and financial liability. In fact, Goldman’s IPO prospectus stated, “Our 
exposure to legal liability is significant,” citing “potential liability for the ‘fairness opinions’ and 
other advice we provide to participants in corporate transactions.” Before the IPO, the partners 
personally shared this liability. (After converting to a LLC and the IPO, partners did not have 
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personal liability in the event of a successful lawsuit; any financial consequences would be borne 
by the firm and not the private partnership.) So partners in the trading business had to trust that 
the M&A partners were being very careful and thoughtful in issuing fairness opinions. 
The Partnership Prize 
Compensation can certainly send a message, but typically it is a private message to the 
employee from the company. Partnership, however, is a public recognition of the value of one’s 
contribution and ability to uphold the principles. It worked together with the culture to motivate 
people to accept lower compensation and work grueling hours. In addition, it served as a 
mechanism related to financial interdependence. 
In a 2009 op-ed letter about the debate over bonuses and Wall Street pay, Peter 
Weinberg, son of Jimmy Weinberg and nephew of John L. Weinberg, described Goldman 
partnership and financial interdependence this way: 
 
                      The only private partnership I can talk about authoritatively is the 
one in which I was a partner from 1992 to 1999, when the firm went 
public: Goldman Sachs. Partners there owned the equity of the firm. 
 When elected a partner, you were required to make a cash investment 
into the firm that was large enough to be material to your net worth. 
Each partner had a percentage ownership of the earnings every year, 
                       but the earnings would remain in the firm. A partner’s annual cash 
                       compensation amounted only to a small salary and a modest cash 
                        return on his or her capital account. A partner was not allowed to 
                       withdraw any capital from the firm until retirement, at which time 
   typically 75%–80% of one’s net worth was still in the firm. Even then, 
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a retired (“limited”) partner could only withdraw his or her capital over 
a three-year period. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, all partners 
                     had personal liability for the exposure of the firm, right down to their 
                     homes and cars. The focus on risk was intense, and wealth creation 
                     was more like a career bonus rather than a series of annual bonuses.7 
The partners knew an elected partner’s actions and performance would reflect on them, 
and if they made an unwise choice, that could have serious financial and reputational 
consequences for them all. Partners also had to believe that transferring a percentage of profits 
from themselves to incoming partners would be advantageous—that the potential dilution of 
their own wealth and the added risk were worth the potential gain. 
Consequently, the Goldman partnership process was carried out in painstaking detail, and 
that was generally understood throughout the firm. Partnership election was taken seriously, as 
shown by the personal involvement of senior executives. The partners judging a candidate’s 
merit and suitability were the very people with whom the candidate would be financially 
interdependent if granted partnership. Written nominations were solicited from the partners; from 
those nominations, the partnership committee created a preliminary list of potential candidates.8 
During the months preceding partnership elections, it was difficult to get time with the 
partners because they had so many phone calls and meetings about candidates. Goldman held its 
partnership elections every two years rather than annually, in part because the process was so 
arduous and time-consuming. 
Although the process was shrouded in secrecy outside Goldman and discussed in hushed 
voices or behind closed doors, some people knew what was going on from off-the-record 
conversations with partners with whom they were close. The conversations were supposed to be 
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confidential, but rumors were quietly passed on. People knew who was a “lay-up” (a basketball 
term for an easy score), who was “on the bubble” (not sure to be elected), and who did not have 
“a prayer.” 
Written nominations were solicited from Goldman’s partners, and from those 
nominations the partnership committee created a preliminary list of potential candidates, kicking 
off a paper chase. Endorsement letters were filed, and internal former FBI and CIA employees 
conducted background checks on all serious contenders. An internal investigation (called “cross-
ruffing,” a term borrowed from the card game bridge) took place, led by a partner not in the 
candidate’s division. Then the list was narrowed during the meetings to discuss the would-be 
partners, a photo of the candidate was displayed on a screen, and from this list, a committee 
selected names to be placed before the partnership for a vote. The partners generally wanted to 
keep the percentage of partners to total employees about the same, so the number elected would 
be carefully chosen depending on retirements and growth. 
The process might seem coldhearted, but it was viewed as essential to maintaining the 
culture, and everyone knew it.9 
The behavior you needed to exhibit to make partner was clear: make money for the firm 
while embodying its principles. Everyone knew that becoming a partner required the support of 
people outside your division and region. Someone in banking needed support from asset 
management or trading. Someone in North America needed support from people in Asia. This 
was a key tenet of teamwork; to make partner, you had better help people across the firm. This 
meant that if you were asked to be on a 4:00 a.m. call with a Japanese client, even if it had 
nothing to do with your clients, you would set the alarm and do it without question, knowing that 
if you did not rise to the occasion, it could hurt your chances of becoming a partner (or staying a 
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partner). If you were asked to bring someone from another area into a project because it could 
help improve the firm’s advice, then of course he or she was invited. And the new person 
participated even though the revenues of the project might not be attributed to you or your group. 
Candidates’ behavior was being vetted as much as their ability to contribute financially to the 
partnership.10 
I was surprised when very senior partners asked—in a roundabout, casual way—my 
opinion of vice presidents who were widely known as being considered for partnership, and as I 
got more senior they privately told me why someone had or had not been elected—with the 
implied messages such information carried. Once a partner showed me the standard form used to 
evaluate candidates. The blank form included numerical rankings of listed qualities related to the 
Goldman principles. 
Former Goldman vice chairman Rob Kaplan says that many of his most stressful and 
difficult moments at Goldman occurred during partner promotions, particularly when he had to 
deliver the news to a highly qualified person that he or she would have to wait another two years 
for reconsideration. It was little wonder that Kaplan writes in What to Ask the Person in the 
Mirror that this message of failure to make partner was often met with “expressions of 
betrayal.”11 
One person I interviewed—a managing director (now at another firm) who was passed 
over for partnership at Goldman in the 1990s before the IPO—said that of course he was furious. 
He had done everything he could—he had given up weekends, birthdays, anniversaries, and 
vacation time with his family—and then had not been elected in spite of what he thought were 
positive indications (assurances that he felt were essentially promises) that he would be. Not 
making partner was devastating to him, he said. He told me that, for people at Goldman, who 
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you are, and what you think about yourself, was ultimately decided at that moment. The thing he 
feared most was the public embarrassment and humiliation, even more so than the loss of 
potential riches. When he failed to receive the customary, congratulatory expected call from the 
senior partner of the firm on the appointed morning, he explained, he felt betrayed. He did not 
want to hear that he might very well become a partner the next time, in two years. He felt that 
people wanted him to stick around so that they could get two more years of relatively cheap 
labor from him and that they would say anything, just as they had assured him before, to keep 
him. But he was determined not to stick around while his peers from business school were called 
managing directors at other firms and he was called a vice president for another two years. His 
staying would be “a cheap option” for Goldman, so he swallowed his pride and successfully 
cashed in his pedigree by leaping to another firm. 
In a 1993 interview, Steve Friedman, then a senior partner, explained that the partnership 
election process was used as a way to convey that people would be rewarded for doing what was 
best for Goldman and would be denied the ultimate reward—partnership—if they paid more 
attention to their own agenda than to the firm’s. Friedman described delivering that message to 
one disappointed banker: “I have looked people in the eyes and said, ‘You did not become a 
partner this time despite your basic abilities, your candle power, your energy. You had all the 
goods to have achieved it, but you did not become a partner because you were perceived as 
having too damned much of your own agenda, and you were ignoring what we were telling you 
was in the broader interests of the firm.’”12 
The flip side of the partner election was that, to add partners, Goldman had to discreetly 
ask others to retire, for the simple reason that maintaining a greater number of partners would 
mean each would own a smaller percentage of the firm.13 If someone was departnered, it was 
	   	   	   83	  
only after careful deliberation by the most senior partners and usually resulted from making too 
small a contribution relative to ownership (Goldman could get someone else to do it for less) or 
from doing something that jeopardized the firm’s reputation and put the partners at financial risk. 
Thus, the pressure was on for performance and proper behavior, even for partners, and the 
pressure was intense. 
Generally, there have consistently been more partner additions than departures, but the 
ratio of partners to the total number of employees has stayed relatively constant because of 
continued growth. For example, the total number of partners noticeably increased from 1984 to 
2011, which corresponded to the increase of total employees: both nearly doubled from 1998 to 
2011. However, the percentage of partners to employees (the partner ratio) remained steady at 
1.5 percent to 2.0 percent. Growth was important to provide more opportunities for partnership 
and for the partnership to be financially attractive. 
A retired partner I interviewed said that he never worked harder at Goldman than when 
he was a partner. He had partner responsibilities and obligations on top of his regular job. He 
explained that he had done everything by the book and was relieved when he made partner. 
“Why were you relieved—was it the money?” I asked. He explained, when he got to that 
point, it was less about the money than it was because everyone knew he was being considered 
for partnership—his wife, his clients, his business school classmates, everyone at the firm. He 
retired after the IPO, despite having been a partner for only a short time, because he was burned 
out, even though he knew that each year he could “hold on” represented millions of dollars. The 
pressure was taking a toll on his health and his family, he told me. Today he still values the 
social status of having been a partner, and that is how he is usually introduced in social contexts:  
“a retired pre-IPO partner of Goldman Sachs.” 
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No one was exempt from performing or from upholding the firm’s values. The 
departnering conversations were held discreetly and privately with the senior partner of the firm, 
but when the internal memo came out, there were almost always rumors, typically related to 
performance. The former partner hadn’t pulled his weight or wasn’t doing the expected culture-
carrying tasks, such as recruiting. Or the outcast had done something harmful to the Goldman 
image, such as having an extramarital affair with someone at the firm or saying something 
inappropriate, or had subjected the partnership to unnecessary financial risk. Even if a partner 
left voluntarily for primarily personal reasons, there was almost always speculation about the 
“real” reasons. 
A current partner told me that the organization looks for an explanation beyond the desire 
to leave because he or she may simply feel he or she has made enough money. That’s not 
acceptable, because it might send a message that money is the primary driver. If the reason for 
leaving is that the partner no longer enjoys the work, then people would wonder what there is 
about Goldman not to like, this partner told me. The firm convinces people that being a Goldman 
partner is something one would never want to surrender; it gives one social identification, 
prestige, money, and access, and it is perceived as serving a higher good. That is what is sold to 
potential and current employees. So if a partner leaves, something has to be wrong with him, and 
the firm perpetuates that belief through whispers. The partner explained that the only acceptable 
answer is that the partner is retiring to serve a higher purpose, which is to go into community and 
public service—and many do. He said it wasn’t the money, it was that their work ultimately 
needed a higher meaning. Historically, Goldman’s process of partner election and departnering 
are exemplary of what sociologists term closure, the tight coordination within a group, which 
ensures that people comply with the organization’s norms.14 According to sociologist Ronald 
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Burt, “closure increases the odds of a person being caught and punished for displaying belief or 
behavior inconsistent with the preferences in the closed network.”15 In his view, closure 
strengthens organizations by ensuring that people not adhering to expected norms can be 
removed.16 Making partner was so lucrative and the identity meant so much to people that they 
modified their behavior to enhance their chances of being elected, and, once they were partners, 
it became an integral part of their social identity.17 Rewarded behavior helped the firm as a 
whole. Partners worked hard to make more money but also were pressured to promote teamwork, 
the culture and the principles, and to stay within the firm’s rules and values. 
Meanwhile, the close scrutiny of each partner’s contributions and adherence to the 
mandate during the partnership election provided closure by removing partners whose continued 
tenure was not to the advantage of the firm, thus ensuring trust among those who remained. In 
this way, partnership election and departnering reinforced the distinction between insiders and 
outsiders. The effectiveness of this practice is best seen, according to Charles Ellis, the author of 
The Partnership—The Making of Goldman Sachs, in the “speed and clarity with which long-
serving partners who left went from being insiders to outsiders and were soon forgotten.”18 
A Social Network of Trust 
While the partnership election at Goldman was grueling, partnership offered camaraderie 
to those who made it.19 A retired partner explained to me that there were regularly heated 
disagreements among partners over business decisions. He felt the partners were  
in fact like a family or club. As in many families, the partnership was “dysfunctional” and had 
“black sheep”; there might be questions of motives or agenda; and sometimes there were even 
sharp elbows or personality mismatches, but there was a good deal of trust and familiarity among 
the members. 
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Most partners had spent their entire careers at the firm, and many senior partners had 
mentored the newer partners over years. They had gone through the same election process and 
knew how tough it was to make partner and how demanding the job was. Partners had outings 
together as well as annual dinners. Many lived in the same suburbs. Generally, they knew each 
other well. Some ties were stronger than others because of business school friendships, 
experience in working in the same department or the same part of the world, or location in the 
same neighborhoods. However, all of them were financially interdependent and needed to trust 
one another. Several partners agreed when I interviewed them that the phrase “social network  
of trust” was a fitting description.20 In 1994, a partner, addressing a gathering of new partners, 
highlighted the relationship between the partnership structure and the cultural view it promoted: 
“We own this business . . . We are partners—emotionally, psychologically, and financially. 
There can be no borders between us, no secrets.”21 
Partners also created stronger networks because of the trust. Building a network involves 
connecting the dots, or rather connecting Goldman people to each other and to important people 
outside the firm. Almost a decade before he crafted the firm’s business principles, John 
Whitehead wrote a set of guidelines for the investment banking services area, one of which was, 
“Important people like to deal with important people. Are you one?”22 Gaining access to 
important people requires introductions from people willing to make the call. Partners were more 
willing to do that for the partners who were in their social network of trust and with whom they 
had financial interdependency. 
For example, an investment banking partner explained to me that he was at ease 
connecting fellow partners to his contacts outside the firm, more so than connecting a vice 
president or regular managing director. Partners, he said, wouldn’t leave the company and take 
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the relationship to a competitor. He trusted his partners in private banking to use good judgment 
and not to put his investment banking relationship at risk. This kind of trust made it easy to offer 
multiple perspectives to help a client. It also aided the firm in cross-selling: providing a full 
solution to clients. For example, Goldman might provide the merger advice to sell a company, 
and then the M&A partner would introduce a Goldman private banking partner to help the client 
manage the proceeds from the sale.23 “Cross-selling” significantly improves a firm’s financial 
performance, maximizing revenue opportunities. 
A virtuous reinforcement loop was erected; partnership was enhanced by the trust 
fostered by the social network and financial interdependence, and the social network was 
enhanced by the trust.24 
Productive Dissonance 
The emphasis on shared values in the Goldman partnership model might lead to the 
impression that the Goldman culture was rigid, monolithic, and intolerant of diverse opinions. 
Generally this was not the case. Although the partners held common values and many of them 
came from similar backgrounds, Goldman recognized that different people had different ideas 
and perspectives and that a diversity of people and ideas was important to the firm’s vitality and 
productivity.25 Diversity was also important in its making the right decisions and giving clients 
the best service and judgment. Such diversity of experiences and expertise gave Goldman the 
flexibility to deal with constant change. 
Goldman promoted cross-function communication and organizational cohesion through 
rotational programs for employees into other departments and regions and firmwide committees 
consisting of people from different departments.26 This “small-world network” of people who 
built ties, had financial interdependence, and trusted one another led to innovation and high 
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performance. Committees drew together partners or potential partners from different areas to 
work together on partnership election, capital commitments, risk, culture, lifestyle, brand, and 
more. These committees, together with partnership meetings, served as places of exchange like 
those Ronald Burt describes as essential for optimizing the number of brokerage opportunities 
for networks.27 This practice created valuable networks, as well as a systematic, structured way 
to bring people together to discuss ideas, challenge each other, and seek solutions.28 Goldman’s 
flat organizational structure also encouraged people to interact, bringing their diverse opinions to 
the table.29 The biennial change in partnership, with a balance of new partners joining and old 
partners leaving, kept the ideas fresh, but generally it did not introduce so many differences that 
cohesion was lost.30 
Goldman’s partnership culture allowed for disagreement in part because the partners have 
a stake in more than only their own areas of responsibility. They were financially interdependent. 
Banking partners had nothing to do with trading and vice versa, but trading partners were 
affected if a banking partner hurt the reputation of the firm, and banking partners were affected if 
trading partners didn’t properly manage risk, because they are risking the capital of all the 
partners. In a typical big bank, by contrast—one without a partnership ownership structure—
compensation is based primarily on departmental and individual performance (and peer group 
compensation averages); what others do or think in another department or divison is typically of 
little concern to anyone else, because one’s own bonus is not materially threatened. The lack of 
financial interdependence typically limits the amount of productive disagreement you find at 
most Wall Street firms. Even with compensation in stock vesting over years, the attitude is much 
different because what one does typically has limited impact on the earnings or stock price of the 
entire firm. 
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The disagreement at Goldman was described by several Goldman partners as valuable.31 
Rob Kaplan indicated that “irritating, distracting, and uncomfortable” discussions were 
“extremely good medicine for a healthy organization.”32 For example, one seemingly contentious 
relationship was that between senior executive John F. W. Rogers, considered by many to be one 
of the firm’s most powerful people, and Lucas van Praag, Goldman’s public relations spokesman 
from 2000 to 2012. Jack Martin, CEO of the PR firm Hill and Knowlton, said that he had seen 
the two “disagree aggressively, but that at the end of the day they [came] together as one.”33 
Although others may see friction between Rogers and van Praag as unhealthy, Blankfein 
expressed confidence in them and asserted that “dissent and disagreement is healthy.”34 
Whitehead described how he and his co-leader, John L. Weinberg, strove to maintain an 
environment conducive to productive disagreement within the management committee: “We met 
every Monday morning. We had an agenda, we went down the agenda, we made decisions as a 
group, and John and I tried not to dominate the committee  because we wanted their input. It was 
very important to have the input of everybody on the management committee. There were seven 
of us, then nine of us, and then eleven. It got bigger as the firm’s diversity grew.”35 
A Harvard Business School case study about Goldman’s training found that Goldman 
used the Socratic method to explore questions through discussion and debate. One senior 
manager described a typical discussion: “That was a good argument. But next time, it would  
actually be really interesting if you also added these three things.”36  One partner expressed his 
delight in this learning environment: “Goldman Sachs when I started was a fantastic place to be 
planted and grow. They treated me the right way, encouraged me the right way . . . It’s a 
Socratic, collaborative style. Bouncing things off of each other is fun, and you encourage that at 
every turn.”37 
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According to a former management committee member, the dialogue was predicated on 
collaboration: “We were always taught that the odds are high you’ll have better outcomes with a 
shared work effort than with that of a single individual. At Goldman Sachs it’s pretty rare that an 
additional perspective doesn’t give you a better outcome. As problems become more complex, 
the ability for a single individual to have the best perspective declines dramatically.”38 
David Stark, a Columbia University sociologist, argues that dissonance, or friction, over 
competing values promotes an organizational reflexivity that makes it easier for a company to 
change and deal with market uncertainty.39 Dissonance prevents groupthink: what happens 
psychologically when a group is so concerned with maintaining unanimity in the face of 
opposition that alternatives and options fail to be identified or properly evaluated.40 Stark notes 
that dissonance can become resonance, a “dangerous form of cognitive interdependence,” when 
too many people overlook a key issue, giving “misplaced assurance” to those who think 
similarly.41 A partnership structure seems to mitigate against this phenomenon in part because of 
the financial interdependence and social network of trust among partners. One researcher 
explained this effect well in describing the era of the private investment banking partnerships as  
one in which “no one could take excessive risk with the firm’s capital, because of the vigilance 
of the partners. If Partner A wasn’t comfortable with a new business or a new client, Partner B 
would have to convince him of the merits of the business—and to do so, partner B  
would have to go well beyond the argument that it would generate a lot of short-term fees.”42 
Stark points out that the “ability to keep multiple evaluative principles in play and to 
exploit the resulting friction of their interplay” is a competitive advantage. Organizations 
typically try to avoid the perplexing situations that arise “when there is principled disagreement 
about what counts,” when, in fact, they should embrace such situations and “recognize that it is 
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legitimate to articulate alternative conceptions of what is valuable, what is worthy, what 
counts.”43 Partners I interviewed generally agreed that this is a good description of the productive 
dissonance that characterized Goldman’s partnership culture model. 
Goldman excelled at adapting to change and dealing with market uncertainty not so much 
because of specific individuals but because the organization’s partnership structure and culture 
sustained ongoing and productive discussion and disagreement. Stark notes that when faced with 
uncertainty, “instead of concentrating their resources for strategic planning among a narrow set 
of senior executives or delegating that function to a specialized department, heterarchical firms 
[flat organizations or those with a limited hierarchy] embark on radical decentralization in which 
every unit becomes engaged in innovation.”44 Therefore, hierarchical firms—those with a long 
chain of command—are less supportive of innovation and entrepreneurship.  
Dissonance—supported by the flat organizational structure that facilitated interaction and 
information transfer, and the financial interdependence of partnership that fostered trust and 
aligned interests—gave Goldman a significant competitive advantage. Based on my interviews, 
dissonance of this degree did not exist at most Wall Street firms, because there was no financial 
interdependence, earnings were distributed, or the partnership was dominated by a few 
individuals, decreasing the financial interdependence. Goldman’s culture of debate took on 
special significance during the credit crisis, as discussed in a later chapter. 
If dissonance encourages entrepreneurship, innovation, or flexibility in meeting 
competitive pressure, why was Goldman in the 1980s not considered innovative? For the most 
part, Goldman had a long history of watching and waiting while others did the innovating; then it 
moved in with an improved or enhanced version. Whitehead said, “[As] far as new products 
were concerned, I never felt that we had to be first when we did something. We had a reputation 
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for being absolutely first-class in everything we did, but we didn’t have to be first with every 
idea. In fact, I enjoyed it when our competitors had the new idea and tried it out first.”45 
Whitehead pointed out to me another reason Goldman was not the first to innovate: 
constrained capital limited what the firm was willing and able to do, something that changed as it 
first began raising more outside capital and then accelerated when it went public. It took bigger 
financial risks and grew more quickly. When I discussed innovation with partners and 
competitors, most said they did not see Goldman as an innovator in the 1980s and early 1990s, 
but they thought that dissonance added to the firm’s superior financial and competitive 
performance and allowed it to get to the best answers for the firm and for clients. 
When I asked Whitehead about the perception of Goldman in the 1980s of not being an 
innovator, he pointed out a nuance that many people were missing: Goldman’s strength was not a 
matter of investing in and potentially taking new risks by developing new products per se. 
Instead, its strength lay in the ability for people to come together as an organization to figure out 
how to change and adapt and market products that were better for clients, no matter who created 
them. To Whitehead, that practice was as innovative as developing products or investing in 
innovations that might not work or benefit clients—but much harder to execute because of the 
barriers to getting people to work together, and a lot less risky. 
Another significant innovation in the late 1980s and early 1990s was the heavy use of the 
emerging technology of voicemail, adopted much earlier and used more effectively at Goldman 
than at other firms. Voicemail helped improve coordination and teamwork, because multiple 
people could be given information simultaneously and they could hear the tone of a message. 
The technology resulted in better execution for clients and gave Goldman a competitive 
advantage. Goldman continued to rely on voicemail heavily even after it had  
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e-mail capability, because e-mail lacked the inflection and expressive capacity of the human 
voice and was less effective in maintaining the firm’s social network. 
Goldman people responded quickly to voicemail (and later e-mail messages) because the 
culture demanded that they do so. A quick and comprehensive response was and still is the norm; 
it would be culturally unacceptable not to respond as soon as possible. No matter the hour, you 
can get a partner or junior person on the phone to help you think about a problem or speak to a 
client. That was true when I was at Goldman, and my interviews confirm it is still the 
expectation. 
Many people from other firms were (and are) shocked at the speed and amount of 
information shared, often mentioning their need to adjust to Goldman’s urgent voicemail (e-
mail) culture. 
Financial Interdependence and Risk Management 
As a private partnership, if Goldman suffered large trading losses, lost a lawsuit, or 
received fines for criminal or illegal practices, then the partners were personally liable. Their 
equity was at risk every day. Even with the protection afforded personal assets by the LLC 
structure, which Goldman changed to in 1996, partners still faced the risk of losing their invested 
capital, which for many represented the bulk of their wealth.46 
When one’s own money is at stake, management of risk, both financial and reputational, 
is a key concern.47 According to the partners I interviewed, managing risk for one’s entire net 
worth, and that of all the partners, brings a higher level of intensity than managing risk for 
shareholders and a longer-term orientation than today’s typical three-to-five-year equity vesting 
period. That is probably why, in Goldman’s own accounts of its culture, risk management often 
is not included: it was so obviously a no-brainer that it was assumed.48 As mentioned earlier, 
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Peter Weinberg stressed this issue in his Wall Street Journal op-ed, “right down to their homes 
and cars,” noting that “[t]he focus on risk was intense.”49 
The firm’s culture and principles, combined with the partners’ financial interdependence 
and the risk to their own capital, ensured that collective risk management and reputational risk 
management would be a priority. The structure of Goldman’s pre-IPO partnership resulted in 
financial interdependence and a social network of trust, virtually ensuring teamwork and 
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Chapter 4 
 
Under Pressure, Goldman Grows Quickly and Goes Public 
 
At a Goldman Partner meeting, the story goes, a senior partner asked the new partners to 
identity the two men who were most important to the firm’s business. The new partners 
responded with last names: Goldman, Sachs, and Weinberg. The senior partner then revealed the 
answer. Senator Carter Glass and Representative Henry Steagall. 1  
Congress passed the Glass-Steagall Act (formally known as the Banking Act of 1933) to 
provide Depression-era deposit bank customers protection against the additional risks involved 
in trading and investing. 2 Its intent was to separate the consumer deposit-based commercial 
banking industry from investment-banking activities by prohibiting well-capitalized commercial 
banks from getting involved in the securities business. It also had the unintended effect of 
protecting the profitable underwriting business of the investment banks.3 The act explains why 
both a J.P. Morgan and a Morgan Stanley now exist. 4 J.P. Morgan had to spin off its investment 
banking business, creating two entities: J.P.Morgan became the commercial bank, whose 
business was deposits and lending, and Morgan Stanley was spun off as the investment bank, 
handling the securities and underwriting businesses. 
However, in 1999 the act was repealed. Such deregulation and other external pressures—
such as competition and technology—as well as pressures from within the organization, had a 
transformative effect on how Goldman did business and on the organizational culture. From then 
on, Goldman had to compete more vigorously for scarce resources—capital, talent, clients, 
reputation, and more—against larger, publicly traded competitors (discussed later). In addition to 
having limited personal liability or capital constraints, these publicly traded competitors had 
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more, and permanent, capital and didn’t espouse the same business principles or have the same 
financial interdependence. 
These combined pressures had one major effect: the leaders of Goldman felt that the firm 
needed to grow—and grow fast. 
I have had lengthy, spirited philosophical discussions with Goldman and McKinsey 
partners about growth. Growth in itself is not a bad thing. But as Goldman navigated its 
environment, the rapid pace of its growth had dramatic (and often unintended or unanticipated) 
consequences—many of which were not fully understood inside the firm or out—and they 
compounded over time. In essence, Goldman’s response to the various pressures in a dynamic 
environment—in particular, rapid growth—made it even more difficult to notice that the firm 
was drifting away from its traditional interpretation of its principles. The rapid growth, combined 
with multiple, conflicting organizational goals, resulted in a series of many small everyday 
decisions happening so quickly that most people didn’t notice (or were too busy to notice, or 
didn’t care). 
Regulatory Pressures 
A great many rules and regulations govern banking in the United States: the Glass–
Steagall Act, the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, exchange rules, and so on.5 I focus here on the key 
regulatory changes that had a particularly strong influence on Goldman. 
Public Trading of Investment Banks in 1970 
Even before the repeal of Glass–Steagall, Goldman was facing increasing competitive 
and other pressures, and those combined pressures led ultimately to the decision to go public, 
which the partners voted to do in 1998, before the act’s repeal (the IPO didn’t actually happen, 
though, until 1999). Much emphasis has been placed on how the IPO affected Goldman’s 
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culture, and that’s true, but the organizational drift had started well before that. Goldman had 
been feeling the increasing heat of competition and other external forces for years. 
The public listing of investment banks is a relatively new development. Investment 
banking, for most of its history, was conducted by firms organized in partnerships. But before the 
1970s, some partnerships decided they wanted to go public to raise capital, reduce the risk of loss 
of partner capital, and improve liquidity, sparking a significant change in the organizational 
structure of the banks. 
In 1970, the NYSE repealed provisions that had prevented publicly listed companies 
from being members of the exchange, and the floodgates opened. That year, Donaldson, Lufkin 
& Jenrette was the first to list on the exchange, with Merrill Lynch, Reynolds Securities, and 
Bache & Co. following in 1971. Salomon Brothers listed a decade later, and Morgan Stanley 
went public in 1986. Goldman, in 1999, was the last major full-service investment bank to be 
publicly listed.6 
Goldman followed much later for two key reasons: first, unlike most of the others, it had 
no retail banking business, wherein banks deal directly with consumers on smaller transactions 
like mortgages and personal loans rather than big institutional clients or corporations executing 
large transactions. Second, Goldman didn’t distribute the firm’s profits to partners annually, as 
the others did. The differences between Goldman and the others were illuminated by a 2004 
study by Alan Morrison and William Wilhelm Jr.7 In the decade before the banks started to go 
public, because of increasing technological and regulatory pressure to scale up (an example of 
the interrelationship between these pressures), those with retail business units increased the 
number of partners, the capital employed per partner, and the number of employees per partner, 
according to the study. They also needed to raise considerable sums to invest in computers and 
	   	   	   99	  
data management technology to facilitate faster handling of administrative activities to support 
the smaller size, but higher volume, of transactions. 
Going to the market (to the outside equity capital markets or private investors) to raise 
this cash was considered the best, if not the only, option. Without outside capital, the only ways 
to infuse new capital into a partnership were to admit more partners or to increase the amount of 
capital contributed by each new partner (while balancing the retiring partners’ capital 
withdrawals). Each approach has limits. Also, because these banks typically distributed their 
profits to the partners annually, they had less capital to work with. Going public offered the 
cheapest cost of capital, because equity investors in the public markets were willing to receive a 
lower return on their capital, in part because their investments are so liquid, than private equity 
investors. But it was appealing for one other crucial reason. Under a partnership model, all 
partners are personally responsible for all the firm’s liabilities. As a public corporation, it is all of 
the shareholders who are liable (and liability is not personal liability). 
According to interviews I conducted, Morgan Stanley had no retail banking at the time, 
but it generally distributed a meaningful portion of its profits to partners annually, and this meant 
that it faced pressure to go public earlier than Goldman. As a Goldman partner explained to me, 
because Goldman required partners to keep their capital in the firm until they retired, the firm 
had more capital to invest to stay competitive. 
In 1986, when Morgan Stanley went public, Goldman had about $1 billion of equity 
capital, twice that of Morgan Stanley. Even so, the competitive and other pressures were such 
that the Goldman partners gave consideration to an IPO at that time. The first serious proposal to 
go public was presented by the management committee at Goldman’s partnership meeting that 
year. It was championed by Bob Rubin and Steve Friedman, who at the time were on the 
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management committee, and it was met with serious opposition from the partners. John L. 
Weinberg distanced himself from the proposal, remaining silent during the meeting. After Jimmy 
Weinberg spoke against it in the meeting, it was not brought to a vote.8 
Although the proposal was set aside, it was clear from the meeting that Goldman’s 
decision to expand to pursue a global business strategy “placed additional capital pressures on 
the firm, making its remaining a partnership less and less feasible.”9 In my interviews, however, 
some partners said the firm had enough capital at the time to fund international expansion, albeit 
at a slower pace, or that it could continue to take outside private capital. Although outside private  
capital was more expensive than capital from the public markets, it would allow the firm to stay 
a private partnership. 
Ultimately in 1986 the partners decided to accept a $500 million private outside equity 
investment from Sumitomo Bank in exchange for 12.5 percent of the firm’s annual profits and 
appreciation of equity value. The deal with Sumitomo was appealing because, according to the 
terms of the deal and the Bank Holding Act of 1956’s preclusion, Sumitomo could not have any 
voting rights or any influence over the firm’s operations.10 
Goldman was growing rapidly in both size and complexity at this time. The firm 
ballooned from a few thousand people in a few offices in 1980, to thirteen thousand at the time 
of the IPO, with much of that growth overseas. At the time Whitehead codified the firm’s values,  
Goldman’s business was entirely within the United States. It was strictly a New York firm. By 
1996, international employees constituted 35 percent of Goldman’s workforce. Further, the total 
number of international employees was now larger than the total number of employees in the 
previous decade. 
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In 1987 a member of the management committee voiced a common opinion: “Everyone 
is uncomfortable with the rate of growth. We all feel that if we don’t keep expanding, we’ll lose 
our position. But if we keep growing at a certain rate, we’ll lose control.”11 As early as the late 
1980s and early 1990s, Goldman was having meetings, even hiring a consulting firm, to discuss 
the consequences of hypergrowth.12 However, Goldman’s growth was phenomenally successful.  
Earnings nearly doubled between 1990 and 1992, funding the opening of new offices in 
Frankfurt, Milan, and Seoul. In 1992, the Kamehameha Schools/Bishop Estate, a Hawaiian 
educational trust, invested $250 million for around a 5 percent stake. 
In 1994 Goldman suffered big trading losses and the unprecedented wave of resignations 
among the partners that followed, starting with the sudden resignation of then senior partner 
Steve Friedman, who cited health reasons. Making Friedman’s departure all the more disruptive 
and unsettling was that it followed Bob Rubin’s abrupt resignation after a short tenure (1990–
1992) as co-senior partner with Friedman to become assistant to President Clinton on economic 
policy. Friedman had refused to accept a co-leader in running the firm and left the choice of 
successors in the hands of the management committee.13 
Almost every partner I interviewed who worked at the firm in 1994 said that, in 
hindsight, the sudden departures of Friedman and Rubin, who had been handpicked by Weinberg 
and Whitehead to lead the firm, had significant unintended consequences for Goldman.  
Some even believe that the timing, circumstances, and handling of the departures caused a 
greater impact on culture than the IPO and were one of the main reasons behind the IPO itself. 
The 1994 departures also raised serious issues of trust among the partners. In addition to 
the senior partner, almost one-third of the other partners retired, giving their capital preferential 
treatment and more protection than that of the general partners who stayed and allowing the 
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retirees to begin cashing out their capital. The resignations would remove hundreds of millions 
of dollars of partners’ capital from the firm, requiring a larger influx of new partners than in the 
past. This situation upset what had been a stable, cohesive group that traditionally had seen just 
enough partner turnover to balance junior and senior partners. The fifty-eight new partners, the 
largest partner class Goldman had ever announced, now also formed a large voting bloc on key 
firm decisions, and they had just seen the firm at its worst with the old partners jumping ship.14 
Discussing the resignation of a senior partner who had been running the financial 
institutions group and was generally considered one of the most knowledgeable about the 
financial sector and the firm’s prospects, one partner expressed the sentiment of many of them: 
“Aren’t these the guys that I’ve been slaving with—not for? I mean really working hard with for 
a long time, and they are quitting? I don’t get that. How can you leave? I mean, just how does 
that square? When it gets tough, you are supposed to get tougher.”15 
Based on the accounts of partners at the time, when the old guard—many of them viewed 
as culture carriers—started bailing and looking out for themselves, it shook the belief in the core 
values and principles of the firm. The resignations caused people to think more about 
themselves, their own interests, and their own personal ambitions—and materialism began to 
grow.16 With Friedman’s sudden resignation and no succession plan, a fierce power struggle 
ensued, increasing the instability and prompting personal reflection. 
Corzine, a trader in the FICC department who also had a CFO-type role (which at the 
time was typically the head of fixed income and chief risk allocator), aggressively announced to 
the management committee that he wanted to be senior partner (and be given the title of CEO) 
and for Paulson to be the number two, with the title of COO. In recent memory there had always 
been co-head senior partners, reflecting a culture of teamwork. There were “the two Johns” and 
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then “Steve and Bob.” Many divisions and departments had co-heads. The firm had never had 
CEOs or COOs (it had senior partners or co-senior partners); the CEO title didn’t make sense in 
the context of a partnership (it typically was used in public corporations with a hierarchy and 
organization charts). Although the people with the senior partner titles were everyone’s bosses, 
everyone on the management committee had a vote, so no one person could dictate.17 
In the end, Corzine got what he pushed for. Paulson did not have enough support on the 
management committee to push for a co-senior partner role. Some people said it was in part 
because Paulson was not based in the New York office 100 percent of the time and lacked 
experience in trading, where the greatest profits and risk were. But the partners I interviewed 
said that they recognized the need for a balance or compromise between banking and trading 
(and a few said they needed someone to “watch” Corzine, who they worried could be too 
aggressive). In hindsight, partners said, the precedent of having no co-senior partner, along with 
the power struggle, sent a poor message to the troops, especially in view of the defections. 
Interviewees explained that once he became CEO, Corzine convinced some partners to 
stay, rather than retire, by leading them to believe they would get rich when the firm went public 
in the near future.18 For a variety of reasons—including alleged promotion promises, guilt, and 
John L. Weinberg’s pleading—more partners stayed than initially had been predicted. But they 
told me the trading losses, combined with the defections, dramatically affected the culture. 
In addition to significant trading losses in 1994, throughout that year the firm worked to 
settle suits with a number of pension funds related to Goldman’s involvement with publisher 
Robert Maxwell.19 Eventually it was settled for $253 million.20 This cost was borne by those 
who had been general partners between 1989 and 1991, and the size of this settlement surprised 
many of them.21 A November 1994 AP article made this prediction: “The general partners may 
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find themselves sitting with a smaller capital account at year’s end than they had starting off. 
That rude and unfamiliar prospect explains why persistent rumors have been circulating on Wall 
Street that Goldman’s management has recently put pressure on the firm’s general partners to 
ante up additional capital. (One partner’s capital account was reportedly wiped out 
completely.)”22 
Layoffs were announced for traders, analysts, and support staff.23 An unintended 
consequence was the emergence of “a culture of contingency. A sense not only that each day 
might be your last, but that your value was linked exclusively to how much revenue was 
generated for that firm on that day—regardless of its source.”24 Between 1987 and 1994, the firm 
had downsized six different times in different divisions in response to different earnings.25 
Despite the instability, the partners opposed going public at the time. It was commonly 
thought, however, that there was an IPO in Goldman’s future: “Down the road Goldman will 
surely revisit the idea of going public, thereby gaining permanent capital. But Corzine has said 
that a stock offering isn’t ‘practical’ right now. You need profit updrafts, not downdrafts, to go 
public.”26 Goldman had been stressed by the events of 1994; it would recover, but the partnership 
showed signs of vulnerability. 
Goldman’s problems at that time were not related only to costs and “bad bets”; one 
partner noted, “[A] culture of undisciplined risk taking had built up over many years.”27 That 
same partner named other “stuff [that] built up,” such as “the lack of a risk committee, trusting 
individual partners, model-based analytics, [thinking] that by God, you can be smart and figure it 
all out, and letting traders become too important and being afraid to confront them if they’ve 
been money makers.”28 When I asked partners about this, they said the statement was probably 
relative. They admitted that changes in business practices needed to be addressed, but they 
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believed Goldman was still much better than its competitors. And, more importantly, the 
adjustments to the losses helped Goldman “strengthen” its risk management culture, and that is 
one reason Goldman did better than its competitors in the credit crisis, discussed later. 
Corzine sought to open offices around the world during this time. “Jon wanted to do 
business in every country, everywhere, and wanted to be big,” one partner said. “He was like the 
guy going through a cafeteria and he wanted to take everything and put it on his tray. That 
concerned people.”29 In 1995, Goldman opened offices in Shanghai and Mexico City and created 
joint ventures in India and Indonesia. Paulson and many others thought Corzine was moving too 
fast. Lloyd Blankfein, the current Goldman CEO, used to joke that “he was going to go away 
someday and wake up and find out we were opening up an office in Guatemala.”30 (I discuss 
selected other organizational changes during Corzine’s leadership and their intended and 
unintended consequences later.) 
From Partnership to LLC 
Corzine raised the idea of an IPO in January 1996, and it was again rejected. But in lieu 
of an IPO, the management committee took several steps to shore up the firm’s capital base and 
limit the partners’ legal and financial liability. The firm became a limited liability partnership in 
1996.31 The potential liability to partners was now restricted to their capital in the firm. The 
“partner” title was formally abandoned. It was believed that the term could be misinterpreted or 
could place implied personal partnership-like liability on the partners. Equity-holding partners 
were now called managing directors, as were almost one hundred of the thousands of vice 
presidents (the more experienced ones). Those who were partners in the firm were internally 
called partner managing directors, or PMDs. Nonpartner managing directors were referred to as 
“MD-lites.” 
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Partners told me they believed that the title change for the chosen vice presidents 
conveyed practical management responsibility on par with that of their peers at other firms. 
According to news reports, “The 128-year-old investment-banking partnership created the title of 
managing director last year and elevated 87 employees to the rank. They get a boost in pay and 
benefits, but unlike Goldman’s 190 partners, they don’t own a share of the firm’s $5.8 billion in 
capital. Goldman executives say the new title recognizes able bankers and traders who face 
tough competition rising to partner, considered the pinnacle of Wall Street. Non-partner 
managing directors are likely to earn $2 million or more each, recruiters say.”32 The addition of 
so many people at once and with the same titles now started to impact the social network of trust. 
Additionally, the firm changed its compensation practices. All MDs received 
participation shares, whose value was tied to the overall profitability of the firm and not to 
individual or departmental performance. Several partners told me that their change in title altered 
their perspective. They no longer had the cachet and status of the title “partner,” something they 
believed differentiated them from peers at firms like Morgan Stanley; there were now many 
“managing directors” at Goldman. 
As a result of this change, only the capital partners retained in the firm, and not their 
personal assets, could be used to repay the firm’s creditors.33 Although the change would greatly 
reduce the risk of personal bankruptcy, the retained capital was estimated to be around 70 
percent to 90 percent of a partner’s assets, capital that could not be accessed until retirement. 
Along with limited liability, however, the firm instituted changes to the capital obligations of  
those leaving the partnership; under the new regime, retiring partners were required to keep their 
capital in their firm for a longer period, on average six years.34 
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The change in legal structure was accompanied by other changes in the firm’s 
organizational structure, processes, tasks, and systems. Goldman became a bit more 
hierarchical.35 In 1995, the firm revamped its governance structure, forming two new eighteen-
person decision-making groups: the partnership committee and the operating committee.  
The operating committee focused on coordination of strategy and operations among the firm’s 
departments, divisions, and geographies. The partnership committee oversaw the firm’s capital 
structure as well as the selection of partners. Soon afterward, the firm established an executive 
committee—the ultimate decision-making group—which was much smaller than its predecessor, 
the management committee. The executive committee’s charter included all issues that did not 
require a vote by the full partnership or a partner’s individual consent.36 In addition, two new 
eighteen-person committees were formed. The six individuals on the executive committee had 
much more power than the management committee had enjoyed, including the ability to change 
the leadership. When I asked partners why they went along with these changes, some admitted 
that some were promised committee appointments, elevating their own status, or some were 
afraid they might be departnered if they didn’t go along with the changes. (Ironically, the 
organizational change by Corzine to a smaller and more powerful group would lead to a coup 
against Corzine; this is discussed later.) 
Many things changed as a result of and around the time of Goldman’s transformation into 
an LLC. The competitive and other external pressures fueling the demand for growth did not. 
From LLC to Public Company 
Some of the firm’s senior partners did not share Corzine’s enthusiasm for abandoning the 
partnership structure. Corzine was strongly in favor of an IPO, but Paulson insisted on a 
cautious, well-informed decision-making process. According to my interviews, three of the six 
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members of the operating committee were in favor of an IPO, and Paulson, John Thornton, and 
John Thain were against the idea. A strategy committee, led by Paulson, was charged with 
determining what Goldman should look like down the road and how best to ensure it remained 
on top. Input was actively solicited from partners, and Corzine tried to speak personally to most. 
After six weeks of study in 1998, the strategy committee submitted a plan for “vigorous 
expansion.”37 The study supported Corzine’s conviction that Goldman needed to go public to 
take advantage of competitive opportunities in businesses other than traditional investment 
banking. Although Corzine and Paulson did not get along, Corzine eventually gained Paulson’s 
support. 
Some people in the press have speculated that Paulson’s ultimate agreement to support 
the IPO was connected to his being made co-head of the firm. The operating committee and 
partnership committee, which together accounted for 39 of the 189 partners, supported an IPO 
for reasons related primarily to the perceived pressures to grow, and grow quickly, citing the 
threat posed by larger competitors and the ability “to bind more employees to the firm through 
equity ownership.”38 After the executive committee agreed to pursue an IPO, co-senior partners 
Corzine and Paulson released a statement that reflects both capital and liability concerns: “As a 
public company, Goldman Sachs will have the financial strength and strategic flexibility to 
continue to serve our clients effectively as well as respond thoughtfully to the business and 
competitive environment over the long term. This action will also meet a fundamental objective  
of the partners—to share ownership, benefits and responsibilities more broadly among all of the 
firm’s employees.”39 
During hours of discussion over a two-day general meeting in 1998, the partners 
registered their opinions with the executive committee, which was empowered to recommend for 
	   	   	   109	  
or against an IPO. 40 In the end, they reached consensus, and the partners voted to go ahead. 
(See table 4-1; for more details on the value of partners’ stock at the time of the IPO, see 
appendix D.) 
 Again, the change in structure was described as a direct response to competitive and 
external pressures to expand. 41 Expansion required large amounts of capital – more than the 
partners could or would contribute personally. The partners why they didn’t push to raise more 
outside private capital while remaining private, following up with the question, Wouldn’t the 
higher cost of capital be worth the benefits of maintaining the partnership structure? 
  
Most of them didn’t have a good answer, but they said it was considered and dismissed. A few 
said that only a limited group of outside private minority investors and capital would be willing 
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to invest without gaining a say in management into perpetuity. A few disputed this argument. 
They also said that by then the culture had changed enough for the IPO to go forward because of 
everything that had happened in the 1990s. One former partner went so far as to insinuate that in 
the end the real pressures were enough, and enough had changed, that their decision to vote for 
the IPO could be rationalized both to the outside world and to themselves. He thought this did 
mark a change in the culture because previous generations could have made the same 
rationalizations, especially in 1986. 
Soon after the decision to go public was made, economic conditions took a sharp turn for 
the worse. The stock market was experiencing erratic swings, the economic chaos in Russia 
carried the prospect of enormous losses to investment banks, the stock prices of Goldman’s 
competitors were falling, and there was virtually no market for IPOs. The firm’s earnings took a 
nosedive in the last quarter of 1998 as trading losses soared. Goldman put its IPO on hold, but 
there was no doubt it was coming. The prospect of enormous personal gain from the IPO 
prevented another mass exodus of partners like in 1999, who would have had difficulty 
withdrawing their capital if they had wanted to leave the firm. However, suddenly and 
unexpectedly, in January 1999, Corzine, whose working relationship with Paulson had always 
been uneasy, resigned as co-CEO, remaining as co-chairman—but only to help the firm get 
through the IPO. 
Another sign that the culture had already changed significantly was a Hank Paulson–
orchestrated management coup that forced Corzine out and put Paulson in charge. According to 
interviews, he and other partners were worried that Corzine “was going off the reservation.” 
They had found out that Corzine had merger/sale conversations with other parties without the 
direct consent of the executive committee. Over the Christmas holiday in 1998, while Corzine 
	   	   	   111	  
was away, Paulson made his move. Corzine had made the organizational change of consolidating 
power into a small executive committee versus the larger management committee, and there 
were some recent changes in the membership, which together opened up the possibility for a 
coup. In what was eerily similar to Paulson’s alleged quid pro quo support for the IPO to be 
named co-head of the firm, allegedly Thain and Thornton agreed to support Paulson in return for 
what they believed was an informal promise: Paulson would be the CEO for only a few years 
(the time was debatable) and then transfer the CEO job to both Thain and Thornton. Thain was a 
longtime lieutenant and friend of Corzine. According to interviews, he justified the decision with 
the argument that he was doing what he thought was best for the firm in the long run. In early to 
mid-January, Goldman partners received an e-mail from Paulson and Corzine: “Jon has decided 
to relinquish the CEO title.”42 Corzine remained co-chairman, but only to help the firm complete 
the IPO. Several partners I interviewed said that in hindsight they believed the alleged coup sent 
a bad message regarding behavior and highlighted how much the firm’s culture had changed. It 
would also affect how the next CEO would organize the firm (discussed later). 
With the markets and Goldman’s earnings recovering, Goldman went public on May 3, 
1999, pricing the stock at $53 per share, implying an equity market valuation of over $30 billion. 
In the end, Goldman decided to offer only a small portion of the company to the public, with 
some 48 percent still held by the partnership pool, 22 percent of the company held by nonpartner 
employees, and 18 percent held by retired Goldman partners and Sumitomo Bank and the 
investing arm of Kamehameha Schools in Hawaii. This left approximately 12 percent of the 
company held by the public. 
Less than six months after Goldman went public, in 1999 certain provisions of the Glass–
Steagall Act were repealed by the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act, and President Bill Clinton signed 
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the legislation that year. Former Goldman co-senior partner Bob Rubin was secretary of the 
Treasury at the time, and he later joined Citigroup.The repeal meant that commercial banks, 
investment banks, securities firms, and insurance companies could be combined.43 Commercial 
banks started to buy investment banks, spawning a massive consolidation in the banking 
industry. Some believed it was inevitable that Goldman would be bought. The firm suddenly 
looked small compared to its new direct competitors, and, with its market position, brand, and 
relationships, it would have been a prize. It turned out that Goldman CEO Jon Corzine and others 
held merger discussions at the time, talks that were disrupted by Hank Paulson’s ouster of 
Corzine (to be discussed more later). Rather than be taken over, the partners decided to grow.44 
The dismantling of Glass–Steagall led to many changes in the ways banks competed, 
changes that put a great deal of pressure on Goldman to rapidly evolve its own ways of 
operating. The changes in practices and in the firm’s culture were greatly accelerated. These new 
powerhouses began challenging Goldman with “margin-reducing, risk-heightening 
competition.”45 The impression was that competitors like J.P. Morgan or Citigroup would tell 
their clients, “If you want a corporate loan, you have to hire our M&A bankers.” This bundling 
of low-margin commercial banking product offerings (such as revolving lines of credit) with 
higher-margin investment banking products (such as M&A work and equity underwriting) 
threatened Goldman’s most lucrative businesses. In short, the investment banking business was 
becoming commoditized. In addition, clients put a premium on retail distribution—that is, selling 
securities to the general public, who were willing to pay ridiculous prices for tech stocks to cash 
in on the technology boom. 
Even before the repeal of Glass–Steagall, in 1997, Morgan Stanley had responded to this 
pressure by merging with Dean Witter Reynolds. Morgan was considered a “white shoe” firm, 
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referring to white buck shoes—laced white suede or buckskin shoes with red soles, which 
stereotypically were worn at Ivy League colleges, while Dean Witter Reynolds was a firm with 
strong retail distribution: nine thousand stock brokers serving more than 3 million customers.  
Dean Witter also owned Discover Card. Generally, white shoe investment bankers often looked 
down on retail stock brokers, whose alma maters typically were not the elite schools. I remember 
when the deal was announced, a Goldman associate called his Ivy League business school 
classmate working in investment banking at Morgan Stanley and teasingly asked him if he could 
now help him get a Discover credit card. Little did he know that I had worked on a project to 
evaluate whether Goldman should buy a retail distribution firm or build a scalable internet-based 
technology platform to access retail investors for distribution. 
In the early 2000s Goldman divided most of its M&A department into industry groups. A 
lateral M&A partner told me that client CEOs couldn’t tell the difference between excellent and 
average M&A advice or banks’ business practices, but they could tell whether you knew their 
industry. 
Competitive pressures forced Goldman to reexamine and modify its strategy. For 
example, Goldman redesigned and restructured into industry groups. Industry knowledge was so 
valued that, for example, I worked on projects evaluating whether Goldman should buy a 
consulting firm with deep industry knowledge and CEO contacts, or a boutique investment bank 
focused on an industry-like technology. Goldman also put greater emphasis on expanding its 
powerful network of key decision makers (CEOs, chief investment officers, government 
officials, etc.) and on trying to ensure that the relationships and information were highly 
coordinated and selectively and tactically shared. Access and information were strengths of 
Goldman’s, as they required a culture of serious teamwork. This was highly valued by clients 
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and a key distinguishing factor in hiring Goldman. In addition, Goldman focused more on 
coinvesting with clients. A coinvestment relationship was seen to have many advantages, 
including establishment of a closer relationship than did a merely advisory one. 
The industry consolidation brought about in part by the changes to Glass– 
Steagall resulted in fewer but much larger banks—banks that many would later argue were “too 
big to fail,” so large that their failure was deemed a risk to the stability of the entire banking 
system. Another result was that the pace at which these companies now had to grow in order to 
stay competitive challenged their organizational cultures. Companies growing via acquisition 




 Following consolidation, the financial services industry became intensely competitive, 
and Goldman now faced competition for scarce resources not only from other banks but also 
from insurance companies, investment advisers, mutual funds, hedge funds, and private equity 
firms.46 
To gain market share, commercial banks aggressively offered highly competitive pricing 
for services, resulting in additional pressures for Goldman. Commercial banking competitors 
also had access to cheaper financing, and they could take a longer-term view in pricing assets 
and loans on their balance sheets than could those who remained strictly investment banks. 
That’s because investment banking firms must mark to market or use fair-value accounting 
(which means that the fair value of an asset is based on the current market price), compared with 
commercial banks, which can use historical cost accounting for assets held for investment.  
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Some Goldman partners often privately complained about this advantage, in addition to 
accusing the commercial banks of illegally tying lending to investment banking business. 
Goldman faced increasing pressure to retain market share by committing more capital to 
important clients and conducting transactions on terms that often didn’t offer returns 
commensurate with the risks or didn’t meet Goldman’s internal return hurdles. Moreover, 
consolidation significantly increased the capital base and geographic reach of some of its 
competitors. It wasn’t only Goldman’s US competitors; foreign banks were buying US banks 
(Deutsche Bank bought Bankers Trust/Alex Brown, UBS bought Warburg and Dillon Read, 
etc.). Goldman also faced competition from the advent of electronic execution and alternative 
trading systems, lowering commissions. It also faced disintermediation by hedge funds, 
alternative asset management companies, and other unregulated firms in providing or raising 
capital. 
Goldman also began facing stiff competition in attracting and retaining employees. “We 
live in a competitive environment,” said David Viniar during his tenure. “We still have people 
leaving for multiyear offers away from us, some from our competitors, some from other industry 
participants.”47 
Goldman’s client base also began to change. Its traditional banking clients were 
corporations, which were typically relationship oriented. In the early 1990s, there weren’t many 
private equity firms. For example, in 1992, when I started, I worked on the sale of one of a 
company’s divisions to a private equity firm. We must have contacted fewer than a dozen private 
equity firms, because there were not many of them around. Nor were there many large hedge 
funds. Later in the 1990s, however, private equity firms and hedge funds began to boom.  
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Generally, these firms were much more transactional and generated large fees in the short term 
compared with Goldman’s traditional corporate clients or “buy and hold” mutual funds. People 
at hedge funds tended to be more transaction oriented than relationship oriented.  
Similarly, private equity firms tend to be transactional; buying and selling companies and taking 
them public are shorter-term transactions than traditional corporate client business. Goldman 
executives decided to focus on this growing industry and even started a group in the mid- to late 
1990s to cater to this client base. 
Reflecting on the shift, a Goldman partner I spoke with said that perhaps Goldman’s 
emphasis on doing the right thing was too extreme to be practical in the competitive business 
environment and that an emphasis on more transaction-oriented clients, like private equity firms, 
was needed in banking. He felt that too many Goldman people were focused on maintain 
unproductive client relationships and were being rewarded simply for their internal Goldman 
relationships or caretaking historically loyal Goldman clients and contributions to recruiting and 
mentoring. 
Because private equity firms and hedge funds valued and treated Goldman differently 
than did traditional corporate clients, Goldman’s approach to clients began to change. The 
private equity firms valued any investment bank that could get them the inside track on deals and 
could provide the best financing terms (including guaranteed or bridge financing, which puts the 
investment bank at risk if it can’t sell or distribute the loan to other lenders or investors). Many 
of the private equity firms felt they already had people (many of them former bankers) who were 
smarter and more skilled than those in the banks in the kinds of deals the firms were doing. In an 
interview, one private equity client described most investment bankers who maintained a 
relationship with his firm as “order takers.” 
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Hedge funds also changed the landscape. Unlike many traditional mutual funds, which 
had a “buy and hold” mentality, many hedge funds went in and out of securities with high 
frequency. They typically borrowed money from investment banks to buy securities, and they 
shorted securities. All of these activities generate significant fees, and so Goldman organized 
groups to focus on these growing clients and their special needs. 
I remember working on a special project to analyze Goldman’s top fee-paying clients, 
and I was shocked by how many were hedge funds. They, along with private equity firms, 
quickly became the largest fee payers on Wall Street. The hedge funds were sharp and 
sophisticated. In trading, there is an inherent tension between buyer and seller.  
Because of the sophistication of the hedge funds, they also typically viewed Wall Street firms as 
“places of execution” that provided liquidity and securities. They valued “the edge”—receiving 
special access to decision makers who gave them a competitive advantage, or to traders who 
were willing to take the risk and provide them with liquidity, better execution, or a better balance 
sheet and who offered low-cost, easy financing terms so that the hedge funds could leverage their 
investments and improve their returns. The private equity funds and hedge funds generally 
treated Goldman more like a necessary counterparty than a trusted adviser for the long term. 
Most of these funds were under intense pressure to produce short-term results and did not value 
long-term relationships in the same way that many corporate clients did. 
As Goldman grew its proprietary investing activities and became a more active 
competitor to its investing clients, some hedge funds and private equity firms suggested that 
Goldman was introducing too many conflicts of interest into its operations—as when Goldman 
had the Water Street Fund in the late 1980s and early 1990s—causing mistrust. They felt 
Goldman had access to proprietary information from clients and had the potential to use it to 
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Goldman’s advantage. According to most of my interviewees, these accusations began in the 
mid-1990s and accelerated as the hedge fund and private equity industry became more 
competitive and added players, and at the same time Goldman dedicated increasing amounts of 
capital to these competing activities. 
Many hedge funds came and went, gaining a few years’ worth of great returns and 
growth and then hitting a rough patch or falling out of style and shrinking as investors fled. 
Hedge fund traders also tended to move around. So there was not the same traditional long-term 
relationship mentality with hedge funds as with corporate relationships. But even corporations 
changed in this regard in the 1990s as pressure for performance increased on corporate boards 
and CEOs. Boards came under pressure to replace underperforming CEOs, a trend that continued 
in the 2000s. The average tenure of a CEO has consistently declined.48 So relationships with 
corporate CEOs were also becoming short-term propositions. 
Technological Pressures 
Technological innovation was another source of significant pressure on Goldman and the 
whole banking sector. New technology has added transparency to financial markets, as with 
electronic trading, while also making them less transparent, as with the design of increasingly 
complex investment products, such as the mortgage securities behind the 2008 crisis. Generally, 
more transparency in markets and electronic execution hurts investment banks’ profitability, and 
the hit on profits drives banks to seek greater scale and a higher volume of transactions to offset 
the losses. This is happening today, for example, with the sale of treasury notes. More than  
20 percent of the $538 billion of treasury notes auctioned this year have been awarded to bidders 
who bypassed the traditional dealers at the banks by using a website to place their orders.49 
That’s almost twice the amount as in 2011 and up from 5.6 percent in 2009. This direct-bidding 
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system has eaten into the profits of government bond traders at investment banks. Typically, 
low-transparency/high-complexity products have the highest margins. So it’s understandable that 
banks focus on developing and selling complex products, especially to offset the negative impact 
of transparency from technology. 
Technological pressure contributed to the change in Goldman’s culture in various ways. 
For one thing, technological changes increased the emphasis on trading, both within Goldman 
and generally. Traditionally in investment banking, information was exchanged primarily by 
word of mouth—in person or over the phone in the context of long-standing relationships. It was 
a labor-intensive, human capital–intensive business, as well as an apprenticeship business, more 
art than science. In Information Markets, William Wilhelm Jr., a professor of management, and 
Joseph Downing, an investment banker, point to technological pressures as being so powerful 
that they were key reasons that Goldman went public. Information technology provides a lower 
cost, more reliable way of disseminating, aggregating, storing, and analyzing information, and it 
has diminished the role of long-standing relationships and human capital in banking. In response, 
Goldman began to put less emphasis on selecting its human capital, and on mentoring, training, 
and developing the culture to support the maintenance of relationships. 
Ironically, the technological advances have also put a higher premium on star players. 
According to one part of Wilhelm and Downing’s theory, there are a few exceptional “human 
capitalists” or “stars” who have an ability to transcend technology and utilize their skills and 
talents to build relationships to bring in the kind of money that technology-driven trading does. 
And these stars require outsized compensation. The way this affected Goldman was that its 
relatively tight bands for compensation for people at the same level started to widen, and the 
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partners decided that exceptions in hiring, compensating, and promoting “stars” must be made, 
further impacting Goldman’s culture. 
Technological innovation also required greater specialization by employees at the firm. 
People needed to be specialists in order to add more value to clients. This also created more 
silos—and the conditions of structural secrecy, where information isn’t completely shared or 
understood by all of the appropriate people. 
More Than the IPO 
Too much emphasis has been placed purely on the IPO as the force of change at 
Goldman; as this analysis shows, the change began well in advance of the IPO. John Whitehead 
had pointed to issues related to Goldman’s earlier growth as his motivation for writing down the 
business principles. The pressure to grow was there at the time the principles were written—
organizational drift was already in motion—and the principles were intended as one way to 
manage or constrain the change. In fact, the agreement of the partners to finally go public after 
resisting for so long was one of the products of the cultural changes that preceded the IPO. 
Some may object to the argument that competitive and external pressures to grow were 
behind the change at Goldman as overly simplistic. The truth is indeed more complex. For one 
thing, the increased complexity in management and systems that often accompanies growth must 
be factored in as well.50 Charles Perrow notes that institutional complexity prevents people from 
understanding the consequences of their behavior.51 Certainly, complex systems pose greater 
control challenges than do simple ones. And the faster an organization grows, the more the 
pressures and reactions to them compound and become interconnected, leading to increasing 
complexity and difficulty in seeing change. 
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In addition to accelerating certain changes, Goldman’s structural change into a public 
company initiated a cascade of significant changes to other aspects of the organization. Now it 
had a board of directors that included independent directors (people from outside Goldman); a 
new partnership compensation program, with voting rights, as spelled out in the shareholder 
agreement (to help replicate some elements of the partnership); additional layers of processes, 
controls, and management needed by a public company; new compensation processes and 
consideration (stock in addition to cash) and more. 
But there were also pressures from within to grow revenues. During my interviews with 
partners, one of the recurring themes was the need for Goldman to “increase the size of the pie.” 
This means that revenues, and consequently the firm, had to expand for the firm to be successful 
in recruiting and retaining talented people. If the pie stayed the same size, then as more people 
became partners, each partner would keep getting a smaller slice of the financial rewards, 
making partnership less attractive. In this way, the external competition for people, combined 
with financial incentives, pressured the firm to increase revenues—not only to stay competitive 
but also to shore up the partners’ wealth. As we’ll explore in more detail in the next chapter, the 
acceptance of a number of changes in practices at the firm that deviated from the traditional 
values, and the normalization of that deviance—or what could be described as rationalization 
that they weren’t really deviations from the original meaning of the principles—were also crucial 
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Chapter 5 
Signs of Organizational Drift 
In their first letter to shareholders in the 1999 annual report, the top Goldman executives 
wrote, “As we begin the new century, we know that our success will depend on how well we 
change and manage the firm’s rapid growth. That requires a willingness to abandon old practices 
and discover new and innovative ways of conducting business. Everything is subject to change—
everything but the values we live by and stand for: teamwork, putting clients’ interests first, 
integrity, entrepreneurship and excellence.”1 
Changes were happening, and the partners seemed to be making it clear that they wanted 
any changes carefully managed to maintain Goldman’s core values. But as the firm encountered 
decision-making dilemmas related to change and growth, managers found it difficult both to 
acknowledge what was happening and to confront the conflicting needs and desires that underlay 
the issues. The Goldman partners I interviewed, even some of those who initially said there had 
been no change in culture, conceded that some changes had occurred, but they described them as 
“one-offs” or “special circumstances,” and others said the industry was growing and changing so 
quickly and becoming so complex that they hadn’t seen the changes clearly. 
It is important to understand certain unique mechanisms at Goldman that formerly had 
helped slow the pace of change. The pressures on these mechanisms provide a lens into the 
firm’s policies and business practices and how they evolved. 
Constrained Capital 
One inescapable reality of a private partnership is that capital is somewhat constrained by 
its being contributed by the individual partners—and there are, after all, only so many partners. 
This constraint acts as a check on growth. A second factor is the personal liability of the partners, 
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which requires the maintenance of large capital reserves to cover potential losses as well as the 
adoption of business practices that help the firm avoid large regulatory fines or lawsuits. 
For most of Goldman’s history, these capital constraints provided a measure of self-
regulation that not only limited growth but also helped maintain cultural stability and led the firm 
to emphasize client relationships. John Whitehead observed that “limited capital forces an 
investment banking firm to be careful in deciding what kinds of business it should be involved in 
and to what extent.”2 With restricted capital, the firm had to emphasize client-oriented 
businesses, rather than trading, because they required less capital and often entailed relatively 
less risk. That is one of the reasons why the M&A department was highly valued. 
Whether or not the lack of capital was a drawback is debatable, and it was debated by the 
partners at the time. Not only did Whitehead believe that capital constraints forced the firm to 
make better decisions, but also many competitors thought Goldman was at no disadvantage. As 
one commented, “I wish I could find a business where Goldman is capital-constrained.”3 But the 
stark fact was that in 1998, Goldman had roughly half the capital base of Morgan Stanley or 
Merrill Lynch—this, after having twice the capital base of Morgan Stanley in 1986. The 
increasing pressure for growth led the partners to seek outside capital in order to remain 
competitive, even though acknowledged Goldman culture carriers voiced concerns, fearing the 
impact on the firm of outside investors’ goals as well as the impact that more capital would have 
on the firm’s business mix, tolerance for risk, culture, and management. 
Another key loosening of the constraints on organizational change came from the 
changes in liability for losses, the dangers of which many partners were also well aware of. 
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Partners’ Liability 
 Earlier investments—the $500 million private equity investment of Sumitomo Bank in 
1986, and the $250 million private investment made four years later by the Kamehameha 
Schools/Bishop Estate, had loosened the constraints on growth, but they had not relieved 
partners of personal liability. But first with the transition to LLC and then with an IPO, they 
would be freed from this liability, which a number feared would lead to a stronger appetite for 
growth and risk and would quicken change. They had already seen evidence of greater risk-
taking even before the IPO. 
In my interviews, many of the partners pointed to their personal liability as having been a 
constraining factor on “doing stupid things.” Some pointed to the risk Goldman took in bailing 
out the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998 as an early case of taking 
on more risk than the firm had traditionally been comfortable with. LTCM was a speculative 
hedge fund that used a lot of leverage and faced failure that year. As LTCM teetered, Wall Street 
feared that its failure could have a ripple effect and cause catastrophic losses throughout the 
financial system. Unable to raise more money on its own, LTCM had its back against the wall. 
Goldman, AIG, and Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway offered to buy out the fund’s 
partners for $250 million, provide capital of $3.75 billion, and operate LTCM within Goldman’s 
own trading division. The situation was so serious and the pressures on LTCM were so intense 
that the offer was made with a one-hour deadline. But at the beginning of the year, LTCM had 
$4.7 billion in equity, so its partners regarded the offer as stunningly low. They did not accept  
Buffett’s offer within the required one-hour deadline, and the deal was off. Ultimately, the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York organized a bailout of $3.625 billion by the major creditors 
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to avoid widespread financial collapse. Goldman and the rest of the top-tier creditors each 
contributed $300 million.4 
For some Goldman partners, getting involved in the bailout subjected their personal 
capital in the firm to too much risk. The investment banking partners, in particular, according to 
my interviews, generally were not happy about the potential risks to their personal capital and 
were worried about Corzine’s aggressiveness in pursuing the deal. To some of them, that the 
firm went ahead was a sign of both the pressures and the changes. 
As the risk rose—when the firm grew and invested its own money more aggressively—it 
subsequently changed the way the partners interacted with the firm. 
The IPO Debate 
Even though many Goldman partners now say that the culture hasn’t changed, at the time 
the IPO was decided, some of the partners were quite vocal about their concerns about cultural 
change. In fact, when people at Goldman—not only partners but also employees—discussed 
among themselves the idea of the firm going public, most of the concerns they expressed were 
about how Goldman’s culture might change rather than about financial or personal 
repercussions. Partners talked about their responsibilities as stewards to leave the next generation 
a stronger business with smarter people than the one they had inherited. In discussions, most IPO 
opponents expressed the concern that going public could “destroy what makes Goldman Sachs 
Goldman Sachs.”5 
A contemporary report described the process of debating and then postponing the IPO as 
“a wrenching experience that has bruised the firm.”6 It created tensions between the firm’s active 
general partners and retired limited partners, between Goldman’s investment bankers and traders, 
and between Corzine and Paulson.7 The discussion was personal, because people had to consider 
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their own self-interest as well as the interests of the firm.8 Partners screamed and cried during 
one meeting in what one observer described as a “cathartic experience.”9 Conflict arose between 
new partners and those who had been at the firm longer and had a much greater stake in the firm 
and were about to retire. Partners with longer tenure, whose Goldman equity and percentage had 
gained greatly in value and now would get multiples of their book value, had a greater personal 
financial incentive to favor an IPO. 
Some partners were rumored to believe they should be compensated, through the IPO, for 
staying in 1994, turning the firm around, and taking the risk when others left. But John L. 
Weinberg said, “I always felt there was a terrific risk and still do, that when you start going that 
way [an IPO] you are going to have one group of partners who are going to take what has been 
worked on for 127 years and get that two-for-one or three-for-one. Any of us who are partners at 
the time when you do that don’t deserve it. We let people in at book value, they should go out at 
book value.”10 
While I was at Goldman, one partner privately told me that he felt terrible that an IPO 
would make him worth more money than the management committee partner who had helped 
build the firm and helped get him promoted to partner. He estimated that this man, who had 
worked at the firm for more than twenty years and retired before the IPO, was worth an 
estimated $20–$40 million, compared with newer partners like him, some of whom had worked 
at the firm for less than ten years and would be worth more than $50 million. 
Understandably, dissatisfaction was greatest among the retired limited partners, and 
tension between them and the general partners (essentially, Goldman’s controlling owners) 
became heated. As the IPO was originally structured, limited partners would have received a 25 
percent premium over the book value of their equity, whereas general partners would have seen 
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premiums of nearly 300 percent.11 Whitehead predicted a major problem if this inequity were 
not resolved. Issues related to fairness and compensation were also raised by nonpartners 
because of Goldman’s long-standing policy of not paying high salaries to the “all-important 
junior executives—the ones who do the grunt work—holding out instead the brass ring of 
partnership and its potential for eight-figure incomes.”12 
Divisions also arose between the investment bankers and the traders. While in general, 
investment banking partners, especially the relatively new partners, did not support the IPO 
because of concerns about culture change and increased risk taking, most trading-oriented 
partners supported it, in part, because with the additional capital they could grow their businesses 
larger and faster. 
One investment banking partner who did support the IPO explained to me that he did so 
because of concerns about capital risk and liability that outweighed those about change to the 
culture. All his wealth from working at Goldman for more than twenty years was tied up in the 
firm, and the IPO offered a way to get it out. Getting out at a multiple of book value was greatly 
beneficial and probably sold him on the IPO, he explained (sheepishly admitting some self-
interest), but he had also been genuinely worried about the risk involved in the LTCM deal and 
he feared massive trading losses. He felt that Corzine was willing to take bigger risks than he 
was, and he was worried that the big traders—many of whom he didn’t know well and some of 
whom were not partners—were risking lots of partners’ money. It spooked him. But the firm 
needed to grow, he said, to continue to be the best place to work, to attract the best people, and to 
survive. He rationalized the IPO as a necessary compromise that was a result of pressures and 
changes. 
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Key Signs of Organizational Drift 
One sign of organizational drift is a change in policies and business practices associated 
with a firm’s principles. Even before the IPO, Goldman began embracing opportunities it had 
once shunned out of concern for preserving its reputation for ethical conduct and to reduce 
conflicting interests. 
When firms get into new businesses in which they lack expertise or that are at odds with 
the values and principles that made them successful, they become vulnerable to veering off 
course, adding incremental risk—financial and reputational. The pursuit of maximizing 
opportunities can lead to rationalizing the drift. Previous decisions made to protect the firm start 
to be considered too conservative or out of date. Even the fundamental business model may be 
challenged. Goldman was not exempt from this process. Once again, I’m not judging or 
evaluating the changes; I’m simply pointing them out.  
Representing Hostile Raiders 
Goldman had made its reputation in banking by defending companies in hostile raids or 
unsolicited takeovers, when a company bids for a target company despite the wishes of the 
target’s board and management, typically when the board decides it is not in the best interests of 
the shareholders for the company to be sold at the price offered. A “hostile” bidder makes its 
offer “public,” taking it directly to shareholders—implying that the board of directors and 
management are not acting in the best interests of the shareholders and are trying to hold on to 
their jobs. To the target’s board and management teams, the bankers who work against the 
takeover to protect them and shareholders are viewed very positively. A 1982 Wall Street 
Journal headline captured this positive image: “The Pacifist: Goldman Sachs Avoids Bitter 
Takeover Fights but Leads in Mergers.” The accompanying article praised Goldman’s policy of 
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not representing corporate raiders in hostile deals, although it included the few obligatory 
criticisms from competitors.13 
Goldman had made a strategic decision not to represent companies initiating hostile bids, 
the only large investment banking firm to do so.14 When questioned about the wisdom of this 
policy, Whitehead responded, “We have to dissuade them from going forward with this and 
explain to them why our experience showed that it would be unlikely that this unfriendly tender 
offer would turn out to be successful for them a few years later.”15 As a result, CEOs were more 
comfortable revealing confidential information to Goldman than to other firms, because they 
trusted Goldman not to use the information in representing hostile raiders against them. 
This policy lost Goldman some business and restricted the profits and growth of the 
M&A department, but it was a sound business decision that contributed to the positive public 
perception of the company. It was long-term greedy, calculated to make the most money for the 
firm over the long term, and Goldman may well have ultimately made more money because of it. 
Many clients actually paid Goldman an annual retainer to be on call in case of a hostile bid. 
Although the policy was not strictly about integrity, it had the effect of reinforcing Goldman’s 
reputation for integrity among clients and the public. Even a Morgan Stanley banker once said 
clients viewed Goldman as “less mercenary and more trustworthy than Morgan Stanley.”16 Most  
partners told me they felt the policy reinforced the image and culture of Goldman. 
In the late 1990s, this policy was challenged, as many huge hostile deals were announced 
by Goldman clients and coveted potential clients. A series of internal meetings was held to 
discuss changing the policy. I participated in some of them. 
At one meeting, the people in the room were evenly divided.  
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I was with the group that advocated against representing hostile raiders, whether they 
were blue chip corporations or individuals financed by junk bonds. We felt that doing so would 
cause us to lose both our credibility with clients and our perceived moral high ground. We 
reminded the group of Goldman’s advertising slogan, “Who do you want in your corner?” and 
observed that Whitehead had also resisted serious challenges to the policy. John L. Weinberg had 
supported the policy, too, even though one of his largest clients had requested Goldman represent 
it in a hostile raid. 
Those arguing in favor of representing hostile raiders claimed that very good clients of 
the firm were asking for our help. By working with them, we could try to reduce the “hostility,” 
implying that other advisers would not have as much tactical or moral sway with clients.  
They also said that they feared clients would not hire us to advise them on buy-side transactions 
because we weren’t willing to advise them on a hostile approach. 
We countered that in the past, Goldman had stepped aside and other firms had stepped in, 
to which the others replied that this was disruptive and did not serve the client well. We pointed 
out that in these very large deals, it was not unusual to have co-advisers anyway, so we would 
simply recuse ourselves, and the client would not have to get someone up to speed from scratch. 
In the end, senior partners decided that Goldman would work on hostile raids “rarely and 
reluctantly.” We developed a series of questions, essentially a test, to determine whether we 
would advise a hostile raider. At the same time, we did get a minor victory in that there seemed 
to be a gentleman’s agreement not to do it in the United States, where Goldman’s market share 
and association with the policy were particularly strong. In hindsight, this compromise is a clear 
case of an incremental shift, and the compromise provisions imply that at least subconsciously 
we were aware that there could be adverse consequences of this change in policy. 
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The manner of the arguments also reflected a drift from the Goldman principles. Never 
did anyone say in the meetings that the policy should be changed to maximize opportunities for 
growth, market share, profits, or a potential IPO. Instead, people argued the need to stick with 
clients, make clients happy, add “another tool in the tool chest” to help clients. Ironically (or 
paradoxically), these arguments invoke the first business principle of keeping our clients’ 
interests first. But for the first time I began to hear the rationalization, “If we don’t, someone else 
will,” and the rationale was not dismissed outright. “This time is different,” people asserted; the 
world had changed and was more competitive than when the two Johns ran the firm. 
One could certainly argue that the real reason for making the change was that Goldman 
needed to maximize revenue growth opportunities in anticipation of an eventual IPO. Goldman 
already had the lion’s share of the raid defense business, so the only way to acquire a greater 
M&A market share was by tapping the other side of the equation. But the decision cannot be 
attributed solely to the looming IPO. The trigger was that there also had been an explosion of 
large, hostile transactions. One concern was surely that hostile M&A deals were very large, and 
if Goldman were not involved, its leading M&A market position could be threatened. 
I later found out that Goldman’s co-leaders at the time disagreed about changing the 
policy. What surprised me was that Paulson supported the change and Corzine did not. It was 
later reported in the press that Paulson thought the “no hostiles” tradition was costing  
Goldman huge fees it could have received from “advising large, ambitious, serial-aggressor 
corporations on takeovers,” whereas Corzine was concerned about the damage to Goldman’s 
image as “corporate management’s most reliable friend.”17 
The firm’s entry into this aspect of investment banking was incremental and started 
outside its core US market in the mid- to late 1990s with hostile acquisitions of non-US 
	   	   	   132	  
companies, outside the United States, by other non-US companies.18 The first announced hostile 
M&A deal for which Goldman advised in North America was in 1999, and that was in Canada.19 
To many of the Goldman partners I interviewed (who acknowledged change), in 
hindsight, there could hardly have been a more dramatic business policy decision to signal that 
the Goldman culture was changing. 
Renewed Involvement in Asset Management 
Goldman had steered clear of asset management since the Great Depression. In 1928 the 
firm created Goldman Sachs Trading Corporation (GTSC) as an investment trust, which worked 
much like modern mutual funds: the trust bought and managed a portfolio of securities, some of 
them speculative, and shares were sold to the public. According to one author, “It was essentially 
a trust which used debt to buy other companies, which used more debt to buy still more 
companies—in other words, a ticking time bomb of debt.”20 
GTSC itself bought many shares of the trusts it managed. The idea was that Goldman 
would profit enormously from the original underwriting fee, from the appreciation of shares 
Goldman held in the trust, and from investment banking and securities trading on behalf of 
companies whose stock was held by the trust. By 1928, with only $20 million in partnership 
capital and either sole or joint control over funds worth $500 million, this created a devastating 
level of exposure on the eve of the October 1929 stock market crash. John Kenneth Galbraith 
used phrases such as “gargantuan insanity” and “madness . . . on a heroic scale” to describe 
GTSC’s strategy.21 When the crash came, GTSC shares fell from their high of $326 to less than 
$2 per share. The ensuing debacle and damage to Goldman’s reputation, leadership, and clients 
caused Goldman to stay away from the asset management business. 
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This attitude changed in the late 1980s, when, lured by the consistent profits its 
competitors were earning in asset management, Goldman established Goldman Sachs Asset 
Management (GSAM) to serve institutional and individual investors worldwide.22 Goldman 
struggled to determine whether it should manage money for high-net-worth individuals or 
institutions, in the end doing both. According to the interviews, there was strong sentiment from 
many partners that Goldman should not be perceived as competing with clients, but one of the 
key rationales was that Goldman’s competitors were doing it. 
Beginning in the mid-1990s, GSAM experienced explosive growth, and Goldman now 
points out that it is one of the largest asset managers in the world, and yet many of the largest 
asset managers are still Goldman’s clients. 
GSAM became a strategic priority, in part, because it was not as capital intensive as 
proprietary trading and it offered consistent fees, which were a percentage of assets under 
management. When Goldman went public, establishing the asset management business proved to 
have been a wise strategic decision for this reason. Institutional investors buying the stocks of 
investment banks, and research analysts covering investment banks, liked the consistency of 
earnings and gave a higher valuation to the earnings from asset management divisions than to 
trading earnings.23 The growth of asset management, and the strategic opportunities and strategy 
of the business, are cited in most research reports regarding Goldman’s IPO. GSAM also is 
mentioned as one of the key areas of potential growth in Goldman’s IPO prospectus. 
The changes in Goldman’s business mix in the 1990s, before the  
IPO, were not lost on the financial press: “Goldman intends to build up its asset management 
business . . . If it does not, it cannot expect to be valued as highly as Merrill and Morgan Stanley 
in the grim as well as the great times of the cyclical securities industry.”24 
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However, some of GSAM’s funds have consistently underperformed Goldman’s 
proprietary traders, an outcome that has led some investors to suggest that the best investors and 
traders at Goldman went into proprietary trading to manage Goldman’s money and not that of 
clients—claiming that this is a classic example of Goldman putting its interests ahead of its 
clients’. Such criticism is not entirely fair, because Goldman partners’ personally invest in the 
funds, as well as often coinvesting the firm’s capital with clients’ money, and the funds have 
specific mandates. But on the other hand, Goldman is receiving valuable recurring revenue fees 
from the outside investors in the funds so the risks and rewards are not exactly the same as those 
for outside clients. 
Advising Companies in the Gambling Industry 
Goldman had also traditionally declined to do business with companies involved in the 
gambling industry, for reputational reasons. The firm changed this policy in 2000. Its first foray 
was to represent Mirage Resorts and Steve Wynn. Mirage was sold to MGM Grand Inc. for $6.6 
billion ($21 a share) in June 2000. Although the gambling industry was starting to be regarded as 
increasingly professional and mainstream, one could argue that Goldman made this change 
simply because it saw a huge financial opportunity. To raise its profile in the industry and in junk 
bonds, Goldman hosted a lavish conference in Las Vegas, with entertainment by Cirque du Soleil 
and Jay Leno, which was attended by eight hundred people. 
As William Cohan wrote in Money and Power, “One portfolio manager who attended the 
three-day conference said that it was something he expected from [Donaldson, Lufkin & 
Jenrette], not Goldman. Marc Rowland, CFO of oil and gas producer Chesapeake Energy of 
Oklahoma City, had previously issued $730 million in junk bonds through Bear Stearns. 
Rowland remarked that prior to the conference, he never would have thought of approaching 
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Goldman to handle junk bonds.”25 Of course, one could also argue that Goldman was shrewdly 
capitalizing on a market opportunity and that it was true that the industry’s reputation had 
changed. 
Partners I interviewed pointed to two key examples of pushing the client envelope in 
terms of the questionable nature of clients taken on. Interestingly, they were both outside the US 
market. One was London’s Robert Maxwell, whom Goldman acquired at the very end of John L. 
Weinberg’s watch, when it was still trying to establish itself in London—and well before the 
IPO. The other recent example was Libya. In early 2008, Libya’s sovereign-wealth fund 
controlled by Col. Moammar Gadhafi gave $1.3 billion to Goldman to sink into a currency bet 
and other complicated trades. At one time, the investments lost 98 percent of their value. Also, 
according to reports, afterward Goldman had to arrange for security to protect its employees 
dealing with Libya. Many current and former partners questioned the firm’s dealing with a client 
like Libya—even though the United States had lifted sanctions in 2004—where employees 
would need security protection. Retired and current partners felt that Maxwell and Libya being 
clients showed a deviation from the standards of the 1980s, and were due in part to the pressure 
to grow. 
Changing Underwriting Standards 
When I joined Goldman, strict underwriting guidelines were in place for taking a 
company public. The process required the team to write an extensive memo for the commitments 
committee by a certain day and time to be considered in the following week’s meeting. The 
committee was responsible for the standards that governed which companies Goldman would 
finance, take public, and be associated with. The memo had to follow a specific format and 
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address standard questions. Mistakes in the memo or unanswered questions usually resulted in a 
severe dressing down at the meeting. The committee was notoriously tough. 
Typically, Goldman would not take a company public if it had not been in business for 
three years, and it had to show profitability. But then came the technology and internet boom, 
and suddenly companies with little track record and no profits started being taken public by 
competitors. The requirement at Goldman was reduced to two years of profitability, then to one 
year, and then to one quarter, until finally the firm was not even requiring profitability in the 
foreseeable future. 
Goldman has denied that it changed its underwriting standards during the internet years, 
but as Matt Taibbi pointed out in a Rolling Stone article, “its own statistics believe the claim.” 
After [Goldman] took a little-known company with weak financials  
called Yahoo! public in 1996, once the tech boom had already begun,  
Goldman quickly became the IPO king of the Internet era. Of the  
24 companies it took public in 1997, a third were losing money at the  
time of the IPO. In 1999, at the height of the boom, it took 47 companies  
public, including stillborns like Webvan and eToys, investment offerings  
that were in many ways the modern equivalents of Blue Ridge and  
Shenandoah. The following year, it underwrote 18 companies in the  
first four months, 14 of which were money losers at the time.26 
In addition, Goldman’s behavior in managing IPOs was questioned. As Taibbi noted, Goldman 
took eToys public in 1999. On the first day of trading, eToys, which was originally priced at $20 
per share, opened at $79 per share, rose as high as $85, and closed at $76.56. By the end of the 
year, the shares had declined to $25. In 2001, eToys filed for Chapter 11 protection in 
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bankruptcy court. Later, the eToys creditors committee filed a lawsuit alleging that eToys relied 
on Goldman for its expertise as to the pricing of its IPO and that Goldman gave advice to eToys 
without disclosing that it had “a conflict of interest,” allegedly an arrangement with Goldman’s 
customers to receive a kickback of a portion of any profits they made from the sale of eToys 
shares after the IPO. In addition, the complaint alleged that Goldman had an incentive to 
underprice the IPO because an initial lower price would result in higher profits to its customers 
and therefore a higher payment to Goldman.27 
The case was dismissed in court on the grounds that there was “no fiduciary relationship” 
between eToys and Goldman: “[W]e find no issue of fact as to whether Goldman Sachs assumed 
a fiduciary duty to advise eToys with respect to its IPO price,” Justice DeGrasse wrote.  
“We therefore need not consider whether such a duty was breached. Were we to consider the 
issue, we would find that Goldman Sachs met its burden of establishing that there was no 
breach.”28 
The Rise of Stars and “Super League” Clients 
In 1970, long before he drafted Goldman’s business principles, Whitehead had written a 
set of statements to guide internal investment banking (IBS) business development, including, 
“Important people like to deal with other important people. Are you one?”29 One partner told me 
Whitehead’s original statement had been reinterpreted and repeated verbally over the years as, 
“You can’t run with the big dogs if you pee with the puppies.” By the mid-1990s the slogan, 
meant to remind bankers to cultivate contacts and relationships with corporate CEOs and 
decision makers, was reinterpreted further and socialized to mean cultivating only the most 
important companies and most important people. This shift represented the preference given in 
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partner elections to those who had relationships with important CEOs and important companies, 
because they had a higher value to the firm than did bankers who covered middle- 
market companies. Formerly, partners who covered many of these middle-market companies had 
been considered culture carriers and their role was deemed important, but that view had faded. 
This change was dramatically represented by John Thornton when he spoke in the late 
1990s at the annual internal investment banking conference held in New York each December. 
In his book The Accidental Investment Banker, Jonathan Knee describes the conference.  
Instead of employing the usual elaborate PowerPoint presentation, Thornton conveyed his 
message with a plain black marker, drawing a few dots that he said represented the “important 
people in the world,” of whom, he conceded, there were not many. He added circles representing 
the orbits of these important people and said, “Pretty much everything important that happens in 
the world, happens in these circles.” He then marked the point where the greatest number of 
circles intersected and said, “This is where I want to be. This is our strategy. Thank you.”30 
Few of the people in the room dealt with Goldman’s most important clients or had access 
to the world’s most important people. The Goldman culture had always prevented stars from 
emerging and eclipsing their peers. Thornton’s new strategy singled people out, and it was 
accepted—a clear signal that the “no stars” policy had changed. When discussing “stars” and in 
explaining how much the policy continued to change, one retired partner pointed out that  
CEO Lloyd Blankfein was allegedly seen attending a pre-Oscars party in Los Angeles in 2013, 
and the partner said he guessed that it must have been a first for the head of Goldman. 
This shift coincided with a new practice of designating “star clients.”  
Clients were categorized and prioritized to help Goldman prioritize and allocate resources, and 
the largest clients that offered the most revenue opportunities and that had influence or 
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influential CEOs were classified as “Super League.”31 Super League clients received increased 
attention from management committee members, and Goldman systematically tracked the firm’s 
relationship and progress with these clients. Employees were also held strictly accountable for 
these relationships. Many bankers wanted to work on Super League clients’ business, resulting in 
fights for clients and internal politics. 
The prioritization and metric-measuring culture rose in the firm during my time. For 
example, senior people asked me to develop lists of the top one hundred people in business and 
determine who at the firm had relationships with them so that Goldman could identify any gaps.  
Goldman executives were assigned to make sure they personally called and met with these 
influential people regularly, conveyed proprietary information or views or “out of the box” ideas, 
and connected them to other important people. When I was in Hong Kong as an analyst, I was 
given a list of about ten clients and told to focus primarily on them. I was told these people made 
all the important decisions and that we wanted to focus all our attention and resources on them—
and, if possible, coinvest with them, because that was the closest relationship the firm could have 
with a client. I was told that if people called me about any other clients to refer them to my 
bosses. 
Partners pointed out that, starting in the mid-1990s, Goldman introduced time sheets 
(records of how much time was being spent on Super League clients and on which transactions 
and products) and revenue scorecards. That led to increasing contention about who got credit for 
what, with implications for compensation and promotion. In describing this change over time, 
some partners said it had brought a “FICC or trading subculture” to the banking side, a mark-to-
market mentality. Before this increased emphasis on quantification and accountability, people 
were willing to make more time for each other and help think through issues. Bankers didn’t 
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worry about filling out time sheets or taking credit. They worried instead more about giving 
clients better advice. 
 This practice clearly signaled a shift of emphasis, and it changed the firm’s 
culture, but it also seems to have had positive financial results, at least in the short to medium 
term. Conceding that Goldman is run more efficiently and with more accountability now than in 
the past, one partner told me that the client metrics have perhaps gone too far in measuring 
investment banking clients as if they were trading clients, and investment bankers as if they were 
traders. The prioritization has made people more accountable and productive and has improved 
Goldman’s management, but he wondered whether it was really good for the clients—and in the 
firm’s best long-term interest.  
Rehiring People and Making Counteroffers 
When I started at Goldman, departing employees were persona non grata. While I was an 
analyst in the M&A department, someone spoke to one of the department heads about being 
approached by another firm and admitted to thinking about the offer. The senior partner told him 
to hold on for a minute, picked up the phone, and called security to escort the offender off the 
floor, telling security to retrieve his suit jacket from his cubicle. Naturally, then, rehiring 
someone who had left the company was unthinkable. 
This policy changed slowly in the mid- to late 1990s as talented people left for tech firms 
or hedge funds and, later, regretting the move, wanted to return. Goldman was desperate for 
talented people, and in many instances made a “bid to match or top” the offer from competitors 
to keep them. By the time I left banking, there had been several exceptions to the “no rehire” 
rule. One of the more visible cases was Michael Sherwood, known internally as Woody, 
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currently vice chairman and co-CEO of Goldman Sachs International. He left for a few weeks in 
1994 before quickly changing his mind and returning to the firm. 
As one partner explained, in the 1990s the bids to keep people were another example in 
the changing culture. Some employees had come to believe they needed to produce an offer from 
a competitor and have Goldman match or top it; otherwise, they would be lost in a crowd of 
many talented people. Those who were good soldiers—formerly viewed as important role 
models (because they didn’t complain, worked hard, didn’t politick or lobby for promotions or 
compensation)—were now considered either naive or not desirable enough to get another offer. 
An example of the change was John Thornton, who was quoted in the New York Times 
as saying he would consider going to work at Lazard, a competitor, but “only for the top job.” At 
the time, a Goldman banker being singled out or quoted in the press was highly unusual, possibly 
a reason for getting fired, much less what was generally interpreted as public negotiation for a 
promotion. But surprisingly, there were no visible repercussions, and, in fact, Thornton would 
become copresident, which signaled that something had changed.32 
Changing Compensation and Promotion Practices 
When I started at Goldman, compensation and promotion were handled by class, 
according to the year one graduated from business school and started at Goldman. The vast 
majority of a class (I would guess 90 percent) was paid within a tight range. Associates in 
banking got bonuses that increased by about $100,000 per year; the range was less than 10 
percent to 25 percent when I started. As competitive pressure to retain people increased and there 
were large differences in backgrounds, the ranges expanded. According to interviews, the 
original 90 percent had dropped to 75 percent, and the range was more like 25 percent to 100 
percent. The goal was to retain and reward people, but the changing ranges also reflected the fact 
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that the quality of the talent, which was very consistent across a class when I started, now varied 
more widely as more people were hired. 
The way the partners were compensated also changed. I was told that in the 1980s 
partners were generally paid by class, according to the year they were elected. If two people were 
elected partner—one in M&A and the other in IT or operations—I was told they generally made 
the same amount at least in the first few years, because the attitude was that everyone worked 
hard and contributed, and, to succeed in IT or operations, a person had to be truly exceptional.  
But this changed over time. Steve Friedman and Bob Rubin tied partner compensation more 
closely to performance in the early 1990s. Also, to strengthen the link, to extend the policy to 
other employees, and to create a new source of developmental feedback, Goldman instituted 
360-degree performance reviews in the early 1990s. 
Promotions to partner typically were made a certain number of years after business 
school; usually it took eight to ten years after business school before someone was up for partner. 
Exceptions had often been made in trading. The rationale was that traders made enormous sums 
of money for the firm and possessed a specialized skill that was transferable to any firm (a hedge 
fund or another bank). Not so for bankers, whose only choice upon leaving Goldman would be to 
work for a competing firm, which would be a step down in social prestige. Traders did not care 
as much about prestige and could work at hedge funds or start their own, so exceptional traders 
began to make partner early. (One of the most notable exceptions was Eric Mindich, who ran 
equity arbitrage proprietary trading and made partner at the age of twenty-eight.) 
The new attitude began to seep into other areas and then into banking. The idea that 
Goldman had stars and had to promote them earlier or compensate them differently set into 
motion a different dynamic. Some partners told me there was a deliberate effort to make 
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exceptions and make a few people partners early, thereby creating more incentive, demonstrate a 
meritocratic culture, and drive people harder. 
I see now that the changes—in compensation and in promotion—represent a fundamental 
shift in the 1980s’ practices of the firm. 
Lateral Partner Hires from Other Banks 
When I started at Goldman, it was unusual for the M&A department to hire senior 
bankers from other firms laterally, because, as I was told at the time, their deal experience, 
training, habits, and sacrifices would not be on par with those of their Goldman peers. When I 
was an analyst in the early 1990s, I remember a department meeting to discuss hiring an 
exceptional associate from another firm—a meeting of the entire department about one associate 
lateral hire. In contrast, by the time of the IPO, when the firm hired three outside senior  
M&A professionals as partners there was no department meeting to discuss it, even though 
Goldman probably had fewer than a dozen M&A partners worldwide. 
As the firm grew, it needed more partners. It also needed to replace pre-IPO partners who 
wanted to “take the money and run—I mean, retire,” in the paraphrased words of one partner I 
interviewed. Goldman especially needed partners in FICC and in proprietary investing areas 
where it seemed there was tremendous growth, but a disproportionate percentage of partners 
retired and sought to start their own investing businesses. The IPO provided the currency to 
attract people from competitors. Goldman had hired laterally before, as it did with a few trading 
partners from Salomon Brothers in 1986, but this was a deviation from the norm. 
The lateral partner hiring accelerated after the IPO. When I was in  
FICC, I noticed that several lateral partners were brought in at senior positions to replace 
departing pre-IPO partners. 
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Turnover Increases 
In the early 1980s, Goldman’s staff grew at an annual rate of approximately 8 percent. 
Over 90 percent of the new growth came from entry-level hires, such as analysts from college 
and young associates out of business school.33 During the 1980s, annual turnover averaged only 
about 5 percent compared to typical turnover rates in the industry of approximately 20 percent. 
In the mid-1990s, however, Goldman’s annual turnover rate rose to between 20 and 25 
percent.34 From 1994 to 2000, the firm’s staff grew from about 9,000 people to close to 22,000, 
an annual growth rate of over 20 percent. At the time, it was estimated that the majority of 
employees had been with the firm for less than three years. Most of the partners I interviewed 
said that this issue was often discussed at the senior level. However, growth was viewed as 
imperative to the survival of the firm, and the increased turnover impacted culture and morale, 
and most of the partners I interviewed said this issue was discussed at the senior level. But the 
argument was that the increase was primarily due to the growing allure of hedge funds, private 
equity firms, and technology companies—not as much about Goldman itself. Goldman adjusted 
its practices and hired more people to compensate for losing more people. 
Recruiting and Hiring 
Many partners with whom I spoke thought Goldman has been much better than most 
firms in terms of senior commitment to recruiting. They also pointed out that Blankfein and 
Cohn have been very active in recruiting at all levels. When I interviewed executives at other 
firms, most agreed that it was less common for one of their managing directors to attend a 
recruiting event on a college campus, while at Goldman it is more common. Executives at 
competitors felt it didn’t impact their promotion or pay, they explained, and their behavior 
reflected that lack of incentive. Managing directors were expected to produce revenues, and that 
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was what drove their performance evaluations. A few who worked at larger investment banks 
that participated in industry consolidation also explained that they were unsure of the value 
proposition they were presenting and didn’t want to sell something they didn’t believe in. Before 
the mergers and consolidations, they felt as if their firms had distinct reputations and cultures; 
today, they think their reputations and cultures are muddled. 
Despite Goldman’s typically stronger commitment to recruiting, the quick pace of growth 
leading up to the IPO did result in more lenient hiring policies and less mentoring due to the 
larger number of new employees. When I was sent to Hong Kong to help build the  
M&A department, I was told I was chosen in part because of my technical skills and 
entrepreneurial spirit. What I quickly found out was that they should have sent someone with a 
human resources background. I spent half of my time interviewing people. We hired and grew at 
such a pace that it was challenging to keep up. Many of the people we hired would probably not 
have been hired at that level in New York.35 But there was fierce competition for candidates who 
had language skills combined with top American MBAs. 
One time I played a practical joke on an associate in Hong Kong who was originally from 
the New York office. We were interviewing a candidate who had grown up in China and had just 
graduated from an Ivy League school. Her family had made enormous sacrifices for her 
education, and she was an excellent candidate. The associate left on vacation, and while he was 
gone, we wound up hiring her. She was ensconced in a cubicle with a nameplate on the outside.  
(Analysts and associates worked in cubicles and vice presidents and partners had offices.) The 
morning the associate was due to come back from vacation, I took the new analyst’s name plate 
off the cubicle wall and put it on the door of an empty vice president’s office. When he walked 
in, he noticed the nameplate and asked what it was doing on a vice president’s office. I explained 
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that, although she had never worked before, there was tremendous competition for her and 
Morgan Stanley had offered her a VP position, so HR agreed to match their offer. The associate 
went nuts and started to march down to the head partner’s office to complain before I stopped 
him and confessed. But we were so desperate for talent, my practical joke was believable.  
The increased demands for talent and increasing competition for the best talent available raised 
further cultural issues regarding hiring standards and to what extent a value fit was considered in 
the selection process.36 
All of the new hiring further taxed the social network of trust. One investment banking 
partner explained that once he had his stock, he did not care as much if the traders wanted to 
bring in “rainmakers” from “second rate” firms, even if they didn’t fit the culture. During the 
mid- to late 1990s, he explained, the firm gave up on making sure each lateral hire was a perfect 
cultural fit and a confirmed success, even in banking. Many of the new people would eventually 
adapt to the culture, add new ideas, add new businesses, add new relationships, and make 
significant contributions, but some would fail miserably. The “dilution” in culture and quality of 
people, as he called it, was just the “cost of the pace of growth.” 
Socialization of New Employees in International Offices 
When I started at Goldman in the early 1990s, there was an unwritten policy that to grow 
internationally the firm would generally hire foreign students at top American business and law 
schools, require them to stay in New York for a year to get socialized to the culture of Goldman, 
and train them to go to a foreign office. At the same time, American vice presidents (even those 
lacking foreign language skills) who had been at the firm for a decade and were considered 
culture carriers were often sent to international offices along with junior employees for a 
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rotational period, with the goal of maintaining a cohesive network and continuing the 
socialization process. 
But international growth accelerated, and regulatory, competitive, organizational, and 
technological changes put pressure on the policy. For example, in Europe, economic unity and 
the use of a common currency allowed massive consolidation of banks, which thereby became 
more competitive with Goldman across Europe. European banks also began setting up large 
presences in the United States. So the training and socialization period was changed from one 
year to six months, and then to a few weeks, and finally to none; new hires would finish their 
training and immediately be sent abroad. Over time, the visiting American partners, who were 
there to help in part with the socialization process, were resented for taking partnership slots and 
Super League clients from locals. According to interviews, many of them, seen as out of touch 
with local customs and values, were marginalized, and, with no opportunities back in New York, 
many of them left. 
Staple Financing 
Staple financing is a prearranged financing package offered by investment banks to 
potential bidders during an acquisition. Financing terms are literally stapled to a deal’s term 
sheet in the context of a structured deal. Essentially, a firm advises a company on its sale and 
also provides financing to the buyers. So the firm plays two roles. Typically banks argue that 
staple financing creates for sellers a convenient negotiation floor. 
Goldman has used staple financing successfully, but the practice raises ethical issues. 
Clearly, the practice carries the potential for conflict by casting the investment bank in dual 
roles, on opposite sides of the table.37 (In fact, it was one of the practices identified by the 
business standards committee in 2011 for review.) 
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One case that focused critical attention on staple financing involved the 2005 acquisition 
of Toys “R” Us by a club of private equity sponsors. Credit Suisse First Boston (CSFB) advised 
the group of buyers, led by Kohlberg Kravis Roberts (KKR). When CSFB first raised the 
possibility of offering a staple financing package to the KKR-led group and other potential 
bidders, the Toys “R” Us board objected and insisted that the bank not discuss potential 
financing until a merger agreement was in place. Once there was an approved merger agreement 
between Toys “R” Us and the KKR-led buyers, CSFB again asked permission to finance the 
buyers, and Toys “R” Us agreed. Consequently, CSFB earned $10 million in financing fees in 
addition to its $7 million sell-side advisory fee.38 
The public stockholders of Toys “R” Us made the staple financing an issue when they 
challenged the proposed acquisition. The Delaware court that heard the matter did not find any 
impropriety but commented on the “possible perception that CSFB’s advice to the seller 
throughout the auction process was tainted by a desire on the part of CSFB to obtain additional 
fees from financing the successful bidder.”39 Although the court did not find that CSFB acted 
improperly, it cautioned, “[I]t is advisable that investment banks representing sellers not create 
the appearance that they desire buy-side work, especially when it might be that they are more 
likely to be selected by some buyers for that lucrative role than by others.”40 Goldman also was 
the sell-side adviser in another deal involving staple financing—the sale of Neiman Marcus in 
2005—that became the subject of a Harvard Negotiation Law Review case.41 
Goldman’s decision to accept the practice is yet more evidence of its shifting culture 
resulting from various pressures, even though it did so “carefully and reluctantly and with the 
right disclosures,” according to a partner I interviewed. A business standards committee report in 
2011 stated, “Goldman Sachs will carefully review requests to provide staple financing when 
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IBD is selling a public company. This review will occur as part of the firm’s customary staple 
financing approval process.”42 
Changes in the Business Mix 
In its quest for growth and profits, Goldman also began to adjust its business mix. The 
prioritized opportunities for growth required more capital: trading, proprietary trading, merchant 
banking/principal investing, and international. Trading and principal investments grew 20 
percent annually from 1996 to 2009, whereas investment banking grew 7 percent. 
The changing business mix at Goldman, with so much more revenue beginning to come 
from trading in particular both reflected and contributed to organizational drift. The balance 
between banking and trading was changing. Also, international growth started to become a 
challenge. 
Trading Becomes a Dominant Percentage of Revenues 
Goldman already had leading market share in M&A and most areas of high-value-added 
investment banking, so the tremendous opportunities for growth, profits, and returns were in 
trading. For this reason, Bob Rubin and Steve Friedman initiated a greater push into trading, well 
before the IPO, and trading became a much larger percentage of Goldman’s revenues. In 1996, 
trading and principal investing represented about the same percentage of revenues as investment 
banking (about 40 percent), but from 2005 to 2007, trading and principal  
investing accounted for about 70 percent of revenues, and investment  
banking had plunged to 15 percent.43 
Banking gave Goldman access to key CEOs and information—maybe not directly to the 
traders, but at the very top, where people set risk limits and oversaw all the risks. It began to 
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become clearer to me, though, that there were different values and approaches among traders and 
bankers and that trading made the money and would come to dominate the thinking and culture. 
The new emphasis on trading caused a cultural shift not only at Goldman but on Wall 
Street generally. Rob Kaplan explained: “As trading came to be a bigger part of Wall Street, I 
noticed that the vision changed. The leaders were saying the same words, but they started to 
change incentives away from the value-added vision and tilt more to making money first. If 
making money is your vision, to what lengths will you not go?”44 The shift may also have 
contributed to turnover. For example, according to Kaplan, 
Wall Street was historically more balanced between trading business 
and client business. I ran investment banking and oversaw investment  
management. But as the trading business got bigger and bigger,  
the client side made up less of the firm’s overall work. This was going  
on at every single firm, not just at Goldman Sachs. I began to believe  
I could add more value in the world by doing something else. It was  
a difficult decision. However, I realized I had lost some passion for  
what we were doing, and that’s when I talked to the CEO, Hank  
Paulson, about leaving. It was traumatic, but I felt like I had to make  
a change.45 
Trading entailed a different view and definition of “clients,” and that difference became 
more significant at Goldman as its trading activities intensified. Blankfein explained the 
difference in an interview with Fortune: “We didn’t have the word ‘client’ or ‘customer’ at the 
old J. Aron [the metals trading division where he worked with Gary Cohn for years]. We had 
counterparties—and that’s because we didn’t know how to spell the word ‘adversary.’”46 Former 
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Bear Stearns asset management CEO Richard Marin described a Goldman executive’s attitude as 
arrogance and said that it was at “the root of the problem” at Goldman: “When you become 
arrogant, in a trading sense, you begin to think that everybody’s a counterparty, not a customer, 
not a client . . . [and] as a counterparty, you’re allowed to rip their face off.”47 A counterparty is 
the person on the other side of a transaction or trade—not someone you are advising. So  
Goldman may see its role, as the firm has said, as a market maker (see chapter  
1), and that is fine. But Goldman can get into issues when the client believes Goldman is acting 
as an adviser and proclaims that “our clients’ interests always come first.” 
According to the clients I interviewed, Goldman has conveniently, for its own purposes, 
shifted its roles as principal and agent/market-maker back and forth—and has even added a few 
more potential roles on the same deal. This is an issue Goldman identifies, in its report of the 
business standards committee, that it needs to make clearer to clients. 
Some people have argued that Lloyd Blankfein is largely responsible for this shift, but 
trading was already becoming a larger percentage and majority of the revenues before Blankfein 
became CEO. The firm also played multiple roles, including proprietary investing and investing 
with clients, before he became CEO. His rise in the firm reflected the pressures and changes. 
Proprietary Trading Becomes a Larger Percentage of Revenues 
 
When one looks at the business principles that John Whitehead wrote in 1979, it is a 
particular challenge to reconcile the goals of proprietary trading with putting clients’ interests 
first, or the goal of being the leading adviser. Proprietary trading has one client: Goldman. As 
proprietary traders, we were walled off from client activity. We were not there to provide 
liquidity to clients, manage funds for clients, or advise clients. From time to time, we were asked 
by banking to tell them or their clients how hedge funds would evaluate a situation. From time to 
	   	   	   152	  
time, we were also approached by banking or trading to help finance a transaction or buy 
something from a client or coinvest with a client—actions that, most of the time, raised all types 
of potential conflicts and died because we were too busy to have long conference calls to discuss 
it. But generally we were in our own silo. 
Proprietary trading at Goldman did not start in the 1990s. Bob Rubin joined the risk 
arbitrage proprietary trading area in the equities division in 1966, and by the 1980s it was 
considered one of the most profitable and powerful areas in the firm. When Rubin and Steve 
Friedman took over as senior partners in the 1990s, Goldman accelerated its additional role of 
risking its own capital versus being a mere “market maker.” It was the size of the losses from 
proprietary trading in 1994 that caused many observers to think the firm would not survive. 
How big and important are proprietary trading and principal investing activities at 
Goldman? Glenn Schorr, a Nomura Securities equity research analyst covering Goldman stock, 
estimated that the Volcker Rule, which is intended to restrict proprietary trading and principal 
investing at investment banks, would impact 48 percent of Goldman’s total consolidated 
revenue. To put this into context, he estimated the impact at 27 percent, 9 percent, and 8 percent 
of total consolidated revenues of Morgan Stanley, Bank of America, and J.P. Morgan, 
respectively. 
Certain Goldman client-oriented sales and trading desks had “proprietary trading” 
operations. They got to see client order flow, but theoretically they existed to provide liquidity or 
“facilitate client trades.” This was prevalent in less liquid, more opaque products and desks, 
especially fixed-income securities like high-yield bonds, where it may not have been easy to 
immediately match a buyer and a seller. It was also prevalent in relatively lightly regulated 
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markets such as foreign exchange. Generally, proprietary trading on client-oriented sales and 
trading desks was less frequent in highly transparent and highly regulated areas such as equities. 
Merchant Banking and Private Equity Become a Larger Percentage of Revenues 
GS Capital Partners was started in 1992 with about $1 billion in assets and grew to $1.75 
billion by 1995 and $2.75 billion by 1998. Ten years later, in 2007, GS Capital Partners had $20 
billion in assets, making it one of the largest private equity firms. Goldman’s Whitehall Real 
Estate Fund also grew to have multiple billions of assets under management.48 Although 
separate, the funds do leverage Goldman banking and other relationships. When I was at  
Goldman we were often reminded how much more money Goldman could make investing the 
deal versus advising on it. Goldman was competing against clients in making acquisitions of 
companies and real estate properties. Goldman also had internal funds for managing  
Goldman’s own money and trying to buy assets. (The corporate and Whitehall funds raised 
money from external sources with Goldman’s coinvestment.) 
The private equity business had many synergies with other parts of the bank and wielded 
a lot of clout as a profit center. For example, the private equity group could take its companies 
public, the executives whom it backed could become private banking clients, and the companies 
that it controlled could use Goldman to hedge its risks or finance its debt. The private equity 
group was careful to maintain relationships with all the Wall Street firms (similar to an 
unaffiliated private equity firm), but there was no question it also was aware of its primary 
affiliation—and disclosed potential conflicts in its documents for investors in the funds. 
An executive of a major real estate firm told me the story of a property his company was 
trying to buy in the 1990s. Goldman had always been the company’s primary banker, and it had 
paid Goldman millions in fees over the years. The executive told his Goldman banker about the 
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deal. A short time later, Goldman’s Whitehall Fund purchased the property. He was furious 
(although he hadn’t hired Goldman to advise him). He asked the banker to arrange a meeting 
with a senior Goldman executive. According to the client, at the meeting were senior people of 
the Goldman Whitehall Real Estate Fund. The corporate executive explained what had happened 
and expressed his frustration as a client. Goldman’s senior executive assured him that there were 
Chinese walls so that Goldman Whitehall would not know what he had told his banker. The 
Whitehall executives swore that they did not know about the client’s interest in the property.  
Goldman’s CEO said that merchant banking and Whitehall were very important to Goldman and 
that the firm had a fiduciary responsibility to do good deals for the clients they raised money 
from. 
Skeptical, the corporate executive told me that since that meeting, he had done business 
with Goldman only if he had to. He doubted Goldman’s ability to manage conflicts, its various  
roles, and confidential information. 
Steve Friedman, however, expressed confidence that Goldman could manage any 
conflicts arising from the firm’s new ventures: “The culture was transformed with a new 
strategic dynamism; and the principal investment business was well launched—although the old 
guard continued to worry and fret over conflicts with clients even though we explained to them 
that there are always conflicts, but you could manage the conflicts.”49 
International Business Becomes a Larger Percentage of Revenues 
In 1984 Goldman was primarily an American firm, with one partner outside the United 
States: an American based in London. After the 1986 partnership meeting, the consensus was to 
grow the firm globally to better serve clients. Consequently, international revenues increased as a 
percentage of total revenues, growing at a faster rate than did the US revenues, and a rate much 
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faster than did the rest of the business. At the time of the IPO vote in 1998, 39 of the firm’s 190 
partners were based in London, compared to 1 partner in the early 1980s. In 2011, 48 percent of 
Goldman employees were outside the United States (compared with 35 percent in 1996), and 
international net revenues grew 30 percent faster than US revenues from 1996 to 2011. One of 
the challenges Goldman faced with the increase in international business was maintaining its 
culture and principles outside New York, because many organizational issues arise in dealing 
with such rapid internationalization and global expansion, including training, socialization into 
culture and values, communication, local cultural nuances, and more. 
When I arrived in Hong Kong in 1993, Goldman’s office was small, employing fewer 
than two hundred people. The cultural and legal barriers, as well as low deal volumes and the 
existence of entrenched local competitors, were major challenges. At the time, Hong Kong was  
a high-risk posting for a seasoned banker. It offered an advantage to advance more quickly but 
had the disadvantage that as locals became socialized and trained, they would ultimately have 
more value than an expatriate. And it was difficult to transfer back home. 
Sometimes, when a senior banker was transferred to an international office, the reality 
was that the banker had lost a struggle back home or had to agree to the move to make partner.50 
However, sometimes a foreign posting was intended to train a professional for a larger role. No 
matter how much Goldman wanted to portray itself as globally important, at the time all major 
decisions were made in New York.  
Although the office furniture, office sizes, and set-up of cubicles were the same, the 
culture at Goldman in Hong Kong was different from what I experienced in New York. The 
Hong Kong office operated in a separate world. At the time, very few senior bankers from New 
York came for an extended period of time. Senior partners would jet in and jet out. Because 
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Goldman was concerned about quality of execution, any deal of meaningful importance typically 
had a New York or London banker assigned to it.51 
Because of the cost of supporting international offices like Hong Kong and because of 
Goldman’s lack of relationships with important local people at the time, the firm realized that 
merchant banking and proprietary investments were much more profitable there than were 
advisory businesses. A team of four or five bankers would work on a deal and get paid a one-
time fee of millions, and then the team would look for another deal to work on. Investing with 
clients, in contrast, was viewed as a way to build closer relationships with them. Once an 
investment was made, hopefully it would make money each year as it produced returns. 
Eventually, the investment would need to be sold or financed, and Goldman was in a good 
position to work on the deal and collect a fee (typically at a rate comparable to those charged in 
Europe or the United States, and not comparable to fees in Asia, which were notoriously low).  
The Goldman bankers’ close relationship would also provide an easier entrée for private 
banking. All of this required teamwork and collaboration, supported by a social network of trust 
among the few partners in Asia and their financial interdependence with the other partners 
around the world. These partners also had to trust that it was for the greater good to have 
Americans and British flying in and out all of the time. 
Proprietary trading internationally was simpler, and it was seen as a high-margin 
business, because it was easily scalable—it took the same time for a trader to research an 
opportunity large or small. The markets in Europe and Asia tended to be less liquid and efficient, 
creating many opportunities. As Goldman established contacts and access, there were even more 
opportunities in which it perceived it held an informational advantage. Interestingly, Goldman 
preferred that its international offices follow the New York model as closely as possible—from 
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people having the same titles (each person would be head of something and have one employee 
reporting to him, whereas the counterpart in New York with the same title would have hundreds 
of reports) to the same style of office furniture—all to make the firm feel united and cohesive. 
But although similar, the local hires typically had one approach, and the New York expatriates 
had another, and, to add complexity, the London expatriates that came stood somewhere in the 
middle. Often, junior people like me were caught in between. 
The internationalization of the firm also had consequences for the acculturation of new 
employees, which traditionally had occurred through an oral tradition. With the overseas 
expansion, this method of passing down the cultural legacy was more challenging. 
Though the partners had strongly indicated at the time of the IPO that they didn’t want to 
undermine the firm’s core values, the changes in business practices and policies, as well as in the 
business mix, clearly illustrate Goldman’s organizational drift. The daily grind of competition, 
and the success these changes led to encouraged those at the firm, including the partners, to 
overlook or discount them, or sometimes purposely ignore them, in the interests of rapid growth, 
which was seen as vital to the firm’s success and survival. This pressure for growth significantly 
intensified after the IPO, which also brought a new set of changes to the firm. 
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Chapter 6 
 
The Consequences of Going Public 
 
While the ipo accelerated many changes already taking place at Goldman, it also brought 
about new ones. The newly public Goldman faced the challenges of a change in ownership and 
financial interdependence among the partners, the elimination of capital and growth constraints, 
and the need to take into account outsiders’ perceptions of the firm—all had distinct cultural 
consequences. 
A fundamental change made because of the IPO was the addition of the new principle 
expressing a commitment to providing superior returns to shareholders. Many observers point to 
this as the biggest change over time at Goldman because the firm could no longer privately make 
decisions in its best long-term interests in its relationships with clients, but instead had to focus 
on the public market investors’ shorter-term interests. They argue that this written addition was 
the “smoking gun” that muddled up always putting clients’ interests first. Though as 
demonstrated in this book, organizational drift had begun before this, there is no question that 
this change introduced its own considerable effects, as did the new structure of ownership. 
Shared Ownership 
When Goldman went public it awarded shares to almost every employee (including 
assistants), with some portion being awarded according to a formula and some by the discretion 
of one’s manager. The formulaic part was calculated on compensation and years of service. 
Generally, the discretionary part was largely determined by seniority and previous years’ 
compensation. There was a feeling among some senior nonpartner employees (those who were 
within a few years of partner) that part of the IPO grant should offset the lower income that the 
employee had gotten versus peers at other firms, now that the firm was going public and it was 
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unclear if the partnership was going to be considered less prestigious and be less lucrative. The 
IPO shares were restricted to vest over years 3, 4, and 5 after the IPO (one-third each year) to 
ensure that everyone focused on the future and that potential outside investors knew that 
employees would not sell shares overnight. Compensation at Goldman had typically been in all 
cash versus most of its peers, which were public and generally paid bonuses both in cash and in 
stock that vested over time. The stock awards were also meant to “align incentives” and give 
employees “a sense of ownership.” It sounded good, and everyone I spoke to was grateful to 
receive stock (although some questioned the fairness of the allocation process). I remember how 
proud I was to receive a thick envelope with information about my stock, complete with bar 
graphs of what it was worth at different prices. But over time I learned that wide stock ownership 
would not necessarily fully meet its objectives, and it also caused some unanticipated issues. 
About a year after the IPO, Goldman stock rose to around $100 a share (from the $53 
offering price) and the partners got approvals to sell shares “in order to improve trading liquidity 
for shareholders.” That increased public ownership to 27 percent.1 To sell, the partners needed 
special approval from the board (the majority of which were insiders) and the shareholder’s 
committee (the majority of which were insiders). None of the three most senior executives sold 
shares, but about 160 former partners did, selling over $2 million on average, while eleven  
sold more than $20 million. No nonpartner employees were allowed to sell shares before the first 
vesting period, three years after the IPO.2 I remember a partner sheepishly telling me he decided 
to sell the maximum he was allowed to in the special offering for “diversification reasons,” 
almost seeking or expecting some sort of understanding or reassurance that it was ok. At the time 
a group of my peers discussed that the partners who retired before the IPO did not have the 
“diversification” option and that the current employees did not have the option to sell after one 
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year. And based on conversations with those more senior to me at the time, some of my peers 
were certainly not the only ones who were questioning the timing of the sales. One interviewee 
mentioned to me that it was eerily similar to the 1994 partners “bailing out.” (I am paraphrasing 
as always in interviewee quotes.) 
A few years after the IPO stock grants, the tech bubble burst. The stock declined to the 
$70s and the firm laid off lots of employees. The information that quickly spread like wild fire 
was that in the fine print of the IPO stock grant was a stipulation that in order to cash out your 
stock when it vested, you still had to be employed by the firm. For those that were being laid off, 
the firm was “allowing” people to keep their 2002 stock “as a bonus” even though it had not 
vested (in some instances getting no cash bonus/severance), but they would lose the amounts for 
2003 and 2004. I remember the shock and outrage not just from those laid off but from some of 
those who remained. There was a feeling by some that the firm had “handcuffed” employees 
with the large grants but then took them away because this helped the firm reduce the number of 
shares outstanding and therefore helped the firm’s reported earnings per share to investors, which 
would help the stock price. To make matters even worse, some felt that the firm paid people less 
than peers during the tech crash because it knew that it had the “handcuffs” from the IPO shares 
that had not vested and that managers included the value of the shares that were to vest in the 
employee compensation calculations. These actions had consequences for how certain 
employees viewed the firm. 
Many people didn’t look at the grants as a sharing of ownership; they saw stock being 
used as a way to make it more expensive for competitors to recruit Goldman people. I remember 
thinking it was odd that the firm had all of these restrictions, in part to keep people and align 
incentives, because the firm used to pay nonpartners all cash in the early 1990s and did not seem 
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to have a hard time retaining people then, or thinking they worked in alignment with the partners. 
The attrition rates were lower then than industry standards. Many employees just discounted the 
value of the shares—and many didn’t count it at all in their equation of compensation. I 
remember a few people sometimes quietly questioning if Goldman’s stock price abnormally 
moved up in the month of November before the grants because of Goldman manipulating the 
price through buybacks or talking to analysts and investors to lower the number of shares they 
needed to give to employees.  
(For this study, I analyzed this in depth and found nothing.3) 
During my time at the firm, I do not remember ever hearing a nonpartner employee 
mention to me that they felt “aligned” with either the partners or the shareholders. Many seemed 
more concerned about the fine print of what they could sell and when they could sell it—
especially the traders when I was in FICC, as they saw the risks inherent in their compensation 
tied to the markets, the value of their apartments/homes in the New York metropolitan area tied 
to the markets, and the value of their retirement plans tied to the markets. The most senior 
executives and partners have more restrictions regarding their stock than the rest of the firm, but 
obviously this is much different than not being able to receive all of your capital until you retire, 
and even then over many years. A partner mentioned to me that he also thought a cultural shift 
occurred in part due to the way the firm treated people in the tech crash. Job security seemed 
more ephemeral. And he believes the result was an attitude that one should take more risk to 
make money fast or spend a lot more time politicking and taking credit for revenues. 
Changes in Financial Interdependence 
Unlike many of its investment banking peers that went public, Goldman tried to remain a 
“partnership,” even if the partners didn’t fully recognize or understand its intended and 
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unintended benefits. For example, Goldman created the Partnership Compensation Plan (PCP). 
The program retained biennial public partnership elections and gave the elected 
partners(internally referred to as PMDs, or partner managing directors) financial and social 
prestige preferences over nonpartner managing directors (MD-lites). In the original idea of the  
PCP, PMDs were to receive a meaningful part of their compensation as a percentage of the 
profits of the entire firm, as with a private partnership. That was a sign of the thoughtfulness and 
concern about what the partnership meant. According to interviews, the PCP was intended to 
combat the consequences of the IPO. A partner explained that, in the initial 1998 vote, he voted 
against an IPO because “I was worried that the fabric and culture of the firm would change if it 
were no longer a partnership.” But in the second vote, he backed the IPO because “the thing that 
convinced me in the end, though, was the idea of maintaining the partnership concept and 
structure within a public company.”4 Many partners told me that they were concerned about how 
quickly the culture of Morgan Stanley changed after its IPO. However, very quickly after the 
IPO even the PCP changed as a result of pressures. 
Soon after the IPO, more factors than a partner’s share of the profits of the “partner pool 
set aside for partners” began to impact their overall compensation. In addition, shares used in 
compensation would vest typically over a few years and could then be sold, as compared with 
partners’ having to wait until retirement to get to their capital. According to interviews, generally 
PMDs looked at their compensation as an annual bonus comparable to those of their peers at 
other firms, not as a percentage of the shared profits of a partnership. 
According to interviews, over time, and in incremental steps, the percentage of the 
overall compensation of a PMD as a percentage of the firm’s profits has shrunk further, and the 
percentage of the “discretionary amount” paid (similar to a discretionary bonus) has become 
	   	   	   164	  
increasingly larger. This policy—in another departure from the “long-term greedy” mentality—
signaled a change from the days when each partner in an elected class got the same percentage. 
Even the top executives were paid on a relative basis in comparison with their peers (executives 
at other banks), and not purely on a percentage basis.5 The proxy statement sent to shareholders 
discusses how, in determining the compensation of the CEO, Goldman looks at what other CEOs 
at comparable firms make—a much different approach from a partnership percentage and the 
financial interdependence related to the collective skills, values, and judgment of the partners. 
At the time of the IPO, Goldman partners and employees owned about 50 percent of the 
firm. Over time, the percentage has changed dramatically. In 2011, Goldman partners owned 
approximately 10 percent. And keep in mind that stock is a significant part of compensation after 
the IPO, meaning that the sales of the original partnership shares from insiders have been even 
more dramatic. For example, according to research conducted by the New York Times’ senior 
reporter Theo Francis and published in January 2011, Blankfein has sold a total of  
$94 million in shares since 1999 and Goldman’s 860 current and former partners have sold more 
than $20 billion in Goldman stock. Overall for the partnership, the stock sales average $24 
million for each partner since the IPO. This analysis does not include the billions of dollars  
Goldman has paid in cash salaries and bonuses to the partners.6 
Not having a meaningful ownership stake at risk represents a significant change from the 
financial interdependence and attitude toward risk that formerly characterized the partnership. 
Risk slowly shifted away from partners to public shareholders. Although the partners’ 
stake in the firm now had liquidity and the risk to their personal assets had been eliminated, the 
loss of ownership and the elimination of personal liability for losses suffered by  
the firm eventually had unintended and far-reaching consequences  
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to the organization’s culture. 
Though paying in stock was meant to align their interests closely with those of investors 
and discourage excessive risk taking, executives can defeat the alignment effort by using 
complex investment transactions to limit their downside when the stock goes down. According to 
the New York Times, more than one-quarter of Goldman’s partners used hedging strategies from 
July 2007 through November 2010.7 
Others’ Capital at Risk 
When Goldman was private, partners’ finances were interconnected. At partnership 
meetings, partners from any area could question traders. A banking partner had every right to ask 
a trading partner about risk, because it was his or her capital at risk. An executive at a competing 
investment bank explained to me that at other banks, it was unheard of for an investment banking 
MD to challenge a trading MD, and the idea of collaborating—sharing ideas or information and 
challenging each other—would be entirely foreign. Although the performance of an MD at 
Goldman can have an impact on the performance of the entire firm, it is not the MD’s entire 
capital at risk or his personal liability, though he can be held accountable for behavior resulting 
in fines. 
Furthermore, several current Goldman partners explained to me that in the absence of 
financial interdependence after the IPO, MDs had little motivation to question traders about 
matters outside their own areas of expertise. The increasing size of the firm and resulting 
specialization and functional silos, combined with the lack of financial interdependence after the 
IPO, changed the social network of trust and reduced the opportunities for debate. One partner 
told me that he heard a story from one of his fellow senior partners about when he decided to 
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retire that speaks to how siloed the firm became. He was in an elevator, and in trying to be 
friendly he introduced himself to the other person in the elevator and politely asked him what  
he did. The person replied that they had met before because he too was a partner. He then said he 
ran what the senior partner called a relatively important business, and yet he hadn’t remembered 
meeting before. By the time the senior partner got off the elevator, he had made up his mind it 
was time to get out and retire. 
Working with other people’s money also coincided with changing attitudes toward risk 
management. With the change to a bonus culture, there was more incentive to take risks, and 
because the partners were no longer personally liable for covering losses, the constraints on risk-
taking (not just financial but also reputational) were loosened. Those in areas such as proprietary 
trading had the opportunity to make more money than banking partners if they made the firm 
significant amounts of money. The incentive was to ask for and to invest as much capital as 
possible, because the more money you were given, the more you could potentially make with 
your trades. Traders could argue that if they worked at a hedge fund they would receive 10 to 20 
percent of the profits they generated and if they didn’t get paid correspondingly by Goldman, 
they could leave. And with so many more hedge funds cropping up, if the trades didn’t work out 
and you got fired, you could be almost sure you’d get a job at another bank or a hedge fund. The 
attitude of many was that the Goldman pedigree would get you another job somewhere for sure.8 
One might ask how the change in the attitude toward risk was evaluated by the board of 
directors. After 2002, when the Sarbanes–Oxley Act became law, Goldman’s board was 
composed largely of independent directors, most of them prominent in business and academia.  
However, according to interviews, none of them had ever focused on trading for a living. None 
would probably have been classified as an expert in risk management by most trading experts. 
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The directors owned very little Goldman stock (less than 0.1 percent of the total company), and 
what they owned generally was not significant to their net worth. An interviewee speculated that 
the fact that Goldman’s traders were making enormous sums of money for the firm and 
themselves also made it unlikely the board would question that success. 
In fact, it could have created the opposite effect. One partner I interviewed said that the 
directors were not likely to question people who made tens of millions of dollars and whose 
returns on equity and profits exceeded those of their peers. Another partner speculated that  
as trading became more important after the IPO and risk management was more critical, the 
board relied on Lloyd Blankfein and his number two, Gary Cohn, from trading, instead of Hank 
Paulson, and that may have contributed to Paulson’s decision to leave to become secretary of the 
Treasury. 
When I was in proprietary trading, one of the partners received a voicemail from Paulson, 
CEO at the time, on which I was copied. It related to risk. The partner forwarded the message to 
Blankfein, answering the question and asking Blankfein to deal with it. I asked the partner why 
he had not responded directly to Paulson. He seemed more than a little annoyed at my curiosity, 
saying essentially that Paulson knew a lot about clients but little about trading risk, and he did 
not have the time to explain it to Paulson. Whether or not Paulson understood trading risk, the 
fact that a partner did not want to deal with the CEO was surprising to me. This was in stark 
contrast to when I was an analyst in the early 1990s, when the senior partner was held with the 
deepest respect. I remember being told that when one goes to see the senior partner of the firm, 
one must wear a suit jacket to show respect. In hindsight, I think I intuitively felt that  
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Hank would probably not be around for much longer if traders didn’t have the time for him, and 
I privately questioned if a banker would ever again be head of Goldman. But I don’t remember 
giving it that much thought. I just went back to my daily routine. 
Misaligned Incentives 
Goldman’s incentive structure, like those of other banks, also evolved in response to the 
changing nature of the firm’s business mix. Rob Kaplan, former vice chairman of Goldman, said 
that banks’ visions changed as they placed emphasis on trading (see chapter 5). It became more 
about making money than about “the value-added vision.”9 
More Cultural Stress: Envy, Self-Interest, and Greed 
One of the basic principles of the financial system is that risk is rewarded. Exactly how 
well Goldman partners were rewarded—what they earned or owned—had been a closely guarded 
secret, but it became public information in the filings for the IPO. Some might even say that it 
was in everyone’s face. When I joined Goldman as an analyst, a list was published by a finance 
magazine of the one hundred most highly paid people on Wall Street, and it was passed around 
among the junior people in great secrecy. I was told that I would be in deep trouble if a partner 
caught me with it. The list contained so many Goldman partner names that, except for a few top 
partners, the names were listed at the bottom of the page, with no bio or background, unlike the 
non-Goldman partners, each of whom got a short description. 
The general reaction of the public disclosure of wealth within the firm was envy stoked 
by self-interest, and that, when coupled with freedom from personal liability, translated into 
greed and lack of restraint. (Bear in mind that this was during the dot-com and equity market 
booms, when many people were becoming extremely wealthy. And even some of the partners 
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would privately question why people who they didn’t feel were nearly as smart or hardworking 
or as committed to the long term were making more money than they were.) 
I cannot emphasize strongly enough the impact on the organization of the resentment 
stemming from knowing who was gaining how much at the IPO; there was a reason many 
partners did not like Goldman’s financial information being disclosed, and Jimmy Weinberg 
argued in 1986 that this was one of the reasons the firm should not go public.10 The average 
partner received around $63 million at the IPO price, an amount that became $84 million after 
the first day of trading. In the class of 2000, of those who just missed making partner before the 
IPO, some received a fraction of that amount. The discrepancy was enough to cause a great deal 
of resentment, especially among those who were hired at the same time as members of the class 
of 1998 but were not nominated for partnership until after the IPO.11 (See appendix D for a table 
showing percentages, shares, and value of partners’ shares at the IPO.) 
I remember working with an MD-lite who had just missed making partner before the 
IPO. Upon finding out the difference between her payout and that of those who were elected in 
1998, she did not come to the office or return calls or voicemail for days. It was like a “mini 
strike,” and it worked: the shares she received were increased. It sent a strong message about 
how one needed to act to get what one believed was promised, fair, and/or justifiable. 
Some of the tensions were eerily similar to many of those who were around in 1994, 
when so many partners retired, when the prevailing sentiment was that the retirees were 
“sellouts,” leaving to save themselves. After 1999, MD-lites and VPs, like the partners who 
remained in 1994, wondered whether they had been sold “motherhood and apple pie” or 
principles of brotherhood, only to realize that there was a limit to the values and the bond. I was 
also surprised that some nonpartners mentioned they felt that the retirees who stayed in 1994 but 
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left before the IPO, and even those who really built the firm but had retired, were being treated 
unfairly. 
Weinberg and Whitehead’s ideas about being custodians of the firm for future 
generations of partners seemed to be less of a priority. For those who believe that greed was 
always prevalent at Goldman, imagine that if the earlier partners had decided to go public 
sooner—they would have received multiples on their capital instead of book value when they 
retired. In particular, interviewees estimated that John L. Weinberg and Whitehead each owned 
about 5 percent of the firm, which would represent billions of dollars today.12 
As a Goldman partner explained to me in an interview, Goldman was slowly losing its 
allure: the prestige of partnership, the mystique that had always marked the difference between 
Goldman and its competitors.13 At the time of the IPO, no one knew that Goldman would (or 
would have to, as explained in some interviews with partners) become the highest-paying firm 
on Wall Street. It had traditionally paid less than its peers, except for partners, a business practice  
Whitehead felt reflected long-term greedy and attracted the right people who had this 
perspective. Before the IPO, Goldman partners made outsized returns, in part by pocketing the 
difference in lower compensation for the nonpartners. One partner with whom I spoke said that 
what made Goldman unique was that it found really smart and dedicated people with certain 
values to “drink the Kool-Aid” and buy into the culture instead of taking more money. He felt, 
over time, people didn’t value the “Kool-Aid” or buy into the culture enough anymore, and 
Goldman raised the compensation level to be competitive—another signal of the drift at the firm. 
Goldman was not special enough, its culture not distinct enough, the value of the partnership not 
high enough for people to be “long-term greedy” and accept lower pay for a long period of time. 
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In addition, Goldman faced heated new competition for talent from other firms as well as 
other opportunities. The firm reacted by significantly increasing compensation, becoming the 
highest-paying firm on Wall Street. Also, compensation per employee increased with the profits 
from proprietary trading and growth—and the changes. For example, in 2004 the average 
compensation per employee at Goldman was $445,390, compared with $279,755 and $199,230 
at J.P. Morgan and Lazard, respectively. In 2007, the numbers were $661,490, $311,827, and 
$466,003 for Goldman, J.P. Morgan, and Lazard.14 According to interviews, before Goldman 
went public, it typically paid its nonpartners less than its peers paid their nonpartners.  
The idea of making partner, and its social meaning and identity, had been taken down a 
notch—or at least there was a market price for it. Before the IPO it was highly unusual for retired 
Goldman partners to work at other firms, but after the IPO this phenomenon increased. Many 
partners who had just made their fortunes in the IPO were primed to retire, and when they left, 
they took not only their money but also their expertise and their knowledge and respect for the 
firm’s history and traditions. Of 221 total partners at the IPO in 1999, only 39 (16 percent) 
remained as of 2011.15 
Changes in the Social Network of Trust 
The net $2.6 billion in proceeds raised by the IPO allowed Goldman to expand rapidly, 
and the partnership pool grew to meet the demands created by rapid growth, changing what had 
once been a close social network. The firm had started selectively hiring more lateral senior 
people in the mid-1980s, and this accelerated in the 1990s as the firm grew. But after the 
announced and expected retirements after the IPO, hiring outsiders as partners became a 
necessity. Within five years of the IPO, almost 60 percent of the original partners were gone. 
Goldman did not have the luxury of time to build product and geographic expertise from within.  
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According to the partners I interviewed, the priority of recruiting, training, and mentoring 
changed. The process of identifying and nurturing partner candidates was pushed aside in favor 
of those who could show immediate results—metrics, revenue production, and Super League 
relationships—and measurable results such as a trading P&L. And if the firm did not have the 
right people, the feeling was that it could hire them from other firms by using the valuable 
currency of Goldman stock. The firm’s executives did not want to wait and slowly develop 
people internally for partnership positions. It would constrain growth. According to my 
interviews, candidates for partner or lateral hires at the partnership level were not vetted as 
thoroughly for the match between their personal values and the firm’s business principles and 
culture—a consequence in part of the drop in financial interdependence and the greater emphasis 
on the financial contribution. Some partners I interviewed believed that this coincided with an 
increasing shift of balance in considering people for partner to more weight being given to a 
person’s ability to contribute commercially and less to other considerations, like values and 
culture. 
The Effects of Wall Street Models 
A distinct change as the result of going public was the deep effect of Wall Street 
investors and analysts on the firm. A partner who voted for the IPO, whom I interviewed, said 
that the firm way under-estimated the scrutiny it would receive as a public company. He said  
at the time of the IPO the firm had a handful of employees in public relations who essentially 
said “No comment” when the press asked about its business. Today, he estimated that over a 
dozen people were involved in public relations, talking to the press, investors, and analysts and 
preparing information for them. 
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The new scrutiny came from many camps. Each of these groups used different tools, 
including the firm’s valuation, to assess Goldman as an investment opportunity. Now having to 
compete in this way with other firms for investors’ cash and positive analyst assessments,  
Goldman became concerned with how it appeared when assessed by models, and therefore it 
instituted some new practices that made it more similar to its competitors. In a process that is 
described by academics as performativity, the models used by Wall Street to assess the  
firm had a reflexive effect on how the firm chose to perform.16 
Formerly, Goldman had generally held itself apart from the crowd, to a separate standard 
of its own devising. A colleague once explained to me in the mid-1990s during a late-night pizza 
break in a conference room, which Goldman regularly paid for in order to promote bonding, that 
at Goldman, people never spoke badly about other firms. (Goldman principle number 13 states, 
“Never denigrate other firms.”) According to him, Goldman employees didn’t really care what 
the other firms did, or that other firms badmouthed Goldman or told people they were better than 
Goldman. He said that Goldman was “the Harvard of investment banking.” I asked what he 
meant, and he elaborated by saying, “You know how people at very good colleges wear t-shirts 
saying things like ‘XYZ college, the Harvard of the Midwest? It’s like a subconscious insecurity 
about where they actually did go, or an acknowledgment that they wanted to go to Harvard 
instead.” He then asked rhetorically, “Have you ever seen anyone at Harvard wearing a shirt with 
the name of another college on it?” I thought the example was a little absurd, and in part to be a  
smart-aleck I asked him, “So do you think people at Morgan Stanley are wearing t-shirts saying, 
‘Morgan Stanley, the Goldman Sachs of Midtown?’” Annoyed, he got up and walked away, and 
I couldn’t stop myself as I called out after him, “I am going to copyright that.” 
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While those at Goldman might still have thought of the firm as the Harvard of Wall Street 
after the IPO, they started to care a great deal about how the other firms were doing. According 
to interviews, after the IPO, both Goldman’s investors and its employees constantly compared  
its performance to that of other firms. In addition, partners’ and CEO compensation was 
compared to peers’. Before the IPO, Goldman was not required to report its earnings—and chose 
not to do so. Earnings, compensation, and similar information were closely guarded secrets and 
helped to add to the Goldman mystique. The prevailing sentiment was that the firm’s record of 
success meant it did not have to care how others were managing their business, the ratios  
they looked at, their margins, or their return on equity. Goldman might choose to compare itself 
to these models and benchmarks, but it did not have to manage to them to appease outsiders. The 
partners reported only to themselves and could choose to measure risk or performance however 
they saw fit. They did not have to explain their decisions to outside board members, and, because 
they did not have to answer to the outside world (the previous outside private investors  
had no say in management), the partners could make the decisions that were best for the 
partnership in the long term. This ability to protect confidential information was one of the 
arguments used for remaining a private partnership. “Are you ready to lose the flexibility we 
now have in reporting up and down earnings?” Whitehead and Weinberg wrote in a letter to 
Corzine and Paulson.17 
As a public company, in contrast, Goldman had to comply with the demands and 
requirements of the capital markets. Among these is the preference for all companies to have 
common measures, so Goldman was expected to employ the financial models used by the  
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street and capital markets, including the desired measures of risk and performance. Ellis notes, 
“The persistent demand to meet or beat both internal and external expectations of excellence [is 
one of the] penalties of industry leadership.”18 
Traditionally, firms want to meet or exceed expectations, believing it demonstrates how 
well they are run. I analyzed Bear Stearns, Goldman, Lehman, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan 
Stanley’s ability to meet or beat analyst EPS and revenue published expectations from  
1999 (when Goldman went public) to 2008 (the credit crisis). There was a statistically significant 
difference between the firms. Bear Stearns and Lehman more consistently met or exceeded 
analyst expectations and showed the highest correlations, implying that they were “managing  
to analyst models.” Obviously those two firms failed. Goldman showed a correlation to meeting 
or exceeding expectations (demonstrating the effect of analyst models) but actually had the least 
correlation among the firms; it was the worst, implying that it was willing to accept losses  
or deviate from the analysts more than the other firms. This may reflect cultural characteristics 
and possibly elements that helped Goldman do relatively better in the credit crisis (discussed 
later). 
Source of Revenues 
At the time of the IPO, analysts and investors wanted to see Goldman increase its asset 
management revenues because of the resulting more-consistent fees. They also discussed 
Goldman’s international growth and placed a premium on it, because Goldman had market  
share opportunities internationally. International growth had already been a priority, a 
benchmark by which the firm measured itself. Whitehead knew that if Goldman could not take 
care of its clients’ banking needs anywhere in the world, it risked losing them to firms that could. 
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Rubin and Friedman pushed for more international growth and executed the vision. Corzine and 
Paulson had pushed even further. But still Wall Street wanted more, according to interviews  
from analyst investors at the time. 
Analysts did not place a high value on the sales and trading revenues and revenues from 
private equity, even though they were highly profitable and important for Goldman, because of 
their volatility and inconsistency. Goldman made a larger percentage of its profits related to 
trading than its peers in 1998. Largely for this reason, the firm’s revenue mix became a topic of 
avid discussion among analysts and investors in the months leading up to the IPO, because the 
revenue mix was more volatile than that of firms that were less reliant on trading. The greater 
stability of asset management revenues can provide a cushion against market volatility, but in the 
mid- to late 1990s, the firm lagged behind its rivals in building its asset management business. 
Only a few short years later, however, Goldman’s asset management business was strong 
enough to attract more of the firm’s top talent to move over from other areas of the firm, as well 
as some “outside honchos [brought in with] the promise that they [would] become partners 
(which is rarely done at Goldman).”19 
Thus, growth was particularly strong in both asset management and international 
expansion. Asset management grew faster than banking over time, and international growth was 
higher than domestic. Goldman even said so in its prospectus: “We pursue our strategy to grow 
our core business through an emphasis on: expanding high value-added businesses . . . increasing 
the stability of our earnings . . . pursuing international opportunities . . . [and] leveraging the 
franchise.”20 When discussing “increasing the stability of our earnings,” Goldman said it would 
emphasize “growth in investment banking and asset management.” Goldman’s investment  
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banking revenues, however, actually declined as a percentage over time. Growing banking was a 
good story for analysts and investors (though not necessarily a representation of reality), 
especially in light of potential investors worrying about the impact of trading. Analysts I 
interviewed said it was probably better to have Paulson, from a banking background, lead the 
firm during the IPO instead of Corzine, because it made Goldman’s story of emphasis on 
advisory businesses more believable, although some had their doubts. 
What really happened in the following years, though, was that trading became an 
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Chapter 7 
 
From Principles to a Legal Standard 
 
Applying a legal standard to define what is right and wrong, rather than an ethical 
standard higher than the law, helps managers maximize business opportunities, because the law 
allows for certain practices that a high ethical standard, in particular regarding clients’ interests, 
would preclude. Any standard above the law restricts opportunities. 
At Goldman, my interviews and research made clear, over time, the interpretation of what 
the “clients’ interests first” principle meant changed from applying a higher ethical standard than 
that required by law to simply meeting those requirements. The standard changed to as long as 
one properly disclosed the risks to clients and followed all the legal rules and regulations, then 
one was ethically, morally, and responsibly adhering to the primary business principle. The 
“ethics” drifted closer to the legal definition over years, and the fundamental reasons were that 
the firm was seeking to maximize opportunities for rapid growth, which was an organizational 
goal. 
What I concluded from my discussions and research was that many at Goldman don’t 
think they’re doing anything wrong, and that adherence to the first principle hasn’t changed.1 
Most of the current partners I interviewed said that they were abiding not only by the firm’s 
business principles, including the first principle related to clients’ interests, but also by the law. 
My interviews made it clear that the two had become one in the same in their minds. When I 
asked them about accusations that the firm has behaved immorally and unethically, most 
countered that the definitions of those terms are highly subjective. 
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This is a far way from how John S. Weinberg described his father’s orientation to the 
question of morality and ethics: “He saw right and wrong clearly, with no shades of gray.” Those 
I interviewed also pointed to the many systems in place at Goldman that were implemented  
specifically to protect against misconduct, by which they meant illegal or criminal behavior, 
which they said Goldman takes very seriously. In addition, some of the partners I interviewed 
made the point that considering the large number of daily transactions and communications with 
clients by tens of thousands of Goldman people located in different countries with different legal 
jurisdictions, it is relatively rare that Goldman gets in legal trouble or is fined, in part because of 
the care the firm takes in dealing with clients. They said that misconduct or failure, when it 
happens, is more often a mistake than criminally intended: something was overlooked, some 
scenario was not considered, or someone was not consulted, because the person was not aware of 
the need to do so; something in a complex system that is designed to protect the firm and clients 
somehow failed.2 
Most of the partners I interviewed said that, given Goldman’s volume of business, the 
depth of its client network, its leading market shares, and its various business activities, 
something is bound to happen. Most seemed to be implying that such errors are a cost of doing  
business. And my calculations indicate that it is a cost the firm can bear, in terms of finances. 
From reviewing publicly available documents, I estimate that Goldman has paid less than $1 
billion in fines since 2003, compared with some $58 billion in net income over the same time 
period. The very year (2010) Goldman paid the largest fine in SEC history at the time ($550 
million), the firm made almost $8 billion. Fines are almost like an expense that Goldman 
attempts to minimize but cannot avoid.3 
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However, many current partners also did generally admit that “mistakes” seem to be 
happening with greater frequency. Some suggested this might be attributed not to a change in 
behavior but to changes in the laws and in enforcement; that there may be no greater incidence of 
mistakes, it’s only that the authorities are more focused on them. But based on my interviews and 
a review of congressional testimony, changes in regulation have in general been more biased 
about the investment banks having more self-regulation. Regarding enforcement, the SEC has 
publicly stated that SEC staff levels have not kept pace with industry growth; in fact, with 
increased funding in 2009 and 2010, SEC staff levels are only returning to 2005 levels. Next, 
we’ll consider a number of the criticisms made against Goldman and several of the cases brought 
against them for alleged misconduct and Goldman’s general views about them. 
Chinese Walls 
Maintaining client confidentiality is crucial to any investment banking firm; it is one of 
Goldman’s stated principles. Client confidentiality is the principle that an institution or 
individual should not reveal information about clients to a third party (in a bank that can be 
another area within the firm) without the consent of the client or a clear legal reason. When firms 
are providing a wide range of services, clients must be able to trust that their information will not 
be used by other areas of the firm that do not need to know and exploited for the benefit of other 
clients or of the firm, which may have different interests. For this reason, banks say that they 
have erected so-called Chinese walls between departments, such as between investment advisors 
and traders.4 Given all of the Wall Street scandals in recent years, however, some people doubt 
the effectiveness of those Chinese walls, and even with effective barriers, how and when and 
what information may have been transferred from one part of a bank to another is difficult to 
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follow and monitor, and even to understand, both for banks’ compliance departments and for 
regulators. 
This makes enforcing the legal requirements difficult. From my interviews with 
regulators and corporate lawyers, it is not as simple as a bank asking a client to sign a waiver; 
rather, it is a matter of explaining to a client exactly how and when and what information 
Goldman learns is used and who knows it. As an easy and straightforward example, if Goldman 
was about to receive confidential information from a publicly traded company that was interested 
in potentially selling itself, then the team would have to check with a conflicts and compliance  
group to see if it is okay to receive such information. Technically there is a Chinese wall between 
banking and trading, so trading may not legally need to be restricted from trading the stock of the 
public company, because both sides should not know what the other is doing. The firm may 
place its own restrictions on trades of the stock or bonds of the company, however, from a 
proprietary basis for its own account. 
Let’s now complicate the situation. Goldman’s private equity area may have at some time 
in the past talked to another client about jointly buying the company, and that should be logged 
into the system. But in order to see where those conversations are or went, the conflicts and 
compliance area needs to ask someone in the private equity group. The simple fact of asking 
could tip someone in the private equity group that banking may have a client interested in buying  
the company, or that the company may be looking to sell or doing something strategic. Who in 
private equity knows, and when, and then what they do in checking, is ambiguous. They may 
need to ask the team leader, also potentially tipping people off. So how you ask, when you ask, 
what you ask, and whom you ask is very subjective, and each request, while ensuring that private 
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equity has no conflict, also adds to the risk that certain information may be passed on to someone 
the client might not want to know. 
The banking team themselves may not know who knows what and when. What is legal or 
what or where the Chinese wall should be in this instance is very ambiguous. If, for instance, 
Goldman decides that because of prior conversations, the firm cannot work for the public 
company because its private equity group had verbally committed to work with a potential buyer, 
and then by coincidence a few months later Goldman’s potential coinvestment client calls the 
company saying it is interested in buying the company—the public company that spoke to 
Goldman about the idea may question whether Goldman shared confidential information. It 
could look bad, even if the Chinese wall was in place and no confidential information was  
shared with the Goldman client. 
The fact that it’s so difficult to adhere to the legal line makes maintaining a high ethical 
standard, and having a business mix that potentially reduces conflicts, all the more important if a 
bank wants to be sure not to violate the interests of its clients. But the sharing of information and 
teamwork are also operating principles at Goldman, and one of the firm’s biggest legal or 
compliance issues is that it shares information among different areas—something that clients 
love when it helps Goldman provide liquidity or improve execution for the client. Indeed, 
information sharing among different areas of specialty within the firm is one of the things clients 
value about Goldman and believe differentiates the firm (when the client believes it’s 
benefiting). But, paradoxically, that same information sharing can sometimes seems to place the 
client at a disadvantage. 
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This has made the ethical line also difficult to draw for Goldman. Clients and the public, 
and even some employees, seem genuinely confused about the firm’s relationships and 
responsibilities as an adviser, fiduciary, underwriter/structurer, and market participant.5 This is  
in part because Goldman has characterized its relationship to clients and its responsibilities to 
them differently in different circumstances. For example, in the congressional hearings 
investigating Goldman’s role in selling mortgage securities to clients, Goldman argued that its  
role was simply that of a market maker, toeing the legal line, which only requires that in such 
sales, the bank or broker inform the clients of the risks. But Goldman executives couldn’t really 
answer to some senators’ satisfaction why the executives instructed traders to “cause maximum 
pain” and “demoralize” market participants if they were simply matching buyers and sellers.6 
Goldman also often touts the role it plays as a coinvestor with clients in certain deals, and how it  
will use its own money to facilitate certain transactions, and in those cases is acting as a principal 
in the deals. This has led some clients and regulators to make the point that the firm will point to 
whichever definition of its role, and associated responsibilities, allows it to justify, excuse, or 
rationalize whichever behavior it’s engaged in that is being questioned. 
A recent example of Goldman’s allegedly inappropriate handling of information 
happened in April 2012. Civil charges were filed against Goldman arising from company 
procedures that allegedly created a risk that select clients would receive market-sensitive 
information, such as changes to Goldman’s recommendation lists of what clients should buy and 
sell and its ratings of stocks. Goldman ultimately paid $22 million to settle the charges, which 
the SEC and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) said stemmed from 
Goldman’s weekly “huddles”—meetings set up for analysts to present their best ideas to  
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the firm’s traders.7 Although the SEC claimed that the traders relayed those tips to a select group 
of Goldman’s best clients, Goldman was not charged with insider trading. The settlement with 
FINRA stated that Goldman sometimes did not monitor the huddle conversations to determine 
whether the analysts revealed or discussed any impending research changes regarding buy and 
sell recommendations. For example, FINRA stated that in late 2008, an analyst who had received  
approval to add a company to a Goldman list of best investment ideas told the huddle the next 
day that the company remained a “favorite idea.” One day later, Goldman published a report 
adding the stock to its “conviction buy list,” which is a list of recommendations about which  
Goldman has a stronger opinion than a recommendation.8 It was estimated  
in the press that Goldman could bring in enough money to pay for the sanction in about seven 
hours of trading and investing, highlighting the “fines as a cost of doing business” aspect of the 
mistake. 
Goldman’s policy required that market-sensitive information from analysts be broadly 
distributed but did not apply to certain internal messages regarding general trading issues or 
market color. Regulators said that Goldman failed to clearly define the exceptions. One report 
quotes Robert Khuzami, the SEC’s enforcement director, as saying, “[H]igher-risk trading and 
business strategies require higher-order controls” and that “Goldman failed to implement policies  
and procedures that adequately controlled the risk that research analysts could preview upcoming 
ratings changes with select traders and clients.” Goldman agreed to pay the penalty, split 
between the SEC and FINRA, and to revise its policies.9 
There are older examples as well. One is of allegations that Goldman mishandled 
information related to the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) books when Goldman was 
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analyzing how it could potentially bail out LTCM in 1998. Roger Lowenstein writes in his 
account of the collapse of LTCM, When Genius Failed: 
 
In Greenwich, Goldman’s sleuths, who had the run of the office, left 
no stone unturned . . . A key member of the Goldman team . . . [who] 
appeared to be downloading Long-Term’s positions, which the fund 
had so zealously guarded, from Long-Term’s own computers directly 
into an oversized laptop (a detail that Goldman later denied). 
Meanwhile, Goldman’s traders in New York sold some of the very 
same positions. At the end of one day, when the fund’s positions 
were worth a good deal less, some Goldman traders in Long-Term’s 
offices sauntered up to the trading desk and offered to buy them. 
Some questioned if, how and when and who had what information 
and how it was being used. Brazenly playing both sides of the street, 
Goldman represented investment banking at its mercenary ugliest 
. . . Goldman was raping Long-Term in front of their very eyes.10 
In other words, the accusation was that Goldman was exploiting its privileged position of 
trust and confidentiality to identify exactly what LTCM would need to dump, thereby affecting 
the market price.11 As Lowenstein portrays it, when Rubin and Friedman took over in 1990,  
Goldman started getting over its previous inhibitions against using confidential information for 
proprietary trading. In effect, clients hadn’t fully realized that the public image of higher ethics 
was changing at the firm, and the firm slowly and covertly taking advantage of it. 
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Goldman’s Research Alignment Process 
In 2003, the SEC announced that it had settled charges against Goldman, as well as nine 
other banks, arising from an investigation of research analyst conflicts of interest. As part of the 
settlement, Goldman agreed to pay a total of $110 million in fines. The settlement was related to 
the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act in 2002, which was intended to restrict communication 
and influence between banking and research. The SEC acknowledged that Goldman strategically 
aligned its investment banking division, the equities division, and the research division to foster 
collaboration;12 the court acknowledged that Goldman’s research alignment process fostered 
collaboration among divisions “to insure a strategic alignment of [Goldman Sachs’] business.”13 
So Goldman’s research alignment program was consistent with the firm’s teamwork approach,  
because it required different divisions to work together. But the SEC concluded that it violated 
securities laws requiring the firm to protect clients, even if there was an alignment that followed 
the principles of Goldman. To executives and board members, because Goldman had leading 
market share in IPOs and equity offerings, the collaboration seemed to be working effectively—
it was an example of teamwork. One would have to believe that the lawyers in each division 
were also aware of the collaboration. Yet Goldman’s research alignment resulted in a fine. And 
not just for Goldman, but for nine other firms, totaling $1.435 billion. It shows the ambiguity in 
the law and people’s ability to rationalize and potentially abuse an interpretation of it. 
In fact, in the findings included in the consent order, one of the pressures facing Goldman 
goes beyond its own self-interest: pressure from clients. In a section titled: “Influences of 
investment banking personnel on research and the timing of research coverage,” it stated that in 
early 2000, a Goldman investment banking client, Ask Jeeves, expressed concern that Goldman 
had yet to initiate research coverage. Typically a bank initiates research coverage as soon as it is 
	   	   	   187	  
legally able to do so after it participates in an equity offering. Ask Jeeves e-mailed its Goldman 
investment banker, saying its stock was “dropping like a rock,” and stating, “our hopes were that 
a buy coverage from our lead banker might help stabilize the stock.”14 
While reviewing the findings, I discovered a reference to something I personally worked 
on. I was the only nonpartner on the firmwide marketing committee, which included some of the 
most respected partners. One of the initiatives of the committee was described: “Goldman Sachs 
introduced a new program in June 2000 to strengthen ‘firm-wide marketing . . . including how 
we leverage our brand, advertise, and in particular, cross-sell . . .’” Strengthening cross-selling 
efforts was defined as a “top strategic priority for 2000.” A $50,000 award was created “to 
recognize individuals across all divisions of the firm who ‘cross-sell or help deliver a significant 
mandate to another business unit or division.’”15 
As the point person on the initiative, I can assure you that all the partners signed off on it. 
People in the legal department were aware of the initiative. The award was even named after 
John C. Whitehead.16 Because we thought that the award exemplified the concept of teamwork  
between one area and another, the only debate concerned the idea of a financial award to people 
for doing what many thought should be a natural part of their jobs, making it feel like a 
“brokerage commission.” The nominations themselves were helpful to Goldman in 
understanding and tracking the teamwork and collaboration that were happening. 
I was part of a team that discussed the award and the committee’s initiatives with the 
management committee. I would have described the committee’s work as successful. As the firm 
expanded, it was more difficult for people to collaborate; people did not know each other as well 
as before, because there was a division of labor and specialization. These were all challenges of 
the firm’s organization and culture struggling with growth.17 At that point, the award was a way  
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to get people to talk about collaborating. No one intended it to be an incentive for unethical 
behavior, nor did we consider that it could be perceived that way or could lead to unethical or 
illegal behavior. 
In hindsight, I see that it might have encouraged a research analyst, for example, to 
suggest a transaction to Goldman bankers and then tout the idea in a written research piece to 
investing clients, impacting the stock price, or to write positive things about the company in 
order to make the company more receptive to Goldman’s bankers’ suggestions. There is a lot less 
room for conflicts when research analysts simply analyze companies and make buy or sell 
recommendations for the firm’s investing clients. It is also a lot cleaner if analysts’ interactions 
with banking personnel are monitored by compliance officials so the analysts can’t be influenced 
or pressured by banking personnel. The potential conflict introduced by offering  
the analyst an award is an example of an unintended consequence of a complex system. 
Conflicts of Interest 
In investment banking, a conflict means that the bank could have an incentive to act in a 
way contrary to the best interests, needs, or concerns of a client. Perceived conflict is defined as 
a situation in which one could argue it was possible that an investment bank had a conflict.  
Such conflicts, perceived or actual, are inevitable in large, global investment banks; it is the 
nature of the beast. Goldman and other banks regulate themselves internally, through processes 
such as conflict clearance, to avoid not only actual conflicts that could result in fines and 
penalties but also even the appearance of conflict, which can cause reputational loss (translating, 
of course, into other kinds of losses). As discussed earlier, actions can look bad to clients even if 
the firm does nothing legally wrong.18 For these reasons, the management of conflicts of interest 
is an important part of Goldman’s business model. 
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One can come up with an endless number of potential conflicts in all types of extremely 
hypothetical scenarios because there are so many different scenarios and possibilities as to what 
may happen in the future and so many different ways in which the parties may react. Because the 
possible scenarios are endless, and because investment banking is so complex, with numerous 
products, departments, divisions, and geographic regions, the timing or sequence of events and 
their consequences are challenging to completely evaluate and predict. No foolproof system can 
be designed to keep track of every potential conflict, and conflict management can never become 
a formula-driven science.19 
As a result, Goldman, and all banks, must rely on judgment calls about when it might be 
crossing the line into a conflict, and those judgments are susceptible to pressure because of the 
strong incentives to always be making as much money for the firm and clients as possible. If the 
firm were to err on the side of being too cautious, it could risk missing opportunities and possibly 
alienating clients who want to work with it. If it were to err on the side of being too reckless, the 
firm could risk alienating its clients and hurting its reputation. Over time at Goldman, this is a 
key factor in the firm moving to the legal standard for making these judgment calls (and relying 
on “big boy” letters). The law is the standard that allows Goldman to maximize its business 
opportunities. 
Consider a hypothetical example of a conflict and its resolution. A bank owns a position 
in company X through its private equity arm, and another client, company Y, now asks the bank 
to help it buy company X. The bank is in a potentially conflicted position. Its client, company Y, 
wants to pay the lowest price for company X. The bank’s private equity business manages 
money for itself and other clients; it has a fiduciary responsibility to clients from whom it takes 
money to get the highest price for company X. 
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This dilemma could be resolved if the bank turned down the opportunity to work with 
company Y and simply worked with company X to get the highest price. There would still be a 
small conflict in that the private equity arm would have to negotiate an appropriate fee with its 
own M&A department. However, the bank has a strong incentive to work with Company Y, 
because it might need financing (a lucrative fee opportunity) to fund the purchase price. How can 
the bank represent both? It can draft a legal letter explaining all the potential conflicts and risks 
and have both companies agree to indemnify Goldman if there is an issue. If the two clients sign 
big boy letters, then Goldman could argue that it had put the clients’ interests first—it told them 
about all the potential risks and conflicts and disclosed everything. This would fulfill its legal 
obligation. 
Some might counter that the perception of conflict, regardless of the law, was so bad that 
the bank must work only for company X. In both cases, the bank will have done nothing illegal, 
and herein lies the problem: trying to maximize opportunities and shareholder returns in the short 
term may well be in conflict with the firm’s higher ethical principles. The interpretation of what 
is right and wrong can also change over time as the situation and facts evolve. And making 
things trickier is that shareholder returns are easily quantified, whereas the issue of putting 
clients’ interests first is more subjective, harder to measure. While measuring market share and 
superior returns is easy, judging what is right and wrong—gauging if you put your clients’ 
interests first—is tough. When a conflict situation has not been managed  
properly, any decision Goldman made may seem obviously inappropriate with the benefit of 
hindsight, but those decisions are much more difficult in the moment. Here’s an actual example. 
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“Hello, Doug, it’s been a long time since we have had the chance to visit,” say the notes 
Blankfein prepared for his call with Douglas L. Foshee, chief executive of El Paso Energy 
Corporation, a big energy company that was in talks in 2011 to be sold to Kinder  
Morgan.20 “I was very pleased you reached out to us on this most recent matter,” the script goes, 
and Blankfein went on to thank Foshee for using Goldman as El Paso’s adviser in the 
transaction. Blankfein added that he knew Foshee was aware of Goldman’s investment in Kinder 
Morgan “and that we are very sensitive to the appearance of conflict.” 
Goldman’s private equity arm owned a 19.1 percent stake (worth about $4 billion) in 
Kinder Morgan, and had two seats on the Kinder Morgan board, making the situation of advising 
the buyer not only awkward but also full of at least perceived conflicts. The Goldman  
banker advising El Paso also owned $340,000 worth of Kinder Morgan stock (a fact that was not 
raised or disclosed in the call, and it’s unclear whether and when Goldman knew about the 
personal investment). The two Goldman board members recused themselves to reduce the 
perception of a conflict, and El Paso hired a second adviser, Morgan Stanley. Kinder Morgan 
soon announced it was about to acquire El Paso for $21.1 billion in cash and stock. Goldman,  
in its role as matchmaker for El Paso, received a $20 million fee. 
When the matter ended up in court as a result of a shareholder lawsuit—alleging, among 
other things, that the merger was the product of breaches of fiduciary duty by the board of 
directors of El Paso, aided and abetted by Kinder Morgan and by El Paso’s financial  
adviser, Goldman—the judge made it clear that Goldman’s conflicts were not only a matter of 
appearance. For example, rather than walk away from the deal and lose its fee, Goldman 
recommended another adviser so that El Paso would receive impartial advice. But the judge, 
Chancellor Leo E. Strine Jr., of Delaware’s Court of Chancery, disagreed: 
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When a second investment bank was brought in to address Goldman’s 
economic incentive for a deal with, and on terms that favored, Kinder 
Morgan, Goldman continued to intervene and advise El Paso on 
strategic alternatives, and with its friends in El Paso management, 
was able to achieve a remarkable feat: giving the new investment 
bank an incentive to favor the merger by making sure that this bank 
got paid only if El Paso adopted the strategic option of selling to 
Kinder Morgan . . . In other words, the conflict-cleansing bank got 
paid only if the option Goldman’s financial incentives gave it a reason 
to prefer was the one chosen.21 
Foshee also received the brunt of Strine’s judicial irritation because Foshee had, as it 
turns out, used a “velvet glove negotiating strategy. . . influenced by an improper motive” to get 
the deal he wanted, planning to later buy El Paso’s exploration and production unit from Kinder 
Morgan. 
In the press, Goldman’s conduct in the El Paso deal was portrayed as brazen, incestuous, 
and shameless. It was particularly shocking in that it occurred soon after Goldman issued its 
business standards report, a recommitment to its values and principles.22 It indicated that  
in some ways the organizational drift continued. 
After Strine’s opinion was read, Goldman continued to claim that it had been completely 
transparent with El Paso regarding Goldman’s conflicts, and El Paso chose to continue to work 
with Goldman. Once again, Goldman claimed it completely fulfilled its legal responsibilities.  
Many observers found it hard to believe that Goldman would even get involved in the deal, with 
its $4 billion investment in Kinder Morgan on one side of the negotiating table, and a $20 million 
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fee on the other, especially considering the scrutiny Goldman had been under since the 
congressional hearings.23 
Lloyd Blankfein had clearly defined Goldman’s position on conflicts in an interview 
years before: 
The crucial differentiating advantage of Goldman Sachs would 
be one that outsiders might find surprising: Its complex variety of 
many businesses was sure to have lots of conflicts. Goldman Sachs, 
Blankfein said, should embrace the challenge of those conflicts. 
Like market risk, the risk of conflicts would keep most competitors 
away—but by engaging actively with clients, Goldman Sachs would 
understand these conflicts better and could manage them better. 
Blankfein (who spends a significant part of his time managing real 
or perceived conflicts) said, “If major clients—governments, institutional 
investors, corporations, and wealthy families—believe they can 
trust our judgment, we can invite them to partner with us and share 
in their success.” 24 
Blankfein’s concept of the relationship between an adviser (that is also an investor for 
itself and with clients) and its clients (that are not coinvesting) can be at very least confusing and 
have unintended consequences. The competitive, organizational, technological, and regulatory 
pressures are there to maximize opportunities in this confusion and ambiguity.25 And so the 
organization drifts, accepting a legal standard as its ethical base. 
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Conflict Clearance 
In my role as business unit manager of Goldman’s global M&A department in the late 
1990s, I addressed strategy, business processes, organizational policy, business selection, and 
conflict clearance issues. Before Goldman could accept work with a client, it needed approval  
(clearance) from me or the people with whom I worked. 
This position was both an honor and a curse. Keep in mind that I did this job in the late 
1990s, when there was a boom in investment banking, stock market, and tech industry activity 
and the firm was growing at a rapid pace internationally and in proprietary trading. 
I had two voicemail boxes that could accept some seventy to one hundred voicemails 
each. I regularly went home at 2 or 3 a.m. and woke up at 7 a.m.—and both message boxes 
would be full. It is hard to imagine, but e-mail was just starting to catch on and there were  
concerns about security and potential legal implications. More and more issues arose with 
Goldman’s growth as conflicts were becoming more complex and global. 
My predecessors in the job typically had to worry about issues such as, If two clients 
wanted to buy the same company, whom would we represent, and why? (Typically, we would 
represent the first to have raised the idea, particularly when we had done previous work for the  
client.) But now, the first question typically was, Have we worked in the past with another 
company analyzing the transaction, or have we advised the target company? We might have 
made commitments and possess confidential information, both of which could preclude us  
from working on the deal or would complicate our potential involvement. To determine whether 
we had worked on it or for the target previously, we consulted a huge Yellow Pages phone book 
in which we catalogued and cross-referenced each assignment by the target’s name and the 
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acquirer’s name, so that if someone asked, we could look it up. Generally, senior partners had a 
good institutional memory and could help identify potential issues. But so many companies  
were merging and their names and legal structures changed, and the book could not necessarily 
keep up. 
Suddenly, companies were being bought, reincorporated, and renamed at an amazing 
pace. In addition, when Goldman worked on an assignment, a confidentiality agreement usually 
had to be signed. We filed those and made sure the companies involved were listed in  
the book, which was getting larger by the day. We had the added issues of international names 
and entities, and the regional offices sometimes were less forthcoming in sharing the 
information, concerned about who learned what information and about protecting their clients’ 
confidentiality. With all that was going on, and with the money being invested in systems for 
managing trading risk, we still had an essentially manual process. The complexity was far 
outpacing our methods. 
We began to push for more automation. We even developed a factory floor diagram, 
breaking the M&A and other advisory processes into parts, so that we could track the process as 
it moved down a virtual conveyer belt. In hindsight, our system had flaws, but we were  
reacting to the challenges we faced as investment bankers who had to process as much 
information as possible to facilitate deals or opportunities. We were neither compliance experts 
nor systems experts, and we did not understand all the possible consequences of our approaches. 
There was no way we could know whether every conversation that might have divulged 
confidential information had been entered into the system. We kept trying to hire more people to 
help us. We brought people in from compliance to help. One of them was so overwhelmed and 
overworked that, sadly, he had a clinical breakdown and had to take time off. 
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The pressures were enormous, because everyone wanted to work for his own clients and 
lobbied for clearance—as well as for a speedy resolution, because a delay could be interpreted by 
the client as a problem and the client might start speaking to other firms. If we said no,  
some people took their views (and anger at us) to a higher court—meaning someone on the 
management committee. And, in the end, if we disagreed and thought there was a potential or 
perceived conflict, there was always the possibility of getting the client to agree to sign a big boy 
letter that indemnified us and represented that the client understood the situation and the risks. 
Some clients strongly wanted Goldman to work on the deal despite a conflict, actual or 
perceived, because they anticipated a reward that outweighed the risk. Then the issue became, 
Who are we to tell a smart, sophisticated CEO with her own advisers that she is not smart  
enough to agree to such a thing? We felt the pressure of our competitors doing it, and we felt that 
if any firm would hold itself to a higher standard, it would be Goldman. The internal thinking 
was, We are different from the other firms; we have higher standards and principles. As 
discussed later, it was this rationalization—a sense of higher purpose supported by Goldman’s 
public and community service and folklore—that in part helped create the unintended 
consequence of a blind spot. 
In my position, something else began to come up more often: the issue of our having a 
proprietary equity position in the publicly traded target or owning its bonds. The questions were 
becoming more frequent, just as in the El Paso case. The decision I found the most difficult, and 
one I did not like, was advising multiple private equity firms on a transaction. Traditionally, 
Goldman would only work with one private equity firm in a potential acquisition. In the  
early 1990s, there were not very many leverage buyout (LBO) firms. If a bank aligned with only 
one, it would risk missing out on advising the winner, but it was accepted practice to work with 
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one. But by the late 1990s several private equity firms would come to us to help finance the same 
leveraged buyout transaction and the commercial banks adopted the practice of having separate 
teams within the bank work for separate private equity firms. The rationale was that there  
were only so many banks, so if each bank committed to only one firm, then one could argue that 
it would limit the number of buyers, which would hurt the seller. So in the end we changed our 
policy and we set up separate teams. At first we preferred they were physically on separate 
floors, but then there were not enough floors. This policy change was another signal of business 
practices changing. 
Even more concerning to me was the policy change to allow our internal funds to bid for 
a company while providing financing advice to competing private equity firms. There is a real 
possibility in that situation that a client will lose to Goldman and will perceive that the firm 
misused information, such as the knowledge of what the client was going to pay. Even if all 
information is in fact completely protected, if Goldman wins the bidding in such a case, the 
perception may be bad. I’m not alone in my concern. In its 2011 business standards committee 
report, Goldman mentions that to “strengthen client relationships and reputational excellence  
. . . Goldman will carefully review requests to provide financing to competing bidders when a 
MBD [Goldman’s Merchant Banking Division] fund or other firm-managed private fund is 
pursuing an acquisition as a bidder.” 
The report states that when Goldman has “multiple roles in a particular transaction . . . 
the firm may be able to address potential conflicts by providing disclosure to its clients, 
obtaining appropriate consents, relying on Information Barriers, carefully defining its role  
and/or requesting that the client engage a co-advisor.” When I discussed this with a legal expert, 
he said that this policy basically covers most imaginable scenarios and would technically allow 
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the firm to play multiple roles and follow different legal standards in serving clients, from the 
highest, that of having a fiduciary responsibility to them, to the lowest, that of being a market 
maker. 
More often, we had clients sign big boy letters. The phrase itself is telling. It neutralized 
what we were doing; it implied the client was sophisticated and that it was OK. If we were not 
convinced about a company—typically a smaller company that might be less sophisticated—we 
would not allow the banker to get a big boy letter from the client. Which clients qualified as big 
boys was subjective. Usually, it was an easy discussion, because we could determine that a 
smaller company with a smaller potential fee was not a big boy and therefore not worth the 
banker’s appeal to the management committee. 
All these decisions were highly vetted and discussed with senior management, 
appropriate committees, and the legal and compliance departments. We had whiteboard sessions 
trying to figure out what might be a problem or what might look bad. During the time of my role 
in the late 1990s, the gold standard for determining the proper behavior expected at Goldman 
was to imagine how we would feel if our actions were disclosed in the Wall Street Journal. This 
test was constantly drilled into our heads. In fact, if it was a decision that would even make the 
Wall Street Journal, we tried to err toward caution. But we couldn’t imagine all scenarios. 
Slowly, even during my years, the world incrementally changed from more “one off” 
instances—“No, we can’t do that; it could look bad”—to, “If both clients agree, or if the 
sophisticated client signs a big boy letter, then it is okay.” Because of Goldman’s market share  
and proprietary trading, and because Goldman’s growth coincided with a booming market, issues 
came up often. Eventually, the key senior person who reviewed conflicts and was seen as “more 
administrative or compliance-oriented” rose all the way to the management committee because 
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of the importance of the job. No other firm had (or has) such a person at such a high level. It is a 
critical job, because it involves not only figuring out how to get to yes, how to please  
clients, and how to maximize revenue opportunities, but also ensuring that the firm is protected 
and following a process that will stand up in court. This is what Goldman refers to as “managing 
conflicts.” During our interview, one partner compared the chief conflict management person 
with the chief risk officer for the firm. 
Goldman still has its leading market share, in part because it effectively  
manages conflicts to its advantage—and it also faces reputational and legal questions and 
consequences, because conflict management is art and not science. If Goldman had not managed 
conflicts, its ability to grow and maintain market share would have been challenged.  
The management of conflicts maximizes opportunities to access scarce resources. The diligence 
and effort and thoughtfulness and angst that go into managing conflicts are immense, and it is 
inevitable that something will not be considered or given the proper weight as a  
possibility. And when that happens, Goldman most likely will be sued, and it will be on the front 
pages, with its reputation questioned. Such questions are the consequence of Goldman doing 
business and maximizing opportunities as well as the consequence of the limitations of human 
thought, processes, and systems. 
About the time of the IPO, a partner told me that there was a limit to the number of 
transactions, of capital flows, in the world. What Goldman was good at was getting involved in 
those transactions or discussions because of its relationships, smarts, and information.  
What Goldman was better at than any other bank was working to maximize the revenue from the 
transaction or flow—finding and managing “multiple roles in a particular transaction.” For 
example, if it were a cross-border M&A deal, then Goldman would provide M&A advice as well 
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as involve its foreign exchange desk to handle the currency exchange for the purchase price. If 
Goldman missed the deal—meaning our bankers were not involved—then proprietary trading 
might possibly be involved in merger arbitrage (oftentimes, Goldman would make more money 
in proprietary merger arbitrage than if it had been hired to advise on the deal). Goldman ensured  
that we looked at each transaction and each flow and had some way to make money from it. The 
more roles we played in a transaction, the more opportunities we had to make money on a cost 
base that was essentially fixed, and thus the transaction would be much more profitable for us 
than if we had played only one role. 
Managing conflicts maximizes that opportunity. Because of this recognition, the firm has 
invested many more resources into conflict management.26 This is one of the keys to Goldman’s 
higher returns on equity compared with those of its peers. But it also relies heavily on an 
organizational culture, a “residual partnership mentality,” the partner told me, that emphasizes 
sharing information to maximize opportunity.  
Goldman has the same conflicts as most other Wall Street firms. However, unlike other 
firms, according to William Cohan, “Goldman has taken the decision that it is in the business of 
managing conflicts and the joke around Goldman was ‘If you have a conflict, we have an 
interest.’ While that has led to tremendous success it is also the firm’s Achilles heel—because of 
its unfailing belief that it can manage conflicts it gets itself into positions where other firms will 
just say no.”27 
When I raised this issue with a Goldman partner, his comment was that the other firms do 
not just say no. He implied that this argument was based on the premise that the other firms had 
some sort of higher values, which, he said, based on his experience working against and 
alongside them for decades, he believes is wrong. He said they most likely wished they had 
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Goldman’s network of relationships (a network with leading market shares), which means 
Goldman must deal with these conflicts. It is easy not to have client conflicts, he stated, when 
you have fewer trusted clients and so many clients asking you to advise on or provide liquidity in 
so many situations. I pointed out that it’s not really the number of clients but rather Goldman’s 
various roles or proprietary investing businesses causing the conflicts. 
Management Committee Composition 
The changes in the membership of Goldman Sachs’ management committee corroborate 
the idea of a shifting emphasis toward the legal standard of compliance and away from the 
original interpretation of the first principle, as well as reflecting the increasing complexity of 
Goldman's business. In 1999 the firm had twenty-two management committee members, two of 
whom were in legal functions (around 9 percent). In 2009, the management committee had  
grown to twenty-nine members. There are two members related to legal functions plus one 
individual who is known for political connections, one individual responsible for compliance, 
and one person responsible for conflicts (representing 17 percent of the committee).  
At the IPO, banking and trading/PIA members represented around one-third of the members 
each. In 2009, banking was around 20 percent and trading/PIA/markets-oriented backgrounds 
represent close to half the committee.28 So there has been a shift at the management committee 
level as illustrated by an increase in legal and in trading/PIA/markets-oriented people. 
Remember, Sidney Weinberg had sought balance with a trader running the firm and banking 
having a large presence on the committee. 
The balance of composition between banking and trading in leadership has been an 
important organizational element (as was the balance between newer and older partners). Sidney 
Weinberg sought this balance when he selected Gus Levy, a trader, to become senior partner, but 
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he created the management committee with a majority of banking partners to instill some 
balance. There’s been a shift in the management committee composition as well as at the very 
top, with the top two having trading backgrounds. 
Outside Board of Directors 
 Some have argued that boards of directors of the banks must take more responsibility for 
oversight of conflicts, so it’s important to consider the role of the Goldman board here briefly. 
The Sarbanes–Oxley Act, which became law in 2002, sought to improve the oversight of 
boards by requiring the appointment of more outside directors. In 1999, Goldman’s board of 
directors had seven members, including four executives of the firm; two outside, independent 
directors; and John L. Weinberg. In 2001, Goldman’s board of directors had eight members: four 
executives at Goldman and four outside directors (John L. had decided not to seek reelection to 
the board after his initial three-year term at the IPO). After Sarbanes–Oxley passed, and in 
compliance with new requirements of the NYSE, Goldman added two outside directors. Thus, 
the majority of its board (60 percent) was comprised of outside, independent directors. 
While a board’s legal and fiduciary responsibilities are typically explained by legal 
counsel at board meetings for board members, according to those I interviewed, understanding, 
interpreting, and protecting Goldman’s principles, values, and ethics, and determining whether 
practices are consistent with them, would be very difficult for outside board members. Many of 
the partners whom I interviewed generally agreed that it is reasonable to conclude that the 
outside board members’ understanding of the firm’s principles, values, and ethics most likely 
differs from that of Whitehead and John L. Weinberg because the organizational and regulatory 
structures and legal liabilities the firm is subject to have changed since their time. At the same 
time, most of the Goldman “insiders” (executives) on the board have a trading background, and 
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some partners suggested that this may mean that they are less sensitive to issues regarding 
managing client relationships than Whitehead and Weinberg were.  
A Change of Meaning 
While some at Goldman told me that the firm continues to abide by its first principle, I 
believe the evidence shows that that can only be considered true if the interpretation of the 
principle has changed. I believe the process of this change was one of social normalization, or 
rationalization, which was gradual, and this in part explains why they do not see it. This kind of 
rationalization happens because the pressures are so strong to grow and change, which can result 
in client conflicts. It is vital in evaluating how an organization’s culture has drifted to recognize 
that organizations generally must adapt to new competitive demands and other external 
pressures, and Goldman’s change to applying a legal standard in regard to serving clients’ 
interests is a good case in point. While the differences may now look to outsiders like a clear 
change of standards, discerning drift that is detrimental from healthy adaptation in the moment is 
a very difficult judgment for those inside an organization to make. That was all the more true for 
Goldman due to its increasing complexity and size. Also, this has contributed to making conflicts 





























Nagging Questions:Leadership, Crisis,and Clients 
 
The mere fact that goldman survived as an independent company in 2008 during the 
financial crisis when many of its peers did not can be considered a success, at least in a relative  
sense, but it is a precarious one at best. Goldman wrote in its proxy statement, “In 2008, we 
outperformed our core competitors due, in part, to the outstanding performance of our Named 
Executive Officers (NEOs).”1 Goldman had a return on equity of 4.9 percent versus .5.0 percent 
for its peers in 2008, and 22.5 percent versus .1.8 percent, in 2009. 
Whether Goldman would have survived without government intervention is debatable.2 In 
fact, in the days immediately following the collapse of Lehman, it became apparent that both 
Goldman and Morgan Stanley could have shared the same fate as Lehman.3 
I focus here first on the aspects of Goldman’s culture that helped it relatively outperform 
its peers during the credit crisis. Then I’ll explore the accusations of wrongdoing leading up to 
and during the financial crisis that were made against Goldman and how the firm has responded. 
The nature of the accusations, and Goldman’s responses, offer much food for thought about the 
change in culture and the potential future risks that Goldman, and the whole banking system, 
face. Organizational drift doesn’t necessarily involve a total abandonment of prior values and 
principles. Elements of the culture may be retained, or retained in part, and that is true of 
Goldman. For simplicity I will use the word residual in front of a word describing an element of 
the culture that has changed but not enough that it is gone or unrecognizable.4 In fact, the 
residual elements help obscure the changes and add to the process of organizational drift. 
One of the most important elements of Goldman’s culture that has changed but is still 
recognizable is what I’ll call its residual dissonance. As discussed, dissonance is the term used 
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by Columbia University sociologist David Stark to describe the ability of those in an 
organization to challenge one another, to ask questions and explain their own views. Dissonance 
of this type leads to more scrutiny of decisions as well as greater innovation and performance. 
The financial interdependence of partners during Goldman’s partnership days, as well  
as the social network of trust among them and the less hierarchical structure, encouraged this, 
and though the new organizational and incentive structure of the company has limited this 
residual dissonance, a strong enough social network among executives at the firm still exists that 
these were key factors that differentiated Goldman during the credit crisis. They helped to break 
through structural secrecy, and that, combined with more expertise at the top of the firm in 
trading and risk assessment, enabled Goldman to do a better job of perceiving and managing the 
risk that led to losses. Blankfein was an expert in trading, and David Viniar, Goldman’s chief 
financial officer, had vast experience outside traditional CFO responsibilities. The combination 
of expertise and residual dissonance at the top enabled Goldman to overcome structural secrecy. 
Based on my interviews with executives at competitors, these cultural elements did not 
exist at other firms in the same way or intensity as they did at Goldman during the credit crisis. 
While discussing Goldman’s success with me, a widely respected consultant, who has experience 
working with many firms, explained that Goldman is exceptionally good at looking at overall 
risk and firmwide risk and understanding the aggregate size of the risk and correlations across 
the firm. He believes that Goldman had so many different proprietary desks in so many different 
asset classes with so many different correlations that it benefits from a diversification effect. 
When the corporate credit or equities businesses are doing poorly, then foreign exchange or 
interest rate businesses may be doing well. No other bank had invested as much  
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in sophisticated, computer-driven quantitative systems to reveal the signals. And several senior 
people had the expertise to read the signals, ask the right questions, and then react.5 Goldman 
was the only firm that had so many risk experts in the highest levels of management. As 
mentioned earlier, Goldman had learned from its 1994 experience. 
Value at Risk, Models, and Risk Management 
Models are widely used in risk management to synthesize risk and help analysts, 
investors, and company boards determine acceptable trading parameters under different 
scenarios. Value at risk (VaR) is a widely used measure of the risk of loss on a specific portfolio 
of financial assets, expressed in terms of a probability of losing a given percentage of the value 
of a portfolio—in mark-to-market value—over a certain time. For example, if a portfolio of 
stocks has a one-day 5 percent VaR of $1 million, there is a 0.05 probability that the portfolio 
will fall in value by more than $1 million over a one-day period. Informally, a loss of $1 million 
or more on this portfolio is expected on one day in twenty. Typically, banks report the VaR by 
risk type (e.g., interest rates, equity prices, currency rates, and commodity prices). 
VaR may be an unsatisfactory risk metric, but it has become an industry standard. Wall 
Street equity analysts expect banks to provide risk (VaR) calculations quarterly, and they talk 
about risk increasing, or decreasing, depending on the output of the models. The models and 
VaR calculations, however, make numerous assumptions, some of which proved over time to be 
invalid, making it dangerous to rely on or extrapolate too much on VaR. Analysts and investors 
(and boards of directors) overrely on VAR as a measurement of risk, and therefore management 
teams do also, one of the external influences of being a public company. Yet the overreliance  
on VaR, one of the key measures employed in risk management, is controversial. Some of the 
claims made about it include that it “[ignores] 2,500 years of experience in favor of untested 
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models built by non-traders; was charlatanism because it claimed to estimate the risks of rare 
events, which is impossible; gave false confidence; would be exploited by traders.”6  
Comparing VaR to “an airbag that works all the time, except when you have a car accident,” 
David Einhorn, the hedge fund manager who profited from shorting Lehman stock, charged that 
VaR also led to excessive risk-taking and leverage at financial institutions before the crisis and is 
“potentially catastrophic when its use creates a false sense of security among senior executives 
and watchdogs.”7 
Leading up to the crisis most of Wall Street essentially used the same models and metrics 
for risk management, particularly VaR (an effect of being public—analysts and investors 
compare VaR between firms in analyzing performance). But Goldman did not rely as heavily on 
it. Interviews confirmed the level of dissonance at Goldman, even as a publicly traded firm, in 
discussing and understanding that the output of the models was and is unique to Goldman, which 
meant the firm was not as dependent on the models as were other firms, and that, combined with 
what sociologists call a “heterarchical structure” (less hierarchy in the chain of command than in 
many firms) and the trading experience of its top executives, gave Goldman an edge.8 The more 
intense scrutiny of the models and risk factors led Goldman’s top executives to pick up on 
market signals that other firms’ executives missed.9 As Emanuel Derman, the former head of  
the quantitative risk strategies group at Goldman and now a professor at Columbia, wrote, at 
Goldman, “Even if you insist on representing risk with a single number, VaR isn’t the best one . 
.. As a result, though we [Goldman] used VaR, we didn’t make it our religion.”10 (Meanwhile, at 
other firms, measures like “VaR [value at risk] . . . became institutionalized,” as the New York 
Times’ Joe Nocera put it. “Corporate chieftains like Stanley O’Neal at Merrill Lynch and 
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Charles Prince at Citigroup pushed their divisions to take more risk because they were being left 
behind in the race for trading profits. All over Wall Street, VaR numbers increased.”11) 
Even though VaR has flaws, it is the only relatively consistent risk data that is publicly 
reported from the various banks, which is why I analyzed it. When analyzing the publicly 
reported data from 2000 to 2010 for Goldman and its peers, what stands out is that Goldman’s 
standard deviation of VaR is higher (meaning that the level of the total VaR was more varied) 
than most other firms, implying that Goldman more dynamically managed risk than its peers 
over the time period.  
Goldman also had the organizational structure and environment to complement and 
support risk management systems and procedures. During an interview for this book, an 
executive at a competing firm (who had earlier worked at Goldman) explained that his firm 
simply did not give the same attention to risk management. He did not think his firm had the 
capability to aggregate risk at a level similar to Goldman and said the top executives neither had 
the capability nor dedicated the time to interpret, discuss, and debate risk. He said that 
Goldman’s focus on proprietary trading and its profits had caused the firm to invest in systems 
and groom future leaders who understand it. He explained that Goldman’s biggest advantage  
was that its top people were real traders and risk takers or had access to and dialogue with such 
traders, as well as the culture to support investment in the systems and the dialogue. He 
explained that this was why he hadn’t been surprised when Hank Paulson and the board had 
bypassed John Thornton and John Thain (to whom Paulson allegedly had verbally promised the 
CEO position) and picked Blankfein to succeed him as CEO. Thornton and Thain did not have as 
much real time and extensive expertise in trading and risk. The firm gained trading expertise at 
its top with Blankfein, and that helped it navigate the credit crisis.12 
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One executive at a competitor speculated that although his firm had people running 
around doing lots of things related to risk, including analyzing lots of models, no one knew how 
it all added up and, more important, what it meant. He questioned whether it was even possible 
to understand risk management in such large, complex organizations. But he said if one firm 
could, it was probably Goldman, which seemed to prioritize risk management because of its 
dependence on proprietary trading and because it had the cultural heritage of teamwork, as well 
as its near-death experience in 1994. 
While some analysts of the crisis have pointed to the failure of the boards of directors at 
the banks to question risk-taking, most of the people I interviewed said that those on the boards 
of the banks had limited trading and risk expertise and that it would be almost impossible, 
anyway, for an outside, independent director who has an important full-time job and attends 
monthly or quarterly meetings to be able to take the time to understand and question such 
complex risks.13 That made having executives at the top of the firm with trading and risk 
management experience all the more important, especially when there wasn’t a mechanism like 
financial interdependence of a partnership. 
Communicating the Signals 
Goldman’s relatively flat organizational structure and the relative strength of its social 
network are exemplified in a series of e-mails and memos from as early as the end of 2006 that 
were sent to top Goldman executives by traders. They discussed the firm’s exposure  
to mortgages and the top executives’ ability to understand the issues, concluding that Goldman 
should reduce risk as quickly as possible. There are e-mails from Blankfein and Viniar giving 
direct guidance related to risk.14 
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In one e-mail, CFO Viniar wrote, “Let’s be aggressive distributing things because there 
will be very good opportunities as the markets [go] into what is likely to be even greater distress, 
and we want to be in a position to take advantage of them.” Blankfein wrote in one e-mail, 
“Could/should we have cleaned up these books before . . . and are we doing enough right now to 
sell off cats and dogs in other books throughout the division?” The communications show how 
involved the leaders were. (They also raise serious questions and concerns about what Goldman 
leaders knew, did, and instructed others to do, and the impact of these actions on the firm’s 
culture.) 
Meanwhile, even as Goldman reversed course and tried to reduce risk in mortgages—and 
even allegedly shorted the market—its competitors were adding risk. For example, Chuck Prince 
at Citi was, as described and paraphrased in an interview, “dancing with elephants.”15 A former 
Citi executive I talked to at the time expressed doubt that Prince (whose professional background 
was more legal and administrative in nature) had the same sort of direct communication, 
knowledge, and discussion that Viniar and Blankfein were having or the expertise to do so. One 
could argue that, at the time, Citi’s structure may have been more hierarchical and more complex 
than Goldman’s (Citi had more than 300,000 people in more than one hundred countries), 
making it harder for information to get to the top. Other elements, such as dissonance, may also 
have been missing, adding to structural secrecy and restricting information flow. 
Goldman, by contrast, encourages the discussion and disagreement needed to arrive at the 
best answer. For example, when I was in proprietary trading in the early 2000s, I participated in 
meetings wherein the portfolio managers of proprietary trading groups presented their ideas and 
strategies to other proprietary portfolio managers in other groups. Once, a manager presented a 
trade that appeared to be a good investment based on models, but the other proprietary traders 
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quickly ferreted out a weakness in the model: it was not properly accounting for the illiquidity 
and the severe downside that would happen in selected, albeit low-probability, scenarios.  
It is hard to believe that a risk management department or accountant expected to value the 
investment would be able to identify all the issues raised in that room of traders. 
Taking Action, Continuous Adjustment: Risk Management Systems 
Before the heavy trading losses Goldman experienced in 1994, the firm’s risk 
management system was informal; traders made their own decisions with little intervention from 
management, and risk was often assessed “with a series of phone calls and a quick tally on  
a scratch pad.”16 By 1995, it had implemented an “interdisciplinary, firm-wide risk management 
system, a risk committee that [met] weekly, and a loss limit on every trading seat.”17 Current 
risks became instantaneously visible through the new computer-based system, which enabled 
managers to “aggregate the firm’s market and credit risks across the entire organization [despite 
any organizational silos] at any point during the day.”18 
One Goldman partner I talked to pointed out that most of the heads of the other firms had 
not gone through what happened to Goldman in 1994 when so much of the capital of the firm 
and of Blankfein, Viniar, and other partners was put at serious risk. The other heads had been 
working in organizations that had worked with other people’s capital with different incentives 
for a longer time. So, the partner told me, Goldman was much more aggressive with regard to 
building risk management systems. 
The computer system was only one aspect of the overall risk management system. 
Traders no longer operated with little oversight. A risk committee, composed of partners from 
around the world, met by teleconference to examine “all of the firm’s major exposures,  
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including the risks related to the market, individual operations, credit, new products and 
businesses, and the firm’s reputation.”19 The committee members had the expertise to question 
and challenge each other and the organizational structure and culture to support the dissonance. 
The traders were not always happy about being subjected to more oversight: “There was, 
in fact, a vigorous debate within Goldman about the right level, just as there was over the firm’s 
overall risk levels,” William Cohan writes. “Angry at being reined in by its powerful  
risk managers, traders dubbed them the ‘VaR Police.’”20 
Crisis Leadership 
Often, leaders get too much credit or blame, with too little emphasis on the organizational 
elements that leaders inherit or are a product of. Lloyd Blankfein has been blamed for a “J 
Aron/FICC takeover” of the firm, which has resulted in a change in culture.21 Yet, he also is 
credited with saving the firm in the crisis. The role of the organizational elements received a lot 
less consideration or publicity. 
Blankfein’s career took off as a sales trader and a manager of traders. He has been 
described as having “a sixth sense about when to push them to take more risk and when to take 
their collective feet off the accelerator.”22 According to interviews, Blankfein thought the best 
traders were quick adjusters, a trait he, too, possessed. He was not a trader per se, although many 
people have the impression that he was, and yet he gained credibility with his traders by 
managing a small trading account that could be monitored. A former partner of Blankfein’s said 
that Blankfein knew he could lose credibility if he lost money, but he thought “even if he lost 
money he would get credibility because the credibility of being right isn’t so important. The 
credibility of knowing what a trader experiences when they lose might even be more valuable, so 
maybe he figured out that either way it was good to show that he was learning.”23 An executive 
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at a competitor that I interviewed pointed out, this is precisely what outside boards of directors at 
banks typically lack. 
Blankfein’s background in trading made him a wholehearted supporter of a strategic 
move toward proprietary trading. He acknowledged the challenges of balancing agency business 
with a growing proprietary business but viewed the move as not only a “momentous strategic 
opportunity” but also a necessity that had been deferred to maximize profits and should be 
deferred no longer.24 Blankfein did not propose making the proprietary (or principal) investing 
business dominant but rather talked about combining the two businesses, agency and principal, 
in an “unbeatable whole.”25 He actively promoted this theme as he gained authority and 
reputation within the organization, even though clients continued to express concern about 
whether, in any given situation, Goldman was acting as their agent or as a competitor.26 
Blankfein’s argument raises questions about Goldman executives’ argument that in certain trades 
the firm was simply acting as a market maker. 
Blankfein gained professional respect from peers and senior partners for his ability to 
evaluate possible ramifications of alternative courses of action. He has been described as 
“original in his perceptions and analysis . . . accessible to others” and as having “a detached  
rationality.”27 His personal style and actions reflected and modeled for others some of the best 
aspects of the firm’s partnership culture as it had been at its strongest. He asked many questions 
of the very smart people with whom he surrounded himself, until he was satisfied that he had 
gotten the right answer. He tapped in to the expertise and vast experience of retired partners, who 
many times (and in my experience) had been treated almost as outsiders after they became 
inactive. He used his extensive global social network to promote the firm’s goals, something that 
became critical to the firm’s survival during the credit crisis. 
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Any discussion of Goldman’s leadership during the crisis must also acknowledge the role 
of David Viniar, Goldman’s chief financial officer from 1999 to January 2013, a man who, many 
of my interviewees said, was the key person responsible for the firm’s survival. A former 
investment banker working specifically in structured finance, Viniar worked on several credit 
and risk committees before becoming CFO. He understood structured products, which were at 
the heart of the crisis. He had the expertise to question traders or have a dialogue with them; he 
had their respect, unlike most CFOs, who would not have worked directly in structuring such 
complex products. Viniar also took advantage of a culture in which an element of dissonance 
was still alive, one that supported playing devil’s advocate, collecting and channeling 
information that challenged taken-for-granted assumptions in the organization, when it came to 
trading risk. 
Viniar’s rotation through various assignments was crucial to his ability to help guide 
Goldman through the crisis. These rotations were the result of an organizational design that 
served to improve understanding and strengthen social networks.28 One Goldman partner  
told me something to this effect (I am paraphrasing): “You can’t BS David. He has a lot of 
experience and knows more than you. He may not be smarter than you in your area of expertise, 
but he knows more about risk than you do because of his training and experiences.  
What makes him particularly effective is his ability to check out what you tell him. He and his 
group have the contacts and know the people—internally and externally.”29 
A Goldman partner credited Blankfein with retaining Viniar when  
Blankfein became CEO and not replacing him with those he considered loyal to him, as the 
partner said Blankfein did in many other important areas. He elaborated that for Goldman’s 
board, Blankfein, Viniar, and Gary Cohn were not only the top three from a reporting perspective 
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but also the top three authorities on risk; no other firm had that much talent and expertise in their 
top three working so closely together during the crisis. However, in many ways their active 
involvement in risk management—supported by the remarkable number of e-mails and other 
communication, and knowing what they knew and directing people to reduce risk—put them 
closer to the actions and behavior of those at Goldman prior to and during the financial crisis. 
This, therefore, raises the issue of their personal role in, at the very least, the change of meaning 
of putting the clients’ interest first. 
A Goldman spokesperson told Rolling Stone that “its behavior throughout the period 
covered in the Levin report was consistent with responsible business practice, and that its 
machinations in the mortgage market were simply an attempt to manage risk.”30 The question 
here is whether its behavior is consistent with the original meaning of the business principles, not 
if these were responsible business practices. In my interviews, most of the current and former 
partners who believe there has been a change in culture strongly stated that in this instance the 
behavior was not consistent with those principles. In my interviews with clients, I asked them 
what they think when Goldman tells them about the business principles, even today, based on 
what they have learned about its behavior. Most told me Goldman’s behavior does not reflect 
how clients interpret the principles, which is based in part on how Goldman itself portrays them 
externally. However, most people I interviewed said that does not necessarily make the firm’s 
behavior criminal or illegal. 
More Concentration of Trading Experience at the Top 
 David Viniar retired in January 2013 and was replaced with Harvey Schwartz. Like 
Viniar, Schwartz worked in various areas of the firm, including banking for a short time, which 
should give him a more nuanced view and access to more information. But Schwartz got his start 
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in the J. Aron area at Goldman, similar to Cohn and Blankfein, as well as the person who is head 
of human resources (the head of human resources would typically interact with the board on 
matters like compensation and performance). Many current and former banking partners that I 
spoke to pointed to this J. Aron concentration at the top. From a sociological perspective, it does 
raise the risk of changing the element of dissonance and increasing structural secrecy. 
Some partners also raised the concern that Blankfein has put people loyal to him in key 
positions throughout the firm and/or lateral hires who may not have as good an understanding of 
the original meaning of the principles. Once again, this is interesting from a sociological 
perspective in terms of raising the risk of a change in dissonance and increase in structural 
secrecy. Some current and former banking partners speculated that they believe that Blankfein 
learned from Paulson’s coup of Corzine and wanted to consolidate power. From an 
organizational perspective, the fact that this could happen reflects the changes. The fact that a 
board would allow this also reflects the changes. And with the passage of time and Blankfein and 
Goldman’s many successes, who is to question it? 
Does Outperformance Signal a Shift from Principles? 
The tricky issue about the residual dissonance that represents a degree of preservation of 
Goldman’s culture at the time the principles were codified is that Goldman does not consider 
that, in some instances, it has an obligation to share the benefit of this wisdom with its clients. In 
late 2006, Goldman recognized the need to de-risk and moved swiftly to do so without warning 
clients or the government. This is one of the things about Goldman that spurred the vitriol of 
Matt Taibbi and many others. After a period of mounting concern about Goldman’s 
overexposure to mortgages, in late 2006 Viniar and a group of executives drafted a memo 
describing their course of action for reducing that exposure. Goldman’s critics are quick to point 
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to this statement: “Distribute as much as possible on bonds created from new loan securitizations 
and clean previous positions.”31 Taibbi translates this to, “Find suckers to buy as much of [the] 
risky inventory as possible.” Taibbi then provides an apt analogy: “Goldman was like a car 
dealership that realized it had a whole lot full of cars with faulty brakes. Instead of announcing a 
recall, it surged ahead with a two-fold plan to make a fortune: first, by dumping the dangerous 
products on other people, and second, by taking out life insurance against the fools who bought 
the deadly cars.”32 According to Taibbi, within two months of the memo, Goldman had gone 
“from betting $6 billion on mortgages to betting $10 billion against them—a shift of $16 
billion.” 
As a public company, Goldman has a fiduciary responsibility to its shareholders, which 
confers the highest standard of legal care and loyalty.33 Therefore, if Goldman thought that it was 
in the best interests of shareholders to de-risk immediately, it had a duty to do so. But to de-risk, 
Goldman sold the risk to clients. Many current partners at Goldman whom I interviewed 
(corroborated by congressional testimony by Goldman executives) pointed out that the 
“sophisticated, institutional clients” wanted the risk, and Goldman sourced it for them. The 
partners argue Goldman did not defraud its clients. However, the SEC charged Goldman and an 
employee with fraud on a specific deal for its role as an underwriter (which has different legal 
obligations than those of a market marker). Goldman settled the charges for $550 million, and 
the employee is fighting the civil case. 
Legal experts I interviewed explained that Goldman has no legal fiduciary responsibility 
to clients when it is acting as a broker on their behalf. Investment banks are not held to a 
“fiduciary standard” in their dealing with these clients, but rather a “suitability standard,” which 
is less stringent.34 Under a suitability standard, Goldman is not required to put the client’s 
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interests first and is not obligated to disclose its own proprietary views or positions. A suitability 
standard instead requires the firm to ask whether the product is suitable for the client  
(for example, whether it meets the investment objectives) and to disclose the risks.35 
The impression of Blankfein’s testimony at the Levin hearings, in response to accusations 
of not putting customers’ interests first in the mortgage trades, is that Goldman, or at least its 
executives, did not think the firm did anything wrong.36 Their argument, as articulated by 
Blankfein on numerous occasions, hinges on the firm’s claim that when Goldman sold the 
mortgage securities, it was not acting as an adviser to the clients, it was acting as a broker, and its 
role was simply to sell sophisticated institutional clients whatever they wanted to buy. As such, it 
completely fulfilled its legal duties when it acted as a market maker or broker with 
counterparties. Goldman maintains that it was essentially only making markets (making a bid 
and an offer for securities) and used responsible business practices in fulfilling all of  
its legal obligations.37 The firm had a legal obligation to ensure that its clients are provided the 
proper disclosures, but that is as far as Goldman’s legal obligation goes: caveat emptor, or 
“buyer beware.”38 
Goldman argues that it was acting as a broker, not an advisor, in selling mortgage 
securities. Maybe that’s true legally, but there’s another question about their role. Can Goldman, 
or any bank, really so cleanly delineate when they are acting as a broker and when as an adviser? 
An executive at a competitor believed that Goldman’s characterization as simply acting as a 
broker was like Goldman suggesting a client called them to ask it to buy shares in IBM and the 
firm did so. He explained that this is not the case with complicated, fixed income securities that 
are not traded on an exchange. First, the bank typically maintains inventory to sell because the 
market is not as liquid. This does not mean the bank is not acting as a broker, but it certainly 
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complicates the relationship. Second, banks are calling up with ideas and suggestions (unlike in 
stocks, which are more regulated and liquid) and the client does need some explanation of what 
the securities are and advice on how it meets what they are looking for. He felt that  
Goldman was disingenuous in saying it was merely acting as a broker when executing 
transactions in complicated securities.  
A client elaborated that there are times when he calls Goldman and expects them only to 
simply execute and actually pays a higher commission than going to another bank that would do 
it cheaper in order to pay Goldman back for its ideas, research, and advice. But he also gets calls 
from Goldman making recommendations and suggestions, which he would characterize as 
advising him, to buy certain complicated securities that generally meet what he is looking  
for, some of which Goldman provides what could be called research and analysis on. He said that 
Goldman has an unbelievable ability to source and develop these investment opportunities. But 
many of them require a dialogue, an explanation, analysis, and expertise. He said it was unclear 
to him in many instances when Goldman was acting as a broker/agent or principal, even when 
giving “advice.” But he clarified Goldman was doing nothing that the other banks were not  
doing too; it is just that Goldman’s principal investing is much larger so it does raise more 
questions. And he felt the ultimate responsibility was his if he were to buy or not buy. But, it 
seemed to him that Goldman was being a little disingenuous in its characterization of its  
role. He pointed out that he thought Goldman’s objective was to be the adviser of choice, not the 
broker of choice. 
“The investors that we’re dealing with on the long side, or on the short side, know what 
they want to acquire,” Blankfein said. “I don’t think our clients care, or that they should care,” 
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what Goldman’s opinion is, he said. The rationalization was that Goldman’s clients were 
sophisticated investors, after all, and asked for the risk, which  
Goldman provided to them.39 
As mentioned earlier, according to my interviews with several Goldman partners, the 
general attitude at the firm was that the clients were “big boys.” Goldman was not selling 
products to “widows and orphans.” They insisted that the firm used legally responsible business 
practices. Some partners explained that, for all the Goldman partners knew, they could have been 
wrong and the clients could have been right—and no one would have wept for Goldman. Some 
clients I interviewed said they understood this argument, but in this case they believed the size of 
Goldman’s short (or hedge, as Goldman describes it) of the securities showed a great deal of 
confidence in its view and that the firm understood the catastrophe that could happen if it did 
nothing. They argued that, given the size of the short and direct communication amongst 
executives, and that Goldman clearly perceived clients could suffer, the firm did have an ethical 
obligation to warn them (especially considering its first business principle). Some partners I 
interviewed countered that they were just doing what they thought was right from an 
organizational perspective and right for their shareholders—and right for the survival of the firm. 
They told me they did not think they were breaking any legal rules or regulations or violating a 
business principle. 
But the behavior was certainly in sharp contrast to John L. Weinberg’s insistence on 
making good on the BP loss even though Goldman had no legal obligation to the British 
government, as discussed in chapter 1. Nor was it in keeping with Paulson’s sitting on the other 
side of the table in the Sara Lee meeting. 
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I don’t believe that the Goldman executives understood all the unintended consequences, 
the magnitude of the consequences, or the way their actions would be interpreted and processed 
externally and internally. If Goldman had understood the magnitude of the potential problems, it 
would have been even more aggressive in its actions, effecting even larger shorts, deleveraging 
faster, and raising more equity sooner. Based on my interviews and their actions, I don’t believe 
that the Goldman leaders realized they were so close to being swept away in a financial tsunami. 
In addition, I don’t believe that they truly understood how their actions would be interpreted by 
employees and how much that would most likely exacerbate the organizational drift. 
Finding a balance between duty to clients and duty to shareholders is a long-standing 
issue. Most clients I interviewed argued that Goldman formerly believed that putting the clients 
first would benefit the owners over the long term, thereby serving shareholder interests.  
They generally did not interpret Goldman’s actions, such as selling the mortgage securities, as 
consistent with the business principles they expected from Goldman. They did not see it as 
illegal; they saw it as Goldman acting like the rest of Wall Street, but maybe a little worse, 
because Goldman waved its principles in front of clients and said it acted more ethically than 
others on Wall Street. 
I asked some executives who were Goldman’s competitors about this dilemma—duty to 
clients versus duty to shareholders—and they, too, explained that Goldman was generally 
behaving as the industry does. The industry generally has moved to a legal standard in 
determining its duties. It was unclear to them when or how or why the legal standard became the 
industry standard. They believe no one really focused on it because, with a few exceptions, 
people were making so much money on Wall Street for such a long time as financial institutions 
generally grew—clients, employees, shareholders, even the public—that no one thought about it 
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or cared. Many said the financial crisis should be a wakeup call to how cultures and incentives 
have changed, how the environment has changed, and how large and interconnected everything 
is. Many executives at competitors also said that in their opinion Goldman was living off the 
brand or reputation for trustworthiness that it had created in the 1980s (some questioned if it 
were even true at that time). They said that Goldman got away with it for so long because the 
firm was crafty in always playing up its “good guy” image, aura of public service, and powerful 
network. 
Several current Goldman partners told me that since the Senate committee hearings, 
Goldman has been trying to take its business principles more seriously (and client anecdotes 
about this surfaced in my interviews). The partners also mentioned that the firm is educating its 
employees about the proper use of e-mails (including not using bad language) and about the 
firm’s various roles and legal obligations. The comments about e-mail training reminded me of 
an exchange between Viniar and Levin during the Senate hearings about both e-mails and 
behavior: 
LEVIN: And when you heard that your employees, in these e-mails, when looking  at 
these deals said, God, what a shitty deal, God what a piece of crap—when you hear your 
own employees or read about those in the e-mails, do you feel anything? 
VINIAR: I think that’s very unfortunate to have on e-mail.(The gallery bursts out 
laughing.) 
LEVIN: On an e-mail? 
VINIAR: Please don’t take that the wrong way. I think it’s very unfortunate for  anyone 
to have said that in any form 
LEVIN: How about to believe that and sell them? 
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VINIAR: I think that’s unfortunate as well. 
LEVIN: That’s what you should have started with. 
The responses in the committee hearings are signals to the employees as to what is appropriate 
behavior. They also reflect a cultural change at Goldman. 
Is Goldman Likely to Recognize the Change? 
The perception of Goldman changed virtually overnight in 2008. I analyzed 345 selected 
articles in the New York Times from 1980 to 2012 and categorized them as positive or negative 
based on tone. From 1980 to 2007, no matter how I cut the data by time period, the number of 
positive articles was always higher than the number of negative articles (the total was 288 
positive articles to 118 negative, for a ratio of 2.4 times as many positive). Using the same 
criteria, from 2008 to 2012 there were 103 negative articles to 57 positive articles, for a ratio of 
0.6 times as many. I divided the articles into topic categories, and the two most common 
negative article topics were Goldman’s conflicts with clients and its connections to the 
government.40 
When Goldman announced it would review its business practices, Blankfein explained 
that there was “a disconnect between how we as a firm view ourselves and how the broader 
public perceives our role and activities in the market.”41 Goldman was concerned not only about  
public perception but also about client perception. The firm’s business standards committee 
commissioned an independent study conducted by a prestigious consulting company to interview 
two hundred clients to explore their concerns about whether the firm still lived up to its core 
values and business principles after the rapid growth and shift in Goldman’s business mix toward 
proprietary trading. 
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Management had been enthusiastic about the proprietary trading business since the early 
1990s but approached it carefully, with top talent and “attentive management,” and, financially, 
it was an “unqualified success.”42 Still, the study revealed that clients believed Goldman was 
placing too much emphasis on its own interests and not enough on those of its clients. The report 
stated, “Clients raised concerns about whether the firm has remained true to its traditional values 
and business principles given changes to the firm’s size, business mix and perception about the 
role of proprietary trading. Clients said that, in some circumstances, the firm weighs its interests 
and short-term incentives too heavily.”43 
Clearly, Goldman knows that it has a serious public relations problem. The business 
standards report expresses Goldman’s recommitment to the core values that once made the firm 
the most respected of Wall Street institutions. However, some clients I interviewed said that 
Goldman’s response has been more to increase its investment in public relations and public 
service, and to reassure clients and the public that Goldman has not lost its customer focus, and 
less to make substantive changes such as spinning-off or closing businesses, as the firm had done 
with the Water Street Fund when clients complained. The clients are not surprised because 
Goldman is in a much more powerful position than it was then. 
The lead in the Wall Street Journal’s sneak peek at highlights of the business standards 
committee’s report attributes a defensive motive to Goldman’s imminent release of the report: 
“Goldman Sachs seeking to beat back criticism that it abused its muscle and trading savvy to put 
its own interests ahead of clients, agreed to release details on how and where the Wall Street 
giant makes its money.”44 The report was released “to great fanfare” but was not received by the 
outside world with much enthusiasm.45 Its primary purpose seemed to be “a more aggressive 
defense of Goldman’s image, not a deep restructuring of its business model.”46 Or it sought “to 
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reassure Goldman’s clients, to placate regulators, and to direct employee activity.”47 More 
bluntly, the report was described as “an exercise in misdirection.”48 
The starting point for evaluating the report must be the assumption that Goldman is not 
very likely to shift away from trading, because “at least as Goldman has pursued it . . . [trading] 
can make money in good markets and bad” and because it cannot return to its earlier self: 
“smaller and a partnership that defined itself as an adviser or intermediary.”49 
The media’s treatment of the report implied that it avoided the real issues, including 
Goldman’s “size, complexity and the role of shareholders and employees.”50 What some found 
most notable was that the report did not include “mention of any issues that are of first order 
importance regarding how Goldman (and other banks of its size and with its leverage) can have 
big negative effects on the overall economy, [even though] one of Goldman’s business principles 
is ‘we consider our size an asset that we try hard to preserve.’”51 Consequently, another critic 
claimed that the report read “more like a consultant’s brief—banal, crowd-pleasing, and 
recommending organizational changes. It will, for this reason, be little read and less heeded.”52 
In May 2013, Goldman released a thirty-page report on its business standards that 
followed up on its January 2011 report. Goldman stated that by February 2013, all thirty-nine 
recommendations had been fully implemented. The report’s opening line is “Our clients’ 
interests always come first.” The report’s standards address relationships with clients and 
conflicts of interests, with an emphasis on client understanding, transparency, and disclosure. 
The media reaction was that “ambitions like these are frequently aspired to in public policy 
statements, but are difficult to effectively implement . . . in the profit-led and bonus-driven 
culture of Wall Street that led up to the financial crisis. Such a culture is most prevalent among 
traders and front-office staff, but it can also influence compliance and control functions.”53 
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Hiring Lawyers 
On August 22, 2011, shares of Goldman tumbled nearly 5 percent, knocking $2.7 billion 
off the firm’s market value, after a report that Blankfein had hired a prominent criminal defense 
lawyer. Goldman portrayed it as routine, given the several government investigations faced by 
the firm. But the sharp reaction in the stock price showed the fragile nerves of investors, who 
were worried that potential legal liability could damage the firm and its earning power.54 
Goldman executives were expected to be interviewed by the Justice Department. The 
agency was conducting an inquiry that resulted from a 650-page report produced earlier in 2011 
by the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. That report said that Goldman 
generally had misled clients about its practices related to mortgage-linked securities. 
Some partners told me that Blankfein’s action was interpreted and processed by Goldman 
employees. However, some of the partners also saw it as a reflection of a change in culture and 
the environment. They said that now if an employee is unhappy with a bonus or feels  
he or she was unfairly passed over for a promotion, he or she will consider consulting a lawyer 
or speak to human resources (or both). They said partners privately complain about such 
behavior as a change in culture and rationalize it as a “sign of the times.” They said employees 
were following the lead of the executives, who had resorted to legalese defensive language in the 
hearings by executives. In any case, some conceded Blankfein’s actions had the unintended 
consequence of supporting behavior that would not have occurred otherwise. 
Identity and Identification 
The most recent glaring criticism of Goldman’s reputation came from Greg Smith, an 
employee who had worked at Goldman for twelve years. Smith delivered his resignation in an 
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op-ed piece published in March 2012 in the New York Times: “Why I Am Leaving Goldman 
Sachs.” 
In the op-ed, Smith attributed his resignation to the drastic changes in Goldman’s culture 
in the past decade or so: “The firm has veered so far from the place I joined right out of college 
that I can no longer in good conscience say that I identify with what it stands for.”55 He pointed 
out specific symptoms of the current “toxic and destructive” environment, such as referring to 
clients as “Muppets.” 
More significantly, Smith pointed out the lack of focus on clients, which had been 
crowded out by a “how much did we make off the client?” attitude. Smith saw Goldman’s 
cultural ills as the result of leadership style—specifically charging that Blankfein and Cohn had 
“lost hold of the firm’s culture on their watch” because of a sea change in the way the firm 
thought about leadership. Smith claimed that there were now three quick ways to become a 
leader at Goldman: persuading clients to invest in the things Goldman wanted to get rid  
of because they were not sufficiently profitable; hunting elephants—that is, getting clients to buy 
things that may be wrong for them but have the highest profit potential for Goldman; and finding 
yourself “sitting in a seat where your job is to trade any illiquid, opaque product with a three-
letter acronym.” 
Goldman’s formal internal response to Smith’s op-ed piece, issued over the signatures of 
Blankfein and Cohn, characterized Smith as “disgruntled” and expressed disappointment that an 
individual opinion spoke louder than the “regular, detailed and intensive feedback” from the 89 
percent of employees who believed Goldman served its clients well.56 Citing both internal and 
external surveys, Blankfein and Cohn maintained that Smith’s assertions did not “reflect 
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[Goldman’s] values . . . culture and how the vast majority of people at Goldman Sachs think 
about the firm and the work it does on behalf of our clients.”57 
Though Goldman aggressively dismissed both Smith and his accusations, some current 
and former employees say that there is “a sizable, yet silent contingent within the investment 
bank, a group of people who are increasingly frustrated with what they see as a shift in recent 
years to a profit-above-all mentality.”58 Therefore the normalization process doesn’t impact 
everyone in the same way and at the same time. While many partners I interviewed thought that 
the culture had not changed, there were a few that would admit it and could see it. Two partners I 
interviewed admitted that they may be in the minority in seeing or admitting the culture has 
changed. I asked why they did not leave. They explained that they heard the culture is much 
worse at other firms. Also, they know of others leaving and being bored, unimpressed, and 
disappointed with their new employers. They said there are many things they like about 
Goldman, such as individual friends/relationships, the intelligence and drive of the  
people, the social status (which they said had taken a hit, but they believed most people still 
think it is the best and most prestigious firm with the best people), the network internally and 
externally one builds at the firm, and the good work that the firm and its people do.  
They talked about how much good the firm and its employees do that gets no real press. They 
said the firm is better run operationally today than it ever has been, but admitted that its 
operational efficiency does not mean the culture has not changed. 
Goldman performed an exhaustive investigation of Smith’s allegations, including 
combing through e-mails looking for the word “Muppet,” and claimed it found nothing material. 
However, it was unclear to a partner I interviewed if the goal was to prove Smith wrong, to 
identify badly behaving people and punish them, to show that Goldman is taking the charges 
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seriously, to frighten staff into being more discreet in what they write in corporate e-mails—or 
all of the above. 
Goldman aggressively went after Smith personally. But one partner I interviewed 
explained with reflection that in the end it didn’t matter whether Smith was disgruntled or not, 
too junior or not, in enough strategically important areas of the firm or not, motivated by money  
or not, and it didn’t even matter whether he got the reasons right; at a high level, his letter was 
making a basic claim: that the culture of Goldman had changed from when he started, and for the 
worse. That statement could not easily be dismissed, because after the hearings, the fines, the 
negative articles, and the investigations, and the executives’ responses to them, many people 
were taking a minute out of their busy lives and daily routines and looking around and starting  
to wonder whether the culture itself had indeed changed. But for whatever reason, most people 
went back to their jobs, and maybe the silent group would slowly leave not just Goldman, but the 
industry. 
Another partner compared what Smith had done to an employee who had been elected 
partner in 1994 and whose name had been listed publicly as being elected. But then he turned 
down partnership and left the firm to join a private equity firm with a reputation of values in its 
industry. The partner explained it was hard for the firm to dismiss him, considering he was 
elected a partner just weeks prior, but as if it were standard operating organizational response, 
rationalization rumors of why he didn’t accept were whispered. But when the event happened, 
whether or not intentional, it sent a signal questioning what was going on at the firm in 1994 that 
someone would turn down what so many were looking to become, and maybe people thought 
about what it meant and then went back to their daily routine. I remember it was only discussed 
very privately because it was a very sensitive topic. Maybe it was a data point for those already 
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wondering about the firm, and then they just quietly left. Maybe, the people who stayed 
processed it and it impacted their future behavior. Based on my interviews and my own personal 
experience, upon reflection it had some impact, but what or how much is unclear. 
Why Do Clients Stay? 
Despite public outcry and even disappointment among clients, Goldman doesn’t lack for 
business. Its brand is still highly rated, and Goldman offers a unique value proposition to clients 
for several reasons, primarily related to access, information, risk management, and people.59 
Goldman has the best network of connections globally and attracts the best and brightest people. 
For the Vault Banking Survey in 2012, some thirty-five hundred investment banking 
professionals were interviewed. For the thirteenth straight year, banking professionals named 
Goldman the most prestigious bank to work for in North America. Professionals also ranked 
Goldman first in Europe. 
Goldman is in the center of a large information flow that it gathers from clients. Goldman 
uses its risk management capabilities and its culture of teamwork to gain insights and then 
packages the insights and information, makes timely introductions, and executes smart trades. 
According to client interviews, the firm will continue to excel and dominate, because, relative to 
its competitors, it generally provides better advice, information, access, and liquidity. However, 
there are signs that Goldman’s culture continues to drift, and therefore Goldman runs the risk of 
becoming less ethically distinguishable than its competitors in the long term (if it isn’t already). 
Many competitors and clients believe that ethically Goldman is already where the rest of  
Wall Street is—but smarter about it. However, they generally agreed that its ability to execute 
and take advantage of the information and network and use it for itself and its clients is 
unparalleled. And so until there is a system failure of such massive proportions from unintended 
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consequences or significant regulatory changes, it is difficult to imagine that Goldman will not 
continue its leadership position. 
Why do people continue to do business with Goldman? The simplest answer is that they 
need to, although that does not necessarily mean they are always happy about it. Some profess to 
a love-hate relationship.60 For example, a senior executive at a large European industrial 
company claims not to be very concerned about Goldman’s image problems: “We hated 
Goldman as a matter of policy. You kept your hands in your pockets when you dealt with them . 
. . They are indeed very aggressive and you better not turn your back on them . . .  
They are also highly competent. It is like everywhere else: high risk equals high return. If you 
deal with Goldman you always have to keep that in mind and then you can’t complain if the 
more intelligent guys are sitting on the other side of the table.”61 Referencing  
Taibbi’s Rolling Stone article, a client I interviewed said Goldman is everywhere; it is the most 
powerful investment bank. When I rhetorically asked if it is “a great vampire squid wrapped 
around the face of humanity, relentlessly jamming its blood funnel into anything that smells like 
money,” he said not exactly, but then he explained that Goldman is everywhere, knows 
everyone, and is wherever there is a market in which to make money.62 And to make money as 
an investor, he needs to deal with them and get along with them. 
Moving into the credit crisis, with trading and principal investing contributing 68 percent 
of the company’s 2007 revenue, compared with 9 percent from advisory fees, some clients 
questioned whether they could count on Goldman to provide unbiased advice: 
“We always need to worry a little about Goldman because we need 
them more than they need us, and the firm is run by traders,” Todd 
Baker, then-executive vice president for corporate strategy and development 
	   	   	   233	  
at Washington Mutual Inc., wrote in an October 2007 e-mail 
to Kerry Killinger, CEO at the time. Killinger, in considering whether 
to hire Goldman Sachs for advice on transferring credit risk off of 
WaMu’s balance sheet, wrote back, “I don’t trust Goldy on this . . .” 
“There was an underlying suspicion that Goldman did play in the 
gray areas [of the law], and I’ve spoken to a number of clients who 
finally did leave Goldman or refuse to do business with Goldman 
because of that concern,” [Charles Peabody, an analyst at Portales 
Partners LLC in New York] said, declining to name any.63 
It may be that Guardian financial editor Nils Pratley is right when he says that “the clients 
(or most of them) know they are at risk of being treated as Muppets” and even profess to hate 
Goldman, but choose to continue doing business with the firm because as an investment bank it 
enjoys “an extraordinarily privileged position in being trading houses, market-makers and 
advisers to companies[, making] them both impossible to avoid and riddled with conflicts of 
interest.”64 Dealing with Goldman simply makes good business sense, but it carries a sense of 
caveat emptor these days. 
Joe Nocera, a New York Times columnist, agrees: “The [client] calculus at Goldman has 
always been, ‘There’s no one smarter out there. I actually can get the best advice from Goldman 
Sachs and they will often bring me the best deals, but I also know that I can’t trust them, that 
ultimately, their motives aren’t necessarily aligned with my motives.’”65 Perhaps this lack of 
trust is less important in trading, where competition is based more on price and liquidity, but it 
should be of concern in investment banking, where clients must be able to trust that Goldman 
will not use the client’s information against the client’s best interests. 
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But the Goldman response to Smith’s letter hangs over its client relationships. One client, 
the very large Dutch investment adviser APG, said it took Goldman more than a day to contact 
APG with reassurances about Smith’s allegations: “We would have expected that a company that 
faces such a big media backlash over something so core to their business such as client trust 
would have instantly reached out to those clients to say something.”66 The client’s real objection 
was having to explain to its own clients why it was doing business with Goldman, and having to 
explain about Goldman’s culture.67 Ultimately, however, another client said, “For  
us it’s about what these banks bring to the table. I think Goldman has the intellectual capital; 
they’ve got the know-how to do these transactions. There are other banks out there, but Goldman 
is still the preeminent investment bank and they give solid advice.”68 
As a client, I had a chance to see how different Goldman’s value-added proposition was. 
I had a potential investment idea, but it required the coordination and collaboration of several 
parts of a bank to execute the transaction. I took the idea to several banks, but I never got past the 
first meeting with any of them. The groups within the same bank couldn’t agree on who would 
get what credit or revenues, something that would impact their bonuses (they never said this out 
loud, and I am reading between the lines of politically correct bankerspeak). So instead of 
executing a trade for a client, the banks did nothing. 
I had a meeting with Goldman, and the partners understood that overall the firm would 
make money, even though each area might not be happy with its individual credit or revenues. 
The partners sawan overall opportunity, spoke among themselves, came to an agreement, 
and agreed to do the transaction (my personal relationshipwith them probably also helped). This 
teamwork in execution is atremendous advantage for Goldman and shows that a residual 
socialnetwork and partnership culture still exists. 
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As the deal progressed, Goldman better understood what I was doing and thought it was a 
great investment idea. Later, Goldman said it wanted to coinvest in the deal. This is an example 
of the powerful strategy Goldman claims of combining advisory work with coinvesting.  
Goldman, to its credit, was the only bank smart enough to figure out how to get the deal done 
and recognize it was a good deal. Goldman’s coinvestment helped execute the deal for us at 
attractive terms. 
I was very happy with Goldman’s advice and execution. However, a few months later I 
heard a rumor from a competitor that Goldman had done a similar deal with another client—
much larger than we were—implying that Goldman took information about the deal and  
showed it to another client. I do not know whether this is true. So even though I had good 
feelings about Goldman getting the deal done for me, recognizing I never would have gotten it 
done without Goldman’s approach and ability to execute, I was slightly annoyed that, allegedly, 
Goldman used information to benefit itself with a larger client. 
When I heard the rumor (again, only a rumor), it kept me on my guard. I didn’t say 
anything. I didn’t want to upset Goldman, because it is a very important player in the 
marketplace. I kept doing business with Goldman (and later I was involved in hiring Goldman to 
sell my firm). In my opinion, its people were responsive, well prepared, thoughtful, and 
connected. However, I did not feel as if all the people at Goldman could be trusted completely all 
the time. This should not be a shocking revelation in hindsight, but it was for someone who 
started at Goldman in the early 1990s. And the point I am making is the change. 
What makes Goldman a tough competitor is its depth of talent and its systematic 
approach to providing high-quality client service (including getting senior partners to connect 
with clients). As an outsider, one can appreciate that, relatively speaking, Goldman is stacked  
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with talent. The bench is deep, and the quality of the talent is relatively consistent. The firm’s 
expertise is phenomenal, again benefiting by pulling information from various people, 
geographies, and areas. 
In my interviews with clients, many said the quality of talent on Wall Street had declined 
overall, Goldman included, perhaps because many clients themselves have become specialized in 
their knowledge and technology has commoditized information and the business in many ways. 
There is also strong competition for the best talent. Many talented individuals interested in 
finance go to private equity firms and hedge funds, which offer attractive opportunities.69 Many 
smart people are going into technology or other fields. But clients felt that Goldman would 
probably be considered the best alternative generally, not necessarily in every area of 
specialization, if one is interested in banking or wants training and credentials. 
Clients I interviewed said that other firms have equal (if not better) talent in selected 
people or specialties, but it is not nearly as broad, consistent, and deep, nor as coordinated, as it 
is at Goldman. A Goldman banker or employee will speak to multiple people to get their views 
and then present a firm view. At many other banks, clients explained they typically get the talent 
of only one person of high quality that they trust. They elaborated that one individual has  
a tough task competing against Goldman even if the one person ismore trustworthy. The 
organizational elements that support coordination set Goldman apart, and this is one reason 
clients still use the firm. This differentiator has been and will be challenging to maintain. Some 
partners I interviewed said that the volume of deals, geographic dispersion, information 
overload, technology changes, new regulations, and client expectations have changed the 
dynamics of collaboration and that they are more rushed and have less time to help others than 
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they had in the early 1990s, for example. However, they pointed out that their peers have the 
same challenges and were confident that Goldman has the ability to adapt. 
Many clients pointed out that not just at Goldman but at its peers, even if they trust their 
one key adviser, they are always skeptical of the organizational pressures. Their adviser may 
have the client’s best interests at heart, but at the same time the adviser has internal pressures to 
sell products or do things in order to get paid or keep his job or get promoted. Therefore, the 
quality of execution, the ability to provide liquidity or find a buyer that no one else thought of or 
find a creative solution often trumps trust on deciding which firm to hire because clients are 
skeptical anyway. 
Goldman still attracts a staggering amount of business. If clients were sick of alleged 
abuses, they would go to another competitor. Every time clients choose to do business with 
Goldman, essentially they are subconsciously performing a cost–benefit analysis, and they are 
making the unpopular (even if financially prudent) decision of giving their business to Goldman. 
Even though Goldman’s market shares seem to be fine after the crisis, I did find one interesting 
fact, that the premium fees that it charged clients above its competitors dissipated in at least one 
key area.70 Perhaps this is a coincidence or there are not enough data points, but it is interesting 
to see if changes in Goldman’s fees in the future will be a barometer of what clients think beyond 
just market share. 
Justice Department Declines to Prosecute Goldman 
The Justice Department began an investigation of Goldman in 2011 after the Senate’s 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations issued a report highlighting questionable conduct by 
Goldman and other banks. The Justice Department focused on Goldman’s practices in selling 
pools of subprime mortgage securities to clients while simultaneously betting on a decline in the 
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housing market. The report essentially alleged that Goldman had profited by betting against the 
very mortgage investments that it sold to clients. In addition, the report insinuated that Blankfein 
might have misled lawmakers when testifying about the mortgage deals. Blankfein testified that 
the bank never bet against its clients for its own profit. In April 2011, Senator  
Carl Levin, chairman of the subcommittee, referred Goldman’s case to the Justice Department 
for a criminal investigation. 
In August 2012, the Justice Department took the unusual action of publicly announcing 
that its investigation into Goldman was closed and it would not bring a case: “[B]ased on the law 
and evidence as they exist at this time, there is not a viable basis to bring criminal prosecution.” 
71 The statement continued, “The department and its investigative partners conducted an 
exhaustive review of the report and its exhibits, independently gathered and scrutinized a large 
volume of other documents, and tenaciously pursued potential evidentiary leads, including 
conducting numerous witness interviews.” 
According to news reports, this action came as a result of pushing by Goldman’s 
lawyers.72 Senator Levin responded, “Whether the decision by the Department of Justice is the 
product of weak laws or weak enforcement, Goldman Sachs’ actions were deceptive and  
immoral.”73 In addition, separately, Goldman soon afterward disclosed that the SEC would not 
pursue any further claims against the bank related to a $1.3 billion mortgage bond deal. 
Goldman seemingly focuses on its legal exoneration, although it  
does not claim to be free of all wrongdoing. At an investor conference in 2009, Blankfein said, 
“We participated in things that were clearly wrong and we have reasons to regret and apologize 
for.”74 But as a current partner pointed out to me, upon further reflection, legal exoneration does 
not mean that the original principles have been upheld or that the ethical standards are the same 
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as they were ten or twenty or thirty years ago. He said he doubted Goldman would ever publicly 
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Chapter 9 
Why Doesn’t Goldman See the Change? 
Despite goldman’s admission in 2011 that it needed to “strengthen the firm’s culture in 
an increasingly complex environment,” its name keeps popping up in the news. For example, 
Goldman’s actions while underwriting a closely watched private financing deal for Facebook 
raised serious ethical questions.1 Goldman sold its own Facebook shares by bundling them under 
one name and selling them to favored clients, circumventing SEC reporting requirements. As Jon 
Stewart quipped on Comedy Central’s The Daily Show, “Oh, Goldman, is there any regulation’s 
intent you can’t subvert?”2 
Even when Goldman thinks it is doing something good, its actions sometimes have 
negative consequences. Goldman’s procurement of doses of the swine flu vaccine for its 
employees when the drug was being rationed to hospitals and schools had consequences. People 
wanted to know why Goldman got as many doses for its bankers as a local hospital got, while 
people at much greater risk had to wait. “Can you not read how mad people are at you?” 
demanded Amy Poehler on a Saturday Night Live skit poking fun at Goldman. She added, 
“When people saw the headline, ‘Goldman Sachs Gets Swine Flu Vaccine’ they were super 
happy—until they saw the word ‘vaccine.’”3 
Clearly, there is a gap between the way Goldman views itself and the way some people 
outside the firm view it, particularly regarding its government connections and the ethics 
surrounding its business practices.4 What are the organizational elements that prevent Goldman 
from noticing, or acknowledging, its changes or their consequences? We’ve considered many 
reasons that Goldman has trouble recognizing its organizational drift—including the incremental 
nature of the changes and the social normalization process. Here we’ll focus on an important 
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additional factor in the rationalization: the firm’s sense of higher purpose, which is driven by its 
commitment to public service. 
A Sense of Higher Purpose 
My argument is that Goldman employees are socialized to believe their work is fulfilling 
a higher social purpose, and that this contributes to their justification, or rationalization, of what 
others view as ethically (and some have claimed legally) inappropriate behavior. As covered 
earlier, public service is deeply embedded in the culture. (See appendix E, which is from 
Goldman’s governance report. No other bank has disclosed as much about its commitment and 
history of commitment to public service in its public documents.) Many of Goldman’s leaders 
have gone into public service, and the firm also regularly recruits people from public service. 
The firm also makes substantial philanthropic contributions and encourages its employees to 
volunteer. While those at the firm may no longer be so modest in their lifestyles and demeanor as 
was true back in my early days there, the ethic of doing public service has remained strong, 
though the emphasis of the reasons of why it’s encouraged may have changed. 
Based on my interviews with employees, the sense of serving a higher purpose that 
pervades the firm leads to the rationalization that they must strive to be the best (and that they 
deserve to be paid the most) because they are serving a more important master than just the drive 
for money.5 This leads them to believe that Goldman should be given the benefit of the doubt 
about its dealings. 
Many at Goldman subscribe to the notion that because the firm serves a higher purpose, 
they are more driven to excellence and are more dedicated than their peers at other firms. The 
pursuit of profit is portrayed as virtuous, and hard work is viewed as a kind of, for lack of a 
better phrase, religious duty. The idea of a corporate culture having the characteristics of 
	   	   	   242	  
religious belief only works as a kind of general parallel. And my use of religious terms or 
phrases should be understood only as analogy, to help explain the ethos. 
Employees at Goldman do even often use religious terms to describe the nature of the 
firm’s work, and there is the element of something like blind allegiance, or faith, in the devotion 
of employees to the firm. A religious-like work ethic is an important force behind Goldman’s 
relentless pursuit of excellence and its people’s devotion. Goldman’s atmosphere is one in which 
the pursuit of excellence is seen as the good and right thing to do, and its success (including 
economic gain) is well deserved. The feeling is augmented by the belief that a higher judge (or 
partnership committee) “elects” people who are destined for something greater and whose good 
favor is reflected in successes. Continuing with the religious parallel, the business principles can 
be seen as a form of Goldman’s own Ten Commandments, and the election to partnership as a 
sort of ascension to heaven. This organizational aura or overtone is such a part of the culture and 
identity of the people at Goldman that an attack on the firm tends to be perceived 
psychologically as almost a “holy war” (the wording is paraphrasing from an interview of an 
executive at a competitor). This helps explain why the firm is so aggressively defensive, and why 
it is blinded by the sense of higher purpose. It is difficult for someone who has been socialized 
through training and has rationalized and made sense of what he or she is doing in this way, who 
has become, for lack of a better word, a zealot, to question behavior or instructions. 
This belief in the good of the firm seems to contribute to the commitment to hard work 
and outperformance, which has benefited the firm, but it has slowly and incrementally changed 
to also be used as a rationalization for behavior that may not be consistent with the original 
meaning of the firm’s principles. The sense of higher purpose explains why Goldman brushes off 
cases of bad behavior as “one-offs” or “exceptions,” why its employees should get swine flu 
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vaccinations ahead of others, and why the firm believes that while its peers may not be able to 
handle situations where conflicts need to be managed through ethical behavior, Goldman can. 
I’m not saying that Goldman doesn’t expect its employees to do good in the world, or 
that they don’t do so. The firm and its employees have given hundreds of millions of dollars to 
charity (keep in mind, though, that they have also made tens of billions). Goldman runs many 
community and public service initiatives, including pledging $500 million to help develop 
tenthousand small businesses and dedicating resources to develop the business and management 
skills of ten thousand women in the developing world. 
Two of the most visible examples of Goldman’s philanthropy are the Goldman Sachs 
Foundation, created at the time of the IPO with $200 million, and Goldman Sachs Relief Fund 
and Outreach, created in response to the attacks of September 11, 2001. Charles Ellis writes,  
“[N]o other organization spawns so many trustees of colleges and universities, art museums, 
foundations, libraries and hospitals” and states that at Goldman, “service and serious giving are 
expected, and leaders are expected to set the pace.”6 There is also a serious expectation that  
Goldman employees will participate in the firm’s philanthropic and charitable activities. 
According to a Goldman’s website section called “Citizenship,” in 2012, more than twenty-five 
thousand Goldman Sachs employees from forty-eight offices partnered with 950 nonprofit  
organizations. When I worked at Goldman, almost everyone I worked with gave time to 
Community Teamworks, one of the very few acceptable excuses for delaying a meeting, call, or 
deadline. This still holds true. For an employee not to participate would be frowned upon. 
But the firm’s corporate citizenship, well intended and generous as it may be, serves a 
dual purpose. Goldman promotes and leverages the positive publicity that attends its and its 
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current and former employees’ public service, and the firm’s reputation and network of external 
connections both benefit from it. 
“God’s Work” 
CEO Lloyd Blankfein has spent a lot of time explaining Goldman’s actions since the 
credit crisis. On one occasion, he defended Goldman’s profits and bonuses with a nod to the 
firm’s fiduciary responsibility to its shareholders and a further claim that “preserving the 
franchise” for them is “also for the good of America . . . I think a strong Goldman Sachs is good 
for America.”7 More notoriously, he was quoted in London’s Sunday Times as saying, “We have 
a social purpose” in referring to the banking industry and further explained, “I’m doing God’s 
work.” The media response was overwhelmingly derisive. Jon Stewart joked that when 
Blankfein said he was doing God’s work, he most likely meant “earthquakes and hurricanes.”8 
Stephen Colbert pointed out that Blankfein never specified which God, and speculated that it  
perhaps was “Shiva, Lord of Destruction.”9 Blankfein quickly apologized for his remarks. In 
fact, he later remarked that he had learned his lesson about joking around with reporters and no 
longer even says “God bless you” when someone sneezes.10 
It is not the first time Goldman and religion have been associated. For example, when 
discussing the management committee in an interview, then senior partner Steve Friedman said, 
“Our management committee is like a college of cardinals. They’re very talented people, and in 
the College of Cardinals, a substantial number of them have a reasonable, legitimate belief that 
they should be elevated.”11 What’s more, at Goldman a mentor, or someone who was supportive 
of your career, was often referred to as a “rabbi.” According to my interviews, without a rabbi it 
would be difficult to be elected a partner. 
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In a discussion about morality and markets at St. Paul’s Cathedral in London in 2009, 
Goldman international vice chairman Brian Griffiths, a former adviser to Margaret Thatcher, 
described giant paychecks for bankers as an economic necessity: “We have to tolerate the  
inequality as a way to achieve greater prosperity and opportunity for all.”12 Again, there is an 
allusion to individual sacrifice for a higher purpose—in this case, the common good. Dedication 
to a higher purpose can also account for what William Cohan describes as “the mystery of 
Goldman’s steadfast, zealous belief in its ability to manage its multitude of internal and external 
conflicts.”13 
One of the problems with zeal, religious or otherwise, is that it can blind zealots to 
considerations not directly associated with their higher purpose, and that blindness might be, at 
least in part, behind Blankfein’s subconscious choice of words in referring to the firm doing 
“God’s work,” as well as Goldman’s failure to see the larger picture (including believing that its 
network in public service is a disadvantage), and its inability to immediately grasp the public 
outrage at its conduct during the financial crisis. The belief in serving a higher purpose is 
implicit in the way Goldman defines itself, not only as an elite firm, smarter and better than the 
others, but as something more. This is not a new phenomenon, because “there has always been a 
whiff of sanctimony about the firm. It not only wants to make money; it wants to be seen as a 
force for good.”14 
The need to endure years of grueling work to be elected partner was offset not only by 
money but also, more importantly, by the “psychic rewards” found in a sense of affiliation, of 
“belonging to a select group with a hallowed history and a common purpose.”15  
Rob Kaplan, who spent his entire career at Goldman and ultimately rose to vice chairman, 
attributes this sense to the need of humans, as social animals, to “be part of an organization that 
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has meaning . . . [which] helps give their lives meaning,” noting that the reason people are 
willing to work hard for relatively low compensation is that they “aspire to something that is 
bigger and more meaningful than financial reward. People want to be proud of what they do.  
Yes, they want to be rewarded, but they typically need other reasons to ‘join up’ and stay 
with an organization. Otherwise, they’ll treat it as a convenient stopping point on the way to 
something more meaningful.”16 
“Government Sachs” 
The sense of higher purpose is reinforced by the relationship between Goldman and the 
government. The White House has often looked to Wall Street experts for advice, and Goldman 
partners have advised several presidents and cabinet members, leading to an incestuous web 
between government and Goldman—hence the nickname Government Sachs. Goldman also 
realized the wisdom of hiring former senior government officials. At the highest levels within 
Goldman, there was, and is, a conscious effort to build and maintain relationships with important 
people. The emphasis on this network accelerated when Goldman began to expand. The  
firm benefited greatly and was able to increase its network when John Rogers, former 
Undersecretary of State for Management, and Gerald Corrigan, former president of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York, both joined Goldman in 1994. Today, they serve very senior and 
important roles at the firm. The web of connections between Goldman and government adds to 
the firm’s mystique and promotes the sense of higher purpose felt by many Goldman  
employees. However, internally the sense of higher purpose obscures the dual purpose of public 
service. To many at Goldman, the only reason Blankfein visits government officials so often is 
that he is performing a civic duty as an expert. Many do not concede any possible truth in the 
accusations of undue influence or advantageous access. 
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Over the years, the extent of Goldman’s network of government connections has been 
viewed externally as a great competitive asset or as a way to gain an unfair advantage, depending 
on the viewer’s perspective, the prevailing economic scenarios, and the competitive 
environment.17 One admirer is impressed by the “phenomenal  
number of people rotating out of the firm at an early age, looking to do something good for their 
country.”18 Another, speculating about “what [it is] about Goldman that makes it such a popular 
feeding ground for Democratic and Republican administrations alike,” says that “many insiders 
attribute the firm’s stature in Washington largely to a Goldman culture that values teamwork 
over individual self-gratification.”19 
Others have taken a more cynical view, implying a self-serving motivation behind 
Goldman’s predilection for public service and for hiring former government officials. James 
Grant, years before the credit crisis, commented, “It is probably no accident, as the Marxists used 
to say, that the ex-president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Gerald Corrigan, is today 
a managing director of Goldman. Mr. Corrigan would be just the right man to have on the 
premises in case the firm should trade itself into the kind of financial crisis from which only the 
Federal Reserve could help to extricate it.”20 Also, there has been criticism that public officials 
give Goldman better treatment because they are hoping that when they finish their political 
careers, they can return to or work at or lobby for Goldman. Stephen Colbert joked, “Why are 
government employees filing a civil suit against Goldman Sachs? That’s just going to be 
embarrassing in a few years when they all go back to work at Goldman Sachs.” 
Many non-Goldman people I interviewed said that Goldman exploits its good works and 
sense of higher purpose to help rationalize or explain why it is uniquely able to manage potential 
client conflicts (“because we are Goldman”). From my interviews of non-Goldman employees, 
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the consensus is that Goldman shrewdly uses its government contacts and its good guy image to 
benefit the firm in increasing its opportunities. As long ago as 1992, for example, Goldman’s 
successful bids for deals with the Russian government were attributed in large part to the firm’s 
Washington connections.21  
Such concerns led CBS News to analyze the “revolving door between Goldman and 
government.”22 Good press or bad, by being associated with the most important people, Goldman 
spun the image to its advantage, prior to being questioned about it during the crisis. 
The fact that Goldman partners did so much good for humanity did serve for many years 
to help distinguish the firm in the eyes of the public and added to the Goldman mystique. It still 
helps the firm attract and retain employees, as well as motivate them. 
Whitehead, Rubin, and Friedman were seen as having used government positions to 
apply their skills to do good for the nation, as well as satisfy any personal ambition. As role 
models, they inspired Goldman employees to think about public service, and the firm leveraged  
that sense of social responsibility to further the perception of Goldman’s sense of higher purpose 
as well as for other purposes that help differentiate the firm. 
Public Service Rationalizing Behavior 
Of course, the sense that one is doing God’s work or serving a higher purpose can easily 
transmute into a holier-than-thou attitude and an excuse for any behavior, until the ends begin to 
justify the means. Believing that Goldman was different—doing good for others, better than any 
other firm at managing conflicts, viewed as a source of important expertise by the government—
became an excuse for questionable behavior, as though Goldman’s good guy status exempted 
individual behavior from close scrutiny. The consequence was the development of the sort of 
arrogance that comes with believing one’s actions are beyond question because of the rarefied 
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atmosphere within which one operates. On the flip side, it must also be said that there have been 
some positive organizational consequences of the sense of higher purpose. In addition to the 
public good done, it has also encouraged employees to work harder than one might think  
possible, at least in part because it imparted a sense of greater meaning to that work. It also 
makes it more difficult for employees to leave once they are socialized into the beliefs. 
Concerns are increasingly raised about Goldman’s influence, its connections to 
government, and the potential for impropriety. Bloomberg News columnist Matthew Lynn put it 
this way: “While no one would dispute that New York-based Goldman Sachs is a  
money-making machine full of alpha-brains, it isn’t healthy for so many decision-makers to be 
drawn from one source . . . It is hard to ignore the trend for appointing Goldman employees to 
big government-appointed jobs. In the information technology business, they used to say, ‘No 
one ever got fired for buying IBM.’ In politics right now, the motto seems to be, ‘No one ever 
got fired for hiring Goldman Sachs.’”23 
There is certainly a long list of Goldman alumni in government and government alumni 
at Goldman (see appendix C for a summary). At the time of the financial crisis, Hank Paulson, 
former Goldman CEO, was secretary of the Treasury and had many Goldman alumni working 
for or advising him.24 Meanwhile, the chairman of the New York Fed at the time was Steve 
Friedman, who was on the Goldman board of directors. 
Undoubtedly Goldman, its employees, and its alumni have made many valuable 
contributions in their public service. Obviously this should be commended and appreciated. The 
danger, though, for Goldman and for the public, is that this strong commitment to public service 
is a contributing factor in the firm’s cultural change, not seeing the change and justification of 
behavior that increasingly pushes up against—some have argued crosses—the line of legality. 
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Conclusion 
Lessons 
Certain residual elements of goldman’s culture will continue to fight organizational drift. 
But the drift will likely continue, and possibly will accelerate, given the continuing competitive, 
organizational, technological, and regulatory pressures the firm faces. Goldman’s response to 
these pressures will most likely continue to be the pursuit of growth. In that pursuit, Goldman 
will be challenged by the law of large numbers. It most likely will continue to occasionally cross 
regulatory or legal lines as it negotiates what its principles mean and what is legal. As the firm 
gets closer to this line, at the very least its ethics will continually be questioned in part  
because of how the firm portrays itself and its principles. It will most likely continue to be 
blinded by both social normalization as well as by rationalization, reinforced by the strength of 
its conviction that the firm has a higher purpose and its many successes.1 And therefore, we 
should expect that Goldman’s organizational response to any criticism will be defensive and 
aggressive. 
In the short to medium term, Goldman’s residual cultural elements will allow it to 
maintain its informational and teamwork advantage, which will continue to support its client 
franchise, market position, and superior financial returns. That will help its reputation and  
attract and retain the best people, giving it a relative advantage. But this can change quickly 
because it will face challenges from various pressures, such as new competitors utilizing new 
technologies and new regulations; the landscape is dynamic and continually changing. 
Although this book focuses on the Goldman case, the story has much broader 
implications. The organizational drift Goldman has experienced—is experiencing—can affect 
any organization, regardless of its many successes. And leaders of the organization may not be 
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able to see that it is happening until there is a public blowup or failure, or until an insider calls it 
out. The signs may indicate that there aren’t changes—signs such as leading market share, 
returns to shareholders, brand and attractiveness as an employer—but slowly the organization  
is losing touch with the original meaning of its principles and values as it responds to various 
pressures and its environment. 
A Victim or a Perpetrator? 
The leaders of Goldman have certainly wanted to make money for themselves and their 
shareholders throughout its history. The original Goldman business principles were written in 
1979 to help regulate behavior and acted as a balance between short-term greedy  
and long-term greedy when dealing with clients as the firm grew. In addition, the organization 
had many elements besides the principles that impacted behavior, from financial 
interdependence, to the social network of trust, to constraints on capital and dissonance.  
The Goldman leaders knew the values and principles, but various pressures left them with the 
conviction that the firm needed to grow rapidly and often caused them to make incremental 
decisions that were not consistent with the original meaning of the principles and values, moving 
the firm increasingly further from the original meaning. With conflicting organizational goals 
and scarce resources, the interpretation of the principles had to change and the culture had to 
change. This process was enabled by social normalization and structural secrecy. Complicating 
this drift was the sense of higher purpose that employees felt Goldman, and they themselves, 
served (including public service contributions), which contributed to rationalization about the 
deviations. 
Goldman most likely will continue to pursue and maximize opportunities and undergo 
organizational drift, until the business is severely negatively impacted or the fines and other 
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consequences are too high, and then perhaps the firm will readjust. It did so in the aftermath of 
its near bankruptcy in the stock market crash in the late 1920s, for example, getting out of the 
asset management business. However, the public and regulators should be concerned—not only 
about Goldman but also about all of the systemically important financial institutions that pose a 
risk to the economic system. They may be doing what is in their own and their shareholders’ best 
interests as they respond to pressures, incentives, and environment, but it may not be in the 
public’s best interests. And when the public must pay for their failures (which, as we have seen, 
can be breakdowns on a massive scale), they should be focused on the consequences  
of the organizational drift that has, is, and mostly will continue happening. 
A concerning issue about the organizational drift toward a legal definition of ethics is that 
Goldman and the other banks have a significant influence or role in determining the legal line. 
For example, Goldman has reportedly spent over $15 million in lobbying related to Dodd–Frank 
and less than two-thirds of the regulations have been implemented.2 Securities and investment 
firms spent more than $101 million lobbying regulators in 2011, according to the Center for  
Responsive Politics, a nonpartisan research group. That is on top of $103 million spent lobbying 
lawmakers and regulators in 2010.3 If the pressure is to maximize the opportunities, especially as 
banks get larger, then the legal line will be pressured to change accordingly, and not just by 
Goldman, but by all of the banks. And the larger the banks and the bigger the challenges of the 
law of large numbers, the more pressure there will be to impact the legal line. 
In the 1990s I received a letter from senior executive asking me to donate money to 
Goldman’s political action committee (PAC). The letter explained that participation was 
completely discretionary and that non-participation wouldn’t negatively affect me, but many  
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people I spoke to about it were skeptical that our bosses didn’t review the list. According to 
some, Goldman’s PAC and its employees have donated more than $20 million to federal political 
campaigns from 1999 to 2009.4 
Can Organizational Drift Be Constrained or Managed? 
Organizations must adapt to compete and be successful in achieving their organizational 
goals, which is what Goldman has done and will surely continue to do. At the same time the 
competitive, regulatory, technological, and organizational pressures that have affected the  
culture and the firm’s behavior will continue. Therefore, I believe ongoing drift is inevitable. 
Are all organizations doomed to failure in the long run because of organizational drift 
combined with organizational and environmental complexity, and therefore, is Goldman also 
ultimately doomed? A very good question, for which I don’t have a good answer, except that, as 
John Maynard Keynes famously remarked, “In the long run, we are all dead.”5 
Perhaps it is naive or idealistic or nostalgic to believe that organizations can implement 
ways to manage or constrain organizational drift. For an organization that is already drifting, 
there are many questions. What will be the catalyst for the self-evaluation? A massive failure, 
congressional investigation, public outcry, shareholder activism, stock price performance, or an 
independent chairman of the board? Why would a firm do a self-evaluation if it is widely viewed 
as successful by its shareholders? Who would even do the evaluation? Is such an investigation 
better done by an external party or internally?  
All are very good questions. And ones that deserve consideration and study, though 
unfortunately they do not seem to get as much attention as they deserve, not just for banking but 
organizations generally. However, some good ideas have been shared about addressing the banks 
specifically as a result of the financial crisis. 
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For example, Peter Weinberg, who is the grandson of senior partner Sidney Weinberg 
and nephew of senior partner John L. Weinberg, and is a former Goldman partner, made a 
proposal in a September 2009 Wall Street Journal op-ed that focused on incentives. He proposed 
a “10/20/30/40” compensation plan under which “junior employees would receive regular 
competitive pay, but senior employees would be paid as follows: 10 percent of annual 
compensation in cash now; 20 percent of annual compensation in cash later; 30 percent of annual 
compensation in stock now (with a required holding period); and 40 percent of annual 
compensation in stock later.” Now means immediately at the end of a compensation period. 
Later means after a period during which a cycle can be evaluated and the award maintained or 
adjusted accordingly. The other main aspect of his plan was that the people who manage trading 
or asset management businesses should have some of their own capital at risk in the business.  
Weinberg’s proposal is based on the premise that success should be viewed in hindsight and 
wealth creation should occur on the back end, to ensure that “through-the-cycle compensation 
[is] linked to through-the-cycle value creation. Requiring those who manage a business or fund 
to have some of their own money invested in it would “better align the pocketbooks of Wall 
Street with the pocketbooks of financial markets and our economy.”6 
Assuming that the banks won’t be broken up or forced back to  
private partnerships, I would suggest examining ideas on locking up capital for longer similar to 
Peter Weinberg’s, but perhaps complementing them with a greater emphasis on organizational 
elements. I would examine some sort of quasi partnership-partner compensation plan with an 
election for banks. 
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A partnership compensation plan could offer a degree of financial interdependence if it 
had a greater emphasis on fixed percentages of profits versus discretionary compensation for 
those in the partnership plan. That might lead the partners to place a greater emphasis  
on the whole enterprise than on themselves or their group. Financial interdependence and 
personal liability—forcing those in the partnership to disproportionately share in fines, 
settlements, compliance or risk management failures, or certain losses with shareholders—might  
make risk management and ethical standards a higher priority and reemphasize a social network 
of trust while creating an environment for dissonance.7 
In discussing the ramifications of the personal liability of executives having been limited, 
a retired Goldman partner rhetorically questioned, why is it that when one person or a handful of 
senior persons at the firm does something bad that costs the shareholders and possibly puts the 
public at risk, that one person gets fired (maybe with some clawbacks of compensation) but the 
managing directors of the entire firm don’t have their compensation significantly affected? 
Another person I interviewed suggested that if Goldman partners collectively had to 
disproportionately pay the $550 million settlement with the SEC out of their bonus pool, or if 
J.P. Morgan had a partnership structure and the partners together had to disproportionately pay 
the losses from the “London whale,” perhaps they collectively would take stronger action to 
prevent such behavior. He pointed out that when Goldman paid settlements related to Robert  
Maxwell, all the partners paid, not just the one responsible for the relationship, and the firm went 
back retroactively to those who were partners at the time for payments. Enacting individual 
clawbacks that hold one person accountable has taken away the emphasis on organizational 
elements of financial interdependence and social networks of trust by which the executives could 
be holding each other accountable and self-regulating. 
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Some critics of the banks have suggested that bankers who do not like the idea of 
increasing their personal liability or risk “should look at the portraits on the wall of their 
predecessors who, as partners of the very same firms, worked and prospered under such a 
personal liability rule every day of their lives.”8 
The regulatory focus on the banks has been on quantifiable and measureable factors like 
minimal capital requirements and certain business restrictions. These are important; however, 
they alone will not address the issues of the banks, including Goldman. This may be in part 
because these regulations typically have some ambiguity and motivated organizations with a 
certain culture can seek to circumvent the spirit of the regulations. 
As I mentioned before, this study is much more than a case study on Goldman, or even 
systemically important, publicly traded banks. It has much broader implications for organizations 
generally. This sociological study opened my eyes to the organizational elements as they relate 
to a culture and the importance of understanding them as they relate to organizational, 
competitive, technological, and regulatory pressures. The organizational elements help form the 
culture, the incentives and behavior—they can help a firm be “long-term greedy.” In addition, 
organizational elements can help constrain or manage organizational drift. 
Lessons Learned 
As I consider what I’ve learned about Goldman, and the sociological theory that supports 
my analysis and conclusions, I am mindful that this book has implications that resonate beyond 
Goldman. The following summary should help leaders and managers think about the  
organizational drift that has, is, and will be happening at their own organizations. 
• Shared values, whether codified or uncodified, tie an organization together. A firm should 
determine its own basic set of nonnegotiable values, the minimal constraints. Leaders, not  
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just boards of directors, should look to the meaning of a firm’s principles to define corporate 
ethics and guide employees’ actions, and try to determine objective ways in which to check  
deviations from the original meaning (for example, attrition rates, independent client interviews, 
independent exit interviews with departing employees).9 
• Social networks can create competitive advantages and improve performance. An organization 
should consider creating some sort of partnership or sharing that is bound by financial  
or other interdependence and focus on improving the trust among the group members through 
socialization. The election or promotion into a leadership group should put a greater emphasis on 
culture-carrying qualities in the process.10 Leaders and board members should also monitor 
changes in the nature of the members of the group, cognizant that they can have an impact on the 
social network. 
• Financial interdependence is important as a self regulator. Leaders’ compensation should be 
based more on collectively generated profits and culture carrying. Leaders should 
disproportionately and jointly share in fines, settlements, and other negative consequences out of 
their compensation plan or their stock. Meaningful restrictions on leaders’ ability to sell or hedge 
shares should be imposed, which can lead to better self regulating and longer-term thinking. 
• Public disclosure supports an organization’s values and strengthens the organization itself. An 
organization should consider making personnel decisions more public. When people are 
dismissed or specifically not promoted because of bad behavior, it should be more public. There 
is a value to having public signals when behavior is not acceptable. Conversely, culture carriers, 
those that represent the values, even if they may not be the firm’s biggest revenue producers, 
must be promoted as a signal of what’s important.11 
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• Generating dissonance or perplexing situations that provoke innovative inquiry can create 
competitive advantages and improve performance. Having some sort of interdependence should 
help create an environment that supports discussion and debate. Complementing this debate is 
balance between groups. Getting the input of leaders from different areas or regions, who have 
worked together and have good working relationships, is also important in encouraging 
dissonance. At the board level, in many situations, an independent lead director or independent 
chairman can add to dissonance. 
• A sense of higher purpose, beyond making money in a materialistic society, can help people 
make sense of their roles. A firm needs to give employees a clear understanding of its values, its 
social purpose, and its sense of responsibility. However, leaders need to be conscious of not 
using the good works of their employees or of the firm to rationalize behavior that is inconsistent  
with its principles. 
• An organization’s culture is transmitted from one generation to the next as new group members 
become acculturated or socialized. It is crucial to recruit people who have the same values and 
socialize them into the firm’s culture. Even if this restricts growth in the short run, it is important 
not to undervalue recruiting, interviewing, training, mentoring, and socializing. This is also very 
important in international expansion. 
• Organizational exceptions may address short-term issues but may cause long-term ones. Early 
promotions and outsized compensation can indicate that a firm is a meritocracy, but they can also 
encourage behavior inconsistent with principles. Leaders need to be cognizant that sometimes 
letting top performers go, if they do not have a long-term perspective and buy into the system, 
may be better for the overall organization in the future. 
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• The ability to make rational decisions is limited, or bounded, by the extent of people’s 
information. To broaden employees’ understanding, a firm should promote a tradition of 
teamwork and interdependence and develop future leaders by rotating them among work 
assignments in different departments and geographic locations. In order to reduce structural 
secrecy, there may be short-term opportunity costs, but the long-term benefits are significant.12 
• Firms must think about long-term greed and what it means. Through actions and training, 
leaders must explain the pressures on short-term thinking and how the firm resolves the conflicts 
of short- and long-term goals. Potentially conflicting or confusing organizational goals, such as 
putting clients first while also having a duty to shareholders, require strong signals from 
leadership as to what is acceptable and unacceptable behavior. These nuances cannot be left to 
statements of principles; they must be modeled by leaders’ actions each day. 
• Leaders must understand that external influences can shape the culture. For example, there are 
competitive, technological, and regulatory pressures. Responses to them can have unintended 
consequences, including drifting from principles. This can increase the probability of an 
organizational failure. 
• An organization needs to understand to what extent models impact behavior, decisions made by 
business leaders, and organizational culture. For example, boards of directors of public 
companies should ask questions if earnings per share (EPS) estimates are too consistent with 
analysts’ estimates. They should ask whether the firm is managing to models or to what is in the 
best long-term interests of the firm. 
• Leaders get too much credit and too much blame. Leaders need to uphold the firm’s shared 
values—and that is a key component to leadership.13 But too little emphasis is given to  
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the organizational elements that shape behavior or provide an environment for leadership or 
change. 
• An organization’s structure, incentives, and values last longer and have more impact than those 
of individual leaders. Usually when there is a change or loss or failure there is a tendency to 
blame one thing or one person, when typically there are complex organizational cultural reasons. 
It is the duty of leaders and board members to examine what is responsible, not who is 
responsible. 
One of the most difficult issues in guarding against organizational drift is that adaptation 
is critical to the survival of an organization, and the difference between healthy adaptation and 
organizational drift is very, very difficult to discern. And when a business appears to be 
successfully reaching its organizational goals, it is especially challenging, and most likely 
unpopular, to start questioning whether the culture has drifted. What is the incentive to do so? 
But it may be precisely at this time that changes may be occurring that are setting a firm up for 
failure. Leadership requires a “curiosity that borders on skepticism” and that “questions are 
answered with action.”14 Examining your own organization will be messy, but I hope the 
observations from sociological analysis outlined in this book will provide useful guidelines and 
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Methodology 
 
Research Question and Hypothesis 
The following was the research question for my PhD dissertation: Has the culture at 
Goldman Sachs changed between 1979, when its twelve business principles were written, and 
today? If the culture has changed, then how has it changed and why has it changed? 
Additionally, I sought to answer this question: Why didn’t the people at Goldman Sachs see 
these changes as they were occurring?  
My initial hypothesis centers on the idea that an organizational shift after Goldman 
Sachs’ initial public offering (IPO) in 1999 catalyzed the changes in the company. Goldman 
Sachs was the last of the major private investment banks to go public. Its primary competitor, 
Morgan Stanley, went public in 1986. Goldman’s partners rejected the idea of going public 
several times over the course of the bank’s history; in part because they were concerned about 
the impact an IPO would have on the established partnership culture. Past and current employees 
of Goldman Sachs widely support this claim.  
My unit of analysis is the organization, with a focus on organizational culture, at 
Goldman Sachs. Extraordinarily, the firm’s official guiding principles, which were written in 
1979, have essentially remained the same. Therefore, I chose to examine the changing 
interpretation of these principles from 1979 to today. I chose to focus on the meaning of the 
number-one listed Goldman Sachs business principle, “Our clients’ interests always come first,” 
because it is commonly cited by both Goldman Sachs and its most vocal critics.  
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Background 
I worked at Goldman Sachs from 1992 to 2004. I started my career in investment 
banking, moved on to an international office, and finally, after a stint in proprietary trading and 
investing (using Goldman Sachs’ own money, not its clients’), I left the firm. My tenure 
coincided with Goldman Sachs’ most rapid period of growth, and I experienced its evolution 
from what was a primarily American firm focused on providing investment-banking services into 
the rapidly growing, international firm with interests in proprietary trading and investing that it 
became. Although I was not a partner, I did work on special projects for Hank Paulson when he 
became the president of the firm and had close contact with other senior partners as well.  
When I left Goldman Sachs, I co-founded a multi-billion dollar asset management firm 
and became a trading and investment-banking client of the firm. I also took a job at McKinsey & 
Company, a management-consulting firm, where I advised financial institutions (including 
Goldman Sachs’ competitors, but not Goldman Sachs) and regulators (including Goldman’s 
regulators) during the financial crisis. Later, I was the chief of staff to the President of Citigroup, 
one of Goldman Sachs’ competitors, and served on its executive, management, and risk-
management committees.  
Issues Related to My Background 
Later in this paper, I discuss data and biases. However, data biases aside, there are 
numerous challenges involved in performing this level of inquiry into an organization that 
formerly employed me. The work of two specific authors initially inspired me to examine the 
cultural shifts at Goldman Sachs, even with the challenges. After reading these books, I realized 
that my status as a former Goldman Sachs employee would actually give me a unique 
perspective during the research process. In Organizational Culture and Leadership, Edgar 
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Schein asserts that basic assumptions hold the key to understanding a culture. He argues that 
after data-gathering interviews, the researcher (an “outsider”) must then explore the assumptions 
with the help of a “motivated group of insiders” who are willing to attempt to bring these 
assumptions to the surface (Schein 1987, 1991, 2010; see also Finney & Mitroff 1986 and Hatch 
1993). In particular, the usefulness of his model depends on identifying the links among a 
culture’s values and assumptions (Hatch 1993). Based on Schein’s findings, I came to believe 
that an academically trained “insider” could deliver exclusive insights and identify the links that 
neither a complete “outsider” nor a total “insider” would be able to articulate.  
Shamus Khan wrote Privilege about the New Hampshire private school that he attended 
and later used as the subject of a sociological study. Regarding the research process, he states, 
“Objectivity may be sacrificed, but it was never possible in the first place. Importantly, 
something far greater is gained: understanding. This is not to say that deep embedding is without 
challenges” (Khan 2011: 202). I realized that my history with Goldman Sachs would lead to 
certain complications; however, I also recognized the possibility that my familiarity with the firm 
could lead to a more thorough understanding of the questions at hand. 
My tenure at Goldman Sachs and the firm’s reputation allowed me to interview partners 
from different eras, geographies, and divisions. Also, I was able to interview a diverse cross-
section of Goldman clients. My familiarity with the firm gave me a deeper understanding of the 
nuances, language, and historical context of what the interviewees said. My experiences as a 
Goldman Sachs client gave me the advantage of seeing the firm from two different perspectives. 
Additionally, I had pre-existing relationships with employees of Goldman Sachs’ competitors. 
As a former employee and a former client of Goldman Sachs, I know how to identify and 
interpret the most valuable information in the official documents that are mandatory to file with 
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the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In Diane Vaughan’s paper based on her 
research about her Challenger accident, she discusses the challenges of translating technical 
discourse (including acronyms) and admits that she underestimated the difficulty of the task 
(2004). Similarly, the lingo of Wall Street is rife with acronyms (and sports analogies), and each 
firm, including Goldman, has its own internal language as well. Navigating this world would 
likely prove challenging for a complete outsider. 
I developed a level of apprehension after reading William Whyte describe revisiting his 
research about the ethnography of a slum district in Boston. Whyte warns, “We seek to observe 
behavior that is significant to our research purposes. Selection therefore depends upon some 
implicit or explicit theory—a process that is in large part subjective. But the choice is not 
random” (1993). Diane Vaughan advises taking similar precautions while establishing paradigm 
preferences and personal research styles. In order to address both Whyte and Vaughan’s 
concerns, I remained highly aware of these inherent challenges while determining the methods 
and tools for my research.  
I worried about my own position within my book with regard to whether or not I had too 
much authority in the narrative. This circumstance could also prove especially problematic while 
conducting interviews. Later, I discuss the ways I tried to address this.  
It was important for me to be aware of my own biases, which came from a number of 
different sources. My own experiences (positive and negative) and environments have influenced 
my perspective. Even my academic environment could be considered an influence on me. I took 
a class called “Organizational Failure,” yet never took one called “Organizational Success.” I 
have read the rampant negative press about Goldman both during and after the crisis. And later I 
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would read about Goldman’s (and the market’s) relatively quick recovery after the financial 
crisis. Diane Vaughan wrote in an email to me:  
So it becomes important to reflect upon how we affect our own work—(called 
"reflexivity")—not with the expectation that we can obtain some sort of "objectivity" but 
that it is important to be aware of what we bring to a study that might lead us to overlook 
something small, or large, like our entire take on something. Some of it we can control, or 
at least design our study to make us face what we don't normally see, or at least make us 
worry about it (Vaughan, personal communication, November 11, 2013). 
 
Reflecting on her advice, I believe that I was so “worried about it” that I consciously structured 
my questions, methods, data, validity, and review process in a way that would help me “face 
what we don’t normally see.” I reveal how I did this in each respective section. 
It is important to note that I donated the profits from the book to charity, and therefore, it 
would be difficult for Goldman Sachs to argue that I slanted my perspective for my own 
financial gain. Additionally, I hired Goldman Sachs to sell my asset management firm in 2007, 
which supports the assertion that I did not approach this project with a negative agenda against 
the firm.  
Inherent Issue in Studying Organizational Culture 
There is a unique issue inherent to the study of organizational culture because there is no 
official consensus about what actually constitutes organizational culture. Culture is one of the 
most pervasive buzzwords in corporate management circles. Specific firms often use the word 
“culture” to describe “the way we do things here.” It is central to an organization’s identity, 
either explicitly or implicitly. I drew my definition of culture from the work of Edgar Schein, 
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Professor Emeritus of Management at MIT and a renowned scholar on the topic of organizational 
culture. This is how he defines organizational culture:  
The deeper level of basic assumptions and beliefs that are learned responses to the 
group’s problems of survival in its external environment and its problems of internal 
integration; are shared by members of an organization; that operate unconsciously; and 
that define in a basic “taken-for-granted” fashion in an organization’s view of itself and 
its environment. They come to be taken for granted because they solve those problems 
repeatedly and reliably. This deeper level of assumptions . . . culture . . . is a learned 
product of group experience and is, therefore, to be found only where there is a definable 
group with a significant history (2010: 6−7).  
	  
Although this was the definition I adopted, culture means something different to each person. As 
I discuss later, I designed my methods and tools to raise the assumptions and values of those 
whom I interviewed to be consistent with this definition. 
Methods 
Before starting my research, I read Schein’s examination of the different research 
methods for studying culture (1988). He analyzes survey research, as well as analytical, 
descriptive, historical, clinical, and ethnographic approaches to organizational culture. 
Ultimately, I decided that my general strategy would be to conduct a qualitative analysis using 
the case-study research method. The unique strength of this approach is that it allowed me to 
combine a variety of information sources, including documentation and interviews. In his best-
selling book about design and methods, Robert Yin explains that “case studies are the preferred 
strategy when ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control 
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over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life 
context” (Yin 2013: 1). A case-study research methodology relies on multiple sources of 
evidence to add breadth and depth to data, to bring a richness of data together in an apex of 
understanding through triangulation, and to contribute to the validity of the research. “The case 
study is preferred in examining contemporary events, when the relevant behaviors cannot be 
manipulated” (Yin 2013: 7). I determined that a case study would be the most effective way for 
me to analyze the real-life, complex situation that I was preparing to explore.  
My decision to use a single case study instead of a comparative one was also based on 
Yin’s work. Yin suggests two rationales for using single-case designs. First, Goldman is an 
“extreme or unique case” and also a potentially “revelatory” one. Goldman is distinctive because 
experts consistently describe the firm as the clear leader in investment banking. Employees 
always mention the “unique culture” at Goldman Sachs. Its alumni have gone on to an 
extraordinarily high number of high-ranking political positions. Also, the firm performed 
relatively better than its competitors during the credit crisis. My research is particularly 
revelatory because I had exclusive access to an extensive set of data not readily available (or 
interpretable) to a social scientist without experience in banking or at Goldman Sachs. I kept in 
mind that case studies are not sampling points. Certainly, evidence from multiple case studies is 
more compelling, and a single case study presents inherent limitations because the theories are 
non-transferable across organizations (Chemers 1997; Poortinga and Malpass 1986). Methods 
that prove to be effective in one organizational culture may be useless when applied to another.  
Case studies do not establish the frequency or prevalence of a phenomenon but instead 
the mechanisms that cause, sustain, or change it. However, a multiple case-study design does not 
apply to certain exceptional and in-depth cases.  
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I decided to use a holistic case study because I believed that the relevant theory 
underlying the study was of a holistic nature. Holistic case-study designs build a research 
framework that draws from an array of stakeholders (MacQuarrie 2010). To that end, I 
interviewed former and current partners at Goldman Sachs, as well as competitors, clients, and 
regulators. This meticulous process allowed me to observe the question and the data through 
different lenses. I thought that this would help address the challenge of my background and 
environment. The process of design, implementation, and analysis facilitated a synergistic 
combination of various elements from the case study. 
I could have used an embedded case-study design and studied the subunits of each area of 
Goldman Sachs in more detail (e.g., division: trading, banking, asset management; or geography: 
United States, Europe, Asia) and even the subunits of those subunits (e.g., trading: proprietary 
trading versus non-proprietary trading). However, I felt that this would take an extensive amount 
of time, and the technical description I would need to describe the nuances of each unit could be 
confusing and detract from the holistic nature of the theory. I believed that a subunit focus would 
divert the reader’s attention from the most significant aspects of the case. However, I have made 
sure to offer significant glimpses into the subunits when this information is required to support 
my findings.  
Data and Sources of Error/Bias 
I used multiple types of evidence in my study for the purpose of triangulation to address 
my challenges. Utilizing my unique access to Goldman Sachs and other relevant professionals, I 
performed over 50 interviews, totaling more than 100 hours of data collection. I interviewed 
approximately two dozen current and former Goldman Sachs partners, representing different 
eras, geographies, and divisions. I also interviewed approximately a dozen Goldman Sachs 
	   	   	   269	  
clients from different eras, geographies, and industries. I interviewed about a half-dozen former 
and current equity-research analysts who worked at investment banks and/or provided research 
on Goldman’s stock for investors (some of them covered Goldman’s IPO). I interviewed about a 
half-dozen current and former regulators, current Wall Street lawyers, and law school academics 
specializing in bank regulation and white-collar crime. I conducted my research under the 
approval of the IRB⎯including the interview questions and data-security measures. The 
interviews were semi-structured and open, which allowed me to bring up new ideas in reaction to 
what the interviewee was saying. I chose this method because I had a framework of themes that I 
wanted to explore. However, I planned out the specific topic or topics that I wanted to deal with 
during each interview. I prepared an interview guide with an informal grouping of topics and 
questions that I could adjust depending on the interviewee. My interview guide helped me to 
focus my interviews on the topics at hand without locking me into a particular format. This 
freedom allowed me to tailor my questions to the subject and context of each interview. I did not 
take notes during the interviews; I only wrote down notes afterwards. I did not directly quote 
anyone I interviewed. With one exception, I did not reveal the identity of an interviewee beyond 
a specific distinguishing factor (e.g., era, geography, or division). However, John Whitehead 
gave me permission to reveal his name. Whitehead wrote Goldman Sachs’ business principles in 
1979 and was a co-senior partner from 1976 to 1985. I felt that identifying him by name was 
important because the interpretation of the principles in 1979 was the starting point of Goldman 
Sachs culture. I destroyed my notes when my work was done to avoid any potential litigation 
from Goldman Sachs or those suing Goldman Sachs.  
In addition to interviews, I analyzed publicly available data, including news reports about 
Goldman Sachs and its competitors, documents related to Goldman Sachs and its competitors 
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filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), business school cases about 
Goldman Sachs and its competitors, congressional testimony by Goldman Sachs executives and 
its competitors, testimony and evidence from lawsuits filed against Goldman Sachs, and books 
written about Goldman Sachs and Wall Street in general. To this end, I am uniquely qualified to 
understand where to uncover data and, also, how to interpret it. 
In addition, I gathered quantitative data and analyzed it using databases that I created. 
The quantitative data came from publicly filed financial data that Goldman Sachs and its 
competitors provided. I quantified certain data in order to evaluate it. For example, I analyzed 
changes in the Management Committee or Value at Risk over time.  
Over the course of my study, I remained sensitive to potential obstacles that could affect 
my results. For example, I was concerned about selection bias, interviewee/respondent-induced 
bias, and interview-induced bias. I attempted to address selection bias by interviewing people 
from different eras, geographies, and industries. I personally knew most of the interviewees, but I 
also proactively approached people I did not know if I required additional data from a certain 
era, region, industry, or expertise, or if a particular subject had the ability to confirm or deny 
other data. I wanted to present a diverse cross-section of human subjects. The vast majority of 
former and current Goldman Sachs partners whom I interviewed are white males with a graduate 
and/or an undergraduate degree from an Ivy League school or another equally prestigious 
institution. This sample reflected the population of Goldman Sachs. However, I experienced 
similar problems to what Vaughan encountered when she was conducting her research in the 
male-dominated NASA (2004). Because there are not enough female and minority viewpoints in 
my data, I could not address the issue of gender or race bias. They may have had different views 
and perspectives than the dominant population. In hindsight, I could have sought out female and 
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minority subjects more aggressively.  
Interview or respondent-induced bias emerged in memories, exaggerations, hidden 
agendas, misunderstandings, lack of expertise, incomplete answers, and courtesy. My subjects 
indicated interview-induced bias through voice inflection, a desire to help, biased questions, 
question order, appearance, and my familiarity with the subject. There were other sources of bias 
such as chronology and recall, as well as the current public perception of Goldman Sachs and 
Wall Street. I found that many of these biases were unavoidable. However, I posed my questions 
in a different order depending on the interviewee, carefully framed my questions in order to 
sound neutral and simple, asked for clarification when appropriate, cross-checked data and 
answers, challenged interviewees in a friendly way when I thought they were trying to please 
me, and I conducted interviews in person at neutral, discreet locations.  
One of my greatest challenges was that, because of my position, interview subjects would 
sometimes gloss over assumptions or details that they assumed that I would know or understand 
as an insider. Some subjects assumed that I must have had a similar experience as theirs. I 
addressed this by having a set of standard questions structured to draw out their assumptions. I 
asked these questions even if the subjects thought they were too simplistic or the answers were 
obvious. Sometimes the subjects even said this in interviews. Another strategy I used was 
presenting them with evidence from articles or other interviews that would challenge their views. 
This caused subjects to go into greater depths of explanation. 
Another challenge was interviewing subjects with whom I was personally familiar or who 
felt overly comfortable with me or our shared background. I found that these subjects would 
reveal more to me than they would to an unknown researcher. I had to remind people that 
although I wouldn’t quote them or use their names, I could potentially use anything they said in 
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my thesis. Gaining informed consent shifted the dynamics of my relationships with these 
individuals because friendly, private revelations cannot exist in the context of an interview. 
Certain subjects told me certain things and then later asked me not to include or refer to the 
controversial material. I respected these requests because the information was typically 
immaterial or revealed through other data. However, I could not simply “forget” what I had 
heard, so it did inform my analysis. 
I was also concerned that revisionist history might make its way into my book. For 
example, some former Goldman Sachs partners whom I interviewed had not worked at the firm 
in decades and had a tendency to look back through a rosy lens of nostalgia. I had to prod them 
until they remembered that working at Goldman was not perfect all the time. Additionally, 
former partners who had left the firm rather abruptly wanted to use the interview as an 
opportunity to share their version of what happened. Fortunately, because I was already familiar 
with the context or knew how to get data, I politely challenged some of their recollections.  
Also, there was the risk of imposing my own cultural perspective on the organization, 
therefore masking or skewing my interpretation of its “actual” culture (Evered and Louis 1981). I 
was aware that I had developed my own opinions during my time at Goldman or after Goldman, 
and maybe I had become too deeply socialized without realizing it. It was possible that I had 
rationalized circumstances that I should have been looking at more closely. My hypothesis that 
the IPO was to blame for the shift in culture grew out of the perspective I had developed over the 
years. Certainly, time and distance could neutralize my outlook, but there was no guarantee.  
Over the last ten years, it has become more common to base qualitative research on 
everyday categorization and ordinary storytelling. This “narrative turn” or “storytelling” was 
important to both my analysis and explanation. Catherine Riessman (1993, 2008) and Gubrium 
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and Holstein (2008) provided me with a deeper understanding of narrative, “case-centered” 
research and the analytic design strategies for that particular method. I learned that the narrative 
approach suits some situations and not others. I believe it is highly effective for understanding 
the way a concept changes over time or where nuances serve to explain or elaborate on a theory 
(Riessman 2000). As Riessman quotes Phil Salmon’s explanation, “A fundamental criterion of 
narrative is surely contingency. Whatever the content, stories demand the consequential linking 
of events or ideas. Narrative shaping entails imposing a meaningful pattern on what would 
otherwise be random and disconnected” (2008: 5). Using storytelling enabled me to link what 
seemed like one-off or exceptional events or decisions, which, when evaluated as a whole, 
helped explain change.  
A first-person narrative is unusual in scholarly writing, and for good reason: it is 
necessary to keep some objective distance between the researcher and subject for the study to 
remain unbiased. However, I used the first person in my book, inserting myself at certain points 
to provide my unique perspective. The personal anecdotes allowed me to address the changing 
Goldman culture in a more specific way. I feel that as an academically trained researcher and an 
insider, I was able to understand the complexity of Goldman and pick up on interviewees’ deep, 
embedded assumptions because I was already conscious of their mindsets.  
I came to believe that the only way for me to reveal the nuances of the changes at 
Goldman Sachs was to merge my own experience with sociological theories and frameworks. 
My conclusions are, of course, subjective, but I relied on interviews from many stakeholders and 
on publicly available data to confirm or disprove various claims and theories that came up in my 
interviews. In addition, I made sure to speak to former co-workers in order to confirm my 
memory of certain events to challenge my own stories. However, as a participant observer, I was 
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actively engaged in shaping the meaning of the data, and thus, my own history at Goldman 
became an integral component of this thesis. I was concerned that my experience and stature 
could lead the reader to feel that I am assuming a level of authority over my research.  
In the end, I relied on triangulation to help ensure that I did not let my biases or personal 
preferences get in the way of observing and recording data. Triangulation was, then, essentially 
my main method for cross checking information. 
Analyzing the Data 
Before writing up my case study, I analyzed the data, remaining focused on my research 
question. I used several strategies, including pattern matching, explanation building, time series 
analysis, cross-case synthesis, and logic models. Interestingly, I found stories from my 
interviews that were inconsistent with other evidence. It was those stories that “failed the test” 
and diverged from established “truth” that were the most powerful and interesting. In addition, I 
found verifying the facts less important than understanding their meanings for individuals and 
groups. By using Diane Vaughan’s causal model as a framework for my logic model, I was able 
to analyze a complex chain of events and examine the relationships between independent 
variables (causes) and dependent variables (events) (1997, 1999). In my analysis, I tried to 
address all of the relevant evidence, account for alternative hypotheses and explanations, and 
focus on the most significant aspects of the case. Although my analysis covers general points 
from this particular case, I focused on the implications for practice and made specific practical 
recommendations. 
A Framework to Analyze Goldman and Organizational Drift 
Diane Vaughan developed a framework for examining the influences that cause 
organizations to deviate from both formal design goals and normative standards or expectations, 
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leading to a suboptimal outcome (1997, 1999). She grounds her framework in her observation 
that environment and organization systematically cause organizational deviation. Vaughan 
recognizes the commonalities among organizations and is able to examine the interactions 
between an organization’s structure and processes, the influence of the environment in which this 
system operates, and how both shape employees’ individual choices. Vaughan believes that this 
combination of competitive pressures, organizational characteristics, regulatory factors, scarce 
resources, the dynamic of competition, and the lack of regulation in business behavior exert 
structural pressures on organizations to move towards misconduct. In addition to Vaughan’s 
framework of regulatory, organizational, and competitive pressures, I consider technological 
pressure to be a separate component (beyond the competitive or organizational environment), as 
technology has become a larger social force since Vaughan’s research in the late 1990s.  
Appendix B in the book illustrates my adaptation of Vaughan’s causal framework to my 
analysis of Goldman’s organizational drift. It highlights the interaction of the causative factors 
and pressures in the context of key developments affecting Goldman Sachs and Wall Street over 
the past few decades. The framework allowed me to track changes in organizational culture over 
time as reflected in organizational structure, ownership, compensation practices, and firm 
policies. 
Appendix B can be considered in tandem with the timeline in Appendix G, which also 
identifies selected pressures (competitive, regulatory, technological, and organizational) 
associated with particular events. These two appendices together form a clearer picture of the 
organizational changes and pressures as they developed over time. In addition, they support my 
conclusion that the pressures and changes at Goldman Sachs began before the IPO and before 
Lloyd Blankfein became CEO.  
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In my thesis, I use the word “drift” and the phrase “social normalization.” I noted in my 
book that my definition of organizational drift is neither precisely aligned with Sidney Dekker’s 
“cultural drift” (2001, 2009, 2011), Scott Snook’s “practical drift” (2000), or Diane Vaughan’s 
“normalization of deviance” (1997, 1999). Although I draw upon many elements from each of 
these theories, there are slight differences not only in their work but in mine as well. Also, rightly 
or wrongly, their scholarly concepts of drift are often associated with organizational “failure” in 
retrospect and in the context of a specific event. The Goldman Sachs case is different because the 
ongoing evolution is messy and indefinable, and more importantly, the outcome is still unknown. 
I noted in my book that organizational drift does not always lead to a recognizable incident of 
failure (it increases the probability). In addition, I tried to limit my use of the word “deviance” 
and instead focus on “change” or “drift.” I felt the word “deviance” had more negative 
connotations than the words “drift” or “change” and could imply a negative bias or lead the 
reader to expect failure.  
I considered the effect of residual elements of the organization’s culture and structure that 
have propelled Goldman Sachs to reach certain goals; these elements may mitigate drift and 
regulate or impact the various internal processes. Most management books focus on success or 
failure, but by focusing on change, my work illuminates a more nuanced reality.  
My analysis of Goldman Sachs encompasses a period of more than three decades in 
which I study organizational, regulatory, technological, and competitive factors. My analysis 
illustrates that the process of organizational change is not as simple as identifying an independent 
variable that affects a dependent variable in a direct chain of events. Examining the changes at 
Goldman Sachs over time allowed me to identify a number of different factors that have interacted to 
produce change. I discovered that using Vaughan’s framework allowed me to address the issue of 
whether my analysis would lead to a different conclusion in a different time period, which was 
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important for validity. I discovered that Vaughan does not fully recognize the power of her 
model in analyzing cultural change. She uses her model to examine a series of events leading to a 
specific, identified organizational failure. In my research, I demonstrated that the model has 
much broader applications.  
I made sure to account for the interrelationships between external and internal variable 
factors. I believe that cultural change occurs as a reaction to competitive, regulatory, 
technological, and organizational factors and that change impacts those factors through an 
ongoing process of internal and external interpretation. Many independent variable 
manipulations involve temporal orders or intervals, while many dependent variables are 
measured in terms of temporal parameters, such as frequency, rate, and duration. In addition, 
many of those measures involve temporal features of measurement (e.g., leads, lags) that are 
important to consider when interpreting them.  
 The development of a more dynamic and comprehensive framework for analyzing 
organizational cultural change allowed for a more rigorous study of a complex organization and 
contributed to my understanding of organizational culture. I could thus develop a more holistic 
approach that incorporated the vital processes, and I had the opportunity to examine the 
manifestation, realization, symbolization, and interpretation of processes within the framework. 
The framework enabled me to describe and consistently mark and analyze the changes more 
richly. Overall, the enhanced framework added to the validity of my study.  
No Opinion If Change Was Better or Worse (Maintaining Neutrality) 
I purposely avoided implying that the change in Goldman culture is a change for the 
worse or that these shifts will inevitably lead to an organizational failure. I believe that if I did 
imply this, it would detract from the study of change or “drift.” I mentioned that the scholarly 
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concept of drift, loosely defined, has often been used to explain how a series of small, seemingly 
inconsequential changes can lead to disaster. Famous examples include the explosion of the 
Space Shuttle Challenger (Vaughan) or the accidental shooting of two Black Hawk helicopters 
over Iraq in 1994 by US F-15 fighter jets (Snook). Though the change at Goldman differs from 
these examples, those incidents offer important insights into why and how Goldman’s culture 
drifted.  
Similarly, I do not predict that Goldman’s drift will inevitably lead to organizational 
failure or an ensuing disaster for the public (although some believe that this has already 
happened). I argue that the organizational drift is merely increasing that possibility. This is why 
it was important to illuminate the sources of the organizational drift.  
Validity 
There are four tests of validity that are common to all social sciences and appear in 
numerous textbooks (Kidder & Judd 1986: 26−29). In order to ensure the validity of my data 
collection, I used multiple sources of evidence, established a chain of evidence, and asked key 
informants to review drafts of relevant case study reports. To ensure the internal validity of my 
data analysis, I used the pattern matching method (predicting a set of results and then comparing 
them to the actual results), time series analysis (observing trends over time), and explanation-
building (a particular theory I used to analyze the data). In addition, I addressed rival 
explanations, used a logic model (which allowed me to analyze the relationship between 
independent variables [causes] and dependent variables [events] in a complex chain of events), 
and performed a cross-case synthesis (analyzed findings and made generalizations across cases). 
I found that the rival hypotheses played an important role in my analysis. Articulating rival 
hypotheses—in this case, the CEO/trading culture—helped me to improve the validity of my 
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evaluation. 
I also used multiple sources of evidence, weighing their various strengths and 
weaknesses. When a subject told me something in an interview, I tried to corroborate it with 
another interviewee or a publicly available document. I used a model and framework that would 
produce the same conclusion even if it were used at a different point in time. This effort was 
critical for validity. It was equally important to address the most common explanation for the 
cultural shift, which is Goldman’s IPO, and the more recent theory placing the blame on the 
firm’s CEO and/or the trading culture. 
Establishing external validity by applying the theory and logic of my design to other 
organizations was also important. Riessman wrote: In the final analysis, good narrative research 
persuades readers. Students can present their narrative data in ways that demonstrate the data are 
genuine, and analytical interpretations of them are plausible, reasonable and 
convincing…Persuasiveness is strengthened when an investigators theoretical claims are 
supported with evidence from informants’ accounts, negative cases are included, and alternative 
interpretations considered” (2008: 191). I tried to use these strategies to help validate my 
findings. Finally, I believe that if a later researcher conducted the same case study again, he or 
she would arrive at the same findings and conclusions. 
Writing Up the Case 
I struggled with writing for two audiences: scholars and leaders of organizations. I used a 
storytelling writing technique to connect data, engage the reader and move the narrative forward. 
My opening is designed to immediately grab the reader’s attention. I laid out scenes in a logical 
order to illustrate points, concepts, or issues related to what I am trying to explain or address. 
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The scenes carry the narrative forward so it does not simply read like a recitation of data or 
events. I also provide relevant details to add richness to the narrative personal stories.  
Review 
I contacted almost every sociologist whose theories I use or refer to in my thesis. I 
thought this would expedite my learning, help me to build a network and awareness around my 
project, and ensure that I was using these theories properly. I asked each sociologist to read at 
least the parts that referenced his/her work. The majority of these scholars responded and 
provided comments, including Sidney Dekker, Karen Ho, Ko Kuwabara, Donald MacKenzie, 
Damon Phillips, Scott Snook, David Stark, Richard Swedberg, and Diane Vaughan. I also 
received suggestions at various stages from several academics, including Anat Admanti 
(Stanford Business School), Peter Bearman, Gerald Davis (Michigan Business Sschool), Paul 
Ingram, Joann Martin (Stanford Business School), Debra Minkoff, Katherine Philips, and 
Ernesto Reuben. Also, many of my students at Columbia Business School and my peers in the 
sociology department provided comments and suggestions after reading drafts or parts of drafts. 
I did show some of the subjects that I interviewed selected sections that I wrote that were 
relevant to them in order to make sure that I was representing their sentiments accurately. Taking 
one’s work back to those studied earlier strengthens trustworthiness Lincoln and Guba argue, 
“data, analytic categories, interpretations, and conclusions are tested with those…groups from 
whom the data were originally collected” (Lincoln and Guba 1985: 314). The credibility of an 
investigator’s representation is strengthened if it is recognizable to participants (Reissman 2008: 
197). Their feedback did not impact my theory. In fact, in some cases their reactions seemed to 
indicate that my analysis or conclusions were something that they had not considered. 
Regardless, I felt that the strategy helped validate my analysis. 
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Contacting Goldman Sachs before Going to Print 
After consulting with Harvard Business Review Press (HBRP), I decided to give 
Goldman Sachs the opportunity to see a draft of my manuscript in the spring for fact-checking, 
but also as a courtesy. I contacted one top executive, who I knew, that typically would deal with 
public relations situations and offered the draft on two conditions: (1) Goldman Sachs would 
have to tell me who read it, and (2) if Goldman Sachs found any incorrect information, they 
would have to inform me. I thought this more sensitive approach would prepare Goldman Sachs 
for my thesis and simultaneously ensure that my data from publicly available information were 
correct. Goldman Sachs responded with an email identifying the two people who read the 
manuscript and a detailed discussion of the areas that they believed were inaccurate. I reviewed 
the email along with HBRP editors and HBRP lawyers, and we collectively decided that the 
Goldman Sachs representatives had not in fact identified any factual inaccuracies. Rather, they 
essentially pointed to conclusions with which they disagreed. I did not make any changes in 
response to Goldman Sachs’ email.  
Concluding Thoughts 
 Although my study focuses on the specific case of Goldman Sachs, my findings have 
much broader implications. The phenomenon of organizational drift extends far beyond 
Goldman. The drift Goldman has experienced—is experiencing, really—can affect any 
organization regardless of its past success. Leaders of the organization may not be able to 
recognize the change until there is a major public blow up or a high-level insider who goes rogue 
and reveals internal information. Certain aspects of Goldman Sachs may not indicate the shift in 
culture, like its leading market share, the returns to shareholders, the brand, and its attractiveness 
as an employer, but the organization is slowly losing touch with its original principles and 
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values.  
Figuring out what happened at Goldman is a fascinating puzzle that took me into the 
heart of a complex organization within a dynamic and rapidly evolving environment. This is a 
story of changes happening inside an institution that garners highly emotional responses. Beyond 
that, though, the story raises questions that are fundamental to all organizations and addresses the 
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Appendix A 
 
Goldman and Organizational Drift 
 
Ship captains set out an intended course and use sophisticated tools for navigation to 
constantly revise their speed and direction based on an analysis of the external conditions under 
which they’re sailing. They know that otherwise, no matter how carefully they aim the prow of 
the ship when they leave port, the cumulative effect of ocean currents and other external factors 
over long periods will cause the ship to veer off course. 
Organizational drift is akin to that deviation from an intended course; it’s the slow, steady 
uncoupling of practice from original procedures, principles, processes, and standards or protocols 
that can lead to disasters like the space shuttle Challenger explosion or the Black Hawk shoot-
down incident in northern Iraq. As Harvard Business School professor Scott Snook argues, 
detecting organizational drift requires a sensitivity to the passage of time; single snapshots won’t 
do.1 
To understand what’s happened to Goldman since the writing of the business principles 
in 1979, then, we have to look back to its performance over time, how its interpretation of the 
principles has changed, and the conditions in which it operates. But before we get to that 
analysis, it’s worth developing a deeper understanding of organizational drift and its 
implications. 
Drift into Failure 
Sidney Dekker, a professor who specializes in understanding human error and safety, has 
used complexity theory and systems thinking to better understand how complex systems “drift 
into failure” over an extended period of time. His theories are worth exploring because they, and 
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the ideas of other researchers, provide us with a clear understanding of how systems interact and 
drift away from intended goals. In some cases, this can end in disaster. In the case of  
Goldman, it means that there’s a distinct gap between the principles by which the firm purports 
to steer itself and what it’s actually doing in the world. 
Earlier theories, Dekker argues, have been tripped up by their tendency to explain 
instances of failure in complex environments by blaming flawed components rather than the 
workings of the organizational system as a whole.2 Dekker concludes, by contrast, that failure 
emerges opportunistically, nonrandomly, from the very webs of relationships that breed success 
and that are supposed to protect organizations from disaster. Dekker also observes that systems 
tend to drift in the direction of failure, gradually reducing the safety margin and taking on more 
risk, because of pressures to optimize the system in order to be more efficient and competitive. 
We are able to build complex things—deep-sea oil rigs, spaceships, collateralized debt 
obligations—all of whose properties we can understand in isolation. But with complex systems 
in competitive, regulated societies—like most organizations—failure is often primarily due to 
unanticipated interactions and interdependencies of components and factors or forces outside the 
system, rather than failure of the components themselves. The interactions are unanticipated, and 
the signals are missed. Dekker points out that empirical studies show that reliable organizations 
with low failure rates tend to have a distinct set of traits: safety objectives and a safety culture  
promoted by leadership, appropriate internal diversity to enable looking at things from multiple 
perspectives and deploying a variety of responses to disturbances, redundancy in physical and 
human components,  
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decentralization of safety decision making to enable quick responses by people close to the 
action, and the ability to continually and systematically learn from experience and adapt. The 
attitudes in such a safety culture include a preoccupation with avoiding failure,  
reluctance to simplify, deference to expertise (while recognizing the limits of expertise), 
sensitivity to operations (with vigilant monitoring to detect problems early), and suspicion of 
quiet periods. Last, Dekker recommends that when investigating why a failure occurred,  
we need to remember that what appears clearly wrong in hindsight appeared normal, or at least 
reasonable, at the time, and that abnormal data can be rationalized away by participants. As 
investigators of system failure we need to put ourselves in the shoes of the people who were 
involved. 
Dekker argues that drift is marked by small steps. He puts it like this: “Constant 
organizational and operational adaptation around goal conflicts, competitive pressure, and 
resource scarcity produces small, step-wise normalization. Each next step is only a small 
deviation from the previously accepted norm, and continued operational success is relied upon as 
a guarantee of future safety.”3 Of course, not all small steps are bad. They allow complex 
systems to adapt to their environment, producing new interpretations and behaviors. It’s 
important to remember, too, that the steps are small. “Calling on people to reflect on smaller 
steps probably does not generate as much defensive posturing as challenging their momentous 
decision.”4 
Dekker explains that organizations also drift due to uncertainty and competition in their 
environments. Organizations adapt because of a need to balance resource scarcity and cost 
pressure with safety. Resources to achieve organizational goals can be scarce because their  
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nature limits supply, because of the activities of regulators and competitors, and because others 
make them scarce.5 
What about the protective infrastructure that is designed to ensure against failure? Dekker 
warns, “Complex systems, because of the constant transaction with their environment (which is 
essential for their adaption and survival), draw on the protective structure that is supposed to 
prevent them from failing. This is often the regulator, or the risk assessor, or the rating agency. 
The protective structure (even those inside an organization itself) that is set up and maintained to 
ensure safety is subject to its interactions and interdependencies with the operation it is supposed 
to control and protect.”6 
Interestingly, the protective infrastructure, with uncertain and incomplete knowledge, 
constraints, and deadlines, can contribute to drift—as well as failing to function when it should.7 
Its functioning or lack thereof is legitimized. 
Practical Drift 
You can see exactly this kind of drift in complex systems in Scott Snook’s analysis of the 
accidental shoot-down of two US Army Black Hawk helicopters over northern Iraq in 1994 by 
US Air Force F-15 fighters. All twenty-six UN peacekeepers onboard were killed. With almost 
twenty years in uniform and a PhD in organizational behavior, Lieutenant Colonel Snook, now a 
Harvard Business School professor, uses sociological analysis to thoroughly examine individual, 
group, and organizational accounts of the accident. Using his practical experience, combined 
with his academic training, he concludes that what happened was what he calls “practical 
drift”— the slow, steady uncoupling of practice from written procedure.8 
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Snook describes the potential pitfalls of organizational complacency that every executive 
should take to heart. He insightfully applies several key sociological theories of organizational 
behavior, structure, and change to analyze how bad things can happen to good organizations.  
His resultant theory of practical drift provides dramatic insight into how such seemingly 
impossible events can be expected to occur in complex organizations. He describes how a 
practical drift of local adaptations and procedures can lead to a widening gap between safety  
regulations and practical operations. Individually, the adaptations can be inconsequential. But 
over a longer period, the accumulated drift results in a vulnerable system. Snook uses the word 
practical because he is looking at everyday practices. Culture and practice are interrelated. Also, 
Snook examines local practices and how a subunit changes and creates practices to adhere to its 
own norms but doesn’t necessarily coordinate with the dominant practices of the units they must 
connect with. So the expected coordinated action is not coordinated. The Black Hawk accident 
happened because, or perhaps in spite of, everyone behaving just the way we would expect them 
to behave, just the way rational theory would predict. Snook also points out that, depending on 
one’s perspective, the slow, steady uncoupling can seem random and dangerous in hindsight.9 
Social Normalization 
Why don’t those involved in organizational drift see what’s going on and correct for it? 
When norms for behavior shift within an organization, members of that organization can become 
so accustomed to deviant behavior that they don’t consider it abnormal, despite the fact that it 
strays far from their own codified rules or principles. The firm’s mission, its reason for existence, 
is assumed to be implicit in its business principles; it is those principles, together with the firm’s  
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strategic decisions, that drive the actions of employees. Eventually, the execution of the strategy 
adapts to match incremental changes in the interpretation and meaning of the principles, but the 
perception remains one of business as usual. It is a complex process with a certain  
level of organizational acceptance: the people outside recognize the change, whereas the people 
inside get accustomed to it and do not. And new members accept it as standard practice. 
A number of sociologists have offered explanations as to why organizations drift: scarce 
resources, misaligned incentives, system complexity, multiple goal conflicts, and more. There 
rarely is a single moment or event that one can point to as that moment when change occurs, or a 
single individual that one can point to as the responsible party. Rather, multiple small steps occur 
over an extended period of time. Therefore, the effects go unnoticed, and norms are continuously  
and subtly redefined; a “new normal” is established with each incremental step. This is how a 
succession of small, everyday decisions can produce breakdowns that can be massive in scale. 
Man-Made Disasters, by Barry Turner, originally published in 1978, suggested the 
possibility of systematically analyzing the causes of a wide range of disasters. The working 
subtitle of the book was The Failure of Foresight, and in it, Turner gives a very good description  
of the successive stages that lead to failure, particularly what he calls the “incubation period,” 
during which the preconditions for disaster develop but go unnoticed.”10 The sequence of events 
is as follows: (1) A notionally normal starting point where culturally accepted beliefs about the 
world and its hazards are regulated by precautionary norms set out in rules and codes of practice; 
(2) An incubation period where the accumulation of an unnoticed set of events is at odds with 
accepted beliefs about norms; (3) Precipitating events bring attention to themselves and 
transform general perceptions of the incubation period; (4) The immediate consequence of  
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the collapse of cultural elements becomes evident; (5) The change is recognized, and there is an 
ad hoc rescue and salvage mission to make adjustments; and (6) Real cultural readjustment 
occurs, where a serious inquiry and assessment is carried out and cultural elements are 
adjusted.11 
Lisa Redfield Peattie, a now-retired anthropology professor at MIT, uses the extreme 
example of the Nazi death camps to describe normalization. (And, no, I’m not comparing 
Goldman to the Nazis in any way.) The two key mechanisms through which normalization  
occurs, she states, are “division of labor, which separates, in understanding and potential for 
collective organization, what it makes interdependent in functioning” and “the structure of 
rewards and incentives which makes it to individuals’ personal and familiar to undermine daily, 
in countless small steps, the basis of common existence.”12 Peattie describes how work and daily 
routines, right down to scrubbing the cobblestones in the crematorium yard, were normalized for 
long-term prisoners and personnel alike by the division of labor, affording a degree of distance 
from personal responsibility for the atrocities being committed. People were simply doing  
their normal jobs and carrying out the normal routines established by those in charge; they had 
lost sight of all aspects of the big picture. 
Edward S. Herman, a retired professor of finance at the Wharton School who specialized 
in regulation, borrowed the term “normalizing the unthinkable” from Peattie to describe how 
once unthinkable acts become routine. Herman explains, “Normalization of the unthinkable 
comes easily when money, status, power, and jobs are at stake. Companies and workers can 
always be found to manufacture poison gases, napalm, or instruments of torture, and intellectuals 
will be dredged up to justify their production and use.”13 
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Obviously these are extreme examples, but they are reminders that complicity, obscured 
by the routines of the work, the division of labor, and distance from the results, is possible even 
in the most egregious of acts. Herman goes on, “The rationalizations are hoary with age: 
government knows best; ours is a strictly defensive effort; or, if it wasn’t me, somebody else 
would do it. There is also the retreat to ignorance—real, cultivated, or feigned. Consumer 
ignorance of process is important.”14 
Diane Vaughan’s now classic investigation of the decision making that led to the launch 
of the space shuttle Challenger in 1986 focuses on organizational factors. Vaughan learned that 
work groups typically develop a concept of “acceptable risk” that becomes part of the  
culture.15 Managers pay attention to only a few parameters and do not develop a formal, 
systematic definition of what is acceptable risk for the organization. More troublesome, it is 
difficult for them to see the full implications of their actions. Deviance from the norm starts to 
become institutionalized, resulting in “an incremental descent into poor judgment.”16 The 
acceptance of risk sets a precedent, and it is repeated and becomes the norm. This process 
mushrooms as the organization becomes larger and more complex. To the outside world, what is 
going on in the organization may look deviant, but to the work group everything is normal, and 
people believe they are adhering to what the organization expects of them. Once produced, 
deviant interpretations are reinforced and maintained by what Vaughan describes as an 
“institutionalized belief system that shapes interpretation, meaning, and action at the local 
level.”17 
Initially, the regrettable decision to launch the Challenger and the ensuing tragedy 
appeared to be a case of individuals—NASA managers—who, under competitive pressure, 
violated rules in order to meet the launch schedule. But what at first appeared to be  
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a clear case of misconduct proved to be something entirely different: Vaughan discovered that 
the managers had not violated rules at all, but had actually conformed to all NASA requirements. 
Her work revealed, however, that they were also conforming to NASA’s need  
to meet schedules, which ended up affecting engineering rules about what constituted acceptable 
risks in space flight technologies and the decisions that were made regarding those risks. She 
discovered that NASA managers could set up rules that conformed to the basic engineering  
principles yet allowed them to accept more and more risk. A social normalization of that 
deviance occurred, meaning that once they accepted the first technical anomaly, they continued 
to accept more and more with each launch, because to do so was not deviant to them. In their 
view, they were conforming to engineering and organizational principles. As with practical drift, 
the normalization of deviance concerns practices.18 
Thus, the first time the O-rings were found to be damaged, the engineers found a solution 
and decided the shuttle could fly with acceptable risk. The second time that damage occurred, 
they thought the trouble came from something else. Believing that they had fixed the newest 
problem, they again defined it as an acceptable risk and just kept monitoring the situation. As 
they observed the problem recurring with no consequences, they got to the point that  
flying with the flaw was normal and acceptable. Of course, after the accident, they were 
horrified. 
Something similar happened at Goldman. There was a social normalization of the change 
as the culture slowly shifted; the changes were so subtle that everything seemed normal. On a 
virtually day-to-day basis, normal was redefined. Once the partners normalized a given 
deviation—a shift in policies related to recruiting, promotion, compensation, underwriting, client 
relations, risk management—the deviation became compounded. Goldman was experiencing the 
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norm shift described by Diane Vaughan: “When the achievement of the desired goals receives 
strong cultural emphasis, while much less emphasis is placed on the norms regulating the means, 
these norms will tend to lose their power to regulate behavior.”19 
Vaughan explains why people within organizations do not pick up on the fact that drift 
has occurred: “Secrecy is built into the very structure of organizations. As organizations grow 
large, actions that occur in one part of the organization are, for the most part, not observable in 
others. Divisions of labor between subunits, hierarchy, and geographic dispersion segregate 
knowledge about tasks and goals. Distance—both physical and social—interferes with the efforts  
of those at the top to ‘know’ the behavior of others in the organization, and vice versa. 
Specialized knowledge further inhibits knowing. The language associated with a different task, 
even within the same organization, can conceal rather than reveal.”20 
She explains how “structural secrecy” develops within organizations, defining it as “the 
way that patterns of information, organizational structure, processes, and transactions and the 
structure of regulatory relations systematically undermine the attempt to know [the extent of the 
danger]” and the ability of people to make decisions on the basis of that knowledge to manage 
risk.21 Structural secrecy helps explain how people failed to notice the signs of impending 
disaster that were present during the incubation period first described by Turner, and it supports 
Peattie’s and Herman’s ideas regarding the normalization of the unthinkable. Vaughan explains 
that in the Challenger case, information was filtered as it moved up the chain of command, so 
people at the higher levels were largely unaware of events that may have been dealt with as 
“acceptable risk.”22 The managers missed signals because some signals were mixed, some  
were weak, and some seemed routine. Vaughan concludes that deep-rooted structural factors 
were responsible for the tragic decision to launch the Challenger. It is important to note that in 
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the case of the Challenger disaster, the cause Vaughn identifies is not deviance from rules and 
norms, but conformity with them. In the case of Goldman, I have identified organizational drift 
from the principles, with some signals of that drift having been missed as people conformed to 
the incremental changes and rationalized their behavior. 
A Framework to Analyze Goldman and Organizational Drift 
Diane Vaughan’s work on the Challenger disaster offers a framework for examining the 
influences that cause organizations to deviate from “both formal design goals and normative 
standards or expectations . . . producing a ‘suboptimal outcome.’”23 Her framework is  
grounded in her observation that organizational deviation is systematically produced by the 
impact of the elements of environment and organization.24 Recognizing the commonalities found 
in organizations, Vaughan examines the interactions between an organization’s  
structure and processes, influences of the environment within which this system operates, and 
how both shape individual choice. It is this combination of competitive pressures, organizational 
characteristics, and regulatory factors, this “dynamic of competition and scarce resources, 
together with the unclear norms regulating business behavior,” that Vaughan believes “exerts 
structural pressures on organizations toward misconduct.”25 
To Vaughan’s framework of regulatory, organizational, and competitive pressures, I add 
technological pressure.26 Appendix B illustrates my adaptation of Vaughan’s causal framework 
for my analysis of Goldman.27 It highlights the interaction of the causative factors and pressures 
with key developments affecting Goldman and Wall Street over the past few decades. This 
appendix can be considered in tandem with the timeline in appendix G, which also identifies  
selected pressures (competitive, regulatory, technological, and organizational) associated with 
particular events. The result of the two is a clearer picture of the organizational changes and 
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pressures as they developed over time. In addition, it supports my conclusion that the pressures 
and changes were happening before the IPO and before Blankfein became CEO. 
While the frameworks set forth by the authors discussed in this appendix offer valuable 
insights into the process of the drift at  
Goldman and constitute a promising starting point for analysis, their studies are primarily 
focused on analyzing organizational failure in retrospect from a specific event. This is different 
from the Goldman case, because what has happened and is happening is messy and, depending 
on one’s point of view, could be labeled a variety of things; but more importantly the outcome is 
unknown. To their analyses, I have added consideration of the role played by residual elements 
of the organization’s culture and structure that have made the organization successful; these 
elements may mitigate drift or regulate or impact the various processes. My analysis of Goldman 
encompasses a period of more than three decades because it is important to evaluate 
organizational elements and regulatory, technological, and competitive factors dynamically over 
time and to appreciate how change happens at different paces and with different emphases. My 
analysis illustrates that the process of change is not as simple as identifying an independent 
variable that affects a dependent variable in a direct chain of events. Examining the changes over 
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Appendix B 
 
Analytical Framework Applied to Goldman 
 
Diane Vaughan’s analytical causal framework examines three main pressures—environmental 
and organizational (for simplicity, “organizational”); regulatory; and competitive—to analyze 
change over time.1 In order to analyze Goldman, I utilize Vaughan’s framework and add 
technological pressure. 
When the framework is applied to Goldman, as shown in Table B-1, the result illuminates 
changes more clearly over time. Even though the changes are presented in temporal sequence 
from 1979, when the firm’s business principles were written by John Whitehead, to today and 
are divided by who ran the firm or oversaw major changes, this is only for simplicity of 
presentation. The changes are related to each other, impact each other, and compound each other 
and have varying degrees of importance and significance. I selected 1979 because that is when 
the principles were written; 1990 because that year was when John L. Weinberg retired as senior 
partner (Whitehead had left in 1984); 1996 because it marked the legal structural change to a 
limited liability corporation; 1999 because it was the year of the IPO; and 2012 because it is the 
current year as this is written. 
To help the reader understand the chart, I will give at least one example illuminated for 
each pressure. 
Organizational pressure: Goldman’s legal structure changed from a private partnership 
with full personal liability and illiquidity until retirement, to a limited liability private company  
with liability capped at the capital in the firm, and finally to a public company at the IPO with 
the liability capped at the capital in the firm, but with liquidity for shareholders. The firm 
changed from being completely privately held, to taking outside private capital, to taking outside 
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public capital. The ownership changed from 100 percent Goldman partners to around 10 percent 
Goldman partners. 
Regulatory pressure: Goldman operated under Glass–Steagall before the law was repealed in 
1999 through the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act. In 1970, the NYSE changed a rule allowing 
investment banks to become public. 
Competitive pressure: The tech boom, the alternatives (hedge fund and private equity) boom, 
foreign competitors entering the US market, and US commercial banks were all factors that 
increased the search for talent. This impacted Goldman’s ability to attract and retain not only the 
best people but also people with the same values. The firm added a new level of executives, 
known as managing directors, in part to offer people a comparable title. The firm changed certain 
business practices in order to maintain and grow market share (e.g., no hostile raids, 
underwriting standards requiring at least three years of profits, and no gambling clients). 
Technological pressure: Technology made information more of a commodity, impacting the 
ability for people to add value to clients. Technology added transparency to markets, lowering 
profitability margins and emphasizing scale. 
Under the time frames, I provide some data to illustrate the changes in business mix. It’s 
important to keep in mind that before 1999, Goldman was a private firm and therefore not 






	   	   	   299	  
 
 
	   	   	   300	  
 
 








	   	   	   302	  
Appendix C 
Selected Goldman Employees and Lobbyists with Government Position (Before or After 
Goldman) 
Joshua Bolten 
Government: President George W. Bush’s chief of staff,  
2006–2009; director of Office of Management and Budget,  
2003–2006; White House deputy chief of staff, January 20, 2001–June 2003 
Goldman: Executive director of legal affairs for Goldman based in London (the bank’s 
chief lobbyist to the EU), 1994–1999 
Kenneth D. Brody 
Government: President and chairman of the Export-Import  
Bank of the United States, 1993–1996 
Goldman: Former adviser and board member of the management committee at Goldman, 
where he worked from 1971 to 1991 
Kathleen Brown 
Government: Former California state treasurer 
Goldman: Senior adviser responsible for public finance, western region 
Mark Carney 
Government: Governor of the Bank of Canada since 2008 
Goldman: Thirteen-year career with Goldman; left in 1995 
Robert Cogorno 
Government: Former aide to Richard Gephardt (D.-Mo.) and one-time floor director for 
Steny Hoyer (D-Md.), the number two House Democrat 
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Goldman: Works for [Steve] Elmendorf Strategies, which lobbies for Goldman 
Kenneth Connolly 
Government: Staff director of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, 
2001–2006 
Goldman: Vice president at Goldman from June 2008 to present 
E. Gerald Corrigan 
Government: President of the New York Fed, 1985–1993 
Goldman: Joined Goldman in 1994, currently a partner and managing director; also 
appointed chairman of GS Bank USA, the firm’s holding company, in September 2008 
Jon Corzine 
Government: Governor of New Jersey, 2006–2010; US Senator, 2001–2006, where he 
served on the Banking and Budget committees 
Goldman: Former Goldman CEO; worked at Goldman from  
1975 to 1998 
Gregory Craig 
Government: White House Counsel in Obama administration 
Goldman: Took position as Goldman’s chief lawyer to defend against an SEC suit 
Gavyn Davies 
Government: Former chairman of the BBC, 2001–2004 
Goldman: Chief economist at Goldman, where he worked from 1986 to 2001 
Paul Dighton 
Government: Chief executive of the London Operating Committee of the Olympic 
Games (LOCOG) 
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Goldman: Worked at Goldman for twenty-two years beginning in 1983 
Mario Draghi 
Government: Governor of the Bank of Italy since January 2006; since 2011, President of 
the European Central Bank 
Goldman: Vice chairman and managing director of Goldman Sachs International; 
member of the firmwide management committee, 2002–2005 
William Dudley 
Government: President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2009 to present 
Goldman: Partner and managing director; worked at Goldman from 1986 to 2007 
Steven Elmendorf 
Government: Senior adviser to then–House minority leader Richard Gephardt 
Goldman: Runs his own lobbying firm; Goldman is a client 
Dina Farrell 
Government: Deputy director, National Economic Council, Obama administration, since 
January 2009 
Goldman: Financial analyst at Goldman, 1987–1989 
Edward C. Forst 
Government: Adviser to Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson in 2008 
Goldman: Former global head, investment management division at Goldman, where he 
worked from 1994 to 2008 
Randall M. Fort 
Government: Assistant secretary of state for intelligence and research, November 2006–
January 2009 
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Goldman: Director of global security, 1996–2006 
Henry H. Fowler 
Government: Secretary of the Treasury, 1965–1968 
Goldman: After leaving the Treasury Department, joined Goldman in New York as a 
partner 
Stephen Friedman 
Government: Chairman, President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and of the 
Intelligence Oversight Board; chairman, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2008–2009; 
former director of National Economic Council under George W. Bush; economic adviser 
to Bush, 2002–2004 
Goldman: Joined Goldman in 1966; former cochairman; left in 1994; was board member 
until April 2013 
Gary Gensler 
Government: Chairman of the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission since 2009; 
undersecretary of the Treasury, 1999–2001; assistant secretary of the Treasury, 1997–
1999 
Goldman: Former co-head of finance worldwide; worked at Goldman from 1979 to 1997 
Richard Gephardt 
Government: US Representative, 1977–2005 
Goldman: President and CEO, Gephardt Government Affairs (since 2007); represents 
Goldman interests on issues related to TARP 
Judd Gregg 
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Government: Three-term New Hampshire senator; ranking Republican on the 
Appropriations, Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee and on the Health 
Education Labor and Pensions Committee 
Goldman: International adviser 
Lord Brian Griffiths 
Government: Head of the prime minister’s policy unit, 1985–1990 
Goldman: International adviser since 1991 
Thomas Healey 
Government: Assistant Secretary of Treasury for Domestic Finance in Reagan 
administration 
Goldman: Started at Goldman in 1985; founded the Pension Services Group in 1990 
Jim Himes 
Government: Congressman from Connecticut (on Committee on Financial Services) 
since 2009Goldman: Began working at Goldman in 1995, eventually promoted to vice 
president 
Robert D. Hormats 
Government: Under secretary of state for economic, energy and agricultural affairs-
designate since July 2009; assistant secretary of state for economic and business affairs, 
1981–1982 
Goldman: Vice chairman of Goldman Sachs International; worked at Goldman from 
1982 to 2009 
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Ottmar Issing 
Government: Bundesbank board member and ex-chief economist of the European Central 
Bank 
Goldman: Senior adviser 
Chris Javens 
Government: Ex-tax policy adviser to Senator Chuck Grassley (R.-Iowa) 
Goldman: Lobbies for Goldman 
Reuben Jeffery III 
Government: Under secretary of state for economic, business, and agricultural affairs, 
2007–2009; chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 2005–2007 
Goldman: Former head of the Goldman Paris office; worked at Goldman from 1983 to 
2001 
Dan Jester 
Government: Former Treasury adviser 
Goldman: Former Goldman vice president and deputy chief financial officer 
James Johnson 
Government: Selected to serve on Obama’s vice presidential section committee but 
stepped down 
Goldman: On board of directors since May 1999 
Neel Kashkari 
Government: Interim head, Treasury’s Office of Financial Stability, October 2008–May 
2009; assistant secretary for  
	   	   	   308	  
international economics (confirmed 2008); special assistant to Treasury Secretary Henry 
Paulson, 2006–2008 
Goldman: Vice president, 2002–2006 
Lori E. Laudien 
Government: Former counsel for the Senate Finance Committee, 1996–1997 
Goldman: Lobbyist since 2005 
Arthur Levitt 
Government: Chairman, SEC, 1993–2001 
Goldman: Adviser, June 2009 to present 
Mario Monti 
Government: Prime minister of Italy 
Goldman: International adviser, 2005 until his nomination to  
lead the Italian government; also worked closely with Goldman to reduce the apparent 
size of Italian government debt 
Philip Murphy 
Government: US ambassador to Germany since 2009 
Goldman: Former partner of Goldman, where he worked from 1983 to 2006 
Michael Paese 
Government: Top staffer to House Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank 
Goldman: Director of government affairs/lobbyist, 2009 
Mark Patterson 
Government: Treasury Department chief of staff since February 2009 
Goldman: Lobbyist, 2003–2008 
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Henry “Hank” Paulson 
Government: Secretary of the Treasury, March 2006–January 2009; White House 
Domestic Council, serving as staff assistant to the president, 1972–1973; staff assistant to 
the assistant secretary of defense at the Pentagon, 1970–1972 
Goldman: Former CEO; worked at Goldman from 1974 to 2006 
Romano Prodi 
Government: Two-time prime minister of Italy 
Goldman: From March 1990 to May 1993 and when not in public office, acted as a 
consultant to Goldman Sachs 
Richard Y. Roberts 
Government: Former SEC commissioner, 1990–1995 
Goldman: Principal at RR&G LLC; retained by Goldman to lobby on TARP 
John F. W. Rogers 
Government: Served as undersecretary of state for management at the US Department of 
State, 1991–1993 
Goldman: Executive vice president since April 2011; chief of staff and secretary to board 
of directors since November 2001; joined in 1994 in the fixed income division and served 
in various positions, 1994–2001 
Robert Rubin 
Government: Treasury secretary, 1995–1999; chairman, National Economic Council, 
1993–1995 
Goldman: Former co-senior partner at Goldman, where he worked from 1966 to 1992 
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Steve Shafran 
Government: Adviser to Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson 
Goldman: Worked at Goldman from 1993 to 2000 
Sonal Shah 
Government: Director, Office of Social Innovation and Civic Participation (April 2009); 
advisory board member, Obama-Biden Transition Project; variety of positions in the 
Treasury Department, 1995–2002 
Goldman: Vice president, 2004–2007 
Faryar Shirzad 
Government: Served on the staff of the National Security Council at the White House, 
March 2003–August 2006; assistant secretary for import administration at US 
Department of Commerce in the Bush administration 
Goldman: Global head of government affairs (lobbyist) since 2006 
Gene Sperling 
Government: Director of the National Economic Council in Obama administration  
Goldman: Consultant to Goldman in 2008 
Robert K. Steel 
Government: Under secretary for domestic finance, Treasury, 2006–2008 
Goldman: Former vice chairman of Goldman, where he worked from 1976 to 2004 
Adam Storch 
Government: Managing Executive of the SEC’s enforcement division, October 2009 to 
present 
Goldman: Former vice president at Goldman, where he worked from 2004 to 2009 
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Marti Thomas 
Government: Assistant secretary in legal affairs and public policy, 2000; deputy assistant 
secretary for tax and budget, Treasury Department, 1998–1999; executive floor assistant 
to Richard Gephardt, 1989–1998 
Goldman: Joined Goldman as federal legislative affairs leader, 2007–2009 
Massimo Tononi 
Government: Italian deputy Treasury chief, 2006–2008 
Goldman: Former partner, 2004–2006 
Malcolm Turnbull 
Government: Member of the Australian House of Representatives since 2004 
Goldman: Chairman and managing director, Goldman Sachs Australia, 1997–2001 
Sidney Weinberg 
Government: Vice-Chair, War Production Board, during World War II 
Goldman: Worked at Goldman from 1907 to 1969 
John Whitehead 
Government: Under secretary of state from 1985 to 1989; former Chairman of the Board 
of the Federal Reserve of New York 
Goldman: Worked at Goldman from 1947 to 1984. Was co-senior partner with John L. 
Weinberg 
Kendrick Wilson 
Government: Adviser to Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson 
Goldman: Senior investment banker at Goldman, where he worked from 1998 to 2008 
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Robert Zoellick 
Government: President, World Bank, since 2007 
Goldman: Vice chairman, Goldman Sachs International; managing director and 
chairman, Board of International Advisors, 2006–2007 
A reminder: I am not judging the involvement of these individuals—good or bad. This is merely 
to present a selected group as data.1 A spokesman of Goldman stated: “We’re proud of our 
alumni, but frankly, when they work in the public sector, their presence is more of a negative 
than a positive for us in terms of winning business. There is no mileage for them in giving 
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Appendix D 
 





A list of Goldman partners at the time of the IPO is shown in table D-1.The names, 
percentages of shares, shares outstanding, values at IPO, and values at close are all provided. 
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Goldman’s History of Commitment to Public Service 
 
 
Figures E-1 and E-2 highlight key milestones demonstrating Goldman’s long-standing 
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Appendix F 
 
Key Goldman People 
 
Following is a list of key Goldman people who are mentioned in this book: the 
Weinbergs and others who formerly ran the firm, those currently running the firm, and other 




John L. Weinberg, with John C. Whitehead, was co-senior partner from 1976 to 1984 and 
continued to lead the firm after Whitehead retired in 1984, until Weinberg’s own retirement in 
1990, capping a forty-year career at the bank. “John L.,” as he was known (to distinguish  
him from John Whitehead), also served briefly on Goldman’s board of directors following the 
public offering in 1999. John L. was part of a family dynasty that has been at the firm since 
1907. His father was Sidney Weinberg. Jimmy Weinberg was his brother,John S. Weinberg is his 
son, and Peter Weinberg is his nephew. 
John L. Weinberg graduated from Deerfield Academy, Princeton University, and Harvard 
Business School. During his senior year at Deerfield, he joined the Marines and led troops in the 
Pacific while still a teenager. After beginning at Goldman, he returned to duty during the Korean 
War and was promoted to captain before returning to Goldman. He died in 2006. 
John S. Weinberg has been vice chairman of Goldman sinceJune 2006 and has been co-head of 
Goldman’s investment banking division since December 2002. From January 2002 to December 
2002, he was co-head of the investment banking division in the Americas. Before that, he served 
as co-head of the investment banking services department, beginning in 1997. He was elected 
partner in 1994.John S. Weinberg graduated from Princeton University, where he was  
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on the tennis team, and from Harvard Business School. His father was John L. Weinberg, and 
Sidney Weinberg was his grandfather. Jimmy Weinberg was his uncle, and Peter Weinberg is his 
first cousin. 
Peter Weinberg is a partner in Perella Weinberg Partners LP. Before joining the firm, Peter 
Weinberg held a number of senior management positions at Goldman, where he was elected 
partner in 1992. For the last six years of his career there, Weinberg was CEO of Goldman Sachs 
International. Peter Weinberg spent time at Morgan Stanley before joining Goldman. Hereceived 
a bachelor’s degree from Claremont McKenna College and an MBA from Harvard Business 
School. His father was Jimmy Weinberg, and Sidney Weinberg was his grandfather. John L. 
Weinberg was his uncle, and John S. Weinberg is his first cousin. 
Sidney J. Weinberg led Goldman from 1930 to 1969 and in many ways defined the art of 
relationship banking on Wall Street. Starting as a janitor’s assistant, Weinberg became partner in 
1927 and became head of the firm in 1930, saving it from bankruptcy, and held that position 
until his death in 1969. He organized the Business and Advisory Council for President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt. In 1942, he took a leave of absence and entered government service as assistant to 
the chairman of the War Production Board. John L. Weinberg and Jimmy Weinberg were his 
sons; John S. Weinberg and Peter Weinberg are his grandsons. 
Sidney James (Jimmy) Weinberg, Jr., joined Goldman’s investment banking department in 
1965. He worked as a vice president of the textile division at OwensCorning before joining 
Goldman. From 1978 to 1988, he ran the firm’s investment banking services department, a unit 
created by former Goldman co-chairman John C. Whitehead to help manage client relationships 
and win business. Jimmy Weinberg retired from the general partnership in 1988, when he turned 
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sixty-five. He remained a limited partner until the firm went public and then became a senior 
director. Jimmy Weinberg graduated from Princeton University and Harvard Business School. 
He served in the Philippines as a first lieutenant in the US Army during World War II. His father 
was Sidney Weinberg, and John L. Weinberg was his brother. Peter Weinberg is his son, and 
John S. Weinberg is his nephew. 
Senior Partners (Excluding Weinbergs) 
Lloyd Blankfein joined Goldman’s commodities trading arm, J. Aron& Co., in 1981, as a 
precious metals salesman in its London office. He has been chairman and CEO of Goldman since 
June 2006, when Hank Paulson left to become secretary of the Treasury. Blankfein has served as 
president and COO of Goldman since January 2004. From April 2002 to January 2004, he was a 
vice chairman of Goldman, with management responsibility for Goldman Sachs’s FICC and 
equities divisions. He served as co-head of the FICC division after its formation in 1997. From 
1994 to 1997, he headed or co-headed the currency and commodities division. The Financial 
Times named Blankfein its 2009 Person of the Year. In January 2010, Blankfein testified before 
the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. He testified before Congress in April 2010 at a hearing 
of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, denying any wrongdoing by Goldman. 
His father was a clerk with the US Postal Service; his mother was a receptionist. As a boy, 
Blankfein worked as a concession vendor at Yankee Stadium. He graduated from Harvard 
College and Harvard University Law School. 
Jon Corzine joined Goldman in 1975 to become a bond trader. Corzine took over the firm after 
Steve Friedman suddenly resigned over health concerns and after Goldman had suffered 
significant trading losses. Corzine was chairman and CEO of Goldman from 1994 to 1999 and 
oversaw the conversion of Goldman from a private partnership to a publicly traded corporation. 
	   	   	   328	  
In 1999, having lost a power struggle with Hank Paulson, Corzine left the firm to run for the US 
Senate, representing New Jersey. He served as senator from 2001 to 2005, when he was elected 
New Jersey governor, serving from 2006 to 2010. In March 2010, Corzine was named chairman 
and CEO of MF Global, a financial services firm specializing in futures brokerage.  
The company filed for bankruptcy protection in October 2011, and Corzine resigned in 
November 2011. Corzine was subpoenaed to appear before a House committee in December 
2011 to answer questions regarding money missing from MF Global client accounts. In school, 
Corzine had been football quarterback and basketball captain. While in college, he enlisted in the 
US Marine Corps Reserve and served from 1969 to 1975, attaining the rank of sergeant. He 
graduated from the Universityof Illinois and University of Chicago Business School. 
Stephen (Steve) Friedman joined Goldman in 1966, helped start the M&A department within 
investment banking, and became a partner in 1973. In 1984, he ran the fixed income division, 
together with Bob Rubin. Friedman was vice chairman and co-COO from 1987 to November 
1990 with Bob Rubin, and co-senior partner and chairman or senior partner and chairman from 
1990 to 1994. Friedman suddenly resigned in 1994 due to health concerns and after Goldman 
had suffered significant trading losses. He currently serves as chairman of Stone Point Capital. 
From 1998 to 2002, he served as a senior principal of March & McLennan Capital, an 
investment arm of the professional services and insurance brokerage firm. From 2002 to 2005, 
Friedman was assistant to the president for economic policy under President George W. Bush; 
from 2002 to 2004, he served as director of the National Economic Council. Friedman was on 
the board of directors of Goldman but resigned in April 2013 when he reached the  
age limit of 75 years old. In 2009, Friedman resigned as chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York while under criticism for his December 2008 purchase of $3 million in Goldman 
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stock. He graduated from Cornell University, where he was on the wrestling team, and Columbia 
University Law School. 
Gus Levy joined Goldman in 1933 to head the then one-man trading department. Between 1933 
and 1969, Levy headed Goldman’s trading department and pioneered new trading strategies. He 
was senior partner from 1969, succeeding Sidney Weinberg, until his death in 1976. It  
was thought that, because he was from the trading department, Levy was not naturally banking 
oriented. According to stories, when he was about to retire in 1969, the highly banking-oriented 
Sidney Weinberg had reservations about leaving Levy in charge. Ultimately, he appointed Levy 
as senior partner but also introduced an eight-man management committee composed of seven 
older, experienced senior banking partners to “supervise” Levy. Gus Levy is credited with 
coining the phrase “long-term greedy” to describe Goldman’s philosophy. 
Henry (Hank) Paulson Jr., joined Goldman in 1974, working in the firm’s Chicago office, after 
having worked in the Nixon White House. Paulson became a partner in 1982. From 1983 until 
1988, Paulson led the investment-banking group for the Midwest region and became managing 
partner of the Chicago office in 1988. From 1990 to November 1994, he was co-head of 
investment banking, then served as COO from December 1994 to June 1998, and eventually 
succeeded Jon Corzine as chairman and CEO. Paulson pushed Goldman’s growth into Asia and 
into principal investing activities. In 2006, Paulson resigned from Goldman to become secretary 
of the Treasury for President George W. Bush. Time magazine named Paulson runner-up for its 
2008 Person of the Year. After leaving his role as Treasury secretary, Paulson spent a year at the 
Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins as a distinguished  
visiting fellow. He is a senior fellow at the University of Chicago’s Harris School of Public 
Policy. In school Paulson was on the wrestling and football teams. He graduated from Dartmouth  
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College and Harvard Business School. He is author of On the Brink: Inside the Race to Stop the 
Collapse of the Global Financial System (2010). 
Robert (Bob) Rubin joined Goldman in 1966 as an associate in the risk arbitrage department in 
the equities division, a proprietary investing area. He became a general partner in 1971 and 
joined the management committee in 1980. Rubin ran the J. Aron commodities trading business 
in the early 1980s. He ran the fixed income division with Steve Friedman in 1984. Rubin was 
vice chairman and co-COO with Steve Friedman from 1987 to 1990. From the end of 1990 to  
1992, Rubin served as co-chairman and co-senior partner along with Steve Friedman. Then 
Rubin resigned to serve in the White House as assistant to the president for economic policy 
under President Clinton. Rubin served as secretary of the Treasury during the first  
and second Clinton administrations. In 1999, he became a director on the board, chairman of the 
executive committee, senior adviser, and member of the office of the chairman of Citigroup, 
where he performed advisory and representational roles for the firm. In 2009, he  
left Citigroup while under criticism that he should have recognized and acted on the extreme 
circumstances faced by the financial system and Citigroup. Rubin is currently engaged actively 
as a founder of The Hamilton Project, an economic policy think tank that produces  
research and proposals for creating a growing economy that benefits more Americans.  
He is co-chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations and sits on the board of the Harvard 
Corporation, Harvard University’s executive board. He was a member of Boy Scout Troop 35, 
sponsored by the American Legion, and received the rank of Eagle Scout. In 1960, Rubin 
graduated from Harvard College and Yale Law School. He is coauthor, with Jacob Weisberg, of 
In an Uncertain World: Tough Choices from Wall Street to Washington (2003). 
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John C. Whitehead joined Goldman in 1947. He was co-senior partner with John L. Weinberg 
from 1976 to 1984, succeeding Gus Levy after Levy died. Whitehead codified Goldman’s 
principles in 1979. He also set up the investment banking services department to help manage 
client relationships, win business, and reduce the firm’s reliance on any one individual. Both 
were innovations for Wall Street. He helped focus the firm on international growth. He retired in 
1984 to serve as deputy secretary of state, under George Shultz, in the Ronald Reagan 
administration, from 1985 to 1989. Whitehead is currently a board member of the World Trade 
Center Memorial Foundation and, until his resignation in May 2006, was chairman of the Lower 
Manhattan Development Corporation. Whitehead graduated from Haverford College and 
Harvard Business School and is author of A Life in Leadership: From D-Day to Ground Zero: 
An Autobiography (2005). 
Selected Current/Recently Retired Executives 
Gary Cohn has been president and COO (or co-COO) and on the board of directors of Goldman 
since June 2006. From December 2003 to June 2006, he was co-head of global securities 
businesses, having been co-head of FICC since September 2002. Before that, he served as co-
COO of FICC after having been responsible for commodities and a number of other FICC 
businesses from 1999 to 2002. Cohn was head of commodities from 1996 to 1999. In 1990, 
Cohn was hired by Goldman Sachs’s J. Aron & Co. unit as a metals trader which traded 
commodities and currencies; he traded silver. Lloyd Blankfein became co-head of J. Aron in 
1994, and two years later he tapped Cohn as global head of the commodities businesses. Cohn 
graduated from American University. 
J. Michael Evans has been global head of growth markets since January 2011, a vice chairman 
of Goldman since February 2008, and chairman of Goldman Sachs Asia Pacific since 2004. 
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Before becoming a vice chairman, he had served as global co-head of Goldman’s securities 
business since 2003. Previously, he had been co-head of the equities division. Evans joined 
Goldman in 1993, from Salomon Brothers, as head of equity capital markets in London. He was 
named a Goldman partner in 1994, and he became head of the business standards  
committee. Evans was part of the Canadian Olympic team in 1984 and won a gold medal in 
eight-man rowing crew. Evans graduated from Princeton in 1981 and attended Oxford University 
from 1982 to 1984 for his graduate studies. 
Harvey M. Schwartz has been the chief financial officer of Goldman since January 2013. From 
2008 to 2013, he was global co-head of the securities division. From 2005 to 2008 he was 
involved in executive sales positions in the securities division. From 2004 to 2005, he was co-
head of the Americas Financing Group. He started at Goldman’s J. Aron & Co. unit in 1997 as a 
gold salesman. Prior to Goldman, he worked at J.B. Hanauer & Co, First Interregional Equity 
Corp., and Citicorp. He graduated from Rutgers in 1987 and  
Columbia University Business School in 1996. 
David A. Viniar had been the chief financial officer of Goldman from 1999 until January 2013. 
Viniar was also head of the operations, technology, finance, and services division. He was a 
member of the management, firmwide risk, finance, firmwide capital, and principal  
investment committees. From 1998 until 1999, Viniar was deputy CFO. He assumed 
responsibility for the firm’s financing activities in the treasury department in 1992 and for the 
controllers department in 1994. Before that, he was a member of the structured finance 
department of the investment banking division. He joined Goldman’s investment banking area in 
1980 and became a partner in 1992. He graduated from Union College, where he played 
basketball, and from Harvard Business School. 
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Selected Former Partners Mentioned 
Rob Kaplan served as vice chairman of Goldman, with oversight responsibility for the 
investment banking and investment management divisions. He was also a member of the firm’s 
management committee and served as co-chairman of the firm’s partnership committee  
and chairman of the Goldman Sachs Pine Street Leadership Development Initiative. During his 
career at the firm, Kaplan served in various other capacities, including global co-head of the 
investment banking division (1999–2002), head of the corporate finance department (1994–
1999), and head of Asia-Pacific investment banking (1990–1994). He became a partner in 1990. 
Since 2005, Kaplan has taught at Harvard Business School. Kaplan graduated from the  
University of Kansas and Harvard Business School. He is the author of What to Ask the Person 
in the Mirror: Critical Questions for Becoming a More Effective Leader and Reaching Your 
Potential (2011) and What You’re Really Meant to Do: A Road Map for Reaching Your Unique 
Potential (2013). 
John Thain was president and COO of Goldman from 1999 to 2005. He was co-president and 
co-COO with John Thornton from 1999 to 2003. During his Goldman career, Thain also served 
as chief financial officer and head of operations, technology, and finance. He was co-head of 
European operations from 1995 to 1997 and was head of the mortgage group from 1985 to 1990. 
After leaving Goldman, Thain served as chairman and CEO of the New York Stock Exchange 
and then Merrill Lynch, before it merged with Bank of America. Currently,  
he is chairman and CEO of CIT Group. He was considered a protégé of Corzine’s, although the 
relationship suffered when Thain supported Paulson’s taking over the firm. Thain andJohn 
Thornton were widely expected to co-run Goldman. Thain graduated from MIT and Harvard 
Business School. 
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John Thornton served as co-president and co-COO of Goldman from 1999 to 2003. He retired 
in 2003 after more than twenty yearsat the firm. Thornton served as co-CEO of Goldman Sachs  
International, Goldman’s business in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. From 1998 to 1999, 
he held oversight responsibility for international operations. From 1995 to 1997, he served as a 
co-CEO for European operations and was chairman of Goldman Asia from 1996 to 1998. 
Thornton joined Goldman in 1980 and was elected partner in 1988. He set up Goldman’s M&A 
department in London in the early 1980s. He imported hard-nosed US investment banking  
techniques into what had been a conservative and traditional M&A environment in London.  
Thornton helped drive Goldman’s growth into Europe and Asia and was the first non-Chinese 
full professor at Tsinghua since the Communist revolution. He is chairman of the board of the 
Brookings Institution and co-chairman of Barrick Gold. Thornton graduated from Harvard 
College, where he played tennis. He holds bachelor’s and master’s degrees in jurisprudence from  
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Appendix G 
 
Goldman Timeline of Selected Events 
 
Following is a timeline summarizing selected key events for Goldman and its industry. 
Although the timeline covers events starting in 1869, the book starts its analysis from 1979, 
when the business principles were codified. The timeline goes through most of 2012. In order to  
help demonstrate that pressures started impacting the firm before its IPO in 1999 and before 
Blankfein took over as CEO, the events are categorized in terms of the analytical framework 
used for the analysis in the book.1 
As discussed in appendix B, the framework categorizes four main pressures (or responses 
to those pressures) that impact an organization: organizational (O), regulatory (R), technological 
(T), and competitive (C). Although many events may apply or occur in response to multiple 
pressures, for simplicity in this timeline I use “O,” “R,” “T,” or “C” to indicate what I believe 
was the primary set of factors at work. It is challenging to precisely characterize each event. 
Also, I may inadvertently have missed selected events. 
1869: Marcus Goldman moves to New York and starts selling promissory notes (early  
 
commercial paper) from a one-room office on Pine Street. 
 
1882: Samuel Sachs, Goldman’s son-in-law, joins the business. 
 
1885: The firm becomes a general partnership, Goldman Sachs & Company. 
 
1896: The company joins the New York Stock Exchange. 
 
1900: Goldman’s first branch office opens in Chicago. 
 
1904: The firm’s capital reaches $1 million. 
 
1906: Goldman co-manages its first IPO for one of its clients, United Cigar Manufacturers. The  
 
same year, Goldman handles the initial equity sales for Sears, Roebuck, pioneering the 
IPO business. 
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1907: Walter Sachs (grandson of Marcus Goldman) joins the firm as a commercial paper  
 
salesman. Sidney Weinberg is hired as assistant janitor. 
 
1909: Marcus Goldman dies, and Henry Goldman leads the firm. 
 
1910: Goldman now has a few partners, all members of the Goldman or Sachs families. 
 
1917: Henry Goldman’s pro-German stance causes a rift between the Goldman and Sachs  
 
families. Henry Goldman retires and withdraws his capital. Sidney Weinberg leaves to  
 
serve in the US Navy during World War I. 
 
1920: Sidney Weinberg returns to Goldman as a bond trader. 
 
1925: Weinberg buys a seat on the NYSE with money from his own earnings, not from trading. 
 
1927: Weinberg becomes only the second partner from outside the Goldman and Sachs families. 
 
1929: Waddill Catchings, who joined the firm eleven years earlier to head up underwriting, holds  
 
the largest single percentage in the partnership and takes over leadership. He pushes for  
 
the creation of Goldman Sachs Trading Corporation, a collection of highly leveraged  
 
investment trusts. When the stock market collapses, Goldman Sachs Trading Corporation  
 
suffers heavy losses, and Goldman’s reputation is severely damaged. 
 
1930: After devastating trading losses, Catchings is forced to resign. The Sachs  
 
brothers name Sidney Weinberg senior partner. Weinberg takes over leadership of  
 
Goldman and builds its investment banking operation. The Sachs family covers the  
 
partners’ losses. Goldman will not reenter the asset management business again for  
 
nearly forty years. 
 
1933: Weinberg organizes the Business and Advisory Council for President Franklin D.  
 
Roosevelt, creating a bridge between business  
and government during the New Deal. Congress passes the Securities Act of 1933,  
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creating the Securities and Exchange Commission. The Banking Act of 1933, known as  
 








1942: Weinberg takes a leave from the firm and enters government service as assistant to the  
 
chairman of the War Production Board, forming relationships with America’s top  
 
executives, many of whom will later become Goldman clients. 
 
1945: At the end of the war, Weinberg resigns from government service. 
 
1947: John C. Whitehead joins Goldman from Harvard Business School. 
 
1948: The Justice Department files an antitrust suit (U.S. v. Morgan [Stanley] et al.) against  
 
nineteen investment banking firms. Goldman had only 1.4 percent of the underwriting  
 
market and was last on the list of defendants. Goldman would not be included in a 1950  
 
list of the top seventeen underwriters. Sixty years later, of the nineteen firms named in  
 
the suit, only Goldman and Morgan Stanley remain as independent firms. 
 
1950: John L. Weinberg, Sidney’s son, joins Goldman. A list of  
 
the top seventeen underwriters does not include Goldman. 
 
1956: Goldman leads the underwriting of Ford Motor Co.’s IPO, building the firm’s reputation in  
 
investment banking. Whitehead and John L. Weinberg become partners. Goldman’s  
 
capital stands at $10 million. 
 
1969: Upon retiring, banking-oriented Sidney Weinberg has reservations about leaving Gus  
 
Levy, a trader, as senior partner, so he introduces an eight-man management committee  
 
with seven older banking partners to supervise Levy. Sidney Weinberg dies. Gus Levy,  
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now senior partner, takes charge of Goldman and rebuilds its trading business. Because  
 
of the potential for direct conflicts with its large block-trading clients and because of the  
 
Goldman Sachs Trading Corporation debacle, Goldman steers clear of asset management  
 
until Gus Levy creates the investment management services (IMS) unit. 
 
1970: The NYSE amends its rules to admit publicly traded members, prompting investment  
 
banks to consider abandoning their partnership structures and offering shares for sale to  
 
the public. Credit ratings are created for every issuer of commercial paper after the Penn  
 
Central Transportation Company goes bankrupt with more than $80 million in  
 
commercial paper outstanding, much of it issued by Goldman. The ensuing litigation  
 
threatens the firm’s existence. Goldman opens its first international office in London. 
 
1971: Merrill Lynch goes public. 
 
1972: Goldman starts a private wealth division and a fixed income division. Goldman pioneers a  
 
“white knight” strategy, defending Electric Storage Battery against a hostile take-over bid  
 
from International Nickel and Goldman rival Morgan Stanley. 
 




1975: May 1 marks the end of fixed trading commissions in the stock market, forcing  
 
investment banks to compete in negotiations over transaction fees. 
 
1976: After Gus Levy’s death, John L. Weinberg (Sidney’s son) and John Whitehead take over  
 
as senior partners and continue to build Goldman’s investment banking business. This is  
 
the beginning of Goldman’s tradition of having co-heads, setting a Wall Street precedent.  
 
The firm sets a record for pre-tax profits of $40 million. 
 
1979: John Whitehead drafts a set of business principles that codifies Goldman’s core values,  
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setting a Wall Street precedent (O). 
 
1980: Goldman’s capital stands at $200 million. 
 
1981: Salomon Brothers goes public (C). Goldman diversifies by absorbing the commodities  
 
trading company J. Aron & Co. Lloyd Blankfein, who worked at J. Aron before the  
 
merger, joins Goldman. J. Aron becomes Goldman’s currency and commodities trading  
 
division (C). In 1997, it is merged with the fixed income division. 
 
1982: Goldman makes its first international acquisition, London-based First Dallas, Ltd., later  
 
renamed Goldman, Sachs, Ltd (C). Stocks in the late 1970s and early 1980s are in a bear  
 
market. The Dow Jones Industrial Average bottoms at 777 on August 12, 1982. But a  
 
steady decline in interest rates—with yields on thirteen-week treasuries having eased to  
 
8.6 percent from nearly 13 percent in the previous month and a half—finally gets stock  
 
moving. On August 17, the Dow leaps a then-record 38.81, or 4.9 percent, to 831.24, and  
 
the equity market begins a long bull run, with some bumps. Massive wealth creation over  
 
the course of the next twenty-five years, the likes of which the United States and the  
 
world had never seen, would follow. 
 
1983: The firm’s capital has grown to $750 million, some $500 million from the active partners  
 
themselves. In 1983, John L. Thornton co-founds Goldman’s European M & A business  
 
in London (O). 
 
1984: Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust becomes the largest-ever bank failure in US  
 
history. Continental was at one time the seventh-largest bank in the United States as  
 
measured by deposits, with approximately $40 billion in assets. Because of the size of  
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1985: Bear Stearns goes public (C). Whitehead leaves Goldman after thirty-eight years and later  
 
becomes deputy secretary of state to George Schultz, serving until 1989 (O). Steve  
 
Friedman, a former M&A banker, and Bob Rubin, a former equities proprietary trader,  
 
co-head Goldman’s fixed income division (O). 
 
1986: Goldman’s capital has grown to $1 billion, almost entirely through retained earnings.  
 
Morgan Stanley, Goldman’s primary competitor, goes public (C). Goldman’s growing  
 
trading business is capital intensive (C). The management committee conducts a study, 
led by Steve Friedman and Bob Rubin, and recommends taking Goldman public (O, C). 
John L. Weinberg and Jimmy Weinberg do not support the idea, and it is not brought to a  
vote (O). To raise capital, Goldman accepts a $500 million private equity investment 
from Sumitomo Bank, as a silent partner, in exchange for 12.5 percent of Goldman’s 
annual profits and appreciation in equity value (O, C). One of Goldman’s largest  
partner classes is voted in (twice as large as any previous class), including three partners 
from other firms who have never worked at Goldman, as well as Goldman’s first female 
partner and first African American partner (O, C). Goldman takes Microsoft  
public and joins the London and Tokyo stock exchanges (C). 
 
1987: In October, the Dow Jones Industrial Average drops 508 points, a stunning 22.6  
 
percent, on “Black Monday,” raising fears that the US economy is headed for a severe 
recession. The Federal Reserve acts quickly to cut interest rates and pump cash  
into the banking system, helping end the threat. The October market crash, in part, causes 
Goldman to reduce overhead; several hundred employees are laid off by the end of the 
decade (O). It is the first time in recent memory that Goldman lays people  
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off. Robert Freeman, Goldman’s head of arbitrage, receives a prison sentence for insider 
trading. As a result of the crash, Value at Risk models receive more emphasis (R, T, O). 
Wall Street begins to increasingly focus on hiring academically trained and quantitatively 
oriented traders and risk managers and increase spending on financial innovation (T, O). 
 
1988: Leon Cooperman, head of equity research, assumes responsibilities for building the  
 
investment management business, and a new division is launched: Goldman Sachs asset  
 
management (GSAM) (O, C). Hundreds of savings and loans (S & Ls) are shut  
 
down, at a total cost of more than the reserves in the federal insurance fund. US taxpayers  
 
make up the difference. 
 
1989: As an alternative to going public to raise capital, Goldman forms a ten-year  
 
consortium with seven insurance companies, bringing in $225 million in new capital to  
 
expand Goldman’s merchant-banking capabilities. The insurance companies receive  
 
a fixed return on their investment but do not share in profits or management and have no  
 
voting rights (O, C). The firm also creates a holding company, Goldman Sachs Group ( 
 
technically not subject to NYSE capital requirements), and spins off several subsidiaries  
 
(R, C). The Berlin wall falls, igniting global expansion for American businesses (C, O). 
 
1990: Bob Rubin and Steve Friedman take charge as co-senior partners and co-chairs of the  
 
management committee, expanding global operations and seeking other opportunities for 
growth, including proprietary trading (O, C). They make partners’ compensation more 
dependent on performance than on tenure, and they initiate the firm’s first lateral hiring 
initiatives (O, C). High-yield bond investors threaten to boycott Goldman after 
accusations that GSAM and Goldman improperly used proprietary information  
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gained in its underwriting role (O, C); Cooperman is forced to change GSAM’s strategy 
to focus on mutual fund sales to individual investors rather than institutional clients.  
Drexel Burnham Lambert, once the fifth-largest US investment bank, is forced into 
bankruptcy in February. 
1991: Goldman’s management committee again studies the option of going public but drops the  
 
idea before the proposal can be put before the partnership (C, O). Warren Buffett helps 
save Salomon Brothers from bankruptcy (C). Goldman shuts down debt investing fund 
Water Street (O). Goldman creates GSCI, a benchmark for investment performance in the 
commodities markets (T). 
1992: Bob Rubin leaves Goldman to become assistant to the president on economic  
 
policy (O). The move adds to the Goldman mystique but is unusual in that Rubin’s is one 
of the shortest tenures as senior partner. A Hawaiian educational trust, the Kamehameha 
Schools/Bishop Estate, invests $250 million in Goldman and receives a stake of more 
than 5 percent in the firm. It is a passive investment; the trust has no voting privileges  
but will participate in Goldman’s profits and losses. In an effort to further link pay to 
performance, and to create a new source of developmental feedback, Goldman institutes 
360-degree performance reviews (meaning that even junior staff reviews  
senior staff). New offices are opened in Frankfurt, Milan, and Seoul (O, C). 
1993: Goldman is one of the most profitable firms in the world with record profits and  
 
experiences rapid growth and global expansion. A federal appeals court rules against 
Goldman and prohibits investment banking firms from advising corporate clients with 
which they had a business relationship in bankruptcy proceedings (R, O). This limits 
money-making opportunities for Goldman and other investment banks (R). Goldman 
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conducts another formal study of the possibility of taking the firm public (O). There are 
now approximately 160 partners. Goldman advises business tycoon Li Ka-shing and his 
family in selling a majority stake to Rupert Murdoch’s News Corp (C, O). Goldman’s 
involvement in such a high-profile deal with two major business tycoons in Asia puts 
Goldman on the map in Asia. It also highlights Goldman’s strategy of focusing on very 
important people. Credit derivatives are pioneered at J.P. Morgan (C, T). By  
1996, credit derivatives would be a $40 billion market and by 2008  
it would be measured in the trillions of dollars. 
1994: Lehman Brothers goes public (C). Goldman suffers large losses in the bond market 
as interest rates rise (C, O). Goldman settles suits brought by a number of pension funds  
related to its involvement with media mogul Robert Maxwell after it was alleged that 
Maxwell stole money from Maxwell company pension plans by hiring Goldman to 
broker a trade between various Maxwell-controlled entities. Goldman pays out $253 
million in settlements, allocated to the people who were general partners in Goldman 
between 1989 and 1991. A significant number of partners leave the firm (many times 
more than normal) to protect their capital, taking their capital with them (C, O). Steve 
Friedman, senior partner for only four years, retires (O). Many of the partners who stay at 
the firm have some resentment toward those who left, and they question the culture. 
Goldman names 58 new general partners (one and a half times as many as usual), the 
firm’s largest partner class ever (O, C). The unprecedented amount of change at the 
partnership level impacts the partnership network. One M&A banker who is elected 
partner turns down the opportunity, something exceptional in the history of the firm (O). 
In a power struggle after Steve Friedman’s announced retirement, Jon Corzine (from 
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trading) becomes sole senior partner, never having rotated through other areas such as 
investment banking (O). Hank Paulson is named COO (O), never having co-headed a  
division with Corzine (O). Some partners are convinced, in part, to stay because of the 
possibility of an IPO (O). The partners who stay form a unique bond, supporting each 
other through tough times, determined to make Goldman a success, but they also see 
firsthand the risks of a private partnership. Goldman starts implementing risk 
management systems (T). Corzine and Paulson immediately reduce employee head count 
and costs by slashing pay and bonuses. Some people still remember the large  
layoffs in the late 1980s, affecting how employees think about  
the firm as a place to work, and it was now happening so soon again (O, C). Despite 
issues, the firm is still ranked first in US and foreign common stock offerings, IPOs, 
worldwide completed mergers and acquisitions, investment-grade debt, and US equity  
research. J.P. Morgan pioneers the concept of the modern credit default swap, which will 
play a major role in the credit crisis. Eric Mindich, who ran the equities arbitrage 
department that invested the firm’s own capital, becomes, at age twenty-seven, the  
youngest partner in the firm’s history, signaling the importance of proprietary  
trading (O, C). Restrictions are put on the withdrawal of partners’ capital (O). Goldman 
opens a Beijing office (O). 
1995: Corzine replaces the twelve-member management committee with a six-member executive  
 
committee (O). Goldman opens offices in Shanghai and Mexico City and creates joint  
 
ventures in India and Indonesia (O, C). Treasury provides aid to Mexico during the peso  
 
crisis, an action that helps save Lehman Brothers, which had made a big, mistaken bet  
 
without hedging. Global Alpha, one of the earliest “quant vehicles” was founded in  
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GSAM and would spawn a new wave of quant funds (C, T). 
 
1996: Goldman is back on track and profits are restored to 1993 levels. Corzine and Paulson  
 
push for business diversification, increasing international, investing, and asset 
management business. There are media rumors of a Goldman IPO. There is a push for a 
partnership vote on an IPO, but it is withdrawn in the face of overwhelming opposition. 
An independent compensation firm concludes that the top five to ten partners would 
increase their compensation if Goldman were a public company but that most would be 
worse off. Also discussed were issues such as impact to culture, moral obligations  
to earlier and future generations, and the attractiveness of the business model. The most 
commonly stated reason for the opposition is the potential unknown impact on 
Goldman’s culture in losing the partnership structure. A new class of “junior partners” is 
created (called “partnership extension”) in an effort to prevent further defections and 
retirements. Partners as well as nonpartners are now referred to as “managing directors,” 
although internally, partners are known as “partner managing directors” (PMDs) and 
nonpartner managing directors are referred to as “MD-lites.” To the outside world, it is 
difficult to distinguish who is a partner and who is not. The title of managing director 
(versus partner) is the same at competitors like Morgan Stanley (C, O). Goldman also 
adopts a limited liability structure, limiting personal risk (R). Goldman helps take Yahoo! 
public, triggering the internet IPO boom. Goldman experiments with e-mail (C). 
1997: Paulson says Goldman’s policy of not advising on hostile takeovers is no longer in the  
 
firm’s interest, but Corzine resists any change that might damage Goldman’s image. They  
compromise on an experiment with a test case outside the United States, and Goldman 
advises Krupp in a successful hostile take-over of Thyssen (O, C). J.P. Morgan develops 
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a proprietary product that helps banks clean up their balance sheets using credit default 
swaps—the first synthetic collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) (T, C). Morgan Stanley 
merges with Dean Witter Reynolds, the financial services business of Sears that serves 
retail clients (C). The acquisition extends Morgan Stanley’s ability to sell stock offerings 
and makes Morgan Stanley larger. Travelers Group, run by Sandy Weill, purchases 
Salomon Brothers, a major bond dealer and investment bank, for $9 billion (C). Bankers  
Trust purchases Alex Brown for $2.1 billion (C). The Asian debt crisis presents a large 
opportunity for Goldman to invest its own capital in the region (O, C). Goldman’s GSAM 
acquires Commodities Corporation (CC) for an undisclosed amount, estimated to be more 
than $100 million (C). At the time of its acquisition, CC had approximately $2 billion in 
assets under management, primarily as a fund of hedge funds: a fund investing  
in a variety of hedge funds to diversify risk. It was part of GSAM’s continued push into 
higher-margin, more-sophisticated products for its clients. The firm merges J. Aron with 
fixed income to create the division known as FICC, to be run by Blankfein (O, C). 
 
1998: Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM), a hedge fund, is about to fail. Wall Street fears  
 
that LTCM is so big that its failure would cause a chain reaction in numerous markets, 
causing significant losses throughout the financial system. Goldman, AIG, and Berkshire 
Hathaway offer to buy out the fund’s partners for $250 million, to inject $3.75 billion, 
and to operate LTCM within Goldman’s own trading division. Many of the partners 
worry about the risk they would assume (O). A deal is not worked out, and the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York organizes a bailout (R). The Goldman executive committee 
discovers that Corzine has been holding talks with the CEO of Mellon Bank about 
merging the firms. In what some describe as a coup d’etat, Corzine is told to focus on and 
	   	   	   347	  
leave after an IPO of the firm (O). After being made co-CEO, Paulson supports the IPO 
(some believe it was a quid pro quo). After significant debate and letters from both John 
Weinberg and John Whitehead advising against it, Goldman decides to go public (C, O, 
R). Thain and Thornton are allegedly promised to become co-CEOs in two years for 
supporting Paulson. The IPO, originally planned for September, is postponed  
because of instability in the global markets. The Russian financial crisis begins. Deutsche 
Bank agrees to purchase Bankers Trust for $10.1 billion (C), signaling that foreign 
competition is coming to the United States. Citicorp and Travelers Group merge,  
creating a $140 billion firm with assets of almost $700 billion (C). The deal enables 
Travelers to market mutual funds and insurance to Citicorp’s retail customers while 
giving the banking divisions access to an expanded client base of investors and insurance 
buyers. The remaining provisions of the Glass–Steagall Act—enacted following the 
Great Depression—forbid banks to merge with insurance underwriters, and this means 
that Citigroup has two to five years to divest any prohibited assets. However, Weill states  
at the time of the merger that he believes that the legislation will  
change over time. (On CNBC’s “Squawk Box” in July 2012, Weill calls for a return of 
the Glass–Steagall Act.) Under pressure from competitors taking companies  
public that have no revenues or profits, Goldman starts to take companies like eToys and  
 
NetZero public, which have limited operating history and little to no profits (O, C). 
 
1999: In January, Jon Corzine leaves Goldman to run for US Senate from New Jersey, leaving  
 
Paulson as sole chairman and CEO (O). Goldman advises on its first hostile deal in North  
America (O). Goldman adds a new business principle—most significantly, a commitment 
to provide superior returns to shareholders (C, O). In May, Goldman goes public and 
	   	   	   348	  
changes its name to The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. The firm is valued at $33 billion at 
the time of the IPO. The IPO is one of the largest events in the firm’s history. The 
decision to go public was debated for decades. In the end, Goldman offers only a small  
portion of the company to the public, with some 48 percent still held by the partners, 22 
percent of the company held by nonpartner employees, and 18 percent held by retired 
Goldman partners and two longtime investors: Bank Ltd. and Hawaii’s Kamehameha 
Activities Association (the investing arm of Kamehameha Schools). This leaves 
approximately 12 percent of Goldman held by the public. In November, portions of the 
Glass–Steagall Act of 1933 (prohibiting a bank holding company from owning other 
financial companies) are repealed, opening the door to financial services conglomerates 
offering a mix of commercial banking, investment banking, insurance underwriting, and 
brokerage (R). Even with Goldman’s success, it is still valued less than many internet or 
dot-com companies. Some of the best and brightest are now more interested in working  
at a technology company than at Goldman (C). Other firms, such as Donaldson, Lufkin & 
Jenrette, start to offer significantly higher compensation than Goldman, especially at the 
entry-level positions (C). Goldman acquires Hull Trading Company, a leading  
technology-driven algorithmic trading firm and electronic market maker, for $531 million 
(C, T). Technology-driven trading is starting to dominate (T). In November, Goldman  
establishes the Pine Street Leadership Development Initiative, in part, to help socialize  
 
larger numbers of managers (O). The Euro becomes an accounting currency and was  
 




2000: The Commodity Futures Modernization Act determines that credit default swaps are  
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neither futures nor securities and therefore are not subject to regulation by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission or the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) 
(R, T). The CFTC changes a rule called Regulation 1.25 to permit futures brokers to take 
money from their customers’ accounts and invest it in an expanded number of approved 
securities (some people think this contributed to the issues related to MF Global) (R). The 
NASDAQ Composite, reflecting the dot-com bubble, hits an all-time high. Credit Suisse  
acquires Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette for $11.5 billion (C). Goldman purchases Spear, 
Leeds & Kellogg, one of the largest specialist firms on the New York Stock Exchange, 
for $6.3 billion, strengthening Goldman’s ability to market directly to the growing ranks 
of retail investors and to gain market information (C, T). Selected Spear, Leeds & 
Kellogg partners became Goldman PMDs. 
2001: Goldman disbands its M&A department and places its M&A bankers in groups focused on  
 
specific industries (C, O, T). Goldman is the top global M&A adviser and underwriter of 
all IPOs and common stock offerings. The September 11 terrorist attacks have significant 
economic impacts. The Fed reduced the federal funds rate to 1 percent from 2001 to 
2002, leading to a surge in home sales and refinancing. Goldman issues a report  
on the emerging BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) economies. 
2002: In a faltering economy, with the high degree of consolidation of banks after the repeal of  
 
the Glass–Steagall Act, there is media speculation that Goldman could be forced into a 
merger to remain viable against large competing banks having assets double or triple 
those of Goldman. Paulson announces Goldman’s strategy for becoming the leading 
global investment bank, securities, and investment management firm (C). Goldman  
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gives special stock offerings to executives in twenty-one companies that it took public, 
including Yahoo! cofounder Jerry Yang, Tyco’s Dennis Kozlowski, and Enron’s Ken 
Lay, to win new investment banking business. Goldman pays $110 million to settle an 
investigation by New York state regulators into manipulations (C, R). The Sarbanes–
Oxley Act is signed into law, setting specific reporting and auditing requirements 
intended to protect investors. It specifically establishes tight accountability standards  
for the boards of US public companies, management companies, and public accounting 
firms (R). IPO volume goes down, creating pressure for banks to find other ways to meet 
earnings growth and return on equity targets. Various investment banks offer  
complex financial products with which European governments can push part of their 
liabilities into the future (C). Greece’s debt managers agree to a transaction with 
Goldman. The structure disguises the debt so that it does not show up in the Greek debt  
statistics for the euro convergence criteria. 
2003: In January 2003, Paulson is criticized for saying that about 15 percent to 20 percent of  
 
Goldman employees add 80 percent of the value and that even significant staff cuts 
would leave the firm well positioned for the upturn (O). He later issues an apology to all 
of the company’s employees via voicemail. The SEC charges Goldman with conflicts of 
interest among its research analysts, charges that the firm eventually settles for $110 
million. Goldman pays $9 million in sanctions to settle a separate SEC case involving  
allegations that it failed to maintain policies to prevent thefirm from misusing material, 
nonpublic information obtained from outside consultants about US Treasury thirty-year 
bonds. A former Goldman economist pleads guilty to insider trading. In October, in a 
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move to eliminate a potential source of criticism and conflicts of interest, Goldman tells 
its MDs that they may no longer serve on the boards of public companies. 
2004: The alternatives (hedge fund and private equity) boom begins after investors see that  
 
alternatives performed well during the bear market and dot-com bust (C). Goldman 
proprietary traders begin leaving and forming their own firms. The proliferation of hedge 
funds and private equity firms makes it difficult to recruit and retain the best and 
brightest. This trend is aggravated by the end of the five-year vesting period for those 
given restricted stock in the IPO. Now employees can sell all their IPO stock. The stock 
vested in years 3, 4, and 5 after the IPO, 33 percent each year. At the request of Goldman 
and other major Wall Street firms, the SEC agrees to release them from the net capital 
rule, which required that investment firms hold a certain amount of capital to limit their 
leverage and provide a cushion of liquid assets to ensure payment of the firm’s 
obligations to its clients (R). The SEC establishes a risk management office to monitor 
the industry for signs of potential problems, but it is soon dismantled (R). Goldman 
settles with the SEC for $10 million over charges it improperly promoted a stock sale 
involving PetroChina (R). 
2005: Lloyd Blankfein argues that principal investing represents a momentous strategic  
 
opportunity for Goldman (C). Goldman represents both sides in the $9 billion merger 
between the NYSE and Archipelago holdings, earning a $100 million fee. Goldman  
promotes the person responsible for business selection and conflict clearance to the 
management committee. No other firm has someone this senior serving in this kind of 
position.The SEC fines Goldman $40 million for allegedly trying to pump up the prices 
of IPOs. Goldman pays the fine without admitting or denying wrongdoing. Peter 
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Weinberg, son of Jimmy Weinberg and nephew of John L. Weinberg, leaves Goldman 
and cofounds a competing firm the next year. In a push to pool knowledge across  
asset classes, Goldman merges its corporate bond and credit area with its equity 
counterparts (O). Goldman reportedly changes its compensation policy in sales and 
trading areas to be more quantitative and transparent (O, C). 
2006: Invited, along with four other investment banks, to make a pitch to defend BAA against a  
 
possible take-over, Goldman proposes buying a chunk of BAA itself, in what sounds to 
BAA like another take-over bid. After Goldman pursues a few other unsolicited bids, it 
receives a “spank from Hank,” as it is dubbed in the press—a rebuke from Paulson 
reminding bankers that they should not be pursuing unsolicited or unfriendly bids for 
listed companies, acknowledging the thin line between an unsolicited approach and a 
hostile take-over (O, C). Paulson leaves to become secretary of the Treasury in the Bush 
administration (O). Blankfein becomes Goldman’s chairman and CEO. Goldman  
is the only Wall Street firm to make Fortune’s list of America’s most admired companies 
(ranking eighteenth). Two former Goldman employees are charged with having run an 
international insider trading ring during their years at Goldman. Both men are eventually  
convicted and jailed. Goldman’s Alternative Mortgage Products (GSAMP), its mortgage 
bond division, issues eighty-three home-loan-backed bonds, valued at $44.5 billion.  
The Washington Post states that one of Goldman’s 2006 mortgage deals, the GSAMP 
Trust 2006-S3, may actually be “the worst deal . . . floated by a top-tier firm.”2 (One in 
every six of the 8,274 mortgages bundled in GSAMP Trust 2006-S3 would be in  
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default eighteen months later. People who bought the S3 bonds either had to take a 100 
percent loss or sell it at a heavy discount.)In December, anticipating a housing crisis, 
Goldman takes a negative stance on the mortgage market but does not announce  
this publicly. Head of the Special Situations proprietary trading area in FICC, who 
reportedly was paid a $70 million bonus (larger than the CEO’s reported $53 million), 
leaves Goldman—supposedly because he was frustrated by the bureaucracy at Goldman  
and because the group was not compensated like a hedge fund or private equity firm for 
the reported $4 billion in profits the group generated (O). John L. Weinberg passes away. 
2007: The credit and housing booms help Goldman post a profit of $11.6 billion on $45.99  
 
billion in revenues, setting a firm record. Goldman’s 31.6 percent return on equity is 
exceptional on Wall Street. The top five Goldman executives split $322 million  
in compensation, a Wall Street record. An article reports that Goldman  
is hedging its mortgage exposure by building short positions to offset “long” positions 
elsewhere in the bank and thereby profit from the collapse in subprime mortgage bonds in  
the summer.3 Media reports ask how Goldman fared so well in avoiding the mistakes 
made by other Wall Street firms that lost money from mortgages. It is rumored that 
Goldman is not quite as careful with its clients’ money as with its own; GSAM’s Global 
Alpha hedge fund, which at one time had more than $10 billion in assets from clients, 
tumbles significantly, as do similar hedge funds. Half of the members of the Principal 
Strategies proprietary trading team in the equities division create a fund called GSIP in 
GSAM. Blackstone, an alternative asset manager and financial advisory firm, goes 
public, adding to the pressure for talent. Other alternative asset managers follow (C). A 
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Goldman subsidiary settles with the SEC for $2 million over allegations that faulty 
oversight allowed customers to make illegal trades (R). 
2008: Goldman becomes a bank holding company, giving it greater government protection as the  
 
nation’s financial crisis worsens. (Morgan Stanley, the only other remaining independent 
investment bank, takes the same step.) Just before Thanksgiving, Goldman stock reaches 
an all-time low of $47.41 per share after trading at about $165 per share in early 
September. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York agrees to pay Goldman  
100 cents on the dollar for its trading position with American International Group (AIG). 
Warren Buffet invests $5 billion in Goldman, roughly a 10 percent stake, an action that 
gives a vote of confidence in the firm. Through the Troubled Asset Relief Program  
(TARP), the US government buys $10 billion in preferred shares from Goldman. 
Goldman is questioned about paying 953 employees bonuses over $1 million each after 
taking TARP funds. CEO Lloyd Blankfein and six other senior executives opted to forgo 
bonuses. It is later reported that Goldman was the company from which Obama raised the 
most money in 2008 and that its CEO Lloyd Blankfein had visited the White House ten 
times. 
2009: A Senate panel, led by Senator Carl Levin (D.-Mich.) and Senator Tom Coburn (R.-Okla.),  
 
convenes under the auspices of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations to 
investigate the causes of the credit crisis. The investigation will continue for the  
next two years. By October, Goldman’s stock price has more than fully recovered, selling 
at about $194 per share. In June 2009,Goldman Sachs repaid the US Treasury’s TARP 
investment, with 23% interest (in the form of $318 million preferred dividend  
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payments and $1.418 billion in warrant redemptions). Blankfein sends letter to Financial 
Services Committee members of the US House of Representatives thanking the 
government for its extraordinary efforts and the taxpayers’ patience; stating that  
it regrets that it participated in the market euphoria and didn’t raise a responsible voice; 
and stating that it has obligations to the public interest. Lloyd Blankfein is named CEO of 
the Year by Directorship magazine. Matt Taibbi publishes a scathing article on Goldman 
in Rolling Stone, which includes the often-quoted “vampire squid” analogy.4 A Goldman 
subsidiary settles with the SEC for $1.2 million over improper proprietary trading by  
employees. The SEC charges a former Goldman trader and his brother with insider 
trading based on information the trader obtained while at Goldman (R). The 
Massachusetts attorney general announces a $60 million settlement with Goldman over  
the alleged role the investment bank played in the subprime mortgage crisis (R). 
Goldman, among others, created a credit default swap index to cover the high risk of 
Greece’s national debt. The firm is reported to have systematically helped the Greek 
government disguise the true facts concerning its national debt between 1998 and 2009. 
2010: Goldman reports a record profit of $13.39 billion for 2009. The SEC charges Goldman  
 
with deception for selling clients mortgage securities secretly designed by a hedge fund 
being run by John Paulson. A number of civil lawsuits are filed against the firm. 
Blankfein and other Goldman employees are called to testify before the Levin–Coburn 
panel about the financial crisis. Rumors about Goldman’s behavior abound. Warren 
Buffet, Goldman’s largest individual shareholder, and other major clients defend 
Goldman’s ethical character and behavior. The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act is signed, implementing broad changes to the regulation of the  
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US financial system. After several months of studying Goldman’s business standards and 
practices, the internal business standards committee issues its report, calling for a 
recommitment to the firm’s business principles. Goldman agrees to pay $553 million,  
the largest fine ever paid to the SEC, to settle fraud claims related to disclosure about the  
 
design of the mortgage security called Abacus 2007-AC1. Fabrice Tourre, an employee at  
 
Goldman, who is also charged, is not included in the settlement and categorically  
 
denies the charges against him, seeking dismissal of the case. Tourre and Goldman 
acknowledge that the marketing for the Abacus deal contained incomplete information 
and that it was a mistake not to inform investors that a prominent hedge fund manager 
had helped design the deal. Tourre says that he and Goldman did not have a duty to give 
investors details that the SEC says they should have disclosed and that the SEC did  
not show that he acted with the intention of defrauding investors. Goldman starts to shut 
down several proprietary trading groups, and many proprietary traders begin to leave as 
the SEC fines Goldman $225,000 for violating a rule aimed at regulating  
short selling (R). The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) says it is fining 
Goldman $650,000 for failing to disclose that the government was investigating two of its 
brokers. One of the brokers was Goldman vice president Fabrice Tourre. FINRA  
says Goldman did not have the proper procedures in place to make sure that this 
disclosure was made (R). 
2011: In March, former Goldman board member Rajat Gupta is charged by the SEC with insider  
 
trading for passing information to the hedge fund Galleon Group that he learned in his 
capacity as a board member. Six months later he is arrested on criminal charges, soon 
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after the SEC charges another Goldman employee with insider trading. In April, Senator 
Carl Levin (D.-Mich.) releases the 650-page report of the Senate investigation into the  
credit crisis (R). It concludes that Goldman misled clients and Congress about the  
 
collateralized debt obligations that helped cause the financial crisis. The report urges  
 
regulators to identify any violations of law in the activities of Goldman leading up to  
 
the financial crisis. The report asserts that conflicts of interest led Goldman to place its  
 
financial interests before those of its clients. The report is the result of a two-year probe  
 
by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. In May, the report is referred to  
 
the Department of Justice and the SEC. In early June, Goldman begins fighting back  
 
against the Senate report, emphasizing inconsistencies in it. Blankfein hires a high-profile 
Washington defense attorney to represent him personally as the Department of Justice 
continues to investigate the bank (O). Goldman is the top-ranked M&A adviser 
worldwide based on total value of deals announced, according to Thomson Reuters.5 
KKR, a private equity firm, starts to get into the capital markets and lending  
businesses, competing with the investment banks (C). The SEC charges a Goldman 
employee and his father with insider trading based on information the employee gained in 
his position at Goldman (R). Goldman pays state regulators in Massachusetts a $10 
million fine to resolve the allegations of “research huddles” (R). 
2012: The SEC notifies Goldman that it may face charges related to mortgage-backed securities.  
 
In February, the board agrees to appoint an independent board member as lead director to 
avoid a shareholder vote on splitting Blankfein’s chairman and CEO roles. As a reaction, 
the American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees Pension Fund 
withdraws its shareholder resolution for investors to vote on at the annual shareholder  
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meeting. Greg Smith, a London-based Goldman employee, delivers his resignation in a 
New York Times op-ed piece.6 He attributes his resignation to the negative changes in 
Goldman’s culture in the past decade or so, decrying the lack of focus on client interests.  
The op-ed sparks a flurry of responses in the media (O). The Volcker Rule, a section of 
the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, is slated to go into 
effect in August (R). It mandates proprietary trading restrictions, with the goal of 
preventing US banks from exposing customers to excessive risk through speculative 
investments. The rule would bar banks from trading for their own accounts and from 
market making and places limits on how much banks can invest in hedge funds and 
private equity funds. Within weeks of its approval, Goldman decides to shut down the 
principal strategies group, which managed about $11 billion. As of this writing, Goldman 
and other firms are lobbying to delay implementation of the Volcker Rule pending further 
revision. A Delaware judge rules in a suit brought by the shareholders of El Paso Energy 
Corporation contesting Kinder Morgan’s purchase of the company and sharply criticizes 
Goldman for conflict of interest in advising El Paso, because Goldman owned 19 percent 
of Kinder Morgan and controlled two seats on Kinder Morgan’s board (R). El Paso was 
aware that there was a conflict of interest but asked Goldman’s advice anyway when 
Kinder Morgan launched its take-over attempt. A Goldman banker on the deal allegedly 
owned shares in one of the companies and did not disclose it. In response,  
Goldman launches a review of conflict management, and many competitors and law 
firms do the same. Goldman agrees to pay $22 million to settle civil charges arising from 
company procedures that created the risk that select clients would receive market-
sensitive information, such as changes to Goldman’s recommendation lists and its ratings 
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of stocks (R). The SEC says that the settlement includes violations of the same law that 
was at issue in the 2003 Treasury bond settlement. Blackrock, the world’s largest money 
manager, announces that it is setting up an electronic bond-trading platform that will 
allow it to make transactions directly with other investors and bypass investment banks 
(C). In August, the Justice Department announces that its investigation is closed and that 
it will not seek criminal charges against Goldman. Goldman eliminates most two-year 
contracts programs for most analysts hired out of college (C). CFO David Viniar 
announces that he will retire in January 2013. Goldman named 70 employees to its 
partnership, which are down from 110 in 2010 and 94 in 2008 (C, O). Around 14 percent 
of the new partners in 2012 are women (the highest percentage since at least 2006), and 
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cited articles on organizational culture, according to Google Scholar, defined organizational 
culture as follows:The deeper level of basic assumptions and beliefs that are learned responses to 
the group’s problems of survival in its external environment and its problems of internal 
integration; are shared by members of an organization; that operate unconsciously; and that 
define in a basic “taken-for-granted” fashion in an organization’s view of itself and its 
environment. They come to be taken for granted because they solve those problems repeatedly  
and reliably . . . culture . . . is a learned product of group experience and is, therefore,  
to be found only where there is a definable group with a significant history. 
From Edgar Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 4th ed. (San Francisco:  
Jossey-Bass, 2010), 6–7. 
8. This definition is similar to A. L. Kroeber’s and Talcott Parsons’s suggested definition  
when speaking of culture more broadly than organizations:We suggest that it is useful to define 
the concept of culture for most usages more narrowly than has been generally the case in the 
American anthropological tradition, restricting its reference  
to transmitted and created content and patterns of values, ideas, and other symbolic- 
meaningful systems as factors in the shaping of human behavior and the artifacts  
produced through behavior. 
From A. L. Kroeber and Talcott Parsons, “The Concepts of Culture and of Social Systems,”  
American Sociological Review 23 (1958): 582. 
9. Typically, the definitions assume that culture concerns collective groups of  
people (not individuals), who, through their shared experiences day by day in the work  
environment, build a shared vision of what the organization is about and how it undertakes  
its purpose, and that this shared vision grows through learning how to behave for  
career survival and advancement. Typically, the definitions describe culture as behavior  
that is learned or taught and represents the general operating norms in the organization.  
Culture affects how people behave when no one is telling them what to do because of  
shared values, assumptions, and socialization experiences, which unite members and  
maintain a distinction from nonmembers. J. C. Collins and J. I. Porras (Built to Last:  
Successful Habits of Visionary Companies [New York: HarperBusiness, 1994], 253) note that  
the basic elements that distinguish the “visionary” companies they studied were present 
throughout the companies’ histories, “long before they became hugely successful,  
premier institutions.” 
10. Collins and Porras, in Built to Last, concluded that successful companies had decentralized  
management combined with a strong culture. 
11. To my knowledge Goldman is the only Wall Street firm that has had the same general  
principles for such a long time. My interviews with people from competing firms revealed that 
most firms that had a set of written principles have changed them significantly or abandoned  
them over time, as the firms underwent mergers and consolidations. In some cases, principles  
were routinely revised with each change in top management. McKinsey & Company, considered  
by many to be a world-class professional services organization, has a similar list of principles, 
and they can be found framed and hanging on some partners’ walls and posted on the company  
website. According to interviews, McKinsey’s values and principles are very well understood:  
they are discussed, breathed, and lived every day, from the first day of employment.  
They include  
	   	   	   366	  
putting the client’s interest ahead of the firm’s, behaving as professionals, keeping client  
information confidential, telling the truth as McKinsey sees it, and delivering the best  
of the firm to every client as cost effectively as possible. Citigroup also has a list of principles  
posted on its website, although interviewees have never seen or heard anyone discuss  
them during a meeting with clients. Citi’s four key principles are common purpose,  
responsible finance, ingenuity, and leadership. 
12. Whitehead, A Life in Leadership, 110. 
13. The firm’s stance on balancing family and work responsibilities changed  
dramatically after the Whitehead era, as evidenced by a couple of anecdotes. An out-of- 
state partner who passed on his first annual partners’ meeting and dinner dance to be  
home for his daughter’s birthday received a call from Sidney Weinberg, complimenting  
the partner for having the right priorities; his wife received roses. When the same issue  
arose years later, “Friedman let the same partner know that skipping partners’ meetings  
was not looked upon kindly.” (See Lisa Endlich, Goldman Sachs—The Culture of Success  
[New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000], 121.) 
14. Whitehead, A Life in Leadership, 110. 
15. Because of the many mergers, it is difficult to identify when and whether other  
firms had stated business principles. However, my interviews with competitors and  
Goldman partners indicates that if they had them, no one took them as seriously or  
clung to them as much as Goldman. Most agreed: no firm has had them for as long as  
Goldman has. 
16. When I refer to a current Goldman partner, I mean someone elected into the partnership  
compensation program (PCP). Goldman is no longer a private partnership, and internally those 
elected into the PCP are referred to as partner or PMD (partner managing director) to distinguish 
them versus those managing directors not in the partnership participation program. 
17. I am reminded of an article I read about the UBS trading fraud not being a system  
failure, but rather a cultural failure. The general claim was that UBS had gone through so many 
mergers and had grown so quickly that it had no defining culture. I found the  
article insightful. In my experience it is challenging even for insiders to design foolproof  
systems to catch fraud, because the complexity is too great. See J. B. Stewart, “Common  
Sense: At UBS, It’s the Culture That’s Rogue,” New York Times, September 24, 2011,  
www.nytimes.com/2011/09/24/business/global/at-ubs-its-the-culture-thats-rogue. 
html?pagewanted=all. 
18. B. Groysberg and S. Snook, “Leadership Development at Goldman Sachs,” Case  
9-406-002 (Boston: Harvard Business School, 2007). 
19. I. Ross, “How Goldman Sachs Grew and Grew, Fortune, July 9, 1984, 158. 
20. Milton C. Regan (Eat What You Kill: The Fall of a Wall Street Lawyer [Ann Arbor, MI:  
University of Michigan Press, 2004], 86–87) provides a concise account of the short-lived  
Water Street Corporate Recovery Fund. 
21. C. D. Ellis, The Partnership—The Making of Goldman Sachs (New York: Penguin,  
2008), 304. 
22. “As a long-time employer of choice for elite undergraduates and MBAs, Goldman  
was able to select from a broad array of talented applicants for the traits it preferred” (see  
B. Groysberg  
and S. Snook, “Leadership Development at Goldman Sachs”). 
23. In Organizational Culture and Leadership (4th ed. [San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2010],  
	   	   	   367	  
231–232), Schein discusses the importance of culture carriers. Culture does not survive if  
the main culture carriers depart and if a critical mass of the members leave. 
24. C. Harper and A. Choudhury, “Sidney Weinberg, Goldman Sachs Senior Director,  
Dies at 87,” Bloomberg, October 6, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-
06/goldman- 
sachs-senior-director-sidney-j-weinberg-jr-dies.html. 
25. W. D. Cohan, Money and Power: How Goldman Sachs Came to Rule the World  
(New York: Doubleday, 2011), 363. 
26. Whitehead remarked in an interview that his starting salary at Goldman, in 1947,  
was $3,600 a year. He went on to say, “$3,600 a year, not $3,600 a month. And it wasn’t  
$3,600 a day, as they now earn.” (A. Blitz, interview with John Whitehead, 2002, http:// 
www.hbs.edu/entrepreneurs/ 
pdf/johnwhitehead.pdf.) 
27. Endlich, Goldman Sachs, 20. 
28. Ellis, The Partnership, 561. 
29. Ellis, The Partnership, 558. 
30. In A Life in Leadership (p. 72), Whitehead recalls his experiences as a recruit: “After 
meeting with the two partners in charge of investment banking at the firm, I sat down with the 
top brass, a rather imposing group of older men who seemed very worldly to a business neophyte 
like me. For much of the afternoon, they peppered me with questions that often left me tongue-
tied. But I must have handled myself adequately because a few days later, I received word that I 
had been accepted for employment at Goldman, Sachs & Co.” Looking back on his experiences 
recruiting others, he writes, “Even after I was a senior partner, I spent a lot of time twisting the  
arms of twenty-year olds, and that was very likely one of the most important things I did” (p. 
110). 
31. Robert Steven Kaplan, What to Ask the Person in the Mirror: Critical Questions for  
Becoming a More Effective Leader and Reaching Your Potential (Boston: Harvard Business  
Review Press, 2011), 60. 
32. Whitehead, A Life in Leadership, 111. 
33. Endlich, Goldman Sachs, 21. 
34. Cohan, Money and Power, 231. 
35. To ensure the acculturation of the teamwork and other values at Goldman, the  
organization “grew” its own talent by using entrenched recruitment and training programs.  
“Out of 1,500 applicants one year, only 30 individuals were given jobs; they were  
the ones with the brains, humor, motivation, confidence, maturity, and, needless to  
say, an inclination to play on the team.” (R. D. Freedman and J. Vohr, “Goldman Sachs/ 
Lehman Brothers,” Case Studies in Finance and Economics, C49 [New York: Leonard N.  
Stern School of Business, 1991, rev. 1999]). 
36. Cohan, Money and Power, 232. 
37. G. Tett, Fool’s Gold: How the Bold Dream of a Small Tribe at J. P. Morgan Was Corrupted  
by Wall Street Greed and Unleashed a Catastrophe (New York: Free Press, 2009), 8. 
38. “John L. Weinberg,” The Telegraph, August 11, 2006, http://www.telegraph. 
co.uk/news/obituaries/1526056/John-L-Weinberg.html. 
39. Goldman moved into its new headquarters building, “a 43-story super-green  
tower of glass and steel located directly across from the World Trade Center in Battery  
Park” in 2009 (from Cohan, Money and Power, 242). It has “cool modern art, a bike path,  
	   	   	   368	  
and a sick gym” (from “Goldman Employees Are Psyched to Move into Their Awesome  
New Building,” Business Insider, December 4, 2009, http://www.businessinsider.com/  
goldman-employees-are-psyched-to-move-into-their-awesome-new-building-2009-12).  
However, the building does not bear a vanity address, and “the name of the firm appears  
nowhere on the exterior, or in the lobby, or even on the uniforms of the security personnel  
or the badges given to visitors. Forty-three stories tall and two city blocks long, the  
Goldman building appears to have been designed in the hope of rendering the company  
invisible.” Goldman’s low profile preceded the firm’s recent reputational and legal difficulties,  
so the design of its headquarters building is completely consistent with its “obsession  
with being extremely powerful and utterly inconspicuous” (from P. Goldberger,  
“Shadow Building,” The New Yorker, May 17, 2010, http://www.newyorker.com/arts/  
critics/skyline/2010/05/17/100517crsk_skyline_ goldberger#ixzz1xQltbdUd). 
40. In The Partnership, Ellis (p. 565) relates a discussion John Whitehead led in the late  
1970s on the danger of arrogance creeping into the culture. When he asked the audience  
for a way to prevent arrogance at Goldman, one young banker facetiously offered this  
advice: “Hire mediocre people.” There was a certain truth to the young banker’s statement.  
Goldman hired people who were accustomed to excelling, who had done so all their  
lives—in the classroom, on the playing field, in almost any endeavor they attempted. No  
one was used to failing.  
41. Cohan, Money and Power, 225. 
42. Ellis, The Partnership, 187. 
43. Harper and Choudhury, “Sidney Weinberg.” 
44. In Gatekeepers: The Professions and Corporate Governance (Oxford, UK: Oxford  
University Press, 2006, 2, 3), John Coffee studied the role played by gatekeepers in corporate  
governance in acting as “a reputational intermediary to assure investors as to the quality of the 
‘signal’ sent by the corporate issuer.” Gatekeepers include securities analysts, auditors, attorneys, 
investment bankers, credit rating agencies, and so on. He describes how reputational  
capital “can be placed at risk by the gatekeeper’s vouching for its client’s assertions or 
projections.” 
45. Ellis, The Partnership, ix. 
46. Blitz, interview with John Whitehead, 2002. 
47. Harper and Choudhury, “Sidney Weinberg.” 
48. Blitz, interview with John Whitehead, 2002. 
49. The long-term perspective associated with success in investment banking began  
to lose importance as the firm’s business mix shifted toward trading. Reputational capital  
also starts to lose significance as a concept in a trading environment. In trading, one  
side provides a price, and the other side thinks it is either too high or too low. If it is low  
enough, they do business together. It is price that matters, not relationships. But in banking,  
it takes years to develop a relationship to the point that the client is willing to share  
confidential information, and a reputation for integrity matters a great deal (paraphrased  
from Endlich, Goldman Sachs, 18). 
50. Today, Goldman’s focus is on “the long-term prosperity of our clients, shareholders,  
employees, and the communities we serve.” Shareholders, employees, and communities  
now rank alongside clients, and the long-term focus is supported by compensation  
policies and promotion processes, and not by values. Also, much of the restricted stock  
issued to named executive officers (NEOs) cannot be transferred for a five-year period;  
	   	   	   369	  
when Goldman was a partnership, the restriction was in effect until the partner retired.  
See N. Lindskoog, Long-Term Greedy: The Triumph of Goldman Sachs (Appleton, WI:  
McCrossen, 1998), 20. 
51. Joel M. Podolny, in “A Status-Based Model of Market Competition” (American Journal  
of Sociology 98, no. 4 [1993]: 851, 839), cites industry research supporting the idea  
that “a higher-status firm can retain an employee of a given level of quality at a more  
favorable compensation arrangement for the firm.” He points out that “if an employee does 
indeed value the status of her workplace, she should be willing to accept a lower  
wage or salary to work for a higher-status firm than for a lower-status one.” 
52. McKinsey & Company is also successful at getting recruits and employees to  
buy into long-term greedy while earning less as partners earn more. Diane Vaughan,  
in Controlling Unlawful Organizational Behavior: Social Structure and Corporate Misconduct  
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985, 70), offers a particularly descriptive simile  
for this phenomenon: “The luster of future financial rewards binds members to the  
organization like a pair of golden handcuffs securing their continued affiliation with  
the firm.” 
53. Harrison C. White’s work on identity and control is relevant in explaining what,  
from the outside, looks like self-sacrificing ignorance of a harsh reality: “Membership  
in a group presumes, as the norm, lack of questioning. Character is a suitable term for  
what membership is to reflect.” See Harrison C. White, Identity and Control: How Social  
Formations Emerge (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 45. 
54. In The Accidental Investment Banker: Inside the Decade That Transformed Wall Street  
(New York: Random House, 2006, 88–89), Jonathan Knee writes, “Any moves, even in  
many cases a move from being just a vice president at Goldman to being a partner somewhere  
else—which might well include a multi-year contract providing for guaranteed  
compensation above what could conceivably be secured at Goldman—usually represented  
a step down in the social pecking order. . . . But from a brand perspective, Morgan  
Stanley was a reasonably close second.” 
55. Groysberg and Snook, “Leadership Development at Goldman Sachs,” 6. 
56. I may have been too junior and inexperienced to notice or see other things at that  
time, and, as I gained experience, I might have noticed more. Or maybe there was more.  
In retrospect, when thinking about the deal, I remember that we did not have to write  
a fairness opinion, which provides legal liability to Goldman for its advice. I now wonder  
whether this had anything to do with the approach. I discuss this issue in chapter 3. 
57. In hindsight, this made me think about the influence clients have on culture and  
behavior. The vice president could have told the potential buyer that there was a minimum  
price, and, to get a deal done, it was the price that needed to be reached. I should  
have asked why we didn’t speak to the client about approaching the buyer in that way.  
58. I worked closely with partners and senior partners, and it was a relatively flat organization,  
so I doubt that the behavior or culture was much different at other levels. My interviews  






	   	   	   370	  
2. Interdependence exists within an organization when the actors are tied together  
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